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Department of Defense Resource Allocations and Progress Toward U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives in Latin America

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS AND PROGRESS

TOWARD U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA

by

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the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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ABSTRACT

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS AND PROGRESS TOWARD U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA

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Old Dominion University, 2013
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This research addresses the issue of insufficient or stagnated progress toward U.S. foreign policy objectives for Latin America through an analysis of Department of Defense resource allocations toward the region. These resources are critical to achieving progress toward U.S. foreign policy objectives because the relationships and engagements the DOD establish with Latin American partner nations largely precede and characterize the role of the U.S. in the region.

First 'efficiency' is defined, and then U.S. foreign policy objectives for the region and the regional issues are outlined. Next, Department of Defense resources are characterized and their posture and allocations in the region are reviewed. The research finally proposes potential modifications to resource allocations which could increase their efficiency in achieving progress toward U.S. foreign policy objectives for the region.

The research finds that if internal Department of Defense processes are improved, the efficacies of their programs are consistently evaluated for self-improvement purposes, and their networks within and outside of the DOD are strengthened, then strategic obstacles to achieving efficient resource allocation and progress toward foreign policy objectives can be overcome.

This thesis is dedicated to my father and all the others who have devoted their careers and lives to building a better, safer world.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States and Latin America share a special and complicated relationship. The White House has asserted "The future of the United States is inextricably bound to the future of the people of the Americas. We are committed to a new era of partnership with countries throughout the hemisphere, working on key shared challenges"[1]. Yet many of the benchmarks for U.S. foreign policy toward the region have not been reached. Public sector corruption remains a crippling inhibitor to progress in Latin American states. Transnational and national criminal organizations engaged in illicit trafficking and terrorist activities continue to plague the region. Respect for human rights and rule of law have not reached sufficient levels and remain an obstacle throughout the region. These are issues which the Department of Defense (DOD) has traditionally been tasked to address. Despite the White House assertion of U.S. dedication to the region, the truth is that Latin America does not fall amongst the highest of priorities for U.S. foreign policy, and has not for quite a few administrations. Considerations for the region are slight compared to other, more threatening and demanding regions of the world. This is an accepted reality. There are few imminent threats to U.S. security and other interests stemming from the Latin America, and overall the region shares a generally positive relationship with the U.S. However, if federal appropriations for Latin America are to be minimal, then their employment must be efficient. The shortcomings in achieving certain U.S. foreign policy objectives in Latin

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[1] The White House, "Foreign Policy," under "Issues," http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy (accessed January 27, 2013).

America necessitate an evaluation of the efficiency of Department of Defense resource allocation in the region to determine potential modifications toward improvement.

The Department of Defense serves as the sword of Executive U.S. foreign policy doctrine. U.S. foreign policy is set toward the protection of American national interests, recently detailed in a 2010 National Security Strategy as the security of American citizens, economic growth, strengthening international support for our leadership in values, and developing a favorable international order capable of addressing 21st-century challenges and strengthening strategic partnerships[2]. The DOD mission contributes to the achievement of these objectives through the provision of "military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country;" the department is responsible for the protection of "national interests through war-fighting, providing humanitarian aid, and performing peacekeeping and disaster relief services"[3]. While the DOD is not solely responsible for the achievement of foreign policy objectives, the organization is one of the most critical instruments in realizing foreign policy goals. The objectives set by the National Security Strategy and the mission of the DOD constitute DOD resource allocation in the Latin American region.

The question is then, are Department of Defense resources efficiently allocated in Latin America in order to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives toward the region? This research will examine U.S. foreign policy goals in Latin America and how the DOD utilizes resources to address these goals. The research goes on to speculate on any

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[2] The White House, "National Security Strategy, May 2010," http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed January 14, 2013).
[3] The White House, "The Executive Branch," under "Our Government," http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-government/executive-branch (accessed January 14, 2013).

potential modifications to DOD resource allocation which could positively impact their efficiency in achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives in Latin America.

When examining the efficiency of the allocation of Department of Defense resources in Latin America, the conclusions of this research are relative to potential alternatives. This research simply aims to examine the overall efficiency level of the current disbursement of DOD resources toward achieving foreign policy objectives for the region, and imagine potential alternatives as more efficient solutions where applicable. Utilizing potential alternatives to evaluate resource allocation efficiency best serves this evaluation because this research is not privy to all DOD internal documentation and intelligence. Therefore to avoid misinterpretations and inaccurate correlations, the appropriate evaluative perspective is purely as an outsider, without employing specific, previous resource allocation tactics as benchmarks.

Avoiding previous tactics as benchmarks prevents inaccurate correlations because of the complicated natures of the region and the issues the DOD seeks to address. Comparing tactics employed from one state to another, even neighboring states, can become immensely inaccurate comparisons. Each Latin American state is unique regarding issues and appropriate courses of action. Further, some resources, appropriated to address multiple regional issues, may be allocated in a way which is strategically efficient to assist in one matter but inefficient to address the second issue. Likewise, resource allocation toward an issue such as drug trafficking may be highly efficient in one region while inept in another, simply because the tactics utilized cannot always be recycled. Resource allocation tactics utilized toward anti-trafficking efforts in Colombia cannot be juxtaposed to anti-trafficking efforts in Honduras to compare for efficiency.

Comparisons are also unhelpful in this analysis due to the persistent evolution of threats in the region. Resource allocation tactics which were highly efficient in a case can become obsolete within a remarkably short time period. Beyond these issues is a matter of priorities. Not every nation in Latin America, a region of 35 states, can be a priority to the DOD. Therefore this research does not utilize case comparisons emphasizing perfectly efficient allocation of resources in every Latin American state, because while there may be issues relevant to foreign policy objectives for the state, there may not be a dire threat to U.S. interests necessitating acute attention.

Due to the lack of access to DOD intelligence, the unique balance sheet of each nation in this region, and hierarchical DOD priorities, this research presents an external analysis of potential modifications to resource allocations in the region which does not employ case studies, but rather utilizes efficiency models and maps the resource-to-threat scenario for the region to determine where efficiency in resource allocation can be improved to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. This research does not seek to critique the allocation of resources within specific U.S. operations implemented in the region. This research steps back to analyze the broader, macro-image of how the U.S. is postured toward Latin America through DOD presence and resource allocation, and whether or not the efficiency of this posture may benefit from modifications. The efficiency of this posture in achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives refers to the relative determination of progress made. Foreign policy objectives for the region tend to be general and long-term, therefore this research considers progress toward these objectives as the goal for DOD resource allocation.

To begin, the research defines the qualifications this research utilizes for deeming resource allocation "efficient" followed by the objectives set by U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America. Next, the research begins to map a resource-to-threat scenario by reviewing the regional issues in order to emphasize the significance of U.S. presence there, the DOD resources considered for this evaluation and their appointed functions, and the DOD posture in Latin American and the overall resource allocation implemented toward defined U.S. foreign policy goals. From this point, potential modifications for the improvement of efficiency of resource allocation may be extrapolated. If, for example, Resource 1 is appointed function X by the DOD, and Resource 1 has been deployed in area A, then we may generally extrapolate that the DOD is using Resource 1 to accomplish goal X in area A. A side-by-side comparison of the problematic issues by area and the deployment of resources by area yields a relative view as to whether or not the appropriate resources are being efficiently allocated in order to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Efficiency of DOD resource allocation in Latin America is a critical component of achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives. The most conspicuous argument for this assertion regards budgetary concerns. There has been substantial pressure placed on the DOD to minimize budgets without sacrificing security of interests. Admiral Mike Mullen emphasized the budgetary crisis as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "I believe the single, biggest threat to our national security is our debt, so I also believe we have every responsibility to help eliminate that threat," he said. "We must, and will, do our part[4]."

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[4] Tyrone C. Marshall Jr., "Debt is Biggest Threat to National Security, Chairman Says," Defense.gov, September 22, 2011, under "American Forces Press Service," under "News," http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65432 (accessed January 30, 2013).

Achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives, while reducing expenditures and sacrificing the minimal level of services, necessitates more efficient operations. A more efficient posture in Latin America not only saves resources which may then be utilized in some other area of significance to U.S. foreign policy or perhaps spares the expense altogether, but also becomes a posture which may be modeled or may inspire efficiency solutions elsewhere. Second, the U.S. must maintain a professional reputation of efficiency and organization of defense forces in the international system in order to maintain the desired leadership role. If Latin American hosts perceive U.S. presence as ineffective or worse, detrimental, the likelihood of maintaining the leadership role or developing deep-rooted cooperation and partnerships necessary for achieving U.S. foreign policy goals decreases. Third, in terms of building strategic partnerships, states in Latin America with few resources must be able to make the most efficient use of resources possible in order to build operational capabilities for assisting the U.S. or operating independently at an acceptable level. If the United States truly wishes to build strategic partnerships in this region and promote the economic and democratic prosperity of Latin American neighbors, then part of the learning process for Latin Americans yielded from engagements with the U.S. must regard examples of how to efficiently allocate limited resources.

Finally, DOD efficiency is critical to quell the regional threats. While the threats to U.S. security from Latin America are not deemed to be of the highest priority by the White House, they are sufficiently threatening to warrant a significant level of attention. The growing capabilities of transnational criminal networks, drug trafficking cartels, terrorist groups, and corrupt public officials operating in the region are a threat to U.S. security and interests. Violence related to drug cartels and transnational criminal

organizations has spilled over into U.S. borders, threatening the security of U.S. citizens. Likewise, the security of our partner nations' citizens has been threatened.

The nature of these criminal organizations is what demands DOD efficiency. The organizations are consistently and covertly transforming. DOD resources must be efficient in order to remain ahead of these threats. These criminal organizations build networks which empower each other through the exchange of resources. Terrorist groups from the Middle East have been known to engage Latin American drug cartels to gain passage into the U.S. through border discrepancies, proposition for criminal acts, and make illegal transactions (drugs, weapons). In 2011, an Iranian-American and an Iranian Quds Force officer propositioned the Mexican drug cartel Los Zetas to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the U.S., bomb the Israeli embassy in Washington and the Israeli and Saudi embassies in Argentina. Additionally, the plan included the smuggling of tons of opium from the Middle East into Mexico. The plan never unfolded because the Iranians were unwittingly negotiating with an undercover U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration informant[5]. This scenario demonstrates not only the potential severity of threats emanating from the region, but also the significance of maintaining strategic U.S. presence and partnerships.

Aside from security threats there is also the concern of threats to U.S. allies and investments in the region. The U.S. has invested billions of dollars in the region for democracy and human rights advocacy programs, humanitarian aid, economic investments, armed forces training and assistance programs, etc. These investments are made with the intentions of building strategic defense and economic partnerships and are

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[5] Charlie Savage and Scott Shane, "Iranians Accused of a Plot to Kill Saudis' U.S. Envoy," *New York Times*, October 11, 2011, under "U.S.," http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/us-accuses-iranians-of-plotting-to-kill-saudi-envoy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed January 17, 2013).

important components of U.S. foreign policy toward the region. The programs all serve to mitigate defective systems in the region and support democratic, functioning systems which may be in their infancy. Problems with corruption of public officials, corruption in the military, drug cartels, terrorist groups and all forms of criminal networks directly threaten U.S. investments in the region, the democratic governments of our allies, and most importantly, the safety of civilians both in Latin America and in the U.S.

Economically, unstable or unsafe territories are bad for business. If the regional issues are not efficiently addressed, U.S. businesses in the region will suffer, and trade relations will suffer with partner nations plagued by insecure territories. U.S. authorities must be tasked to build strategic security partnerships and facilitate the growth of partner nations' capabilities. When partner nations suffer from natural or man-made disasters beyond their capabilities, U.S. authorities have the duty to assist in order to protect our interests and partnerships.

While these threats may not be as acute as those in more hostile regions of the world, they are legitimate concerns which need to be directly addressed. Efficient allocation of DOD resources is of the utmost importance. DOD presence in the region must be able to provide sufficient protection to U.S. investments and enable Latin American allied forces in order to promote stable and prosperous strategic partnerships.

II. WHAT IS "EFFICIENT"

What is efficient resource allocation for the Department of Defense? This research defines "efficient" as achieving as much progress toward foreign policy objectives with as few resources as possible. Here, the intention of DOD efficiency is to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives toward Latin America to the highest possible level of satisfaction for the U.S. and partner nations with the increasingly limited DOD resources available for the region.

This discussion first examines the methodology for official approach and evaluation of DOD efficiency, followed by an examination of other approaches to efficiency both specific and non-specific to the DOD.

Of course, there is a simple manner of DOD resources self-evaluating the situation they have entered (inclusive of the budget), the objectives behind their presence, and whether or not their contributions to the situation have facilitated the achievement of these objectives with the intended resolution or an acceptable alternative in accordance with foreign policy objectives and partner nations' terms. Partner nations' terms are important standards to meet regarding any assigned objective because of other U.S foreign policy objectives for the region: building strategic partnerships, solid and trusting relationships, promoting democracy and human rights. If an initiative goes awry, progress toward any of these other objectives could be soured. While this 'common sense' approach to gauging efficiency is traditional and seems appropriate, there are other efficiency performance measures and goals which the DOD is and should be officially measured against.

The DOD has a planning, programming, and budgeting system in place to self-assess efficiency beyond the 'common sense' approach. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) requires all government agencies to report on their missions, describing the objectives and the means by which they intend to achieve objectives[1]. This is part of a strategic plan which agencies may measure themselves and each other against. The DOD Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report satisfies the requirements for GPRA and serves as their strategic plan. The QDR Report outlines the strategic goals and objectives for the entire DOD. The document is the precursor for the Annual Performance Plan, which is the document the DOD can measure performance against to assess whether performance is meeting objectives.

From the QDR Report, the Performance Budget Task Force assigns each goal and objective to a functionally-oriented taxonomy (Forces and Infrastructure Category-F&IC) in order to align each objective with the appropriate DOD programs, functions, and resources related to the taxonomy. At this phase, the task force also begins to develop performance goals for each objective[2]. Figure 2.1 below represents the DOD Performance Goal Construct utilized to organize performance goals in reports and documentation.

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[1] William F. West, *Program Budgeting and the Performance Movement: The Elusive Quest for Efficiency in Government* (Georgetown University Press, 2011), 3.
[2] U.S. Department of Defense Comptroller, "FY 2013 Performance Improvement," (2012), http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2013/FY2013_Performance_Improvement.pdf (accessed January 30, 2013).

Figure 2.1 DOD Performance Goal Construct

Figure 2.1 DOD Performance Goal Construct *Source:* U.S. Department of Defense Comptroller, "FY 2013 Performance Improvement," (2012): 4,
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2013/FY2013_Performance_Improvement.pdf (accessed January 30, 2013).

Figures 2.2 and 2.3 represent the 2011 DOD-wide Performance Goals and

Strategic Goal Results, respectively. A comparison of the two figures demonstrates how

DOD identifies performance gaps.

Figure 2.2 Performance Goals

DoD STRATEGIC GOAL #2: PREVENT AND DETER CONFLICT.		
DoD Forces and Infrastructure Category 1F1: Expeditionary Forces		
DoD Strategic Objective 2.1.1F1: *Extend a global posture to prevail across all domains by increasing capacity in general purpose forces and by enhancing stability operations and foreign security force competency.*		
Performance Measures	**Long-term Performance Goals**	**Annual Performance Goals**
2.1.1-1F1: Percent of the DoD Combatant Commanders (CoComs) that are ready to execute their Core or Theater Campaign Plan missions (USD(P&R))	2.1.1-1F1: For each fiscal year, DoD Combatant Commanders (CoComs) will be ready to execute 100 percent of their Core or Theater Campaign Plan missions.	FY07 – 08 Actual: Not available FY09 Actual: 100% FY10 Actual: 100% FY11: 100% FY11 Actual: 100%
Contributing DoD Components: *USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, USNORTHCOM, USSTRATCOM, USSOCOM, USTRANSCOM, and USJFCOM*		
2.1.2-1F1: Percent of the Combatant Commanders' (CoComs) Contingency Plans which they report ready to execute (USD(P&R))	2.1.2-1F1: Beginning in FY 2009, DoD Combatant Commanders (CoComs) will be ready to execute 80 percent of their Contingency Plans.	FY07 – 08 Actual: Not available FY09 Actual: 89% FY10 Actual: 82.1% FY11: 80% FY11 Actual: 85%
Contributing DoD Components: *USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, USNORTHCOM, USSTRATCOM, USSOCOM, USTRANSCOM, and USJFCOM*		
2.1.3-1F1: Cumulative percent increase in DoD Special Forces and Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) personnel achieved (USD(P&R))	2.1.3-1F1: By FY 2012, the DoD will increase its Special Forces and Navy SEAL personnel by 32 percent from FY 2006 actual of 13,206 end strength.	FY07 Actual: 4% FY08 Actual: 18% FY09 Actual: 23% FY10 Actual: 27% FY11: 28% FY11 Actual: 35%

Figure 2.2 Performance Goals *Source:* U.S. Department of Defense, "Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request Overview," (February 2012): 45, http://dcmo.defense.gov/publications/documents/FY2013_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf (accessed January 31, 2013).

Figure 2.3 Strategic Goal Results

STRATEGIC GOAL 2: PREVENT AND DETER CONFLICT.			
Performance Measures	**Annual Performance Goals/Results**		
	FY 2010 Results	**FY 2011 Goals**	**FY 2011 Results**
Strategic Objective 2.1-12A: Extend a global posture to prevail across all domains by increasing capacity in general purpose forces and by enhancing stability operations and foreign security force competency.			
2.1.1-1F1: Percent of DoD Combatant Commanders (CoComs) that are ready to execute their Core or Theater Campaign Plan mission	100%	100%	100%
2.1.2-1F1: Percent of DoD Combatant Commanders' (CoComs) Contingency Plans which they report ready to execute	82.1%	80%	85%
2.1.3-1F1: Cumulative percent increase in DoD Special Forces and Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) personnel achieved	27%	28%	35%
2.1.4-1F1: Cumulative number of Army brigades converted to a modular design and available to meet military operational demands	56	66	71
2.1.5-1F1: Cumulative number of Army Multi-functional and Functional Support (MFF) brigades converted to a modular design and available to meet military operational demands	202	225	225
2.1.6-1F1: Cumulative percent of unit initiatives completed to balance three Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces (MEFs)	84%	92%	95%
2.1.7-1F1: Cumulative number of ships in the fleet	287	284	284
Strategic Objective 2.2-1F2A: Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on the U.S. and on our allies and partners.			
2.2.1-1F2A: Number of formal DoD-led meetings with international partners to reaffirm U.S. commitments to extended deterrence	Non-applicable	6	11
2.2.2-1F2A: Passing percentage rate for Defense Nuclear Surety Inspections (DNSIs)	73%	100%	85.7%
Strategic Objective 2.3-1F3: Strengthen cooperation with allies and partners to develop and field robust, pragmatic, and cost-effective missile defense capabilities.			
2.3.1-1F3: Cumulative number of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)-capable ships	21	23	23
Strategic Objective 2.4-1X2: Ensure sufficient Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) collection and analysis capacity for full spectrum operations and ensure resiliency of ISR operations.			
2.4.1-1X2: Cumulative number of Predator (MQ-1) and Reaper (MQ-9) aircraft intelligence, surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) orbits	45	50	59

	Met or Exceeded		Did Not Meet		Total	
GOAL 2 – PREVENT AND DETER CONFLICT.	10	91%	1	9%	11	100%

Figure 2.3 Strategic Goal Results *Source:* U.S. Department of Defense Comptroller, "FY 2013 Performance Improvement," (2012): 15, http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2013/FY2013_Performance_Improvement.pdf (accessed January 30, 2013).

Once the specific performance goals have been outlined in accordance with DOD-wide performance goals, DOD components develop program, detailed budget, and resource allocation proposals to submit for approval. The proposals are reviewed all the way up for Congressional and Executive approval. The Department of Defense Performance Hierarchy below demonstrates the relationship between various levels of strategic planning and the performance accountability at all management levels[3].

Figure 2.4 Department of Defense Performance Budget Hierarchy

Figure 2.4 Department of Defense Performance Budget Hierarchy *Source:* U.S. Department of Defense Comptroller, "FY 2013 Performance Improvement," (2012): 3, http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2013/FY2013_Performance_Improvement.pdf (accessed January 30, 2013).

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[3] U.S. Department of Defense Comptroller, "FY 2013 Performance Improvement," (2012) http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2013/FY2013_Performance_Improvement.pdf (accessed January 30, 2013).

After all proposals have been approved and DOD components begin execution of plans, performance is assessed on a quarterly basis. The Office of the Secretary of Defense assigns Principal Staff Assistants to report on performance results each quarter. These reports are assessed at the management level by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. If management recognizes a performance trend which is negative or has flat-lined and deems corrective action is necessary, the Principal Staff Assistant is then tasked to identify and implement the corrective action. If, ultimately, performance levels are not improved, then in the following year's planning and budgeting process considerations are made regarding which programs or elements should be cut or revised[4].

William F. West explores an alternative approach to efficiency in his work *Program Budgeting and the Performance Movement: The Elusive Quest for Efficiency in Government*[5]. He argues that public administration is fundamentally different from private administration, and efficiency systems typically adopted by businesses are too comprehensive to effectively implement across the board in government structures. West argues that efficiency is bounded and context-specific, requiring a less coherent and rigid approach. The planning, programming, and budgeting (PPB) system described earlier in this section allows DOD management and policymakers to evaluate activities in terms of the planned objectives, in order to rationalize the allocation of resources and responsibilities. This serves efficiency goals by helping to prevent overlap and redundancies of functions across organizational boundaries and also justifies the functions which are actively consuming resources.

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[4] U.S. Department of Defense Comptroller, "FY 2013 Performance Improvement," (2012), http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2013/FY2013_Performance_Improvement.pdf (accessed January 30, 2013).
[5] William F. West, *Program Budgeting and the Performance Movement: The Elusive Quest for Efficiency in Government* (Georgetown University Press, 2011).

The DOD maintained PPB even when other government agencies abandoned the system. West speculates the DOD has held on to PPB because the system's hierarchical logic complements the cohesive DOD mission. PPB's multiyear planning orientation may also have been compatible with DOD planning due to extremely high expenditures and long-term commitments. He also suggests that organizational arrangements tend to persist once established and accepted, not only because they become part of the organizational culture but also because the cost of abandoning the system would be immense and chaotic. If the DOD were ever to abandon PBB without an immediate, perhaps even more coherent and rigid system, the organization may be accused by the public of abandoning accountability for activities as well. PPB has afforded the enormous, complex organization a framework of protocol, information, and role expectations from which some level of stability and predictability can be achieved.

But the DOD appears to have adapted somewhat of a distant, convoluted version of PPB. The DOD version of PPB excludes some of the pillars of the originally designed system. PPB requires the development of operational performance measures based on clearly expressed objectives. Decision-making processes are supposed to emphasize distinct, limited service orientations which allow for expenditures following a base budget with incremental requests. West also makes reference to military personnel who have conveyed that PPB has become a method of justifying large expenditures rather than a method of achieving efficiency. He contends that PBB may be credited for the enormous budgetary success the DOD has enjoyed. The system is perhaps operating under the guise of an efficiency system but may in fact have a large 'smoke and mirrors' composition.

West proposes a system known as Managing For Results, or performance management, with some elements of PPB included to compensate the weaknesses of the performance management system. Performance management essentially seeks to rationalize government activities. Whereas PBB creates a plan and then seeks resources, performance management might pay more preliminary attention to resources and create a plan from that information. The purpose of performance management is to operate efficiently and constantly improve. Performance management objectives are to respond to elected officials' and the public's demands for accountability, submit budget requests, conduct internal budgeting, initiate in-depth examinations of performance issues and potential corrections, motivate, contract, evaluate, support strategic planning, improve communication and trust with the public, and continuous improvement. The system falls short in creating a structure for adequate strategic planning, program assessment, and resource allocation. For these issues, West suggests the fundamental features of PPB could be implemented in order to integrate these structural requirements into performance management's approach.

Performance-based management can fit into the DOD approach to efficiency as part of a greater, Total Quality Management strategy. The initial phases of PPB would require little, if any, modifications. The most significant changes would be to what happens in between these annual phases. Components can be evaluated under performance-based management on a rolling basis, collecting data on program activities and achievements as they go along[6]. Total Quality Management (TQM) is designed to increase customer satisfaction, cut costs, and reduce the amount of time required to

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[6] Patricia de Lancer Julnes and Marc Holzer, *Performance Measurement: Building Theory, Improving Practice* (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2008).

introduce innovative services. For the DOD, this equates to greater achievement of foreign policy objectives, reduced cost, and creative ways in which to efficiently achieve objectives. TQM's reduced costs and innovative services are meant to increase an organization's flexibility, a quality particularly desirable for defense services. TQM, like performance management, emphasizes continuous improvement of processes through data collection, problem-solving, and employee-team empowerment[7]. These are the tricky elements for the DOD to adopt. Accountability and the severe consequences of mistakes makes empowerment capabilities somewhat limited. Further, the cost of persistent data collection and review can become substantial. However, if the data collection and review are effective in continuously improving processes, costs should be reduced; ideally by such a margin that the cost of review is covered and then some.

The role of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) seems to be conducive to total quality management. GAO supports Congress in decision-making in part by investigating and reporting on the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations and to what degree these operations are meeting their objectives[8]. The most recent GAO report specifically drawn up for SOUTHCOM was the 2010 report *U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation* sought to assess the "extent that SOUTHCOM exhibits key attributes that enhance and sustain collaboration with interagency and other stakeholders," and "SOUTHCOM's approach

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[7] Michael A. Hott, R. Duane Ireland, and Robert E. Hoskisson, *Strategic Management Concepts*, 8th Ed. (Mason: South-Western Cengage Learning, 2009), 120.

[8] U.S. Government Accountability Office, "About GAO," http://www.gao.gov/about/index.html (accessed January 24, 2013).

for developing an organizational structure that facilitates interagency collaboration and positions the command to conduct a full range of missions[9]."

GAO approached this assessment through analysis of SOUTHCOM documents, interviews with the command and partners, and visited three U.S. embassies in the Caribbean, Central and South America. This approach seems helpful as an outsider looking in to evaluate the Command. The assessment is less restricted by not depending on the rigid PPB structure. Because the SOUTHCOM documents were likely in accordance with PPB, this approach would have been an element of GAO's assessment as they measured SOUTHCOM's achievements against their objectives, but may not have been an overwhelming influence since the assessment included subjective analyses via interviews and experiences at the embassies. The factors considered by GAO representatives may not have been included in SOUTHCOM's outlined performance measures. The Command could benefit by regularly including less rigid methods of analysis similar to those employed by the GAO.

In Adams and Leathernman's *A Leaner and Meaner Defense: How to Cut the Pentagon's Budget While Improving Its Performance*[10], the authors address the notion of unavoidable defense cuts in the next few years with a few suggestions as to how this could be feasible without sacrificing our foreign policy objectives. As the title suggests, the DOD could improve efficiency by trimming some of the excess forces and missions. Not all objectives are critical, and even toward the objectives which are critical, not all missions are critical. Further, the DOD may be able to cut the size of forces in some

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[9] U.S. Government Accountability Office, "U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation," Report No. GAO-10-801, (July 28, 2010): 2, http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/307800.pdf (accessed February 9, 2013).
[10] Gordon Adams and Matthew Leatherman, "A Leaner and Meaner Defense: How to Cut the Pentagon's Budget While Improving Its Performance," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 1 (2011): 139-152.

areas. The size of forces is the greatest driver to DOD spending. Arming and equipping forces, not to mention compensating them, accrues a certain level of cost in addition to the cost of operations, which is positively related with an increase in forces. You need more fuel to move more soldiers, more food to feed them. The authors also express concerns regarding an excess of forces that is not only cost-inefficient, but could also tread on the welcome of U.S. presence in the host country in some instances.

There must always be a decision process determining the most critical of objectives, operated by the most critical forces and personnel. The authors suggest the use of lean, specialized, military units for missions which require military action and disseminating some of the less traditional roles for military to civilian personnel of the U.S. government. The military has taken up the gamut of responsibilities: sea-lane patrol, disaster relief, nation-building, stabilization, counterinsurgency, and capacity-building missions. The authors raise the question, are all these missions necessary for the DOD?

This research disagrees with the authors' contention on some level. Initiatives such as capacity-building, nation-building, disaster relief and stabilization serve as investments in strategic partnerships and should not be completely eliminated from the military's itinerary. However, such initiatives could certainly be examined for efficiency and perhaps be scaled back in certain areas, leaving only the most critical, minimal forces to work toward these objectives. Maximized interagency communication and operations with some of the U.S. government's civilian personnel would ease the responsibility of DOD resources, allowing the DOD to share information regarding problem areas and the demands of a situation without actually having to exhaust their own resources in addressing them. Limiting the mass of forces present could also help to mitigate or

prevent negative sentiments from the host country, so long as the forces present are achieving the agreed upon objectives. Here, efficiency of minimal forces is critical.

The authors suggest reallocating funds from the mass of permanently deployed forces toward support for capabilities which enable rapid deployment if necessary. This could be relevant where the missions do not require day-to-day operations the way nation- and capacity-building, stability, and disaster relief operations do. However, different partner nations request different aspects of U.S. presence. Some may simply feel more secure with long-term U.S. presence, while others may strictly desire assistance with specific projects. DOD strategizing may face some difficulty in the ultimate decision-making for presence in the region because Latin America is so diverse in need and desire for partnership.

Eaglen and Pollack's *How to Save Money, Reform Processes, and Increase Efficiency in the Defense Department*[11] takes a slightly different stance than *A Leaner and Meaner Defense* in that the authors do not believe in cutting the defense budget, but rather doing more within the budget by increasing efficiency across the board. The authors believe in maintaining and improving the strength of the U.S. military, where any money saved through improved efficiency should be reinvested into the services. This work would agree with the authors of *A Leaner and Meaner Defense* regarding the need for evaluation of what is critical and necessary to defend U.S. interests. Those deemed critical and necessary are the justifiable expenditures. While the authors of the two pieces would likely diverge as to what is critical and necessary in some areas, when discussing DOD resources relevant to Latin America there is some distinguishable consensus.

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[11] Mackenzie Eaglen and Julia Pollack, "How to Save Money, Reform Processes, and Increase Efficiency in the Defense Department," *Backgrounder*, no. 2507 (January 10, 2011), http://report.heritage.org/bg2507 (accessed January 26, 2013).

Eaglen and Pollack applaud many of the budgetary cut suggestions of former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, including one which would set Combatant Command billets at pre-9/11 levels and freeze them there. The authors propose that there is an excess of military personnel performing civilian functions. If the assignments cannot be redistributed to non-DOD personnel, then the positions should be filled with civilian DOD personnel with lower compensation costs than military personnel.

Similar to the notion of investing in rapid deployment capabilities in *A Leaner and Meaner Defense,* Eaglen and Pollack suggest utilizing performance-based logistics. This would entail building a supply network capable of rapid delivery of commodities to reduce storage and inventory costs, improving arrangements with host countries and contractors regarding Theater Security Services to maximize efficient utilization of airfields and ports and designating more responsibilities to contractors, and the modernization of military logistical information systems, base operations and base maintenance and supply systems.

Because this research seeks to evaluate efficiency from more of a macro-, systemic perspective, sub-systemic efficiency measures such as base maintenance and supply systems are not specifically considered here. However, these are important features of this research in the sense that we may assume these are issues within military bases in the region which perhaps do not appear to be efficient in the sense that they do not deliver a strong contribution toward achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives.

In *Refocusing the Defense Strategy[12]*, Friedman and Preble of the CATO Institute suggest DOD inefficiency stems from a proliferation of objectives. The authors of this work reiterate the need for the DOD to narrow the spectrum of operations. They argue that DOD budget cuts without corresponding strategic cuts would overburden service members and would be counterproductive and inefficient. Their answer is to lower the budget, and then correspondingly strategize to streamline operations and cut out objectives which are not critical enough to be included in the reduced budget.

In a similar essay, *A Plan to Cut Military Spending[13]*, the same authors contend that the Department of Defense should be utilized as constituted: for defense. They assert that broader objectives addressing issues which are not threats to the U.S. are not the responsibility of DOD resources, humanitarian operations should utilize multilateral capabilities, and partner nations should carry more of the burden of responsibility for their own defense. By eliminating extraneous missions, the DOD resources would be less strained, could minimize to create more elite forces, and reduce costs.

The DOD could also increase efficiency by addressing some issue areas with an approach similar to Corporate America's. Adopting commercial best practices and eliminating low priority programs may help the DOD to reduce cost and improve performance. When appropriate, utilizing technology such as teleconferencing instead of in-person meetings may reduce significant costs[14]. There are cultural factors to consider

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[12] Benjamin H. Friedman and Christopher Preble, "Refocusing U.S. Defense Strategy," November 2010, under "Defense," http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/defense/refocusing-us-defense-strategy (accessed January 26, 2013).

[13] Benjamin H. Friedman and Christopher Preble, "A Plan to Cut Military Spending," November 2010, under "Defense," http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/defense/plan-cut-military-spending (accessed January 26, 2013).

[14] Gina C. Humble, "2011 Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows Program: Observations and Recommendations from IBM," April 2011,

here, some partners may be put-off by this sort of approach. But these are the types of options the DOD can integrate into their training exercises, education of partner nations' forces, and overall organizational culture, to be considered for use on a case-by-case basis.

Perhaps the most efficient approach to DOD resource allocation is some amalgam of "common sense," PPB, performance-based management, and TQM. The pillars of PPB which create a structure and stability for the organization are critical, but the rigidity of PPB could actually be an inhibitor to achieving objectives. The DOD-PPB approach leaves less room for creative solutions along the way, waiting until the following planning, programming, and budgeting period to implement changes. Long-term planning, huge investments, and expensive contracts prevent management, at every level, from making decisions and modifications on an as-needed basis. This approach may be justified in part by the immense level of accountability pressure placed on the DOD. Huge investments and long-term contracts in weaponry systems and military bases for example, need a substantial approval process and are bound to weigh heavily on flexibility in decision-making. However, Latin America is not a traditional war zone. Threats evolve faster than year-long plans can hope to keep up with. A performance-based, TQM management approach could create a more flexible and efficient resource presence in the region while maintaining accountability. The DOD could retain initial PPB planning, but shift the approach to allow for changes on more of a rolling basis in accordance with performance output. These changes must be justified and defended of course, but could be done within a much more efficient timeframe than PPB affords.

http://dtlweb.au.af.mil///exlibris/dtl/d3_1/apache_media/L2V4bGlicmlzL2R0bC9kM18xL2FwYWNoZV9t ZWRpYS81NzQxMQ==.pdf (accessed January 26, 2013).

DOD efficiency of resource allocation in achieving foreign policy objectives can be difficult to discern. Achievement of goals alone can be challenging to measure. Many of the goals for the region are long-term, taking years to fully discern and understand the results of DOD initiatives. There are many variables and elements involved in efficient resource allocation, and this is why we are likely to find "yes and no" results. The results are relative to the goals, expectations, unexpected consequences, and consistently evolving threat environment for the U.S. and Latin American partner nations.

III. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA

Most U.S. foreign policy objectives toward Latin American are directly related to DOD functions. Those which are loosely related to the DOD, like cooperating on energy and climate futures, are still partially dependent on the relationships the DOD builds with partner nations. The DOD is an essential tool in building trusting, cooperative partnerships which facilitate successful future engagements in issue areas outside of security. This is one of the more generic foreign policy objectives to Latin America, but is pertinent the modern U.S. approach toward the region. In the foreign policy section of their website, the White House expressed the commitment "to shaping that future through engagement that is strong, sustained, meaningful, and based on mutual respect" in Latin America[1]. The same section outlines regional and citizen security, economic growth and equality, and restoring American leadership in the region as foreign policy objectives.

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[1] The White House, "Foreign Policy," under "Issues," http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy (accessed February 10, 2013).

Figure 3.1 U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives in Latin America Interconnectedness

Economic Growth

Economic
Equality   Regional Security

American   Citizen Security
Leadership

Each of these objectives is loaded and interconnected with the others. First, each

carries significance twofold: to prevent or quell capabilities of threats to U.S. security and

to the security of U.S. interests. Second, each carries different meanings depending on the

Latin American state being considered. Citizen security alone covers the gamut of DOD

capabilities. Recently, the primary threat to citizen security in Honduras has been

criminal organizations engaged in illicit trafficking while in Haiti has been natural

disasters. The common thread is weak government infrastructures incapable of providing

adequate relief to citizens. This problem is directly related to weak economies, but

economies remain weak largely because of the overwhelming security threats. Economic inequality can be associated with weak economies; weak economies do not typically provide adequate resources for poverty-stricken classes to excel, but this inequality can also be associated with corruption and crime.

The U.S. stands to gain from the resolution of each of these issues. While American leadership in the region makes contributions to economic growth and citizen security, the desire to restore American leadership in the region partially stems from an increasing Chinese and Russian presence there. Both have economic investments and defense relationships with various Latin American states, including the sale of arms and in China's case, military training engagements[2]. In all likelihood, China stands to benefit from military training contributions by bulking the security of the region where they have made economic investments, not unlike the U.S. The U.S. therefore seeks to assert itself as the security and economic partner of choice for the region, so as not to be undercut by competitor nations or nations who at times share strained relations with the U.S.

If the DOD is present in Latin America to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives, then trade is a huge issue. At the Senate confirmation hearing on secretary of state bid, Senator John Kerry noted, "more than ever, foreign policy is economic policy"[3]. Latin America purchases a huge portion of U.S. exports. Mexico and Brazil are both among

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[2] Douglas Fraser, "Posture Statement," (before the 112th Congress House Armed Services Committee, March 6, 2012), http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/SOUTHCOM_2012_Posture_Statement.pdf (accessed February 10, 2013).

[3] Anne Gearan, "Kerry sails through Senate confirmation hearing on secretary of state bid," under "Foreign Policy," *Washington Post*, January 24, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-24/world/36517602_1_kerry-foreign-policy-syrian-president-bashar-al-assad (accessed January 28, 2013).

U.S. top ten trading partners[4]. In January 2013 the U.S. Chief of Naval Operation spent a week in Brazil meeting with the nation's naval leaders to work on expanding naval partnership opportunities. Greenert demonstrated his desire to strengthen the partnership with the economically vibrant and increasingly militarily capable nation through a series of engagements during his trip, including an invitation to the Brazilian navy to participate in the multinational exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) in 2014[5]. One of the assigned purposes of the Southern Combatant Command (SOUTHCOM), the primary DOD organization in Latin America, is to protect the Panama Canal, an essential conduit for U.S. maritime trade flows. Secure naval presence encourages an expansion of and ensures the safety of maritime trade flows through the region. U.S. companies are more likely to set up shop in regions which are deemed stable and secure, and this is part of the role of the DOD in the region.

The regional and citizen security issues are largely characterized by transnational criminal organizations, including illicit trafficking and terrorist groups. These threaten U.S. security and the security of U.S. interests and investments in Latin America. U.S. investments in the region are substantial. The region represents important trade relationships but also ongoing investments in the promotion of U.S. values and protocol: expensive military and diplomatic programs in the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, democratic governance, military tactics and training, etc. These values are especially critical in building other forms of partnership, especially security partnerships. Enabling

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[4] U.S. Census Bureau, "Top Trading Partners - Total Trade, Exports, Imports: Year-to-Date December 2012," http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1212yr.html (accessed February 10, 2013).

[5] U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Public Affairs, "CNO Expands Brazil Partnership," Story No. NNS130119-03, January 19, 2013, http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=71552 (accessed February 10, 2013).

partner nations to build their security capabilities in accordance with U.S. protocol and values promotes cooperation and interoperability, thereby decreasing the security burden of the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere.

The President has issued the strategic guidance for the DOD which essentially serves as the connective tissue between U.S. foreign policy objectives and intended allocation of DOD resources. The document outlining the President's strategic guidance details the overall strategic direction and the primary missions envisioned for the Armed Forces. Pertinent to Latin America, this guidance discusses a vision of building partnership capacity in order to share costs and responsibilities of global leadership, become the preferred security partner to allies, and building or strengthening new partnerships to promote freedom, stability, and prosperity[6].

These three tenets, freedom, stability, and prosperity, encompass the facilitation of economic growth and commerce. Freedom of access through global commons which are safe and secure is a critical component to this objective. In accordance with functionalist theory, this objective is likely to build partnerships both in trade and security. Functionalist theory dictates that when actors cooperate, focusing on a common interest or need, they are more likely to cooperate again in the future on other shared interests or needs. As global commons are secured through joint security operations, businesses perceive less risk, contributing to increased international trade and economic prosperity. Meanwhile, security forces have the opportunity to engage in a fruitful partnership, perhaps facilitating future engagements in other common security areas.

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[6] U.S. Department of Defense, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," (January 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf (accessed January 28, 2013).

To this point, the emphasis the U.S. has placed on building the capabilities of strategic partners also becomes clear. Not only is this notion resource-efficient in the long-run, but if the U.S. foresees future cooperation and interoperability, then capable forces with similar protocol and standards as strategic partners is most ideal.

The President's strategic guidance also makes specific reference to increasing the efficiency of DOD resource allocation toward these objectives: "Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities"[7].

The detailed visions for the primary missions of the Armed Forces emphasize these efficiency goals. The essence of the President's vision appears to be the deterrence of aggressors against U.S. and partner nations' interests. Aggressors should be deterred both by resignation that U.S. and partner nations' capabilities outstrip the aggressor's, rendering his objectives are unattainable, and also through the foreboding that U.S. and partner nations' capabilities would enact punishment beyond an acceptable level.

This level of deterrence is to be achieved by securing territory. Populations should be secure and transition to stable governance should be facilitated, when necessary, through small scale operations with limited forces on site and for limited periods. Even when operating in one region, forces will be capable of rapidly deterring or engaging aggressors in another. Forces will be responsive and utilize balanced lift, presence, and prepositioning to the fullest extent to attain the greatest level of agility and efficiency in preparation for rapid mobility to regions in which conflict may occur. Whenever possible, U.S. forces will plan to operate in conjunction with partner nations' forces.

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[7] U.S. Department of Defense, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," (January 2012): 9, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf (accessed January 28, 2013).

U.S. forces are responsible for the defense of U.S. territory from aggressors, and for providing support to civil authorities in the case of natural disasters or some other catastrophic event. DOD resources will also remain available to partner nations in the event they face similar threats. Many of the DOD's rapid deployment capabilities (airlift, sealift, surveillance, medical evacuation and care, and communications) are perhaps most valuably utilized toward supplementing humanitarian and disaster relief agencies. Therefore the role of providing aid continues to be part of the strategic vision for the DOD.

And finally, the President's strategic guidance dictates the Armed Forces will provide a stabilizing presence, at sustainable levels, in partner nations when necessary. This includes rotational deployments, bilateral and multilateral training exercises to reinforce deterrence, facilitate capacity-building of partner nations' forces, build and strengthen relationships with partner nations, and increase U.S. influence.

U.S. influence in Latin America has a long-standing tradition, for better and for worse. The role of the United States in the region is incredibly complicated. The U.S. provides a level of security and funding, but is also considered by some to be a source of Latin America's troubles. Here, history matters. The U.S. is the number one importer of drugs from Latin America. The U.S. has also historically imposed American strategy and policy in the region somewhat carelessly. Part of the problem from the past has been America's view of the region. To the U.S., Latin America was once a lumped region of nearly identical states with identical problems. Operations in the region could historically be characterized by sparse, small-scale interventionist initiatives.

Today, each state has territory carved out by different criminal organizations, with varying tactics and capabilities. Each state has a unique geographic, political, and economic set of strengths and vulnerabilities which various criminal organizations adapt to and exploit. Therefore, each state's needs must be assessed and addressed individually in order to subdue threatening criminal networks. Not until the United States began approaching Latin American states individually, and legitimately understanding each state's unique needs, was the U.S. able to provide efficient assistance with relative success. Plan Colombia represents a large-scale, comprehensive plan tailored to the needs of a specific state, and is considered to be largely successful. It was not until the United States recognized Colombia as a potential strategic partner in the War on Drugs that the state's individual needs toward the effort were identified and met.

There were certainly mistakes within this initiative on the part of the U.S. and there is more which could be done. But on this subject there are varying opinions as to the responsibilities of the U.S. versus the partner nations. If a partner nation agrees to combat the drug trade, the growth, harvesting, transporting, and transactions of illicit drugs, the partner nation must be prepared to handle the economic "losers" of this situation. There will be stakeholders of all kinds in this sort of initiative. Aerial spraying over illicit crops has had detrimental effects including the displacement of vulnerable populations and environmental damage. The U.S. has not provided sustainable economic alternatives to farmers who previously accumulated wealth growing marijuana or coca.

Further, the U.S. has not done enough to reduce the demand or availability of drugs within U.S. borders[8].

This last point has also become a point of contention straining U.S.-Mexican drug-war alliance. Tensions between U.S. and Mexican government officials were brought to light in 2011 when two U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents were shot, one fatally, by Mexican criminals. American officials are concerned they cannot depend on Mexican institutions in bilateral operations, particularly regarding the safety of Americans working there. Mexican officials counter with their frustrations that the U.S. hasn't done enough to reduce drug demand or the flow of automatic weapons to drug-trafficking organizations[9]. Mexican institutions are not able to provide the environment Americans seem to be looking for because they do not have the resources on hand to combat criminal organizations funded by American drug demand and armed with sophisticated American weaponry. The majority of weapons confiscated from cartels are from U.S. gun outlets. The outflow of armaments, cash, and chemicals (used to make methamphetamines, heroine, etc.) crossing the border toward Mexico is not as tightly inspected as the inflow crossing toward the U.S. This is part of the frustration from Mexico.

These issues carry significance politically, disrupting or altering diplomatic and military relations between the U.S. and partner nations. While partner nations' leaders may be committed to a cause like drug eradication, if constituents are staunchly opposed then leaders must oblige on some level. This could indicate a diminishing request for

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[8] Clare Ribando-Seelke, Liana Sun Wyler, June S. Beittel, and Mark P. Sullivan, "Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs," Congressional Research Service, May 12, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41215.pdf (accessed December 1, 2012).
[9] Ioan Grillo, "U.S. Agent's Killing Hints at Drug-War Tensions," *TIME*, February 22, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2052944,00.html (accessed December 2, 2012).

U.S. presence or perhaps assistance in empowering the partner nations' forces, to demonstrate to constituents the growing capabilities of the public sector under their leadership and the diminished need for U.S. presence. In some cases issues like these could potentially lead to an abandonment of a cause or at least an abandonment of U.S. protocol toward the issue.

The latest elections in Mexico indicate the state's intentions to take the lead against the criminal violence within Mexican borders. Newly elected Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto ran on the platform of approaching the problems in Mexico with a focus on reducing the violence, rather than on making arrests and seizures to block the flow of drugs to the U.S. Nieto has reaffirmed his stance since being elected, and he asserted his country would continue to work with the U.S. government to combat organized crime, but would no longer "subordinate to the strategies of other countries." Nieto also announced he intends to withdraw Mexican Army forces from the drug war, an initiative Calderón set in place. The new president partially attributes the massive death toll since 2006 to the military being an inappropriate force for an initiative which should be led by police forces[10].

In Mexico and many other states in Latin America, there is a deep-seeded mistrust of the military and this contributes to animosity regarding large, permanent U.S. military presence. Mexico places restraints on the firearms U.S. military and law enforcement can

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[10] *New York Times*, "Mexican Drug Trafficking (Mexico's Drug War)," *New York Times: World*, October 9, 2012,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/mexico/drug_trafficking/index.html (accessed December 2, 2012).

carry within their borders[11] Latin America has a less than desirable history with military

regimes, with gross human rights violations and abuse of power by military institutions.

Democratic governance has been instituted in a number of Latin American states to

replace military regimes, and since this period the role of the military has often been

confused.

The U.S. has contributed to this confusion in the past through the nature of

engagement with Latin America. The U.S. has typically sent soldiers to the region to

work with Latin Americans in a large number of initiatives. American soldiers have

dispersed humanitarian aid, taught civil engineering tactics, aided investigations, trained

police forces, and engaged Latin Americans on practically every level. From these

engagements, imagining how a developing state would come away from a U.S.-

engagement experience with the idea to utilize their military for non-traditional purposes

is understandable. This demonstrates another facet of how narrowing the scope of DOD

objectives in the region increases efficiency. Disseminating operations such as training

police forces to civilian government personnel not only spares DOD resources, but sets a

more appropriate precedent for partner nations' police force protocol.

The recent shift in U.S. approach to Latin America toward a more comprehensive,

full-scale initiative which includes civilian U.S. government personnel may influenced

the way Latin American governments approach issues like drug trafficking. Mexico and

other states have learned from their experiences of over-utilizing their military forces and

perhaps also from the example or advice of U.S. organizations, as many states are

moving away from a military-led defense against criminal organizations. The

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[11] Kimberly Dozier, "US commandos boost numbers to train Mexican forces," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, January 17, 2013, http://www.ajc.com/ap/ap/crime/us-commandos-boost-numbers-to-train-mexican-forces/nTzDS/ (accessed January 29, 2013).

Washington Office on Latin America explains the importance of the separation of

defense forces:

> Military and police are not interchangeable entities. Military forces are trained for combat situations, with force used to vanquish an enemy. Police are a civilian corps, trained to address threats to public security using the least amount of force possible, to investigate crime and identify those responsible, and to arrest criminals with the cooperation of the people[12].

Helping partner nations to align appropriate roles with appropriate forces lowers

the DOD demands and the defense budgets of partner nations and helps mitigate issues

with military-civilian conflict.

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[12] John P. Sullivan, "Police-Military Interaction in Mexico's Drug War," 2009, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2009/3tri09/sullivaneng.htm (accessed November 30, 2012); Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Colombia's Consolidation: Everything Coming up Orchids?," Brookings, March 8, 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/03/08-colombia-felbabbrown (accessed November 30, 2012).

IV. LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL ISSUES

Latin America is an incredibly diverse region. From border to border, each nation presents a multitude of ethnic groups and political parties, shaping a region of nations whose governments are often on divergent trajectories and face unique issues. The common themes in Latin America are the nature of armed conflict being characterized by non-state actor (often criminal networks) aggression, and the inability of states to unilaterally quell destabilizing threats such as drug-trafficking organizations and political insurgency groups, corruption of public officials, social inequality and poverty, and poor government infrastructure to respond to natural disasters. While states suffer across the region from similar plagues, each sub-region and each state balances unique strengths and weaknesses.

The Organization of American States (OAS) is a regional institution, inclusive of all 35 sovereign states of the Western Hemisphere (including Canada and the United States), which provides the primary forum for member states to approach political, juridical, and social issues[1]. This organization functions as one of the primary means Latin Americans can have their issues represented at the international level. Therefore, looking past the influence the U.S. may exert on this organization, the issue areas the OAS chooses to highlight should be representative of the most critical issues Latin America faces. OAS chooses to focus program efforts on Promoting Democracy, Defending Human Rights, Ensuring a Multidimensional Approach to Security, Fostering

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[1] Organization of American States, "Who We Are," under "About the OAS," http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp (accessed January 22, 2013).

Integral Development and Prosperity, and Supporting Inter-American Legal

Cooperation[2].

All of the issues OAS highlights are connected to one another and with the

aforementioned destabilizing threats. Among the issues addressed by OAS's Inter-

American Legal Cooperation is corruption of public officials, a crippling struggle across

the region. The institution's Multidimensional Approach to Security includes programs to

address regional drug-trafficking issues. Poverty, social inequality, human rights, drug

trafficking, and corruption are directly connected to one another. These threats are

fostered by weak government infrastructures and national poverty incapable of

confronting the issues unilaterally. Further, these criminal networks operate without

regard to borders. Operations flow across the span of several nations, increasing the

difficulty of addressing the threat because their operations are not confined to any states'

geographic, military, or jurisdictive borders.

In undertaking organized criminal networks, Latin American governments face

immense hurdles in the identification and prosecution of suspects for their crimes. Battles

between these criminal networks in Latin America are dominated by drug cartels, whose

practices are brutal and often include a number of civilian casualties. Because organized

criminal rings do not represent traditional threats to the state where overt military conflict

is engaged and the threat may be eliminated, each individual must be incarcerated in

accordance with some level of due process. The process is frustratingly near impossible

at times for governments without the capabilities to identify and prosecute individuals

under judicial systems which are often found to be corrupt; run by public officials who

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[2] Organization of American States, "Our Purpose," under "About the OAS," http://www.oas.org/en/about/purpose.asp (accessed January 22, 2013).

have been hired or otherwise coerced by criminal networks to serve as obstructions to justice.

Because criminal networks are a cross-border, regional problem, even if one country were to successfully eliminate significant levels of corruption from the public sector, if judges or police forces in neighboring countries are corrupt and uncooperative they become obstructions to justice and progress for everyone. When states increase their capabilities to combat criminal networks by eliminating corruption from the equation, criminal networks naturally relocate their base of operations to weaker governments incapable of addressing the issue. This situation can be partially attributed to the migration of Mexican drug cartels into Central America, especially Honduras.

Social inequality and corruption are perhaps the most critical contributors to criminal organizations' ability to garner power in Latin America. The relationship between the three can be easily distinguished. Social inequality leaves certain communities with little opportunity for upward mobility. This factor alone contributes to the emergence of political dissident groups, often funded by similar illicit activities, but social inequality also provides opportunity for criminal organizations. The operations of criminal organizations such as drug cartels provide financial opportunities unavailable to many working within the legal economy, and the prospect of greater financial opportunities enlists a great deal of manpower for the organizations. Throw a natural disaster into the mix, with a government incapable of providing any significant means of relief to victims, especially those in remote regions, and one can imagine why many civilians turn to criminal organizations offering generous relief and compensation for illicit jobs.

Beyond the positive correlation between social inequality and crime[3], criminal organizations which rally supporters around some ideology, such as social injustice and the rallying of victims of social inequality are able to create strong, enduring organizations[4]. The political dissident and terrorist group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC-Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) is the archetypal example of this, enduring for nearly half a century. These elements, the ideological and economic incentives of enlistment in criminal organizations, also contribute to the level of corruption at the operational level of the state when individuals involved with criminal organizations or political dissident groups are employees of the state.

Additionally, police forces, judicial employees, and lower-level government officials are often bribed or otherwise persuaded to work with or for criminal organizations regardless of their ideological or political positions. Coercion is also an element of cooperation between criminal organizations and lower-level actors of the state. Explicit threats of violence against an individual, their family, and community are strong incentives to cooperate. Conversely, relative protection under the cloak of one criminal organization from another in exchange for cooperative measures or enabling services can represent an equally powerful incentive in communities where citizens do not feel secure.

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[3] Pablo Fanjnzylber, Daniel Lederman and Norman Loayza, "Inequality and Violent Crime," *Journal of Law and Economics*, no. 45 (April 2002): 1-40, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources/Crime%26Inequality.pdf (accessed November 30, 2012).

[4] Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, "Criminal Rebels? A Discussion of Civil War and Criminality from the Colombian Experience," *Politics & Society* 32, no. 2 (June 2004): 257-285, http://pas.sagepub.com/content/32/2/257 (accessed November 30, 2012).

In some areas, remote regions of Honduras for example, a staggering portion of the population is working with criminal organizations because these organizations represent the largest level of wealth and power coming through the area. Criminal organizations choose these remote regions because of the lack of government authority present and the geographic mask for trafficking operations. Communities isolated by dense jungle, accessible only by boat or plane, serve as ideal illicit trafficking routes[5]. The problem with organized criminal networks in nations like Honduras is partially the result of the evolution and migration of long and arduous conflicts in Colombia and Mexico.

South America

In Colombia, by the late 1990s, the state had been struggling against FARC and other political dissident groups for well over two decades. The nation beseeched assistance from the international community, particularly the U.S., via a six-year plan titled "Plan Colombia" to combat the widespread drug production and nationwide attacks from paramilitary and guerilla forces. Plan Colombia sought to combat narco-terrorism, revitalize the economy, strengthen democratic institutions, provide humanitarian assistance, and restore respect for human rights, an agenda which has become a longstanding approach to the entire region. As FARC gained power through terrorist operations (infrastructure attacks, kidnappings, brutal murders, and public displays of violence), Plan Colombia sought to undermine the group by cutting FARC's primary funding source: cocaine.

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[5] Damien Cave, "Honduran Villages Caught in Drug Wars' Cross-Fire," *New York Times,* May 23, 2012, under "World," http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/24/world/americas/in-remote-honduras-area-drug-raid-stirs-anger.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed January 26, 2013).

The U.S. contributed to Plan Colombia through substantial funding (approximately $8-9 billion worth) to strengthen Colombia's counter-narcotic capabilities and official government presence, among other Plan Colombia initiatives. The U.S. sought to develop a strategic partner in the region toward the War on Drugs. Since the inception of Plan Colombia, FARC's influence has been diminished and Colombia has stabilized, but the group has not been vanquished. Colombian defense forces, including an army, navy, air force, and national police force, continue to cooperate closely with U.S. forces. Colombian forces receive training and equipment from the U.S. via military assistance programs, foreign military sales, and the international narcotics control program[6].

By 2003, various paramilitary groups like the AUC had demobilized, but political dissident groups have evolved in Colombia over the past few years and present new threats to the nation. BACRIMs ("bandas criminales"-"criminal groups") are the latest manifestation of criminal networks, partially composed of members of former paramilitary groups, which can best be described as gangs. These gangs possess strategic alliances with traditional threats to Colombia (groups such as FARC and ELN-Ejército de Liberación Nacional-National Liberation Army), and they function primarily through drug-trafficking operations[7].

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[6] U.S. Department of State, "Colombia (03/06/12),"
http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/colombia/199006.htm (accessed November 30, 2012).
[7] U.S. Department of State, "Colombia (03/06/12)"; Esther Robollo, "La transición del narcotráfico, de carteles a bacrim," *El Mundo.com*, March 29, 2011,
http://www.elmundo.com/portal/noticias/nacional/la_transicion_del_narcotrafico_de_carteles_a_bacrim.ph
p (accessed November 30, 2012).

Colombia and the U.S. continue to share a close counter-narcotics partnership. In 2011, 195 narco-criminals were extradited from Colombia to the U.S. Similar figures are reported for 2010 and 2009. The U.S. has also provided assistance to the Colombian Government's National Consolidation Plan, which strategically identifies areas highly afflicted by political dissident groups and narco-traffickers and then takes measures to re-establish and strengthen state control in these "consolidation zones." These areas have served as hubs for criminal networks, where drug-trafficking, violence, and a relative absence of state control have converged. The U.S. contributes to the operations in "consolidation zones" through the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative, which serves as an inter-agency effort aimed at supporting Colombian-led operations (including eradication, interdiction, and capacity-building of Colombian defense forces and judicial system)[8].

Despite relative success in "consolidation zones" such as Macarena, replication of these successes may be difficult to achieve. Colombia may not be able to garner the same concentration of resources (i.e. military and police forces, economic assistance) in other areas, simply because the Colombian government lacks the capacity to assemble the necessary level of resources independently as the U.S. begins to withdraw ground presence and resources. Further, each zone faces different challenges from different threats, and solutions in one zone cannot necessarily be superimposed upon another zone. The ambition of the Colombian government to regain control of sixteen more zones has gradually been reduced to fewer zones as the allocation of resources becomes more constrained and inflexible. The U.S. has been consistently withdrawing aid as Colombian

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[8] U.S. Department of State, "Colombia (03/06/12)"; U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Relations with Colombia," http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm (accessed November 30, 2012).

forces become more capable, but there are indicators that remaining imbursement of U.S. aid may not be as efficient as possible[9]. Plan Colombia and the Colombian Strategic Development Initiative have not necessarily created a framework which can sustain their initiated programs without U.S. support. In 2013, the U.S. plans to withdraw 15 percent of military and narcotics aid to Colombia[10]. The Colombian government is faced with the challenge of getting creative with the procurement or reallocation of resources in order to achieve the National Consolidation Plan's objectives.

While Colombia still struggles with evolving non-state threats, the Colombian government and FARC have attempted to begin peace negotiations in Oslo (October 2012) and in Havana (November 2012). Oslo's meeting served as a preliminary meeting to discuss an agreed upon agenda for the Havana meetings, which includes drug trafficking, victims' rights, land ownership in rural areas, FARC's political participation, and the manner through which to cease conflict[11].

In Havana, FARC representatives presented optimistic reviews of negotiations, despite their likelihood to be lengthy and arduous. While previous attempts for negotiations have been unsuccessful, both sides indicated a greater level of determination to achieve concrete results in this round of negotiations[12]. However, the realization of successful negotiations appears frail if FARC activities in January 2013 serve as any

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[9] Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Colombia's Consolidation: Everything Coming up Orchids?," Brookings, March 8, 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/03/08-colombia-felbabbrown *(accessed November 30, 2012).

[10] Michael L. Burgoyne, "Not the time to bug out on Colombia," *Foreign Policy*, posted by Thomas E. Ricks, February 20, 2013, http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/02/20/not_the_time_to_bug_out_on_colombia (accessed February 21, 2013).

[11] *Al Jazeera And Agencies*, "Colombia and FARC Rebels Launch Negotiations," October 18, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2012/10/201210182638604537.html (accessed November 30, 2012).

[12] Tom Brown and Peter Cooney, "Colombia, FARC wrap up first round of peace talks," *Reuters*, November 29, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/30/us-colombia-rebels-talks-idUSBRE8AT03M20121130 (accessed November 30, 2012).

indicator. In the week of January 20, 2013, the rebel group reportedly executed 32 attacks on security forces and infrastructure, seven of which were directed at Colombia's oil and gas industry[13].

The battle against terrorist and criminal organizations in Colombia is still fierce; in 2012, 243 Colombian soldiers were killed and 821 were wounded. FARC's forces number at around 8,000, and the National Liberation Army (ELN) numbers around 2,000 guerillas[14]. The U.S. investment must be steadfast here, where the battle against criminal and terrorist organizations wages on and feeds a broader network of illicit actors throughout the region and globally. But despite the long journey ahead of the state, Colombia's efforts and achievements so far are laudable. The homicide rate in Colombia has steadily declined over the past few years[15], the nation has taken the lead on domestic security operations and developed capabilities to combat internal threats and provide for the security of Colombian citizens. The nation is also an active force in a number of international institutions which seek to reinforce democratic governance and peaceful resolutions in Latin America and work toward regional integration. Colombia's initiatives toward peace-building regardless of the state's increasingly capable government and defense forces have demonstrated the state's propensity to resolve conflict peacefully.

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[13] Olle Ohlsen Pettersson, "Renewed FARC violence Exceeds Pre-Peace Talk Levels," *Colombia Reports* January 27, 2013, http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/27877-renewed-farc-violence-exceeds-pre-peace-talks-levels.html (accessed January 27, 2013).

[14] Michael L. Burgoyne, "Not the time to bug out on Colombia," *Foreign Policy*, posted by Thomas E. Ricks, February 20, 2013, http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/02/20/not_the_time_to_bug_out_on_colombia (accessed February 21, 2013).

[15] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Intentional homicide, count and rate per 100,000 population (1995 - 2011)," http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html, (accessed November 30, 2012).

Colombia's neighbor, Venezuela, has presented various points of contention over

recent years. The two nations have practically opposite approaches to relations with the

U.S. and this has posed a degree of diplomatic conflict between the two. President Hugo

Chávez has expressed acute anti-American sentiments over his tenure as Venezuela's

leader. Chávez stands in staunch opposition to American presence in Latin America,

particularly regarding the War on Drugs. In 2009, when Colombia and the U.S. initiated

an agreement granting the U.S. access to Colombian military bases, Venezuela

considered the agreement threatening, and proceeded to procure over $2 billion in credit

from Russia to finance arms purchases. Chávez also initiated relations with Iran, another

government sharing anti-American sentiments. The relationship involved military

cooperation in addition to a trade proposal of nuclear technology for Venezuelan oil. The

U.S. was concerned Venezuelan behavior would trigger a massive arms race in South

America[16].

A large-scale arms race did not ensue, however, and Colombia responded in part

by requesting one of the prominent South American institutions, Union of South

American Nations (UNASUR) to address the issue. Colombia asserted that all security

agreements with the U.S. were to combat the threat of drug trafficking and terrorism, not

other Latin American states, and further expressed desires to cooperate with others in the

region in order to combat these threats[17]. Colombia's inclination to pursue this course of

action demonstrates the weight of international institutions in the region and the

propensity to resolve conflict peacefully. However, the scenario also highlights the issue

[16] Elise Labott, "U.S. fears Venezuela could trigger regional arms race," *CNN.com/world*, September 16, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/09/16/us.venezuela.arms/ (accessed November 30, 2012).

[17] Neda Vanovac, "Colombia to ask UNASUR to discuss arms race in region," *Colombia Reports*, September 15, 2009, http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/5918-colombia-to-ask-unasur-to-discuss-arms-race-in-region.html (accessed November 30, 2012).

of mistrust and low transparency which continue to haunt the region despite extensive efforts toward regional integration and cooperation.

Venezuela's mistrust of Colombian security agreements with the U.S. may indicate a perception of low Colombian and U.S. transparency, and Venezuela's refusal to comply with thorough transparency protocol regarding the purchase of arms certainly indicates low transparency on their part. Low transparency and corruption at all levels in Latin America disrupt the democratic processes and enable non-state actors to continue plaguing the region by inhibiting cooperation and enabling corruption and under-handed behavior by public officials. At the highest levels, as demonstrated by the Colombian-Venezuelan incident, low transparency and corruption prevent international cooperation which would be critical in eradicating criminal organizations which operate across borders and within complex networks beyond the scope of any one nation's capabilities. At the lowest levels, these same factors allow for the bribery or threatening of public officials such as judges and police forces by criminal organizations in order to enable their operations. In example, police forces may be bribed to ignore an illegal operation, or a judge may be threatened against prosecuting a critical operative of an organization.

Figure 4.1 below represents the 2011 Transparency Score for South American nations according to the 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International.

Figure 4.1 2011 Transparency Score for South American Nations

Country	2011 Transparency Score	Country	2011 Transparency Score
Colombia	3.4	**Argentina**	3
Venezuela	1.9	**Paraguay**	2.2
Guyana	2.5	**Chile**	7.2
Suriname	3	**Bolivia**	2.8
Brazil	3.8	**Peru**	3.4
Uruguay	7	**Ecuador**	2.7

Figure 4.1. 2011 Transparency Score for South American Nations. *Source:* Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2011," 2011, http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/ (accessed December 1, 2012).

The index measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption by various non-governmental organizations in the international community. The scores are assigned according to a scale of zero to ten, where ten represents the most transparent and least corrupt public sector and zero represents the least transparent and most corrupt[18]. Predictably, Venezuela holds the lowest South American transparency score. The two highest scoring nations for South America, Chile and Uruguay, are not highly associated with the production or transshipment of illicit drugs[19] (also see Figure 4.2). The relative absence of intense drug trafficking operations in their states may partially contribute to their ability to achieve lower corruption levels. As criminal organizations' operations have been constrained and drug-related violence in South America, particularly in Colombia, has decreased, the overall conditions have gradually improved. But another region's has correspondingly deteriorated. Criminal organizations have sought asylum in

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[18] Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2011," http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/ (accessed November 30, 2012).
[19] Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Field Listing: Illicit Drugs," 2011, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2086.html, (accessed December 1, 2012).

the remote regions of Central America with little to no government presence. The transfer

of "narco-power" from Colombia to Central American states with weaker governments

has had devastating effects on the region. Drug trafficking organizations have operated in

Central America for decades, but the level of operationalization and violence seen today

is unprecendented in the region.

Figure 4.2 Major Drug Trafficking Routes in Latin America and the Caribbean

Figure 4.2 Major Drug Trafficking Routes in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Source:* Clare Ribando-Seelke, Liana Sun Wyler, June S. Beittel, and Mark P. Sullivan, "Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs," Congressional Research Service, May 12, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41215.pdf (accessed December 1, 2012).

Mexico and Central America

Today, the drug-related violence in Central America surpasses that of South America by far. In this region, cartel politics matter as much as state politics. States and citizens are caught in the midst of brutal violence between rivaling drug cartels seeking to carve out territory and gain control of strategic, multi-billion dollar trafficking routes[20]. Mexico has been fighting an uphill battle against these cartels for years. In 2006, former President Calderón deployed nearly 45,000 troops of the Mexican army to work alongside national police forces[21], assisting police and in some cases replacing local and corrupt state police[22], interrupting drug-related operations at record-high levels. Calderón surpassed his predecessors in efforts to combat drug-related crime and solidified the agenda to quell the threat rather than coexist or cooperate with the cartels, as the Mexican government had approached the issue in the past.

The threats posed by organized crime in Mexico are shared with the United States. The U.S. and Mexico share a 2,000-mile border through which approximately 95 percent of cocaine entering the U.S. travels by way of Mexican drug traffickers[23]. Figure 3.2 represents the direction of drug trafficking routes through Latin America. The primary destination is fairly clear. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has described the U.S. demand for drugs as "insatiable," and further explains U.S. responsibility to the border stems from the "inability to prevent weapons from being illegally smuggled across

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[20] *Economist Online*, "Drugs in Mexico: Kicking the Hornets' Nest," *Economist Online*, January 12, 2011, http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/01/drugs_mexico (accessed November 29, 2012).
[21] Shannon O'Neil, "The Real War in Mexico-How Democracy Can Defeat the Drug Cartels," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 4 (July/Aug. 2009): 63-77.
[22] U.S. Department of State, "Mexico (11/16/11)," http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/mexico/191338.htm (accessed November 29, 2012).
[23] Clare Ribando-Seelke, Liana Sun Wyler, June S. Beittel, and Mark P. Sullivan, "Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs," Congressional Research Service, May 12, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41215.pdf (accessed December 1, 2012).

the border to arm these criminals," contributing to the violence and deaths of police officers, soldiers, and civilians[24]. As the overwhelming majority of drugs from Latin America flow north, trafficking operations and drug-related crimes are concentrated in Mexican territory, particularly along strategic routes and along U.S. border areas.

The majority of northbound trafficking operations from South America bottleneck in southern Central American states before reaching Mexico. The overwhelming majority of cocaine entering the U.S. through Mexican territory travels through southern Central America first[25]. These states suffer immensely from criminal organizations. Their governments are simply not equipped to combat the threats. In 2011, the homicide rate in Honduras, the most acutely afflicted state in Central America, was 91.6 per 100,000. That figure is three times higher than the homicide rates in Colombia or Mexico for the same year, and surpasses the highest homicide rates reported in Colombia during the most violent periods of the past twenty years[26].

The U.S. has offered assistance to the region primarily through Merida Initiative, launched in 2008 to reinforce security forces, law enforcement, and the judicial system, to improve the capabilities of the public sectors in Mexico in order to weaken regional criminal organizations. The initiative has since broadened to include aid allocated toward democracy-strengthening institutions and border control for "secure flows" of people and goods. Two other programs have been launched in the northern Latin American region, the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the Caribbean Basin

[24] Mark Landler, "Clinton Says U.S. Feeds Mexican Drug Trade," *New York Times*, March 25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/world/americas/26mexico.html (accessed November 30, 2012).
[25] Clare Ribando-Seelke, Liana Sun Wyler, June S. Beittel, and Mark P. Sullivan, "Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs."
[26] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Intentional homicide, count and rate per 100,000 population (1995 - 2011)," http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html, (accessed November 30, 2012).

Security Initiative (CBSI), which also seek to build democratic institutions, strengthen communities, and enforce drug-control. The programs, coordinated by the U.S. State Department, all provide equipment, training and technical assistance to the beneficiary states[27].

The pushback against drug trafficking organizations has had inadvertent repercussions. Various reports from Mexican officials estimate the state has suffered somewhere between 50,000 to over 60,000 casualties from the drug war since Calderón launched his offensive in 2006. Further, the increased security pressure in Mexico has intensified narco-traffickers' presence into southern Central American states, and CARSI is the U.S. response to this effect. In states like Honduras, Guatemala, and Belize, the governments are too weak to subdue or even constrict criminal organizations' operations unilaterally[28]. The necessity of CARSI becomes clear when one imagines the condition of weaker, poverty-stricken states helplessly embroiled in Mexican trafficking cartels' and Colombian producers' turf wars[29].

Drug-related crime has reached peak levels of incidence and brutality. The organizations utilize car bombs, political assassinations, public murders, mutilated corpses left on display, and coordinated attacks on cities to intimidate rivals, citizens, and the government to display dominance and undermine the authority of those thought to provide security. In one instance, the Mexican border town of Tijuana was attacked,

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[27] Clare Ribando-Seelke, Liana Sun Wyler, June S. Beittel, and Mark P. Sullivan, "Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs."

[28] Randal C. Archibold and Damien Cave, "Drug Wars Push Deeper into Central America," *New York Times*, March 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/24/world/americas/24drugs.html?pagewanted=all (accessed November 30, 2012).

[29] Ioan Grillo, "Behind the Murder of Honduras' Drug Czar," *TIME*, December 17, 2009, http://www.time.come/time/world/article/0,8599,1948258,00.html (accessed November 30, 2012).

where within one hour seven police officers were publicly assassinated and many more injured, followed by a broadcast of a drug ballad over the police scanners' networks. Drug-related crimes such as kidnappings, money laundering, and arms trafficking have increased correspondingly with the increase of trafficking operations and narco-power[30].

The Merida Initiative, CARSI and CBSI are scheduled to continue into next year, but there are multiple factors which impede the potential of these programs. The nations in which these programs are operated have limited resources to contribute to counter-narcotics efforts, and the programs which the U.S. has implemented are not self-sustaining in many of the beneficiary countries. Therefore, the programs contribute to a dependency of these countries on the United States to combat criminal organizations. Atop these issues are mounting anti-American sentiments from the public. Some renounce their political support for a democratic government (which they perceive as a platform for corruption), cooperating with Americans whom they mistrust[31].

Many of these communities are justified in their disapproval of their government's behavior. Like South America, Central America is also afflicted by corrupt public sectors. Figure 4.3 represents the 2011 Transparency Scores for Central American nations according to the 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International.

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[30] Clare Ribando-Seelke, Liana Sun Wyler, June S. Beittel, and Mark P. Sullivan, "Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs"; John P. Sullivan, "Police-Military Interaction in Mexico's Drug War," 2009, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2009/3tri09/sullivaneng.htm (accessed November 30, 2012).

[31] US Government Accountability Office, "Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries Has Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are Needed," GAO-08-784, (July 2008), http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/278210.pdf (accessed December 1, 2012).

Figure 4.3. 2011 Transparency Scores for Central America

Country	2011 Transparency Score
Mexico	3
Guatemala	2.7
El Salvador	3.4
Honduras	2.6
Nicaragua	2.5
Costa Rica	4.8
Panama	3.3

Figure 4.3. 2011 Transparency Scores for Central America. *Source:* Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2011," 2011, http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/ (accessed December 1, 2012).

Democratic government structures are relatively new for some of these nations, and many communities do not support democratic government because their experience with the structure has been one filled by corrupt officials. Some also feel that democracy is a compulsion imposed by Americans onto their state in exchange for resources. These attitudes toward the structure, along with the condition of the state, prevent democracy from flourishing into the promised institution. This scenario is not the case in every Central American state, but for those scoring lowest in transparency, such as Honduras, this scenario has become the bane of U.S. cooperation and assistance. Corruption at every level disrupts and at times sabotages joint and U.S.-supported counter-narcotics initiatives in the region, particularly among police and military units.

Yet many states are taking strides toward mitigating corruption in their public sector. Honduras has announced a comprehensive inter-institutional Transparency and Anticorruption Plan for 2011-2014 which pools the resources of various institutions to improve citizens' access to public information, the development of norms, internal

controls and audits, national procurement and contracting processes, and the overall

public sector culture of transparency. The country has also implemented a law

enforcement vetting process to conduct background checks, which includes specialized

units for anti-crime, anti-gang, drug enforcement, and customs and immigration

enforcement. Similar measures have been taken throughout Central America and the

Caribbean, but these measures have proven more effective in combating corruption at the

higher government levels than at the police and military levels. This may be accounted

for by issues such as low salaries for police officers and judges, as well as poor law

enforcement or judicial structures[32].

The Caribbean

In the Caribbean, a considerable amount of criminal activity is associated with

narco-trafficking. Illicit trafficking routes suggested in Figure 4.2 illustrate drug flows

from the Caribbean into Florida, and the U.S. launch of the CBSI program suggests the

Caribbean serves as a significant passageway for illicit drugs and the criminal activity

there represents a threat. The Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Jamaica have

been identified as the major drug-producing or drug-transit locations for the Caribbean[33].

This region's geographic vulnerabilities to natural disasters and proximity to illicit

trafficking destinations more than exhaust the local government's capabilities.

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[32] U.S. Department of State, "2012 INCSR: Country Reports - Honduras through Mexico," http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2012/vol1/184100.htm (accessed December 2, 2012).
[33] Clare Ribando-Seelke, Liana Sun Wyler, June S. Beittel, and Mark P. Sullivan, "Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs."

Latin American Alliances and Regional Conflict Potential

Latin American alliances such as the Organization of American States and the Summits of the Americas are generally quite inclusive of the United States in their proceedings. There are other Latin American institutions which the U.S. is not part of, Union of South America Nations (UNASUR) for example, but by and large these institutions share friendly relations with the U.S. For this reason, the U.S. foreign policy objectives are likely to be appropriate for the regional issues and generally welcomed by partner nations.

There are some Latin American relationships which are partially based on the mutual anti-American sentiment and the desire to develop Latin America independently of American influence. The Bolivarian alliance for example, led by Venezuela's Chávez and Cuba's Castro, is highly characterized by anti-American sentiment and has played a counterproductive role in the War on Drugs. Venezuela and Bolivia have accused the U.S. DEA of various interventionist initiatives (attempting a coup on Chávez, financing rogue groups to conduct espionage) in attempt to undermine the legitimacy of U.S. presence in Latin America.

The conflict potential in Latin America is largely characterized by the threat of non-state actors. The states of this region do not have the propensity in recent history to engage in armed conflict with each other, or with others outside the region. The region has institutionalized many formal realms of interstate engagement and has created the platforms on which to resolve contentions peacefully. Even states within the region which have strained relations appear disinterested in the notion of engaging in armed conflict against one another. The sources of armed conflict are the criminal organizations in the region and their networks, particularly those engaged in drug-trafficking operations.

Citizens of the U.S. are the primary customers of drug-trafficking organizations. The U.S. is the inadvertent provider of arms to these organizations. The U.S. has also influenced the armed conflict potential by imposing democratic institutions and norms on those states which are the beneficiaries of U.S. assistance. The U.S. is deeply intertwined in the order of Latin America, and efficient cooperation with the region must be set as a priority if the threat of armed conflict through criminal organizations is to be subdued.

V. WHAT ARE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESOURCES

The relevant components of the DOD in Latin America serve as the resources for this research. Therefore the discussion on DOD resources requires an understanding of the DOD organizational structure and the appointed functions of various components. These appointed functions are coordinated with the regional threats the organization is tasked to address. Figure 5.1 illustrates the organizational structure of the DOD.

Department of Defense | Department of Defense (DoD)

Secretary of Defense

Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense

Figure 5.1 Organization of the Department of Defense

Department of the Army		Department of the Navy			Department of the Air Force		Joint Chiefs of Staff	
Secretary of the Army		**Secretary of the Navy**			**Secretary of the Air Force**		**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**	
Office of the Secretary of the Army	The Army Staff	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	Office of the Secretary of the Navy	Head-quarters Marine Corps	Office of the Secretary of the Air Force	The Air Staff	The Joint Chiefs	The Joint Staff

The Army	The Navy	The Marine Corps	The Air Force

Defense Agencies (17)
- ed Research Projects Agency
- ssary Agency
- t Audit Agency
- t Management Agency *
- e and Accounting Service
- tion Systems Agency *
- nce Agency *
- ervices Agency
- s Agency *
- / Cooperation Agency
- / Service
- Reduction Agency *
- Agency
- tial-Intelligence Agency *
- aissance Office *
- y Agency/Central Security Service *

DoD Field Activities (10)
- Defense Media Activity
- Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office
- Defense Technical Information Center
- Defense Technology Security Administration
- DoD Education Activity
- DoD Human Resources Activity
- DoD Test Resource Management Center
- Office of Economic Adjustment
- TRICARE Management Activity
- Washington Headquarters Services

Combatant Commands (9)
- Africa Command
- Central Command
- European Command
- Northern Command
- Pacific Command
- Southern Command
- Special Operations Command
- Strategic Command
- Transportation Command

* Identified as a Combat Support Agency (CSA)

Figure 5.1 Organization of the Department of Defense *Source:* Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Director of Administration and Management,"Organizations and Functions of the Department of Defense," March 2012.

The primary component of the DOD operating in Latin America is the Combatant Command called Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). SOUTHCOM and the other Combatant Commands are directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman, which fall directly under the Secretary of Defense, a Cabinet Member to the U.S. President. Among many duties, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in particular, are responsible for the advisement and assistance to the President and the Secretary of Defense regarding strategic direction of the Armed Forces, to prepare "strategic plans, including plans that conform to resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense" as well as the "joint logistical and mobility plans to support those strategic plans," and to prepare an analysis of the assignment of functions, roles, and missions with recommendations for modifications in order to achieve the greatest efficiency of the Armed Forces toward achieving the goals and conforming to the strategic plan. Another function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is to submit alternative program recommendations and budget proposals which may include funding requests for joint exercises, force training, contingencies, and selected operations[1]. Therefore a great deal of responsibility for the efficient allocation of DOD resources lies upon the shoulders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

All of the Combatant Commands, including SOUTHCOM, have certain responsibilities in common. Combatant Commands, overseen by a Commander of the Combatant Command, are responsible for conducting missions assigned to the command, managing resources, equipment, internal organization, and training in order to successfully carry out missions and provide support to other Combatant Commands as

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[1] U.S. Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Directive, Number 5100.01, December 21, 2010, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components," http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510001p.pdf (accessed January 15, 2013), 14-16.

prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. SOUTHCOM is specifically responsible for "providing contingency planning, operations, and security cooperation for Central America (excludes Mexico), South America, and the Caribbean (except for U.S. commonwealths, territories, and possessions)"[2]. SOUTHCOM is responsible for overseeing the Armed Forces' protection of U.S. military resources in the region and defending the Panama Canal and Canal area.

The joint command represents Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and various federal agencies, organized under a staff of directorates, component commands and military group. Each branch of the services provides SOUTHCOM with a component command: U.S. Army South, 12th Air Force and Air Forces Southern, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South, and U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command. These commands work with SOUTHCOM's Joint Special Operations component (Special Operations South), two Joint Task Forces (Joint Task Force-Guantanamo and Joint Task Force–Bravo), Joint Interagency Task Force South, and Security Assistance Offices (Center for Hemispheric Studies and Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation) to execute SOUTHCOM missions and security cooperation activities. SOUTHCOM exercises authority as a Combatant Command via the commanders of each of the branches' component command and Joint Task Forces, Joint Interagency Task Force, and Security Assistance Offices[3].

[2] U.S. Southern Command, "About Us," http://www.southcom.mil/aboutus/Pages/About-Us.aspx (accessed January 15, 2013).
[3] Ibid.

The components of SOUTHCOM can be considered the primary resources of the DOD utilized toward achieving regional objectives in Latin America. SOUTHCOM's mission, vision, and focus areas are described as follows:

Mission: "We are ready to conduct joint and combined full-spectrum military operations and support whole of government efforts to enhance regional security and cooperation."

Vision: "We are a joint and interagency organization supporting U.S. national security interests, and with our partners, fostering security, stability and prosperity in the Americas."

Focus Areas: Countering Transnational Organized Crime, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief, Support to Peacekeeping Operations, Training and Exercises, Multinational Engagement, and Human Rights[4].

Each SOUTHCOM component contributes unique capabilities toward the overall Mission, Vision and Focus Area Missions, functioning as part of SOUTHCOM's Theater Security Cooperation Strategy. Theater Security Cooperation Strategy is simply the regional strategic plan each Combatant Command develops to align engagement activities with national strategic objectives[5]. Theater services are inclusive of all the command's capabilities, typically operating in support of humanitarian and combat missions. The functions of each SOUTHCOM component toward theater security are explored below.

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[4] U.S. Southern Command, "Missions Main," under "Missions," http://www.southcom.mil/ourmissions/Pages/Our-Missions.aspx (accessed January 17, 2013).
[5] Gregory L. Hager, Supporting and Integrating Theater Security Cooperation Plans," March 19, 2004, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423731 (accessed January 17, 2013).

U.S. Army South

U.S. Army South (ARSOUTH) supports disaster relief and counterdrug missions, provides oversight, planning, and logistical support to the humanitarian and civic assistance projects under SOUTHCOM's Theater Security Cooperation Strategy. The vision statement of ARSOUTH describes an agile and responsive Army Service Component Command able to simultaneously accomplish the objectives delegated by the Department of the Army and SOUTHCOM's Theater Security Cooperation and Contingency Operations. ARSOUTH forces are comprised of aviation, intelligence, communication, and logistics units. The primary operations ARSOUTH is engaged in include Humanitarian Operations and Engagement, Joint and Combined Engagements, and Reintegration operations. This component command also provides Title X and Executive Agent responsibilities in the region[6]. Title X is the legal premise from which each branch of the Armed Forces and the Department of Defense performs[7] and Executive Agent refers to the duties of communicating orders from higher authorities.

12th Air Force and Air Forces Southern

The mission of the portion of Twelfth Air Force, or Air Forces Southern (AFSOUTH) operating in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility is to serve as the air and space component to SOUTHCOM, overseeing Air Force assets and the command and control of air space within the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility. The 612th Air and Space Operations Center enables the component to conduct joint and combined air and

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[6] U.S. Army South, "Mission, Vision, Area of Responsibility and Operations," under "About Us," http://www.arsouth.army.mil/mission-and-vision.html (accessed January 17, 2013); U.S. Southern Command, "SOUTHCOM Component Commands and Units," under "About," http://www.southcom.mil/aboutus/Pages/Our-Team.aspx (accessed January 17, 2013).
[7] U.S. House of Representatives, "Title 10," http://uscode.house.gov/download/title_10.shtml (Accessed January 17, 2013).

space operations by way of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, intra-theater airlift, and information assets. The staff of this Operations Center is responsible for ensuring the combat readiness of one of five Falconer combined air and space operations center weapons systems for the Air Force (supported by the 612th Air Communications Squadron) and developing strategic plans for the execution of air and space operations to support SOUTHCOM objectives. ARSOUTH oversees four forward operating locations and serves as the executive agent for these locations. AFSOUTH operations provide joint radar surveillance architecture oversight. AFSOUTH supports SOUTHCOM's Theater Security Cooperation Strategy in providing oversight, planning, execution, and logistical support for disaster relief exercises, humanitarian and civic assistance projects, and counter-drug operations. The command provides similar services to the civil and military engagements SOUTHCOM conducts. One example of such engagements are the Airmen-to-Airmen conferences AFSOUTH hosts in the region[8].

U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command and Commander, U.S. Fourth Fleet

U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) provides SOUTHCOM with a forward presence in the regional waters, affording freedom of maneuver and security for trade within the maritime domain. This component, like the others, works in conjunction with all SOUTHCOM components as well as partner nations to enhance regional security, deter aggression, strengthen and foster coalitions, and promote peace, stability, and prosperity for partner nations. Commander, U.S. Fourth

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[8] 12th Air Force and Air Forces Southern, "12th Air Force and Air Forces Southern" December, 13, 2012, under "Fact Sheets," under "Library," http://www.12af.acc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4470 (accessed January 19, 2013); U.S. Southern Command, "SOUTHCOM Component Commands and Units," under "About," http://www.southcom.mil/aboutus/Pages/Our-Team.aspx (accessed January 17, 2013).

Fleet (COMFOURTHFLT/C4F) is the Numbered Fleet Commander assigned to

COMUSNAVSO, responsible for the operational control of assigned naval forces and all

aspects of conducting Maritime Security Operations (MSO) in the SOUTHCOM area of

responsibility. COMUSNAVSO does not own any ships. Operations are geared toward

establishing U.S. presence against threats, Theater Security Cooperation, building

strategic partnerships and relationships, and facilitating the growth of partner nations'

capabilities in maritime operations. COMUSNAVSO operations include counterdrug

operations, disaster relief, Teamwork South, UNITAS, Fuerzas Aliadas PANAMAX,

humanitarian and civil assistance projects under New Horizons exercises, community

relations and military-to-military relations projects[9].

U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South

U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South's (MARFORSOUTH) mission is to command

and conduct the deployment planning and execution of Marine Corp Forces assigned to

SOUTHCOM, advise SOUTHCOM on the appropriate utilization of Marine Corp Forces,

and execute additional operations as assigned. This component focuses on Latin

American Marines, Naval Infantries, and Maritime Security Forces to train and help

enable these forces in order to build strategic partners in anti-terror, peacekeeping,

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities applicable to their own nations as

well as the UN peacekeeping missions abroad. These partners work to "detect, deter, and

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[9] U.S. Navy, "COMUSNAVSO-C4F," http://www.public.navy.mil/comusnavso-c4f/Pages/default.aspx (accessed January 19, 2013); U.S. Navy, "Operations and Exercises," http://www.public.navy.mil/comusnavso-c4f/Pages/OperationsandExercises.aspx (accessed January 19, 2013); U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command U.S. Fourth Fleet, "U.S. Fourth Fleet Brief," http://www.public.navy.mil/comusnavso-c4f/Pages/default.aspx (accessed January 19, 2013).

defend critical infrastructure and assets." MARFORSOUTH also contributes to SOUTHCOM by helping to establish the command's maritime domain awareness[10].

MARFORSOUTH achieves a significant portion of the aforementioned mission through routinely conducted security engagements with partner nations. The sort of engagements typically conducted include Combined Operation Seminar Team (COST), a seminar series conducted with partner nation militaries and led by a team of instructors directed by MARFORSOUTH to train on the Marine Corps Planning Process. COST is a joint endeavor conducted in attempt to standardize planning efforts. Landing Attack Subsequent Operations (LAST) are typically conducted post-COST seminar in conjunction with partner nations. This security engagement focuses on capacity-building of the partner nations Marine and Naval Infantry forces to improve the host nation's infantry tactics. Other engagements aimed at furthering and deepening U.S. relations and interoperability with the host nation include Mobile Training Teams (MTT), Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE) where technical, functional, and professional counterparts exchange information, and Traditional Commander Activity (TCA) which serve as military-to-military, leadership engagements[11].

MARFORSOUTH is a critical component of SOUTHCOM's Theater Security Cooperation Strategy. MARFORSOUTH supports 28 partner nations and engages more

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[10] U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South, "U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South," under "Units," under "Unit Home," http://www.marforsouth.marines.mil/UnitHome.aspx (accessed January 19, 2013); U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South, "U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South," under "Units," under "About," http://www.marforsouth.marines.mil/About.aspx (accessed January 19, 2013).

[11] U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South, "Security Engagements," under "Unit Home," http://www.marforsouth.marines.mil/UnitHome/SecurityEngagements.aspx (accessed January 19, 2013).

than 55,000 marines in 16 Partner Nation Naval Infantries or Maritime Security Forces in multinational training exercises, including Fuerzas Aliadas PANAMAX, Tradewinds, UNITAS/Partnership of the Americas, and Southern Exchange[12].

Special Operations Command South

Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) is the joint Special Operations headquarters overseeing the Special Operations service members from all four military branches assigned to SOUTHCOM: U.S. Army Special Operations, U.S. Marine Special Operations Command, U.S. Naval Special Warfare, and Air Force Special Operations Command. SOCSOUTH is responsible for planning, preparing, and executing special operations executed by Special Operations Forces from the Special Operations Combatant Command (USSOCOM) and the four military branches. These forces operate in small units, focusing on strategic or operational objectives via direct or indirect military action. SOCSOUTH is tasked with the management of all special operations in SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility, the establishment, deployment, and command of a Joint Special Operations Task Force, and providing an immediately deployable theater crisis response force. SOCSOUTH's vision is to enhance "security and stability in the Americas with our interagency partners and partner nations by establishing an in depth networked defense that will detect, deter, disrupt, and defeat illicit transnational elements"[13].

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[12] U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South, "Theater Security Cooperation," under "Unit Home," http://www.marforsouth.marines.mil/UnitHome/TheaterSecurityCooperation.aspx (accessed January 19, 2013).
[13] Special Operation Command South, "Mission," under "Mission," http://www.socso.southcom.mil/mission.aspx (accessed January 20, 2013).

The Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) utilized by SOCSOUTH is responsible for all the same duties as the other Combatant Commands, with the addition of performing specialized functions beyond the routine capabilities of traditional military forces. These functions, in coordination with the Military Service Chiefs, include the organization, training, equipping, and provision of Special Operations Forces, doctrine, procedure, and equipment toward counterterrorism operations, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, civil affairs operations, military information support operations, information operations and operations specified by the President or Secretary of Defense[14]. Essentially this command provides specialized support for other commands and conducts specialized missions independently of other commands to protect U.S. interests.

SOCSOUTH engages partner nations' militaries through participation in Fuerzas Aliadas PANAMAX and hosting the international special operations training exercise and commando competition Fuerzas Comando. The "Exercises" section of SOCSOUTH's website refers to an element of SOUTHCOM's Theater Security Cooperation Strategy which resonates throughout SOUTHCOM's forces:

> The stability and security of U.S. and partner nations hinge upon our ability to work together in a mutual effort to confront and defeat common security challenges. SOCSOUTH's battle-focused training programs allow our partner

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[14] U.S. Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Directive, Number 5100.01, December 21, 2010, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components," http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510001p.pdf (accessed January 15, 2013), 22-23.

nations to enhance their regional security in order to confront common challenges before they mature into direct threats against the U.S. and our counterparts[15].

A similar statement from MARFORSOUTH focuses on the "interoperability" aspect of confronting challenges. The statement builds on this concept asserting,

> Coalitions and regional partnerships comprised of capable and willing nations build mutual security, deter aggression and extremism, and provide the underlying conditions for success if military action is required[16].

Quite a bit can be extrapolated from these statements. Based on these and the mission and vision statements of each of the component forces, a clear emphasis has been placed by the DOD on empowering partner nations to become strategic partners in joint initiatives and strong independent actors toward regional security, prosperity, and the protection of our mutual interests. The relevance of this emphasis to this research is both the importance of Joint Task Forces and the characterization of the role of other SOUTHCOM components in the region, as well as the geographic deployment of these components. With this emphasis, components which train in certain areas of defense should be deployed to certain areas. For example, SOCSOUTH forces should only train forces of stable nations with anti-corruption measures in place. Otherwise, there is a danger of defected troops with commando skillsets, which can be incredibly dangerous.

Joint Task Force-Guantanamo

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[15] Special Operations Command South, "Exercises," under "Exercises," http://www.socso.southcom.mil/exercises.aspx (accessed January 20, 2013).

[16] U.S. Marine Corps Forces, South, "Theater Security Cooperation," http://www.marforsouth.marines.mil/UnitHome/TheaterSecurityCooperation.aspx (accessed January 20, 2013).

Joint Task Force-Guantanamo (JTF GTMO) is most recognized for Guantanamo detention and interrogation operations, responsible for the care and custody of detainees. In particular, JTF GTMO has played a crucial role in obtaining and analyzing intelligence regarding terrorist organizations, especially al-Qaida and the Taliban. But regarding JTF GTMO's contributions to SOUTHCOM's missions, the component supports local law enforcement, war crimes investigations, and the Office of Military Commissions. JTF GTMO is also responsible for responding to mass migration events in the Caribbean if called upon to do so[17]. Such events can occur in response to extreme political quakes, natural disasters, or any extreme event which the state in incapable or unwilling to provide the stability and security citizens require. Such instances highlight the importance of humanitarian assistance training, security training, and other stabilizing exercises SOUTHCOM components engage in. Mass migration for any reason is destabilizing and insecure. The training strategic partner forces receive from U.S. forces to respond to such events is critical to reducing the risks for all stakeholders (migrants, their nation, and the nations receiving migrants) in the event of a crisis.

JTF GTMO is located within U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which serves as a fully functioning, self-sufficient naval station with Marine Corps Forces and a U.S. Coast Guard Aviation Detachment[18]. JTF GTMO has approximately 1,000 Army and Navy guards assigned to the component's Guard Force, responsible for everyday

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[17] Joint Task Force Guantanamo, "Overview," http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/xWEBSITE/fact_sheets/GTMO%20Overview.pdf (accessed January 20, 2013); Joint Task Force Guantanamo homepage: http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/xWEBSITE/index.html.
[18] U.S. Navy, "NAVSTA Guantanamo Bay, Cuba," November 8, 2011, http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/xWEBSITE/fact_sheets/NavstaGTMO_08NOV11.pdf (accessed January 20, 2013).

oversight and protection of detainees and personnel[19]. JTF GTMO is responsible for the operation of a critical institution to national security, but is also flexible enough to provide support toward other SOUTHCOM objectives.

Joint Task Force-Bravo

Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-Bravo) plays major supportive roles to SOUTHCOM components operating in the region. Located at Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras, the task force serves as an on-site coordinator of international and interagency projects, especially those concerning humanitarian assistance and community outreach. JTF-Bravo operates a forward, C-5 capable airbase. This is critical toward the JTF-Bravo mission because the C-5 aircraft, a massive military transport aircraft, expands the capabilities of the joint task force by enabling the rapid transportation of forces and supplies. JTF-Bravo organizes multilateral operations and exercises in humanitarian and civic service, disaster relief, counter narco-terrorism, contingency, and building partner nation capabilities in the region, especially in Honduras and throughout Central America[20].

Their Civil Military Operations include the Medical Readiness and Training Exercises (MEDRETES), hosted on a monthly basis throughout the region[21]. JTF-Bravo also assumes responsibility for Army Support Activities (ASA), because the task force is largely supported by Army units. ASA manage resources and facilities and enable

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[19] Joint Task Force Guantanamo, "Guard Force," November 1, 2011, http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/xWEBSITE/fact_sheets/guard_force.pdf (accessed January 20, 2013).
[20] Joint Task Force-Bravo, "Joint Task Force-Bravo," http://www.jtfb.southcom.mil/main/welcome.asp (accessed January 20, 2013); U.S. Southern Command, "SOUTHCOM Component Commands and Units," under "About," http://www.southcom.mil/aboutus/Pages/Our-Team.aspx (accessed January 20, 2013).
[21] Joint Task Force-Bravo, "Civil Military Operations," http://www.jtfb.southcom.mil/communityprograms.asp (accessed January 20, 2013).

mission execution[22]. JTF-Bravo coordinates many small operations, but is a critical component to relationship-building with partner nations, establishing government presence in Central America, and enabling security forces operating in the area.

Joint Interagency Task Force South

Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South) is a task force which initiates and conducts integrated, synchronized interagency and international detection and monitoring operations and interdictions of illicit trafficking and narco-terrorist threats. These include the detection and monitoring of ostensible air and maritime illicit activity in the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific waters. JIATF South serves as the hub for intelligence, intelligence resources and the capabilities of all agencies and nations engaged in operations. The hub facilitates the collecting, processing, and disseminating of counter-drug intelligence to enable interagency and international operations. JIATF South aspires to achieve 100% domain awareness of illicit trafficking, to eliminate the primary flow of illicit drugs, and to expand their network to include all critical international and interagency partners. The component currently partners with the DOD, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs and Border Protection, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the National Security Agency, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency[23].

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies

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[22] Joint Task Force-Bravo, "Army Support Activities,"
http://www.jtfb.southcom.mil/units/armysupportactivityscab/index.asp (accessed January 20, 2013).
[23] Joint Interagency Task Force South, "Joint Interagency Task Force South,"
http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/index.aspx (accessed January 20, 2013); U.S. Southern Command,
"SOUTHCOM Component Commands and Units," under "About,"
http://www.southcom.mil/aboutus/Pages/Our-Team.aspx (accessed January 20, 2013).

The Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies seeks to foster trust, mutual understanding, regional cooperation, and partner capacity through the education of civilian and military leaders of partner nations in defense and military studies. The institution educates, conducts outreach activities, research, exchange of knowledge activities surrounding defense, international security policy-making, and military issues relevant to the Western Hemisphere. The efforts of this institution are geared toward the advancement of international security policy and defense decision-making processes, and effective civil-military relations in a democratic environment[24]. These efforts allow the Western Hemisphere to make progress toward standardized, interoperable forces.

Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation

The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) is the replacement for the infamous School of the Americas in the sense that the institute is a U.S. government school instructing partner nations' ascending military, civilian, and law enforcement leaders selected by their nation to attend the institute. There is a stark difference, however, between the School of the Americas and the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. The School of the Americas was formed and geared toward U.S. interests in the region in terms of the Cold War. Many of the graduates from this school eventually committed crimes against their people or their state and were counterproductive toward the establishment of democracy as a systemic ideal for the region. The purpose of WHINSEC is based on providing professional education and

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[24] Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, "About CHDS," under "Home," http://www.ndu.edu/chds/index.cfm?secID=15&pageID=91&lang=EN&type=section (accessed January 21, 2013); U.S. Southern Command, "SOUTHCOM Component Commands and Units," under "About," http://www.southcom.mil/aboutus/Pages/Our-Team.aspx (accessed January 20, 2013).

training to emerging leaders of partner nations within the context of the democratic

principles set by the charter of the Organization of American States (OAS).

WHINSEC takes preventative measures against the issues the School of Americas

faced by selecting students who have passed a thorough background investigation. The

students are first nominated by their own government after an investigation process, and

then undergo an investigation process by the U.S. embassy in their nation. Additionally,

the institute is overseen by a Congress-mandated Board of Visitors, including academics,

representatives from the Department of State and Department of Defense, members of

religious and human rights non-governmental organizations (NGO), and representatives

from militaries of partner nations.

The preeminent goals of the institute are to strengthen democracy, instill a respect

for the rule of law and human rights, and educate the future leaders of partner nations in

the appropriate resolution of regional issues. WHINSEC approaches these goals via

thorough curriculum and exercise training explicitly addressing human rights and

democracy issues and standards. Thorough training in just war theory, the United Nations

Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva and Hague Conventions, and the appropriate

role of the military. The curriculum also includes peaceful resolution of border conflicts,

combating narco-terrorism, organized crime and illicit trafficking in general, responding

to natural disasters, and providing support to peacekeeping efforts[25].

WHINSEC is an important enabler of partner nations' capabilities. While other

DOD components provide field training and some level of formal education of partner

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[25] Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, "What is WHINSEC?," under "FAQ," https://www.benning.army.mil/tenant/whinsec/faq.html# (accessed January 22, 2013).

nations' forces and civilian personnel, WHINSEC provides the most in-depth, engaged formal education for our partners' most important resources: rising leadership.

Northern Combatant Command

Perhaps the greatest area where coordination of U.S. support for the region is necessary is between SOUTHCOM and the Northern Combatant Command (USNORTHCOM). SOUTHCOM's area of responsibility does not include all of Latin America. USNORTHCOM's area of responsibility includes Mexico and approximately 500 miles of surrounding sea area, the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, and U.S. Caribbean areas (the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands)[26]. These are critical areas in which many U.S. security issues concerning Latin America are found. In particular, Mexico and the surrounding sea area require a close partnership between the two Commands. The capabilities and influence of Mexican transnational criminal organizations in Central America and beyond are of the utmost concern to both Commands. Widespread violence and corruption are specifically cited as deteriorating effects of the growing power these criminal organizations have on partner nations. The two Commands work conjointly to monitor hot zones of illicit trafficking by these organizations. The Tri-Border area between Mexico's southern border, Belize, and Guatemala is a critical zone requiring in-depth cooperation[27].

The mission of USNORTHCOM is conducting homeland defense, civil support, and security cooperation operations in defense of U.S. interests and security.

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[26] U.S. Northern Command, "About USNORTHCOM," http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html (accessed January 17, 2013).
[27] U.S. Southern Command, "Countering Transnational organized Crime," http://www.southcom.mil/ourmissions/Pages/Countering%20Transnational%20Organized%20Crime.aspx (accessed January 22, 2013).

USNORTHCOM oversees the operations relevant to the Command within the Command's area of responsibility, and is responsible for planning, organizing, and executing these operations, but the Command does not have a substantial number of permanently assigned forces and relies heavily on volunteers from the armed forces. Forces are assigned to USNORTHCOM as necessitated by mission plans and ordered by the President of Secretary of Defense. The components of USNORTHCOM relevant to Latin America are Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region, responsible for coordinating the allocation of armed forces for USNORTHCOM missions and cooperation with other federal agencies or civil authorities, Joint Task Force North (JTF North) and other components of U.S. Army North, 1st Air Force, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, U.S. Marine Forces Northern Command[28].

U.S. Army North supports theater security with Mexico to address common threats. The component also supports Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Administration, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to enhance their capabilities. U.S. Army North trains and supports Mexican counterparts, seeking to build mutual understanding and trust with longstanding professional and personal relationships in order to enhance interoperability and positive relations. The component promotes mutual understanding of doctrine, tactics, and protocol. Theater security-enabling units from U.S. Army North include the 167th Theater Sustainment Command, responsible for planning and coordinating theater sustainment and logistical support, the 63rd Theater Aviation Brigade, responsible for providing theater aviation planning and coordination,

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[28] U.S. NORTHCOM, "About USNORTHCOM," http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html#JFHQN (accessed January 29, 2013).

and the 263rd Army Air and Missile Defense Command, which plans, coordinates,

integrates and executes missions to engage short- and medium- range ballistic missile

threats[29].

JTF North, composed of active duty and reserve service members from every

branch of Armed Forces, DOD civilian personnel, and contracted support personnel, falls

under the operational control of U.S. Army North's Joint Force Land Component

Command. The coordination of operations from various DOD branches and civilian U.S.

government agencies facilitates interagency synchronization within USNORTHCOM's

area of responsibility. The joint service command is responsible for supporting U.S.

federal law enforcement agencies in disrupting the operations of transnational criminal

organizations through counter drug and counter narco-terrorist missions. Target activities

include international terrorism, narco-trafficking, alien smuggling, weapons of mass

destruction and the delivery of weapons systems. JTF North aids the "identification and

interdiction of suspected transnational threats within and along the approaches to the

continental United States"[30].

1st Air Force (AFNORTH) serves as the air component for USNORTHCOM, is

responsible for the aerospace control and air defense of the continental U.S., U.S. Virgin

Islands, Puerto Rico, and the surrounding sea space approximately 500 miles out from

borders. In addition to the control and defense of air space, operations include

surveillance, search and rescue, and coordinating on-land Federal searches[31].

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[29] U.S. Army North, "Command Brief 2011," under "Site Links," http://www.arnorth.army.mil/Home.aspx (accessed January 29, 2013).
[30] Joint Task Force North, "Joint Task Force North Mission," http://www.jtfn.northcom.mil/subpages/mission.html (accessed January 29, 2013).
[31] U.S. Air Force, "1st AF Mission," under "Fact Sheets," http://www.1af.acc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4107 (accessed January 29, 2013).

U.S. Fleet Forces Command, serving as the Joint Forces Maritime Component

Commander North under USNORTHCOM, supports USNORTHCOM through providing

trained, certified, combat-ready naval forces to the Combatant Commands which are

capable of executing swift, sustainable naval or joint operations. The component also

assumes responsibility for commanding and controlling these forces during the planning

and execution of these operations[32].

USNORTHCOM relies heavily on reserve forces. The U.S. Marine Corps

component of USNORTHCOM falls under the Marine Corps Reserve forces. These

forces, and the other reservist forces, are able to be called upon when needed for

emergency assistance to civil authorities or other U.S. government agencies in the case of

a natural disaster or some other catastrophic event, and to assist in protection of forces or

anti-terror operations[33].

Combat Support Agencies

Aside from SOUTHCOM and USNORTHCOM, the DOD also utilizes Combat

Support Agencies (CSA), identified in Figure 5.1, as resources toward achieving

objectives. The most relevant CSAs to Latin America are the Defense Contract

Management Agency, Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Intelligence

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[32] U.S. Fleet Forces Command, "About USFF - Our Missions, History, and Other Info About Us," under "About Us," http://www.cffc.navy.mil/ (accessed January 29, 2013).

[33] U.S. NORTHCOM, "About USNORTHCOM," http://www.northcom.mil/About/index.html#JFHQN (accessed January 29, 2013); William Knight, "CRS Report for Congress: Homeland Security: Roles and Missions for United States Northern Command," (January 28, 2008), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl34342.pdf (accessed January 29, 2013); U.S. Marine Corps, "MCICOM and TECOM Responsibilities in the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) Areas of Responsibility (AOR) for USMC Antiterrorism (AT) Program and Force Protection (FP) Responsibilities," October 17, 2012, http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/128697/mcicom-and-tecom-responsibilities-in-the-us-northern-command-usnorthcom-and-us.aspx (accessed January 29, 2013).

Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National

Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security Agency/Central Security Service. This

research will not delve into the roles of these agencies because their contributions are

largely dependent upon the operations of the component commands previously detailed.

VI. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSTURE AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Department of Defense posture in the region places heavier emphasis in joint exercises and rapid, flexible, maneuverable forces rather than permanent standing forces. The DOD has positioned itself in a supportive, advisory role where the organization is 'leading from behind' in most scenarios. U.S. forces are deployed to the region on a rotational basis, intending to work as enablers to their counterparts in the region for relatively short periods, leaving little footprint behind beyond the tools they have contributed to partner nations' capabilities.

In 2010, SOUTHCOM released the Command Strategy 2020: Partnership for the Americas detailing the vision for the command to "continue to evolve as a joint and interagency organization supporting U.S. national security interests through enduring partnerships[1]." The living document, intended to be reviewed and updated every two years, outlines how the command intends to achieve three overarching goals: defending the southern approaches of the U.S. and U.S. interests, fostering regional security and positioning the U.S. as the strategic partner of choice for the region, work alongside other U.S. agencies and partner nations to secure citizens' safety, political and economic freedom.

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[1] U.S. Southern Command, "Command Strategy 2020: Partnership for the Americas," (July 2010), http://www.southcom.mil/aboutus/Documents/Command_Strategy_2020.pdf (accessed February 4, 2013).

The strategy is deeply engaged in the vision of partnerships. Globalization is increasingly setting the agenda for the Western Hemisphere and the world. The relationships among nations, among forces, among institutions, private parties, public sectors, and also among transnational criminal organizations requires an expansion of cooperative engagement and efficient networks to promote security, prosperity, and economic and political freedom. The mission is to be postured to enhance regional security and cooperation through readiness to conduct joint and combined full-spectrum military operations and to support whole-of-government efforts. The command is also situated for crisis response in the event of aggression, large-scale instability, or some major disaster.

The overarching goals of defending the United States, fostering regional security, and being an enduring partner are resource-demanding objectives. In order to better inform the planning, programming, and budgeting process, SOUTHCOM has identified three focus areas: Counter Illicit Trafficking (CIT), Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). The following Figure 6.1 depicts the linkage between the focus areas and strategic objective lines of effort.

Figure 6.1 SOUTHCOM's Strategic Objective Linkage

Strategic Objectives and Associated Lines of Effort	Focus Areas		
	CIT	HA/DR	PKO
#1 - Defend the United States			
Detect/counter threats through a layered defense	X		
Secure the U.S. against attacks and intrusions	X		
Support the interagency and Partner Nations to counter illicit trafficking	X		
Secure air, maritime, land, cyber and space domains	X		
Protect critical infrastructure and assets		X	
Support civil authorities in the conduct of consequence management		X	X
#2 - Foster Regional Security			
USSOUTHCOM and Components maintain full-spectrum capabilities	X		X
Enhance collaborative defense and security capability	X	X	X
Deny sanctuary to hostile actors	X		
Strengthen security capability through engagement with partners	X	X	X
Promote respect for human rights and the rule of law through mil-to-mil engagement	X	X	X
#3 - Be an Enduring Partner			
A. Military-to-Military			
Promote the U.S. as a Partner of Choice	X	X	X
Encourage regional leadership on hemispheric challenges	X	X	X
Promote greater sharing of information and transparency	X	X	
Support regional initiatives toward hemispheric security	X		
Strive to open new avenues of engagement as opportunities arise	X	X	X
B. Interagency			
Expand cooperation with the interagency	X	X	
Build enduring relationships with interagency partners to enhance security	X		X

Figure 6.1 SOUTHCOM's Strategic Objective Linkage, *Source:* U.S. Southern Command, "Command Strategy 2020: Partnership for the Americas," (July 2010): 7,
http://www.southcom.mil/aboutus/Documents/Command_Strategy_2020.pdf (accessed February 4, 2013).

Figure 6.1 demonstrates the priorities of U.S. focus areas by the number of set

objectives assigned to each area. Counter Illicit Trafficking is clearly the first priority,

with almost every strategic objective relating to this focus area. The majority of

objectives are also aimed toward Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief and

Peacekeeping Operations, with HA/DR barely taking precedence over PKO. The

following section will review which DOD resources are being allocated to the three focus

areas Countering Illicit Trafficking, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief, and

Peacekeeping Operations.

Countering Illicit Trafficking

SOUTHCOM has two Cooperative Security Locations (CSL), formerly known as

Forward Operating Locations, from which the Command maintains presence and

coordinates rapid response efforts with partner nations. CSLs have existing airfields from

which U.S. and partner nation aircraft deploy in support of counter transnational

organized crime operations. These locations are not U.S. military bases and exist only

under the pretense of tenant agreements with the host nation. One of these locations is the

Caribbean CSL at Curaçao's Hato International Airport and Aruba's Reina Beatrix

International Airport. This location is incredibly close to the Venezuelan coastline. The

U.S. has an access agreement with the Netherlands, who controls the islands. The U.S.

presence there is predominantly Air Force personnel, working to provide effective, rapid

response to the immediate area, especially on counter-drug flight missions. The second

CSL is the Central American CSL in Comalapa International Airport in El Salvador,

situated closely to the tri-border area for El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, directly

by the El Salvador-Honduras border. The U.S. presence at this location is predominantly Navy personnel, working to extend the reach of detection and monitoring aircraft for the Eastern Pacific drug trafficking passageways. SOUTHCOM estimates more than half of the drugs moving toward the U.S. pass through this area.

Aircraft usage and operations at CSLs are coordinated by the Joint Interagency Task Force South from their base at Key West, Florida. The aircraft are unarmed, serving only as surveillance tools to complement local authorities of the host nation in detecting, monitoring, and tracking illicit trafficking operations. Regarding interdiction, host nations are responsible for the final decision-making within their own borders, while the operations are U.S.-led in international spaces[2].

Theater Security Cooperation is an essential component of DOD posture in Latin America. DOD must find creative, efficient approaches to the modern issues confronting the Western Hemisphere. Training exercise series are an important component to Theater Security. They allow multiple nations, agencies, military and police forces, and civilian personnel to converge around a common threat, exploring options and tactics of interoperability and coordination in order to create the most efficient, seamless response initiatives. The predominant training exercises for U.S. and partner nations' forces are detailed as follows.

Secure Seas, a maritime security assistance initiative, falls under CARSI, focusing on building the capabilities of nine Caribbean nations: Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname, Guyana. The goal of this program is to facilitate effective

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[2] U.S. Southern Command, "Cooperative Security Locations," under "Missions," http://www.southcom.mil/ourmissions/Pages/Cooperative-Security-Locations.aspx (accessed February 7, 2013).

interoperability to counter transnational crime in the Caribbean. The U.S. Coast Guard oversees the acquisition of assets, with each partner nation gaining access to equipment (interceptor boats, command, control and communications systems, infrared systems, supportive equipment) along with training and technical support according to their unique needs[3]. SOUTHCOM has reported an improvement in the maritime interdiction of many Caribbean nations since the inception of the exercise, which serves as a preventative measure for each nation to enhance both their own security and their collective regional security. The 12th Air Force Sovereign Skies Expansion Program has work with several partner nations over the past few years, including the Dominican Republic, Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, to improve interdiction rates and reduce illicit traffickers' capabilities in these areas. On land, SOUTHCOM components have worked with partner nations to conduct training and improve checkpoint infrastructure the Caribbean and in Central America to disrupt the northbound flow illicit trafficking along the Pan-American Highway. The Border Security Initiative, a partnership effort among SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM, U.S. State Department, and the U.S. Embassies in Guatemala, Belize, and Mexico, is a sub-regional program sponsoring the training, equipment, and infrastructure to the three partner nations for counter-narcotics operations. The program has established an Interagency Border Security Unit in Tecún Umán in Guatemala and expanded land interdiction capabilities via border checkpoints at the Mexico-Guatemala border[4].

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[3] U.S. Southern Command, "Secure Seas," December 12, 2012, under "News," http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/Secure-Seas.aspx (accessed February 7, 2013).
[4] Douglas Fraser, "Posture Statement" (before the 112th Congress House Armed Services Committee, March 6, 2012), http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/SOUTHCOM_2012_Posture_Statement.pdf (accessed February 7, 2013).

Tradewinds is another annual exercise series, approximately one week in length, designed to increase the capabilities and interoperability of defense forces, law enforcement, and disaster management agencies in the Caribbean. Participants from sixteen partner nations, primarily those in and around the Caribbean Basin, develop interagency approaches to address complex scenarios with defense, natural and man-made disaster elements. The exercises place partner nations' authorities in leadership roles, and allow them to simulate scenarios with various agencies both from the U.S. and other partner nations to gain experience and determine which areas need improvement[5].

Specific to Special Operations military and police forces is the annual, week-long counterterrorism skills competition Fuerzas Comando. In June 2012, 21 countries participated in the competition hosted in Colombia. The competition promotes friendly military-to-military relations, trust and confidence, training, interoperability, and enhanced regional security: Bahamas, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and the U.S. The 2012 competition included multinational special operations skills competition designed to physically and psychologically test competitors in land and maritime endurance, and a Senior Leader Seminar. The skills competition was based on physical fitness, weapons marksmanship, aquatic skills, and tactical capabilities, while the Senior

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[5] U.S. Southern Command, "Tradewinds 2012," June 14, 2012, under "News," http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/Tradewinds-2012.aspx (accessed February 8, 2013); Ryan Taylor, "Tradewinds Command Post Exercise a Success," U.S. Southern Command, June 24, 2012, under "News," http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/Tradewinds-Command-Post-exercise-a-Success.aspx (accessed February 8, 2013).

Leader Seminar emphasized political-military relations in approaching regional counterterrorism strategy[6]

A special operations team from USNORTHCOM has become the new U.S.-based special operations headquarters, initiated especially to train Mexican security forces (military, intelligence, and law enforcement) in counter-terrorist operations. The training will be geared to utilize tactics the U.S. has used against al-Qaida against Mexican drug cartels and criminal networks. The training will not only include physical tactical training, but also in how to build and utilize interagency networks to counter criminal networks. The goal is to enable Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto to build a security force focused on inhibiting and disintegrating criminal networks.

However, the level of Mexican interest in this program is unclear. The Mexican Foreign Affairs Department has reportedly issued a statement that they have been briefed on the changes and had no further comment. Currently, USNORTHCOM's special operations training missions coordinated with Mexico are extensions of the Merida Initiative. The new headquarters could facilitate an increase in training missions, but that is contingent upon Mexico's interest in participating. The training missions are meant to enable Mexican forces, utilizing their own weapons, and they do not insinuate any utilization of U.S. resources, weapons or forces, toward special operations missions in Mexico. U.S. forces are rarely even permitted to carry guns in Mexico.

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[6] U.S. Southern Command, "Fuerzas Comando 2012," June 4, 2012, under "News," http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/Fuerzas-Comando-2012.aspx (accessed February 8, 2013).

The level of uncertainty regarding Mexican participation in these training missions would portray the new special operations headquarters as a risky investment, but the headquarters is simply placing operations which are already occurring under a component commander, according to a NORTHCOM spokesman. The new headquarters is also intended to serve as a base for coordinating special operations troops toward any domestic needs; search and rescue after a natural disaster, in example[7].

Operation Martillo embodies the multinational, interoperating missions the DOD has sought to build toward. The effort includes U.S., European, and Latin American contributions: Belize, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Spain, the U.K. and the U.S., with contributions from Chile. U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels, aircraft from U.S. federal law enforcement agencies, and military and law enforcement units from partner nations cooperate toward the effort. JIATF South coordinates Operation Martillo, which focuses on targeting illicit trafficking along the Central American isthmus. Early in January of 2013, the operation saw the seizure of 600 pounds of cocaine (approximately $$22 million worth), confiscated by U.S. Coast Guard personnel within the Fourth Fleet area of responsibility[8].

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[7] Kimberly Dozier, "US commandos boost numbers to train Mexican forces," *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, January 17, 2013, http://www.ajc.com/ap/ap/crime/us-commandos-boost-numbers-to-train-mexican-forces/nTzDS/ (accessed January 29, 2013).
[8] U.S. Southern Command, "Operation Martillo," January 23, 2013, under "News," http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/Operation-Martillo.aspx (accessed February 7, 2013).

In addressing Congress with the SOUTHCOM Posture Statement, General Douglas Fraser highlighted the potential of amplifying the effects of Operation Martillo by aligning air and maritime resources with partner nations' complementary land forces and law enforcement. SOUTHCOM has coordinated with Central American partner nations and international donors to realize this potential[9].

In this framework, the Marines contributed to Operation Martillo around August/September, 2012 with Detachment Martillo, approximately 200 marines and four UH-1N "Huey" helicopters deployed to Guatemala for two months to conduct over 250 monitoring and detection flight mission in support of Guatemalan law enforcement and naval authorities. On flights, a Guatemalan translator would accompany the marines and relay information back to local authorities responsible for conducting interdictions. The officer-in-charge for Detachment Marillo, Colonel Robert Rauenhorst, reported, "We saw an immediate impact in trafficking patterns along established routes after we started flying our helos." During their deployment, the marines also trained local forces on basic water survival and combat lifesaving skills. They also medically treated and evaluated local personnel, assisted by the base medic who was able to pick up advanced techniques in preventative medicine from the experience[10].

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[9] Douglas Fraser, "Posture Statement" (before the 112th Congress House Armed Services Committee, March 6, 2012), http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/SOUTHCOM_2012_Posture_Statement.pdf (accessed February 4, 2013).

[10] Greg Wolf, "After partnering to disrupt trafficking, Detachment Martillo departs Guatemala," October 16, 2012, under "News," Headquarters Marine Corps, http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/News/NewsArticleDisplay/tabid/3488/Article/128618/after-partnering-to-disrupt-trafficking-detachment-martillo-departs-guatemala.aspx/aboutus/Documents (accessed February 7, 2013).

UNITAS is a series of annually conducted naval exercises between the U.S. and partner nations' forces. The goal is to enhance security cooperation, interoperability, and improve coalition operations focused on high-tech surface, air, amphibious and under-sea naval training exercises. The exercises cover a variety of Theater Security scenarios (military-to-military cooperation, humanitarian assistance, disaster response, combined exchanges, exercises and operations, and maritime security) not only to train on the basic operating level but also in how to effectively communicate, coordinate, and cooperate with each other's navies in such a way that the partnerships are built on mutual understanding and ultimately become more effective. The practice also gives the partnerships opportunities to identify where there are weaknesses in performance or cooperation so those issues may be addressed. UNITAS exercises are carried out in the Caribbean, Pacific and Atlantic waters. UNITAS Pacific was hosted by Peru in 2012, focusing on maritime interdiction operations, counter-piracy events, air, surface, and anti-submarine warfare. In September 2012, Naval forces from Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and the U.S. participated in UNITAS Pacific, while Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, the U.K. and the U.S. conducted UNITAS Atlantic. UNITAS Atlantic also includes the Marine Corps exercise Partnership of the Americas, which includes more advanced training exercise: ship-to-land movement, military operations in urban terrain, and live-fire ranges. UNITAS-Partnership of the Americas included forces from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay[11]. All the UNITAS exercises undoubtedly double as a display of military might and cohesion as a measure of deterrence from would-be threats.

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[11] U.S. Southern Command, "UNITAS/Partnership of the Americas," September 24, 2012, under "News," http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/UNITAS-2012.aspx (accessed February 7, 2013).

Southern Seas is a six-month-long annual naval engagement (May-October in 2012) whose participants engage in the Pacific and Atlantic UNITAS exercises, and Silent Force Exercise. This operation, implemented by U.S. Fourth Fleet, is part of the Partnership of the Americas and focuses on training in the multinational environment, refining coordination, improving interoperability, and demonstrating flexibility, particularly in combating illicit trafficking. Southern Seas also places an emphasis on engagements with partner nations. The tour makes several stops in multiple partner nations' ports for face-to-face interaction between U.S. sailors and the local military and civilian populations[12].

Fuerzas Aliadas PANAMAX is an exercise series focused on the defense of the Panama Canal and Central American region by the multinational joint- or combined- task force. The series is hosted in various locations within the U.S. over the duration of less than two weeks. The exercises focus on protecting free flows of trade, simulating responses to requests from Panamanian and Colombian governments for safe passage through the Panama Canal by neutral forces. The exercises included maritime, air, land, space, and cyber challenges. Similar to the previously described exercises, PANAMAX builds interoperability and capability among partner nations to handle complex multinational initiatives and modern threats. The series is designed to fall in accordance with the standards for stability operations set by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions. This series also placed an emphasis on building partner nations' leadership capabilities. The 2012 PANAMAX marked the first event which Colombia led the ground component and Brazil led the maritime component of the exercises. Seventeen

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[12] U.S. Southern Command, "Southern Seas 2012," October 17, 2012, under "News," http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/Southern-Seas-2012.aspx (accessed February 7, 2013).

partner nations participated in the 2012 PANAMAX: Belize, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and the U.S. The U.S. forces were represented by Army South, Marine Forces South, Special Operation Command South, and Naval Forces South/Fourth Fleet[13].

Aside from exercises emphasizing partnership-building and interoperability, U.S. forces also work on training exercises focused on partner-enabling. In Honduras, U.S. Navy Special Forces have worked to help build an elite military counter-illicit trafficking force. Honduras in one of the most dangerous nations in the world, largely as a consequence of being the major transit point for narcotics trafficking. Much of the illicit trafficking enters Central America through maritime routes. In response to this threat, U.S. Special Naval Warfare Task Force-Alpha deployed Special Naval Warfare Unit Four in support of Special Operations Command South to partner with Honduran counterparts in a six-month elite training program. The program was aimed at increasing the capacity of Fuerza Especiales Naval, the Honduran Special Operations maritime unit especially tasked to countering illicit trafficking and transnational organized crime. The training consisted of two, eight-week Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL, modeled after the courses U.S. Navy SEALs undertake, and ultimately yielded 45 elite Honduran Special Operators. Fuerza Especiales Naval also received training in basic watercraft maintenance skills and procedures, nautical chart familiarization, boat vectoring and intercepting techniques, small boat handling tactics, long-range navigation exercises, and communication via Harris radio technologies (an especially rare skillset in the region). To

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[13] U.S. Southern Command, "PANAMAX 2012," August 6, 2012, under "News," http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/PANAMAX-2012.aspx (accessed February 7, 2013).

approach the training in such a way that the Honduran unit would be self-sustaining, seven Special Operators were also trained as future instructors of the skillsets garnered over the course of this program. The U.S. forces worked with the Hondurans to create organizational departments (assault, communications, engineering, and training) in order to ensure the team had a solid infrastructure from which to remain self-sustaining and increase capacity over time[14].

DOD components conduct regular staff talks with military and political leaders of partner nations in order to express their concerns, discuss mutual issues, align their plans and intentions, and coordinate their resources appropriately. Representatives of Army South, acting as executive agent for the U.S. Army in the region, have met with Brazilian military leaders annually to strengthen professional partnerships and increase interaction and effective coordination between U.S. and Brazilian armies. The meetings conclude with the signing of a bilateral engagement plan for the upcoming year detailing the activities the two armies plan to coordinate and mutually engage. Army South conducts these staff talks with Chile, Colombia, and El Salvador as well on behalf of the U.S. Army Chief of Staff[15].

Similarly, in 2011 SOUTHCOM components supported various military leadership conferences and engagements. Army South assembled Guatemalan, Honduran, Salvadoran, and Nicaraguan Army Commanders together for their first Central American Regional Army Leaders Conference. The conference served as an opportunity for the Army Commanders to engage and consult over mutual threats, particularly transnational

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[14] U.S. Southern Command, "US Navy Special Forces help Honduras form elite counter trafficking force," February 3, 2013, under "News," http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/US-Navy-Special-Forces-help-Honduras-form-elite-counter-trafficking-force.aspx (accessed February 8, 2013).
[15] U.S. Army South, "U.S. Army South conducts Staff Talks with Brazilian army," Release No. 04-12-03, April 26, 2012, http://www.arsouth.army.mil/news/newsreleases/3594-u-s-army-south-to-conduct-staff-talks-with-brazilian-army.html (accessed February 8, 2013).

organized crime. Marine Corps Forces South coordinated the 2011 Marine Leaders and Senior Enlisted Leaders Conferences to bring North American, Central American, and South American Marine Corps and Naval Infantries together. Likewise in the same year, 12th Air Force engaged representatives from 13 partner nations' Air Forces comprising the System of Cooperation Among the Air Forces[16]. The U.S. initiative in all these gatherings represents the new posture in the region. 'Leading from behind' and promoting shared responsibility is the U.S. intent in Latin America. These conferences, engagements, and all the training exercises are investments in this new hemispheric order. Each one is an opportunity to imprint U.S. values and protocol on partner nations which will begin to assume many of the security responsibilities the U.S. has traditionally dominated.

The SOUTHCOM Posture Statement sets Central America, Colombia, and Peru as priority focus areas, with the Caribbean immediately following. Central America's greatest threat is the illicit trafficking of transnational criminal organizations and the violence and devastation they carry. Colombia and Peru are also subject to these problems, coupled with serious terrorist aggression. The Caribbean is also vulnerable to transnational criminal organizations. Therefore the emphasis of security training in these regions is logical. The Command Strategy also highlights the achievements and potential of Colombia, Chile, and Brazil as top strategic security partners in the region. Colombian and Brazilian forces have some of the highest narcotics seizure rates, and have always played pivotal roles in facilitating security cooperation among partner nations. Colombia

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[16] Douglas Fraser, "Posture Statement" (before the 112th Congress House Armed Services Committee, March 6, 2012),
http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/SOUTHCOM_2012_Posture_Statement.pdf (accessed February 8, 2013).

has provided training to thousands of security forces in Central America, and has

coordinated interdiction missions and intelligence sharing with Honduran counterparts.

Brazil facilitated trilateral counterdrug initiatives with Bolivia and the U.S., two nations

with often-strained relations in this issue area. Chile has also contributed to maritime

expertise to Central American security forces[17].

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

One of the greatest demonstrations of DOD disaster relief efforts is Operation

Unified Response, providing support to Haiti earthquake relief in 2010. By the morning

after the earthquake, January 13, 2010, SOUTHCOM was directing U.S. military forces

assisting the Haitian U.S. Embassy and local government authorities. The 1st Special

Operations Wing reopened the Toussaint Louverture International Airport while the U.S.

Coast Guard and military aircraft worked on delivering relief supplies and evacuating

American citizens. Several naval ships were deployed to the island and SOUTHCOM

then established Joint Task Force-Haiti in order to coordinate, command, and control the

massive efforts and resources flowing into the area from the military, USAID, various

NGOs and the Haitian Government. The efforts pulled resources from every U.S. military

branch to provide timely relief to the Haitians, a process which encompassed almost the

entire range of military capabilities: search and rescue, medical care, humanitarian

assistance, security, logistical planning for disbursement of resources, moving Internally

Displaced Persons, stabilizing danger zones from flooding and mudslides, running camps

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[17] Douglas Fraser, "Posture Statement" (before the 112th Congress House Armed Services Committee, March 6, 2012),
http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/SOUTHCOM_2012_Posture_Statement.pdf (accessed February 7, 2013).

and medical facilities, clearing debris, engineering, and rebuilding. While relief came

from sources globally, Joint Task Force-Haiti assumed a leadership role to seamlessly

coordinate with USAID, local authorities, the United Nations and others[18].

SOUTHCOM components coordinate a handful of humanitarian assistance

programs. Among them are Beyond the Horizon and New Horizons. These programs

essentially serve the same purpose, assessment, construction, and sustainment projects,

but Beyond the Horizon projects are executed over a three-year period while New

Horizons focus on short-term projects typically coordinated over the duration of one year

or less. Both programs target rural, poverty-stricken communities to help construct

schools, clinics, community centers, water wells, and similar facilities to improve the

quality of life for these areas. The programs also include medical components to provide

essential care and training to locals. Both programs try to integrate local authorities,

doctors, and professionals into the activities in order to promote sustainment of the

program's initiatives and positive civil-military relations. The medical training

components are Medical Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETES). MEDRETES

feature a small, military medical team deployed for approximately two weeks to

underprivileged regions. These programs are typically partners with Beyond the Horizon

and New Horizons projects but are also executed independently depending on regional

needs[19]. These projects serve the civilian populations, provide training and experience to

U.S. and partner nations' participants, and increase the partner nations' government

presence in areas which are often isolated and underserved.

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[18] U.S. Southern Command, "Operation Unified Response: Support to Haiti Earthquake Relief 2010,"
under "News," http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/Operation-Unified-Response-Support-to-Haiti-Earthquake-Relief-2010.aspx (accessed February 7, 2013).

[19] U.S. Southern Command, "Training and Exercises," under "Missions,"
http://www.southcom.mil/ourmissions/Pages/Training%20and%20Exercises.aspx (accessed February 8, 2013).

In 2011 Army South conducted New Horizons projects in El Salvador, Dominican Republic, and Haiti while 12th Air Force conducted the projects in Suriname. In the same year, multiple engineering projects commenced in Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Peru, and Haiti[20]. In 2012, Army and Navy personnel coordinated with Guatemalan forces and civilian personnel on Beyond the Horizon projects in San Marcos and Colón areas of Guatemala[21]. In Honduras, the Air Force is joining in the mix of U.S. forces coordinating with Hondurans for Beyond the Horizon projects near San Pedro Sula[22]. In December 2012, JTF Bravo partnered with the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, the Guatemalan Army and Ministry of Health to set up MENDRETES and the dental counterpart DENRETES in Chiquimula, Guatemala[23].

MEDRETES and Medical Civil Action Programs (MEDCAP) are mutually beneficial projects for U.S. military medical personnel and the local populations in the region. The projects give U.S. forces an opportunity to train, operating in unique, challenging environments, while local doctors receive training and citizens receive free, quality healthcare. In FY2011, SOUTHCOM estimates approximately 225,000 citizens in 19 partner nations received care from these programs. The Navy's annual Continuing Promise deployments provide medical care and infrastructure projects similar to those provided by New Horizons and Beyond the Horizon, coordinating deployments with the

[20] Douglas Fraser, "Posture Statement" (before the 112th Congress House Armed Services Committee, March 6, 2012), http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/SOUTHCOM_2012_Posture_Statement.pdf (accessed February 8, 2013).
[21] U.S. Army South, "U.S. and Guatemala armies kickoff Beyond the Horizon exercise," Release No. 04-12-02, April 16, 2012, http://www.arsouth.army.mil/news/newsreleases/3558-beyond-the-horizon-guatemala-2012.html (accessed February 8, 2013).
[22] U.S. Army South, "Exercise in Honduras Strengthen Partnership with United States," Release No. 04-12-01, April 13, 2012, http://www.arsouth.army.mil/news/newsreleases/3557-army-south-kicks-off-beyond-the-horizon-honduras-2012.html (accessed February 8, 2013).
[23] Eric Donner, "JTF-Bravo MEDRETE, DENRETE in Guatemala a huge success," January 17, 2013, under "News," U.S. Army South, http://www.arsouth.army.mil/news/4461-jtf-b-guatemala-medrete-a-huge-success.html (accessed February 8, 2013).

Atlantic hurricane season in order to support disaster relief efforts in the region. When

disasters occur, SOUTHCOM operates in support of USAID and the Office of Foreign

Disaster Assistance to mitigate the safety, economic, and social effects. SOUTHCOM

also engages local authorities of partner nations to improve the planning and response to

natural and man-made disasters through training exercises, seminars, conferences, and

the strategic positioning and construction of Emergency Operations Centers and Disaster

Relief Warehouses. These efforts are combined and shared by partner nations[24]. Fuerzas

Aliadas Humanitarias is one of the primary multinational exercises in humanitarian

assistance and disaster relief. The program assembles military personnel and

organizations, civilian authorities, NGOs, and various government agencies to plan and

train in the collaboration of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance efforts[25].

The amalgam of DOD-led humanitarian and disaster relief efforts has left

hundreds of thousands of partner nations' citizens with quality medical treatment

including surgeries and complicated procedures, an infrastructure from which to self-

sustain a higher quality of living and broader response capacities, and the foundations of

partner nation networks to engage each other for assistance and mutual benefit. The

efforts have garnered attention and investment from the international community. The

Inter-American Development Bank pledged to incorporate the sustainment of various

projects, particularly the schools established, into their grant package in 2012[26].

[24] U.S. Southern Command, "Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief," under "Missions," http://www.southcom.mil/ourmissions/Pages/Humanitarian%20Assistance.aspx (accessed February 8, 2013).

[25] U.S. Southern Command, "Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias 2011 (FA HUM 11)," April 25, 2011, under "News," http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/FA-HUM-11.aspx (accessed February 8, 2013).

[26] Douglas Fraser, "Posture Statement" (before the 112th Congress House Armed Services Committee, March 6, 2012), http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/SOUTHCOM_2012_Posture_Statement.pdf (accessed February 8, 2013).

Peacekeeping Operations

The DOD works in conjunction with the State Department on the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which seeks to increase the peacekeeping capabilities of partner nations. This initiative includes the PKO Americas exercise, focused on training partner nations in conducting effective peacekeeping operations[27]. GPOI promotes partner nations' capacities to support United Nations and regional peacekeeping operations by building partner nations' capacities in peacekeeping proficiencies, increasing the number of military and police personnel with this skillset available for deployment, and facilitating operations with logistical and preparatory support[28]. SOUTHCOM supports GPOI through the Marine Corps Forces South Partnership of the Americas and Army South's Peacekeeping Operations-Americas training exercises. Peacekeeping Operations-Americas is a training exercise which focuses on the coordination among military combined- and joint-forces, governments, and NGOs during peacekeeping operations. The goal of the exercises is to enable forces ready to deploy for peacekeeping operations in support of GPOI and the UN, but also to promote peace and stability within their own areas of responsibility. The exercises emphasize mutual understanding, cooperation, and partnership. These are elements of all the multinational training exercises DOD sponsors, but Peacekeeping Operations-Americas approaches

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[27] U.S. Southern Command, "Support to Peacekeeping Operations," under "Missions," http://www.southcom.mil/ourmissions/Pages/Peacekeeping.aspx (accessed February 8, 2013).
[28] U.S. Department of State, "Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)," under "Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis (PM/PPA)," http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/ (accessed February 8, 2013).

these elements directly. Respect for the rule of law and human rights are important aspects of these exercises as well[29].

The DOD educational and academic institutes, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, as well as the Inter-American Defense College emphasize the innate role of respect for the rule of law and human rights in a functioning nation and stable region. At these institutes, these values are instilled as part of the curricula and tenets of legitimate protocol. The DOD works to convey these aspects of military culture not only to impart protocol compatible with U.S., UN and global allies' standards, but also in support of State Department initiatives. Partner nations receive restricted U.S. assistance unless certain standards of human rights and rule of law are met, as determined by the State Department. This has been an issue in Latin America. Particularly in Guatemala, where human rights violations have a long and deeply ingrained history, the DOD has not been able to provide the full spectrum of support to the Guatemalan military which other partner nations have been the beneficiaries of. This is concerning considering that Guatemala is situated in such a dangerous geographic position, vulnerable to exploitation by transnational criminal organizations. SOUTHCOM supports the State Department and Guatemalan authorities' efforts to rectify the human rights situation in order to move forward with the necessary support programs[30].

Utilization of DOD resources to promote good will and offer humanitarian assistance have become, at least in part, leverage for indirectly achieving U.S. foreign

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[29] U.S. Army, "Peacekeeping Operations - Americas Exercise 2012," *Stand-To!,* May 2, 2012, http://www.army.mil/standto/archive/issue.php?issue=2012-05-02 (accessed February 9, 2013).

[30] Douglas Fraser, "Posture Statement" (before the 112th Congress House Armed Services Committee, March 6, 2012), http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/SOUTHCOM_2012_Posture_Statement.pdf (accessed February 7, 2013).

policy objectives, such as democracy promotion. Assistance from the U.S. is contingent upon several counter-drug related, human rights, rule of law, and democratic performance measures. Certain types of assistance are withheld from "drug majors," the major drug-producing or drug-transit countries who do not comply to the best of their ability with U.S. drug policy issues. Security forces of a state are not provided assistance of any kind if they are under suspicion of gross human rights violations. Individual countries are subject to country-specific prohibitions of assistance in addition to these measures. These typically include accountability and transparency measures for federal police forces, measures to address the sources of drug-related violence, and ensure the investigation and prosecution when applicable of federal forces and judiciary officials suspected of corrupt activity[31].

The separation of military and law enforcement roles is an area in which the DOD works to cooperate with State Department efforts. In Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, military forces have been called upon to address domestic security issues surrounding illicit trafficking. Law enforcement institutions in these states are often understaffed, poorly trained and equipped, and vulnerable to corruption by transnational criminal organizations. In the short-term, military forces supplementing law enforcement efforts is necessary in order to achieve stability and civilian security in these states. However, the DOD and State Department recognize the instability this can create in the long-term. The DOD and State Department work to coordinate their efforts in order to facilitate the separation of military and law enforcement roles whenever possible and

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[31] Clare Ribando-Seelke, Liana Sun Wyler, June S. Beittel, and Mark P. Sullivan, "Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs."

emphasize the military's respect for human rights in the interim period when military

forces have taken on internal security roles[32].

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[32] Douglas Fraser, "Posture Statement" (before the 112th Congress House Armed Services Committee, March 6, 2012),
http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/SOUTHCOM_2012_Posture_Statement.pdf (accessed February 7, 2013).

VII. POTENTIAL MODIFICATIONS

To the credit of the Department of Defense, the budgetary and political pressures

to reduce expenditures and increase efficiency have been acknowledged and the

department has taken measures to respond. Former Secretary of Defense Gates embarked

the Department on an Efficiencies Initiative, not only to address the budgetary and

political pressure but also with the intention to cultivate enough savings from abating

inefficiencies to be able to reinvest in modernization of the department. His 2010

statement regarding the initiative describes, "our headquarters and support bureaucracies

– military and civilian alike – have swelled to cumbersome and top-heavy proportions,

grown over reliant on contractors, and grown accustomed to operating with little

consideration to cost[1]."

Following suite with the initiative, SOUTHCOM made adjustments to their

organizational structure, conducted a manpower analysis to facilitate an improved

alignment of resources and functions, improved internal business practices to improve

management of resources, eliminated their Standing Joint Force Headquarters, and froze

the number of billets for certain civilian, general, and flag officer positions to 2010

levels. The command also applied reductions to programs which were not deemed

essential to the SOUTHCOM missions[2].

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[1] Robert M. Gates, "Statement on Department Efficiencies Initiative" (The Pentagon: August 9, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1496 (accessed February 11, 2013).
[2] Douglas Fraser, "Posture Statement" (before the 112th Congress House Armed Services Committee, March 6, 2012), http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/SOUTHCOM_2012_Posture_Statement.pdf (accessed February 11, 2013).

Since the commencement of Gates' Department Efficiencies Initiative, a number

of changes seem to have been implemented culminating, thus far, in the department

repositioning itself toward a new role in order to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives to

the greatest extent in the most efficient manner. 'Leading from behind' requires much

care and creativity, lest the U.S. diminishes their leadership role in the region. The

President's Strategic Guidance document admits, "A reduction in resources will require

innovative and creative solutions to maintain our support for allied and partner

interoperability and building partner capacity. However, with reduced resources,

thoughtful choices will need to be made regarding the location and frequency of these

operations[3]." This is especially true in Latin America, a region which has been placed in

the bottom half of U.S. security priorities and receives much less defense funding relative

to other regions.

The need for innovative and creative efficiency solutions is recognized and

accepted by capable personnel; the problem seems to be that coordination and execution

of creative solutions is incredibly difficult to achieve within the established DOD

framework.

Process Modifications

The existing DOD framework was established for a hegemonic military engaging

in traditional warfare. This is not the role the U.S. Department of Defense will continue

to play in the future. Traditional warfare and predictability of engagements are slowly

becoming obsolete. Tomorrow's threats are covert, swift, and under the radar, requiring

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[3] U.S. Department of Defense, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," (January 2012): 5-6, http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf (accessed February 11, 2013).

rapidly responsive, efficient resources from the U.S. and partner nations. No one nation, not even the strongest, most capable nation, can quell these threats unilaterally and without an efficient network of alliances. This security environment coupled with the U.S. fiscal environment necessitates these networks and their burden-sharing qualities all the more. The Budget Control Act requires the DOD to cut $487 billion over ten years[4]. Therefore the DOD must learn to improve efficiency in practices, and building networks is a solid option for achieving efficiency.

Yet building these networks has proven incredibly challenging because of the DOD framework. In the past, the DOD has been able to assert an overwhelming lead in initiatives, scarcely requiring or considering the contributions of militarily-weak partner nations. Many Latin American countries have borne witness to the U.S. overstepping their boundaries within their borders. This has led to most Latin American states asserting their sovereign rights and requiring the U.S. to yield military authority in their states. There is no longer a preponderance of U.S. military facilities in the region. The few military facilities remaining, while predominantly controlled by U.S. resources, are technically joint facilities with the host countries. In Mexico, U.S. forces are not permitted to carry firearms, except under special, rare circumstances. The regional culture has changed to demand the U.S. is inclusive of the appropriate partner nation authorities, and the U.S. has been willing to oblige because these demands are largely in accordance with U.S. values and interests. However, the nature of these new, equality-oriented relationships does step on the toes of DOD initiatives at times, particularly as the red tape doubles and the potential for process failures increases.

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[4] U.S. Department of Defense Comptroller, "FY 2013 Performance Improvement," (2012): 43 http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2013/FY2013_Performance_Improvement.pdf (accessed February 11, 2013).

Figure 7.1 SOUTHCOM-Partner Nation Network

From the U.S. side alone there are process issues which can inhibit the efficient

execution of operations. Due to the DOD planning process, Combatant Commands are at

a disadvantage. Because these commands have few standing or permanent forces, they do

not have resources readily available to make operational plans for. Combatant Commands

must request forces through their respective service component command. The limited

permanent forces does reduce cost and aid flexibility for Commanders' planning, but

becomes an issue for SOUTHCOM because the command must now compete for

increasingly limited resources with the other Combatant Commands, many of which are

more highly prioritized than Latin America. Similarly, because Combatant Commands'

Theater Security Cooperation Plans follow a different route than other DOD components,

they have often suffered from less visibility and inclusion in broader DOD decision-making when submitting proposals and this has equated to lower budgetary endowments. Theater Security Cooperation Plans include specific Combatant Command activities too detailed for the Office of the Secretary of Defense to properly process, prioritize and allocate appropriate resources for[5].

If the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is not able to adequately process the Combatant Commands' proposals, then some agent component of the DOD needs to be established in support of the Combatant Commands, particularly since their operations represent the approach the DOD is moving toward: small standing forces with rapid deployment capabilities. This new DOD component, the Combatant Commands' nerve center and agent to the OSD, could address many of the efficiency issues surrounding Combatant Commands. This component could be responsible for processing the Combatant Commands' proposals; aggregating, prioritizing, and submitting them forward to the OSD in a more manageable format. This component would also be working alongside the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure the Combatant Commands are adequately supported under appropriate prioritizations.

When examining the organizational structure of the DOD (see Figure 5.1) and the placement of the Combatant Commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as the downward agent, disseminating information downward and setting the agenda for Combatant Commands, but do not serve as an upward agent through which Combatant Commands may regularly have their needs adequately addressed. An agent component would be

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[5] Gregory L. Hager, "Supporting and Integrating Theater Security Cooperation Plans," U.S. Army War College (May 3, 2004), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423731 (accessed February 11, 2013).

inclusive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Combatant Commands could utilize the agent component in the same way each branch has a formal Department managing their affairs.

The DOD is a colossal organization and communications between components can become distorted or lost. This is a major inhibitor to the success of SOUTHCOM and others operating in Latin America. An agent component could help improve lines of communication. Because SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM rely heavily on forces borrowed from other DOD components, the lack of understanding decreases the efficiency of their operations. The borrowed forces cannot possibly understand the essences of each Combatant Command's missions, strategies, and approaches. When forces are rapidly deploying from region to region, Middle Eastern war zones into Latin America for example, misunderstandings and mistakes are inevitable. If an agent component could help to more accurately represent the missions and approaches of Combatant Commands to other components, then forces assigned to the Commands may be able to grasp the Commands' mindset more easily and integrate more efficiently. This would translate to better performance.

The component could also be responsible for organizing and facilitating regular performance reviews under the Joint Chief of Staffs, OSD, and Total Quality Management guidelines. Instead of submitting annual proposals which are not adequately reviewed, Combatant Commands can consult with the agent component on a regular basis to review programs, processes, and initiatives, and address issues sooner in order to make progress toward their objectives. If the DOD intends to proceed with increased

reliance on Combatant Commands then these commands need the support of an agent component.

Combatant Commands have also found creative ways to resource their initiatives by coordinating efforts outside of the DOD. Coordination of efforts with partner nations, of course, is part of this but the commands have also coordinated with the State Department and various NGOs on mutual objectives. However, these processes can become difficult when the planning horizons and timelines are mismatched. This is an issue between the DOD and the State Department, who often need to coordinate initiatives. The two departments have had difficulty in streamlining operations because they do not tend to coordinate on the spending of each other's budgets or many of the details beyond the quantity of resources and the activities they are to conduct[6]. If the DOD were to adopt a less rigid framework than PPB, coordination issues could be alleviated to some degree, but the nature of competition between agencies and dissonance in objectives or approach makes seamless coordination unlikely to become the norm regardless of the DOD framework.

Coordination processes with partner nations are also problematic for Combatant Commands, particularly those like SOUTHCOM who are attempting to coordinate efforts with many under-resourced nations. Theater Security Cooperation Plans can be incredibly difficult to translate into bilateral or multilateral initiatives in accordance with partner nations' capabilities, requirements, and defense structures. Coordination must

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[6] Gregory L. Hager, "Supporting and Integrating Theater Security Cooperation Plans," U.S. Army War College (May 3, 2004), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423731 (accessed February 11, 2013).

effectively link these elements of partner nations to facets of Theater Security

Cooperation Plans and then facilitate the execution of plans[7].

Here is another area where coordination with the State Department, Department

of Justice, and other agencies is critical. Diplomatic relations and military relations are

closely related. U.S. support is contingent upon partner nations meeting the human rights

and rule of law requirements the State Department demands. The separation of law

enforcement and military roles dictates that partner nation law enforcement should be

engaged by U.S. law enforcement agencies rather than U.S. military. Issues like these

require a cohesive network to engage partner nations efficiently. Atop these obstacles is

facilitating the coordination among partner nations. Threats like transnational criminal

organizations and natural disasters have no regard for national borders, and the

coordination of efforts among partner nations is absolutely vital.

The interagency, public-private, and partner nation coordination and streamlining

of operations are critical to the Combatant Commands' success. The commands simply

do not have the resources or, in some cases, the authority to address issues which inhibit

them from achieving their strategic objectives. While SOUTHCOM is responsible for

building this network in Latin America, having the support of the agent component would

facilitate the command's ability to strengthen the network. If the component served to

enable SOUTHCOM to operate more efficiently, cooperative initiatives should become

more successful and facilitate future, similar engagements. An agent component could

also facilitate seamless coordination between the Combatant Commands. SOUTHCOM

and NORTHCOM already work closely around their mutual Area of Responsibility

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[7] Gregory L. Hager, "Supporting and Integrating Theater Security Cooperation Plans," U.S. Army War College (May 3, 2004), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA423731 (accessed February 11, 2013).

borders, but NORTHCOM also works closely with law enforcement agencies, particularly toward their mutual counter-drug and counter narco-terrorism missions[8]. There could be opportunities to take advantage of each other's networks if the commands had a better platform for integrative efforts. The NORTHCOM-Law Enforcement network expertise could certainly be useful toward many SOUTHCOM initiatives, particularly in those states with weak law enforcement institutions.

Resource Allocation Modifications

The reduction of DOD resources in this fiscal environment calls for a "renewed emphasis on a globally networked approach to deterrence and warfare. It will also require thoughtful choices regarding the location and frequency of future operations[9]." The determination of the location and frequency of future operations is incredibly complicated because the threats are inconsistent. There are some variables which are long-term, however, and we may rely on those in this analysis. Corruption, national poverty, homicide rates, and vulnerability to transnational criminal organizations or natural disasters are threats to stability and inhibit partner nations' capabilities to perform as strategic partners (militarily or economically). These threats are elements of the issue areas which SOUTHCOM is tasked to address.

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[8] Joint Task Force North, "Homeland Security Support,"
http://www.jtfn.northcom.mil/subpages/homeland_s.html (accessed February 11, 2013).
[9] U.S. Department of Defense Comptroller, "FY 2013 Performance Improvement," (2012): 43
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2013/FY2013_Performance_Improvement.pdf (accessed
February 11, 2013).

National homicide rates are an indicator of citizens' security. Figure 7.2

represents the most recent available homicide data for Latin America.

Figure 7.2 2011 Latin American Homicide Rates

Country	2011 Homicide Rate (per 100,000)
Honduras	91.6
El Salvador	69.2
Jamaica	40.9
Guatemala	38.5
Colombia	31.4
Dominican Republic	25.0
Mexico	23.7
Nicaragua	12.6
Bermuda	12.3
Costa Rica	10.0
Uruguay	5.9
Chile	3.7

Figure 7.2 2011 Latin American Homicide Rates, *Source*: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Homicide Statistics 2012," under "Crime," http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html (accessed February 9, 2013).

Those nations with the highest homicide rates require assistance in improving

citizens' security. Not surprisingly, Honduras ranks first in homicide rates for the region.

This nation is most vulnerable to transnational criminal organizations. Geographically,

the nation is ideally situated as a transit point for illicit traffickers. The nation also has

large, geographically isolated regions where government presence is sparse to

nonexistent. Many of the citizens here are poverty-stricken and view illicit traffickers as

sources of income. Many of the public officials are corrupt. These aspects combine to form a paradise for transnational criminal organizations. Honduras is the most extreme case of need for DOD resources in Latin America, but elements of the Honduran scenario can be found throughout the region. The following suggested modifications for Honduras can be considered as generally applicable models for the region.

Citizens recognize corruption as a national ailment through education and understanding of how democratic governance is negatively impacted by the behavior. Many Latin Americans, especially in poverty-stricken nations, are not well-educated and they do not perceive corruption in the way citizens of more advanced democratic societies do. To them, a public official accepting a bribe is acceptable, especially if they perceive the official is bringing money to the country or reacting to an opportunity in the same way they would react. Combating corruption therefore becomes an overwhelming initiative because the battle is to educate and shift cultural norms. This is one of the reasons why the DOD educational and academic institutions are so vital.

In the case of Honduras, the actual engagement of transnational criminal organizations is possibly one of the simplest aspects of confronting the issue. The problem is culturally enabled, and this necessitates a broad range of U.S. DOD resources. For a corrupt public official whose behavior is accepted by many of their peers and constituents, there seems to be less incentive to fully commit to U.S.-led counter narco-trafficking efforts than to play 'the game'. 'The game' is accepting U.S. resources to help build public sector infrastructure and physical infrastructure, while narco-traffickers are also providing funds in exchange for the enablement of their operations. The sum of DOD resources pouring into Honduras is a double-edged sword. While this transit zone

represents a critical obstacle to achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives, the DOD is arguably wasting resources by coordinating efforts with a corrupt government. Honduras' Lobo government has disregarded respect for human rights and rule of law in many of their actions, garnering ineffective repercussions enforced by the United States[10]. So long as the constituency permits this behavior and there are insignificant consequences, corruption will be widespread in their public sector, from the top down and the problem will never be eradicated. For their contribution, the DOD utilizes education, training, and other relationship-building tactics to infiltrate the culture, but the DOD needs to improve networks with the State Department, law enforcement agencies, and NGOs specifically in Honduras to make a significant impact.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts double as part of the DOD's relationship-building tactics. When U.S. forces coordinate with Honduran authorities to travel to isolated regions on humanitarian missions, not only are they providing services to the people and helping to build trusting relationships, but they are increasing the government presence there, and gathering information from the locals which can benefit future operational decision-making. Humanitarian assistance projects like New Horizons and MEDRETES help to build trust between isolated populations, their government and forces, and U.S. forces. From here, U.S. and partner nation authorities are able to gain a better understanding of what is really happening in these areas; what the true problems are and where they stem from, what needs to be done, and what can feasibly be achieved regarding transnational criminal organizations and other threats to citizen security.

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[10] Dana Frank, "The Latin America Mistake: Memo to Secretary Kerry: Stop funding the bad guys in Honduras," *Los Angeles Times,* February 12, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-frank-honduras-drug-war-20130212,0,1104889.story (accessed February 12, 2013).

Interacting with the local population also allows authorities to begin to understand who the critical players are and where to look for resources or additional information. HA/DR and PKO programs and security force training exercises help authorities to map the region in order to make well-informed strategic decisions. They also help to restore America as the partner of choice by reinforcing partner nations' trust and confidence in the U.S. as an ideal partner. Therefore, while some may assert some of these projects are not aligned with the constituted purpose of the DOD and should be eradicated from the defense budget, they actually make significant contributions to successful defense ventures and are appropriate DOD initiatives.

To further infiltrate the culture and increase Honduras' government presence in their isolated regions, the U.S. should initiate another joint base in the Mosquitia region. This is the isolated region where transnational criminal organizations have little difficulty operating. If there was a joint base here, the facility would bring government presence to the area, stimulate the local economy, and provide greater access to medical care, security, and basic amenities the local communities have been deprived of. All these effects could encourage locals to disengage illicit traffickers in favor of their own government.

Further, this would facilitate more efficient interdiction operations. Currently, rapid-response interdiction missions are inhibited by distance. The joint base at Soto Cano is around 200 miles from the Mosquitia region. Moving forces to the region from Soto Cano by helicopter could take between two or three hours. By this time, a number of events could have occurred to prevent the success of the mission: a corrupt public official could have tipped off the traffickers or the operation could have passed through before

the Honduran forces ever had a chance to engage. There has been a U.S. radar system in Puerto Lempira[11], Honduras which is located in the Mosquitia region, but again, by the time this radar system would have detected trafficking operations there would not be much time for forces at Soto Cano to react. A better situation for the U.S. radar system would be Colombia's San Andrés island. San Andrés is about 200 miles southeast of the Honduran coast. If a radar system there detected trafficking operations, Honduran forces would have adequate time to react and interdiction levels would likely improve. Colombia's increasingly proactive role as a security partner within the region indicates the country may be receptive to this sort of arrangement.

However, officials of the current Honduran government are likely to enforce barriers to these reallocations due to their relationships with illicit traffickers. Here, there is the potential for strong interagency, public-private, and military-to-military networks to achieve a significant milestone. The region does harbor indigenous communities and national parks, but there are ways to respect these areas while providing a secure government presence and facilities to the local communities. The effort would require a strong, capable network.

Planning for the strategic placement of DOD or joint resources can be immensely informed by U.S. Special Forces. These forces can infiltrate a wide range of environments with few resources, and have the expertise to help determine what facilities, equipment, teams, training, etc. is needed in order to enable the partner nations' forces and joint operations. The DOD has indicated a shift in strategy emphasizing the utilization of Special Forces because they are able to swiftly complete missions with few

[11] Xiomara Orellana, "Estados Unidos confirma que se llevó radar de Honduras," *La Prensa,* September 8, 2012, http://www.laprensa.hn/Secciones-Principales/Honduras/Apertura/Estados-Unidos-confirma-que-se-llevo-radar-de-Honduras#.URpsG78IJBk (accessed February 12, 2013).

resources and at a relatively low cost. But this is only relevant so far as the U.S. intends to conduct specific missions. Initiatives such as building partner-nation capabilities require more than a handful of Special Forces engagements. These forces should be deployed to initially engage partner nations and determine what resources are necessary in order for other teams to effectively replace their presence and ultimately, for partner nations' forces to assume responsibilities.

Maintaining standing forces is an important contribution to achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region. These are the forces which are best-equipped to help enable long-term stability in volatile regions. Further, while partner nations' capabilities have certainly seen improvement recently, even our closest security partners arguably still require standing U.S. assistance. Especially in Honduras and Colombia, the U.S. should not make plans for a major divestment of semi-permanent resources in the recent future. While the new DOD approach is 'leading from behind,' the strategy should not risk leaving partners vulnerable.

Weaknesses to Research

The DOD cannot typically provide specific benchmarks to gauge against. The foreign policy objectives which the DOD serves are general: strengthen partner nations' capabilities, increase interoperability, strengthen democratic values and institutions, etc. Not only are these benchmarks general, but they are long-term, and in many ways difficult to credit solely to DOD efforts.

Further, this research is not privy to sensitive information which guides DOD behavior. There is likely a significant body of pertinent information which explains why the DOD has not been able to achieve many U.S. foreign policy objectives to the desired level. While acknowledging this factor, this research simply seeks to highlight the discrepancies and weaknesses of DOD resource allocation in Latin America visible from the outsider's perspective. Likewise, this research acknowledges the DOD has undergone a number of changes over the past few years and these take time to successfully implement in order to produce tangible and recognizable results.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

The DOD is one U.S. organization among many engaging Latin America in order to make progress toward foreign policy objectives for the region. The Department of State and Department of Justice are also critical components in achieving progress. However the focus on the DOD is important because all partner nations in Latin America have militaries and DOD counterparts, whereas they may not have the resources to create sufficiently separate Department of State or Department of Justice counterparts like a Drug Enforcement Administration. In these cases, there are likely to be partner nation military forces that have been trained by the DOD in counter illicit trafficking tactics working alongside U.S. DEA teams on initiatives and missions. This exemplifies why the emphasis on DOD engagements is most critical.

Because the U.S. has positioned itself to lead from behind and empower partner nations, engagements must begin with the military and basic police forces these countries have. When their capabilities and resources grow, they will already possess basic training and experience in efforts like countering illicit trafficking which are self-sustaining and can be built upon. Partner nations' newly established counterparts to the U.S. Department of Justice will be able to train with their existing military teams and with their foreign counterparts. This will improve the efficiency and interoperability of internal networks between partner nations' militaries and other agencies, as well as external networks between their resources and those of other partner nations and the U.S. Another critical element to consider here is the variance of capabilities throughout the region. Brazil possesses a superior set of capabilities to Honduras' in combating threats. However the

baseline resource between them is a military. When the U.S. coordinates multinational training exercises and initiatives, they are most appropriately geared toward militaries because this is the resource all partner nations have in common.

Until the distribution of capabilities across the region begins to homogenize, DOD initiatives will be among the most impactful and effective means of addressing transnational threats in Latin America and building capable strategic partnerships. DOD initiatives are inclusive of most of the objectives other U.S. organizations have set for the region: strengthening respect for rule of law and human rights, countering illicit trafficking, humanitarian assistance, even mitigating disparities in opportunity for various social classes and ethnic groups. When appropriately and efficiently operated, DOD engagement with Latin American partner nations is among the best U.S. approaches to the complicated threats and issues stemming from the region.

Overall, the DOD seems to be engaging the appropriate Latin American states through appropriate initiatives and generally seems to be making progress toward U.S. foreign policy objectives over a long-term scale. There are some potential modifications to DOD resource allocations and the processes through which resources are allocated which could achieve greater efficiency in progress toward U.S. foreign policy objectives.

There is some element to the U.S. approach which has either deterred or not effectively convinced all partner nations to follow the U.S. lead. This research presumes the problem can be partially explained by lack of U.S. resolution and objectives which are too general to produce tangible results. Mexico should be one of the strongest advocates to U.S. policy in Latin America because the two have such strong trade relations, proximity, and history cooperating. Yet Mexico seems to have grown weary of

U.S. policies. This could be because after more than a decade of attempting to directly confront issues like drug trafficking under U.S. protocol, the drug-related violence has only increased and there have been few tangible achievements. Mexico seems to be moving their policy in a more autonomous direction to confront their security threats, but the nation still seems interested in coordinating efforts. This indicates more of a problem with U.S. policy than with DOD resources.

Mexico is able to make this decision because their security forces have been trained and are enabled to act independently. Colombia is another nation whose forces are highly qualified and have been beneficiaries of U.S. partner-building initiatives. As many nations begin to achieve greater capabilities, the U.S. will lose this element of leverage and partner nations' decision-making will become less influenced by U.S. policy pressures. Therefore, restoring American leadership and becoming the security partner of choice in the region is a long-term investment for the protection of U.S. interests. The DOD role in securing the U.S. position as the security partner of choice is pivotal to restoring American leadership in the region. In the long-run, if DOD resources continue to develop lasting partnerships with security forces of partner nations, then the U.S. is likely to be considered the security partner of choice and American leadership in the region will be fortified. These objectives are supported by efficient resources which effectively function and are appropriately allocated.

Consistent evaluations of DOD efficiency in achieving U.S. policy objectives becomes important not only because of U.S. cost considerations, but also because partner nations are paying close attention to the significance of U.S. presence within their borders. As partner nations' capabilities increase, their options are broadened and they

may conceivably choose not to support U.S. policies or leadership. Partner nations will desire the most efficient, beneficial partnerships for their interests. The CSIS report "Planning for a Deep Defense Drawdown-Part I: A Proposed Methodological Approach" asserts "no further savings for DOD efficiency are likely" and the true opportunity cost of inefficiency is not the monetary value of waste, but capabilities which would have contributed to security that have been unrealized or forsaken[1]." These capabilities can be realized through consistent evaluation and strong networks.

The DOD has self-proclaimed their role as supportive to other agencies and partner nations in Latin America. By default, a supportive role indicates a network. A stronger, more efficient network will equate to stronger, more efficient support and this will enable the DOD to overcome strategic barriers and achieve progress toward U.S. foreign policy objectives in Latin America to the fullest extent with the fewest resources. Because the supportive role the DOD wishes to fulfill can best be described as 'leading from behind,' the DOD should take the lead on strengthening these networks and ensuring their processes are committed to consistent self-improvement.

An agent component, serving as the nerve center for the Combatant Commands, could help to improve internal DOD processes in support of SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM, and all other Combatant Commands, yielding improved efficiency in resource allocation and performance. This component could support the Commands in regular consultations regarding the review of performance and proposals in accordance with the Joint Chief of Staffs, OSD, and Total Quality Management guidelines to address issues as quickly and efficiently as possible. Additionally, the component would aid

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[1] Clark A. Murdock, "Planning for a Deep Defense Drawdown-Part I: A Proposed Methodological Approach," Center for Strategic International Studies (May 2012): 18, http://csis.org/files/publication/120522_DD_Interim_Report.pdf (accessed February 12, 2013).

Combatant Commands in creating effective lines of communication with other DOD components whose resources are borrowed for various initiatives.

If internal processes are improved, the efficacy of their programs are consistently evaluated for self-improvement purposes, and networks within and outside of the DOD are strengthened, then strategic obstacles to achieving efficient resource allocation and progress toward foreign policy objectives can be overcome.

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