Austrian Patriots and German Nationalists: Political Radicalism and Austrian Identity in Fin-De-Siècle Vienna

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AUSTRIAN PATRIOTS AND GERMAN NATIONALISTS: POLITICAL RADICALISM AND AUSTRIAN IDENTITY IN FIN-DE-SIÈCLE VIENNA

by

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B.A. May 2002, The College of William and Mary

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HISTORY

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ABSTRACT

AUSTRIAN PATRIOTS AND GERMAN NATIONALISTS: POLITICAL RADICALISM AND AUSTRIAN IDENTITY IN FIN-DE-SIÈCLE VIENNA

Scott O. Moore
Old Dominion University, 2005
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The political atmosphere of the last decades of the Austrian Empire is often characterized by the outbreak of radical political movements. These movements were sharply critical of the political, social, and economic developments which resulted from the state's transition into a modern, industrial society. Two of these movements, the Christian Socialist Party, led by Dr. Karl Lueger, and the Pan-German Nationalist Party, led by Georg von Schönerer, became notable for their use of anti-Semitism as a means of vocalizing these criticisms. While these two groups were contemporaries, Lueger's Christian Socialists achieved unparalleled success, dominating Viennese politics by 1900; and Schönerer's Pan-Germans slipped into relative obscurity. This project attempts to examine the reason behind Lueger's success and Schönerer's failure, in light of their mutual use of anti-Semitism.

Using secondary and primary source material, the platforms and rhetoric of these two movements are studied. The project explores the differences in the anti-Semitic language of each, while also looking at the differences in the platforms and rhetoric on the whole. Ultimately, it discovers that Karl Lueger and the Christian Socialist Party created a political movement and platform which reinforced the traditional elements of Austrian society and culture, while Georg von Schönerer and the Pan-German Nationalists called for a radical departure from these traditions. In
the end, by supporting the Catholic Church, the Habsburg dynasty, and other elements of Austrian identity, Lueger was able to create a movement which resonated with the population of the Austrian capital.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

During the last decades of the nineteenth century, Vienna developed political, social, cultural, and economic standards and traditions that characterize the modern-industrial landscape. Politically, the close of the nineteenth century is remarkable due to the sharp increase in extremist political movements which coincided with an increase in ethnic tensions endemic to the Austria portion of the Dual Monarchy. These political movements, among the first in Europe to use modern political techniques, aimed at the mass audience of voters rather than the narrow business and social elite. By 1900, the Christian Socialist Party, one of the most successful of the new political movements, had gained almost total control over Viennese politics.¹

The Christian Socialists owed their success largely to their charismatic leader, Dr. Karl Lueger, who created the party and shaped their platform until his death in 1907. Lueger began his political career as a traditional nineteenth century liberal, then became a figurehead for reactionary, extremist politics and a lightning rod in Viennese society. He was also one of the first politicians to successfully garner the support of Vienna’s lower and working class voters and use the support of these groups to build his political movement.

While Lueger was the first to successfully target these voters, he was not the first to recognize their potential strength as supporters. Georg von Schönerer, a minor noble, also sought to build political support for his Pan-German Nationalist Party

¹ This paper follows the format requirements for A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses and Dissertations 6th edition by Kate L. Turabian.
from the lower and working class Germans. Unlike Lueger, Schöenerer's primary focus was the Bohemian provinces of Austria, which were embroiled in conflict among its German and Czech nationalities. Because of this, Schöenerer's agenda was often broader and grander in scope and, on the whole, his political rhetoric and platform was much more extreme and radical than Lueger's.

These movements would have had little chance for success without the drastic changes occurring in Austria’s political and social landscape. Starting in the 1870s, the franchise of Austria gradual expanded, eventually extending to universal manhood suffrage in 1907.² Without the expansion in franchise, neither Lueger’s Christian Socialists nor Schöenerer’s Pan-Germans could have benefited from the support of the lower and working classes, most of whom had little or no property or wealth.

The social and economic changes which resulted from Austria’s transition into modernity made the lower and working classes would not have been as susceptible to the extremist rhetoric of either the Pan-Germans or the Christian Socialists. Industrialization and mass production damaged the livelihood of the traditional artisans of Austria, most of whom depended on stable markets and low competition to sell their handmade goods.³ Industrialization flooded the markets with high quantities of cheaper goods, pushing many artisans out of business. Alienation was increased by the changing culture of Vienna, which was becoming more cosmopolitan.

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³ The damage to the livelihood of traditional artisan shops in Austria was typical to the damage incurred on artisans throughout industrialized Europe.
The Christian Socialists and the Pan-Germans attempted to co-opt the hostility among the working and lower classes by tailoring their platforms to exploit feelings of isolation and frustration. Both platforms viciously attacked modernity and capitalism as well as the bourgeois society they represented. Condemnations of capitalism and the banking industry became focused during periods of economic crisis, such as the stock market crash of 1873. Both movements were among the first to politicize anti-Semitism, using it as a focal point for party rhetoric as well as a central element of their platforms.

Due to the similarities in their political platforms and methods, Lueger and Schönerer are often grouped together. Both appear as examples of Austrian political extremism. However, in spite of their similarities, the two men and their parties exhibited striking differences, the most fundamental lay in their political success. Georg von Schönerer achieved political fame and notoriety; however, after a series of scandals, his popularity began to decline in the 1880s and he had essentially fallen from political relevance by 1900. Conversely, Lueger achieved enormous political success, dominating Viennese politics as mayor for almost a decade. Lueger’s success came almost at the same time as Schönerer’s general decline in significance. If the two were held such similarities, why did Lueger succeed while Schönerer failed? That answer is found in examining the differences in their platforms and rhetoric.
Methodology and Literature Overview

Most studies of Karl Lueger have focused primarily on his use of anti-Semitism and the ways his style of politics influenced the development of extremist politics on the whole. It is impossible not to read Lueger’s speeches and pamphlets and not think of the horrors of the Holocaust, Lueger’s influence on Hitler, and the impact of anti-Semitic politics on twentieth-century politics. Because of this, several scholars viewed Lueger as a right-wing extremist and a prefiguration of Hitler.

The common use of anti-Semitism in the Pan-German and Christian Socialist platform has also prompted a collection of scholarship viewing the movements as developing in tandem, blurring the differences which separate the two groups. This technique has its merits when studying the broader issue of political extremism, but frequently misses the significant nuances which separate the politics of Lueger from the politics of Schönerer.

In general, the consensus regarding Schönerer has remained almost the same, even in recent works. Historians tend to agree that he was too extreme and too volatile to maintain political momentum. Many, such as Andrew Whiteside, also look at his erratic personality and unpredictable temper, arguing that there was little separation between Schönerer’s public and private personae. Most of the examinations of Schönerer also point out that his most successful agendas, including

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4 Adolf Hitler makes numerous statements of praise for Karl Lueger’s political party and campaigning technique within Mein Kampf. Adolf Hilter, Mein Kampf (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1940).


the Linz Program and the protests during the Badeni crisis, were shepherded by other politicians.

Lueger's political rhetoric was more complex and the separation between his public remarks and private thoughts very unclear. Scholarship on Lueger offers diverse opinions. As with examinations of his anti-Semitism, there is a tendency to see Lueger as a foreshadow of Hitler, and a true believer of his speeches. However, there is enormous evidence which seems to paint a more complex picture. Recent scholarship has seen Lueger more as a political opportunist than as a true anti-Semite. Historians such as John Boyer and Richard Geehr argue that anti-Semitism was a convenient means of generating support, and Lueger had little true passion regarding the subject.⁸

The subject is made more complicated due to the limited and contradictory material left by Lueger. Most of what survives is in the form of draft speeches, speeches, pamphlets, official party publications, and newspaper accounts of interviews. There is little written by Karl Lueger which did not have some political intent. Even personal correspondence which survives is generally written for political purposes.⁹ It is very hard to get at Lueger's personal beliefs and intent.

Due to the limited personal material, historians have relied primarily on Lueger's public material to reconstruct his motivations. Once again, the primary focus is often his use of anti-Semitism. While this examination is critical, it may often overlook the complexities of Lueger's rhetoric. This work attempts to look at

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these complexities and examine how the finer nuances of Lueger’s political platforms enabled him to succeed where Schönerer failed.

Lueger’s used anti-Semitism and other extremist language but at the same time reinforced traditional cultural elements of Austrian society. While Schönerer’s political rhetoric was based on extreme notions of nationalism and class conflict, Lueger’s was rooted in notions of Austrian identity. When exploiting the tension created by the process of industrialization and modernity, Lueger argued that it was a corruption of Austrian society and culture. By embracing modern culture, Vienna had somehow moved away from Austria’s heritage to something foreign. To exemplify this point, Lueger frequently employed anti-Semitism. The culture of modernity came to be equated with the culture of the Jews. When observed through this lens, Lueger’s use of anti-Semitism can be seen as more of a socio-cultural issue than a religious or racial issue.

In contrast, Schönerer’s political platform centered primarily around the issue of race and ethnicity. The Pan-German party sought to protect German culture and position within Austria, specifically within Bohemia. Schönerer argued that the Germans had to be protected from the culture of the Jews and Slavs. He used anti-Semitic and anti-Slavic language to either condemn perceived abuses of German culture or to condemn what Schönerer contended was an inferior culture.

Schönerer’s preoccupation with race and ethnicity prompted the most striking difference between the Pan-German platform and the Christian Socialist platform. Schönerer was virulently anti-Catholic and anti-Habsburg. He tolerated both, but exploited every opportunity to promote the image of German unity, merging Austria’s
German components with the Protestant, German Empire. By opposing the Catholic Church and the Habsburg dynasty, Schönerer opposed two of the most fundamental elements of traditional Austrian society. Schönerer argued that both were too international to protect the Germans of Austria and therefore were hostile to German culture.

While Schönerer’s political extremism led him to reject core factors of the Austrian identity, Lueger embraced them. Lueger openly supported the Habsburg dynasty, its historical place in the history of the Germans and of Europe, and openly courting Catholic politicians and voters. Schönerer argued that society had reached a point where the Germans needed to embrace their German nationalism to protect themselves from cultural erosion; Lueger argued that the Germans of Austria needed to reject modern culture and return to their core cultural identity.

Lueger relied on more than just anti-Semitic language. He appealed to a Romanic notion of the medieval past, where an idealized father-king led his people, who worked cooperatively together for the common good. To this end, he praised the dynasty as the traditional provider of the father-king and praised the Church for providing unity. These two elements, the Church and dynasty, were critical to Lueger’s ideal society.

This ideal was juxtaposed against the modern society of capital, industry, and liberalism. Lueger pursued an extremist platform by appealing to tradition. True, these traditions were manipulated to fit his political purposes, but nevertheless he appealed to a public attachment and sentiment. Schönerer’s rhetoric failed to resonate with Viennese sentiments on this level. While he offered condemnation of
modern society, his solution was to embrace a society that, while German, was still fundamentally different from Vienna’s traditional culture. This difference was the major factor which contributed to Karl Lueger’s success and Georg von Schönerer’s failure.

*Definitions*

The political party system of Austria followed the traditional multi-party system of Europe, and there were at times, dozens of parties operating in Austria’s political arena. Since most of these parties operated in coalitions or other alliances, most scholarship has grouped single parties together under a common alliance or ideology. This tradition is adopted herein. Rather than list individual liberal parties, they are collectively referred to as the Liberals or Liberal Coalition. Since the liberal parties ruled the parliament as a coalition during the 1860s and continued to cooperate following their eventual defeat, there is seldom very little difference in their general objectives and goals.10

While the Liberal parties enjoyed considerable unity, the conservative parties often differed on their techniques and objectives following their political defeat in the 1860s. For this reason, they will generally be referenced by their specific name, unless it is regarding a platform item or issue in which there was a general consensus among the elements of the conservative parties.

Whenever the term anti-Semitism is used, it refers to the general discrimination, persecution, or hatred of individuals or groups due to their Jewish

10 This is a common way to refer to the Liberal coalition, and is best shown in Paul Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, 1-37.
heritage. A times, this definition may be focused more specifically to deal with issues such as political anti-Semitism or racial anti-Semitism, and the changes resulting from these terms will be discussed as they are used. The use of lower and working classes is reserved to those sectors of Vienna’s society that worked in either the service industry, such as maids and janitorial staff, or as manual laborers, such as factory workers. In general, it is used to refer to those who have either low or limited income and therefore were traditionally ostracized from political activity. Bourgeoisie refers to those who operate within the world of modern capital, generally bankers or industry owners. In general, these individuals have considerable income and political influence. The term artisan refers to the traditional handicraft workers of Austria. These workers usually produced handmade goods, sold locally in a shop owned by the master craftsman. The trade was taught using the traditional master/apprentice system and usually governed by guilds or trade unions.

Finally a note should be made regarding the use of German terminology. For the most part, the names of particular political organizations or student groups are left in the original German with a translation provided. Most of the titles use the English equivalent, for example Bürgermeister is translated as mayor, Graf as count. The only exception is the use of Kaiser when referring to Franz Joseph. The literature on the period is inconsistent, some authors preferring Kaiser, with others using emperor. For the most part, historians have opted to refer to Franz Joseph as emperor, reserving the title of Kaiser for Wilhelm I and Wilhelm II of the German Empire. However, Franz Joseph’s role in society and his approach to leadership is examined throughout

11 These groups were kept from political activity due to the complex restrictions on the voting franchise, such as income or land requirements.
12 These definitions are consistent with the literature on the subject.
this work, and given his fatherly view toward his subjects and his status in the minds of his subjects, Kaiser seems more appropriate. The term evokes a more intimate connection between ruler and subject which emperor does not often capture, while it also implies a greater sense of tradition and unity which is also lacking in the English equivalent.

*Chapter Outline*

This analysis of the Christian Socialist Movement and the Pan-German Nationalist Movement begins by first analyzing the changes occurring in Vienna during its transition into a modern city and society. It examines the artisan and working classes’ growing sense of isolation resulting from the political dominance of the Liberal Coalition, the economic changes resulting from capitalism, and the social changes resulting from the development of new art styles and the construction of the *Ringstrasse*. The early careers of both Karl Lueger and Georg von Schönerer are also explored.

The following chapter examines the use of anti-Semitism by both Lueger and Schönerer. It explains how Lueger was able to successfully use anti-Semitic language to voice frustration over the socio-cultural changes resulting from modernity, while anti-Semitism ultimately proved to be a liability for Schönerer’s movement. There is a focus on the specific language used by each in their speeches and party platforms as well as how the issue of anti-Semitism connected to the other areas of their parties’ rhetoric and activity.
The analysis of the political rhetoric of both Lueger and Schönerer continues by examining the role of Catholicism in the respective movements. As will be shown, the role of the Catholic Church was drastically different in the Pan-German Nationalist Party and the Christian Socialist Party. Schönerer’s attacks on the Church are examined as are his motives for creating an explicitly anti-Catholic political platform. Lueger’s pro-Catholic platform is examined, as is the political benefits received by openly courting the Church and the faithful Catholics of Austria.

The analysis concludes with the issue of nationality and the Habsburg dynasty. It looks at Lueger’s use of the dynasty as a political tool and his personal conflict with the Kaiser during his election as mayor. It also examines Lueger’s difficulty in balancing support for the dynasty and support for German nationalism at a time when ethnic tensions were erupting throughout Austria.
CHAPTER II
MODERN VIENNA AND ITS COMPLICATIONS

In his autobiography, *The World of Yesterday*, Austrian writer Stefan Zweig described Vienna, its history and its culture.

The Romans had laid the first stones of this city, as a *castrum*, a fortress, an advanced outpost to protect Latin civilization against the barbarians; and more than a thousand years later the attack of the Ottomans against the West shattered against these walls. Here rode the Nibelungs, here the immortal Pleiades of music shone out over the world, Gluck, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Brahms, and Johann Strauss, here all streams of European culture converged. At court, among the nobility, and among the people, the German was related in blood to the Slavic, the Hungarian, the Spanish, the Italian, the French, the Flemish; and it was the particular genius of this city of music that dissolved all the contrasts harmoniously into a new and unique thing, the Austrian, the Viennese. Hospitable and endowed with a particular talent for receptivity, the city drew the most diverse forces to it, loosened, propitiated, and pacified them. It was sweet to live here, in this atmosphere of spiritual conciliation, and subconsciously every citizen became supernational, cosmopolitan, a citizen of the world.¹

Zweig refers to the image and mythos of Vienna, an imperial city steeped in tradition and home to one of Europe’s oldest imperial dynasties. But as with all major European cities, Vienna was undergoing tremendous changes resulting from the process of industrialization and the advent of the power of capital.

Successful business leaders and industry owners were gaining more authority, eroding the traditional influence of the absolutist monarchy. The power of capital was evident in the development of the *Ringstrasse*, the boulevard which became the centerpiece of the city. This power came at the expense of other elements of Viennese society. The success of the Liberals following the creation of the October Constitution in 1860, marginalized traditional elements of Austrian society, including

the army and the Catholic Church. New art, such as the *Secession*, supported by the newly empowered bourgeoisie, usurped the position of traditional art and music.

Economic changes created by the process of industrialization further altered Vienna and Austria. Traditional artisans found themselves unable to compete with their industry counterparts, and their livelihood was jeopardy. The developing working class was shut out of the excess and prosperity generated by the success of industrialization. Coupled with these economic problems, the artisans and working class found themselves isolated in the political realm. Most could not meet the voting requirements and were not part of the franchise. This left them with few chances to voice their grievances within the Austrian legislature.

These groups became the target for politicians such as Georg von Schönerer and Karl Lueger. Both men realized the potential support they could receive from these groups and began to develop a platform to gain followers from the artisans and workers. Ultimately, the desire to gain the support of those alienated by modernity is what drove the creation of the Christian Socialist Party and provided the backbone for Schönerer’s work with the Pan-German Nationalists.

Vienna’s transformation into a modern city was well underway by the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The process of industrialization had begun shortly after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and continued throughout the remainder of the century. A large, urban working class developed alongside an increasingly wealthy middle class. During the last half of the century, both began to challenge the absolutist tendencies of the Habsburg dynasty. The Austrian middle class joined in the European wide Revolutions of 1848, hoping to win political freedoms and usurp
the power of the aristocracy for themselves. Their efforts failed. The Habsburg army, with aid from Russian troops, suppressed the bourgeois revolution.\textsuperscript{2} Austria returned to absolutist rule following the Revolutions of 1848 and the power of the traditional, conservative aristocracy was largely unaffected. As a result, the bourgeoisie influence on Austria's society continued to grow while their political power stagnated.

A constitutional government, created after Austria's defeat at the hands of Napoleon III, gave the bourgeoisie their chance to gain political power.\textsuperscript{3} The October Constitution of 1860 reflected the bourgeoisie desire for a liberal, nationalistic, and democratic government. New political opportunities, coupled with increased the power of capital and industry made the bourgeoisie an influential group in both Vienna and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.\textsuperscript{4} Capital allowed for social mobility, financed railway construction, supported banking houses, and provided private funds for public works. As the affairs of capital became more closely tied to the affairs of the empire, many capitalists were rewarded with titles of nobility.\textsuperscript{5} With their newly elevated social status, capitalists sought to find a means of expressing their power.

The construction of the \textit{Ringstrasse} provided the bourgeoisie with their first major opportunity to reshape Vienna to reflect liberal, nationalistic, and democratic principles. The \textit{Ringstrasse}, built throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century, was born from the dismantling of the medieval walls of Vienna. The land

\textsuperscript{2} For more on the Revolutions of 1848, see Robert Kann, \textit{A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 290-318.
\textsuperscript{3} For an explanation of this conflict, see Kann, \textit{A History of the Habsburg Empire}, 267-270.
was sold, and the imperial capital began its transformation into a modern city. The plans for the *Ringstrasse* began in 1857, when Kaiser Franz Joseph initiated his plan to revitalize the urban space of Vienna by removing the walls. He followed this announcement with the creation of the City Expansion Commission, which was responsible for overseeing the development of the land.\(^6\) Original plans for the *Ringstrasse* included vast barracks and an arsenal which would give the army adequate access to the city in case of revolution.\(^7\) The military guided the development of city plans until the Liberal Coalition gained control of Austrian politics in 1860. From that point forward it became the goal of the new, Liberal Commission and city government to make the *Ringstrasse* a showcase of bourgeois, liberal values and ideals.\(^8\) When the Liberal government distributed pamphlets outlining the plans for Vienna’s renewal, it clearly reflected the desire to build a city which was “Strong Through Law and Peace” and “Embellished Through Art.”\(^9\)

The Liberals frustrated the military’s attempts to maintain the newly constructed barracks and their requests to maintain a large tract of land across from imperial palace as a parade ground was rejected.\(^10\) Instead, the Liberal Coalition opted to devote that land and its adjacent lots to the construction of the new Rathaus

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\(^{7}\) Heinrich Friedjung, *Österreich von 1848 bis 1860* (J.G. Cotta: Berlin, 1912.) 425-26. This process is very similar to the changes which were initiated by Baron Haussmann in Paris during the reign of Napoleon III. Several of Haussmann’s goals are also found in the development of the *Ringstrasse*, such as creating a more open space, as well as an urban center which would not be easy to barricade during revolutions and uprisings. For more on Haussmann’s work in Paris see Howard Saalman, *Haussmann: Paris Transformed* (New York: G. Braziller, 1971), and Rosemarie Gerken, “Transformation” und "Embellissement" von Paris in der Karikatur: Zur Umwandlung der französischen Hauptstadt im Zweiten Kaiserreich durch den Baron Haussmann (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1997).


\(^{9}\) Ibid., 31.

\(^{10}\) Ibid., 39.
(city hall), Parliament building, and University building. The Liberals selected plans for these structures which reflected not only the idealized function of each building but also the liberal ideals associated with each. At their instruction, architect, Heinrich von Ferstel, designed the University in the Renaissance style. City planners wanted the façade of the University to reflect the architecture of early Humanism, a guiding philosophy for the curriculum which would be taught by the University. Immediately adjacent to the University was the Vienna Rathaus, constructed in the neo-Gothic style. The Commission wanted the Rathaus to reflect the style of medieval Germany. The Parliament building, sitting next to the Rathaus, and across from the imperial palace, was constructed in the neo-Classical style, openly acknowledging the link to Greek democracy. In many ways the construction of the Parliament was the greatest victory for the Liberals. A building, which signified the end of absolutism in Austria, was constructed across from the imperial palace, on land which had formerly been allocated as a military parade ground. All three of these buildings, erected during the first years of Liberal rule in Austria, were designed specifically to provide a visual representation to liberal ideals.

New residential buildings were constructed as well. Original plans anticipated the construction of London-style townhouses along the boulevard. However, these plans were abandoned in an effort to provide more living space. Apartment buildings

13 Springer, Geschichte und Kulturleben der Wiener Ringstrasse, 456-470.
constructed along the Kärntner Ring from 1861-1865 reflected the bourgeoisie’s desire for maximum living space and their new wealth and status in society. By the time of the Reichsratstrasse’s construction, the apartment buildings had become more ornate. The façades of the meitpalais, or rent palace, privately built by the wealthy bourgeoisie were be designed to resemble the traditional baroque town palaces built for the Viennese aristocracy. The gilding along the exteriors of these buildings marked bourgeois efforts to present itself as the new “aristocracy” of Vienna.

The buildings’ interiors were generally divided into various apartments, with the owners frequently occupying a floor of the building, and the ground floor was generally rented to commercial establishments. These buildings became the center for a distinct, modern subculture in Vienna. This subculture was colored by innovations in both academia as well as the arts. It was here that Sigmund Freud began his influence on the fledging field of psychology and a philosophy circle known as the Wiener Kreis, (the Vienna circle) began challenging accepted cultural norms.

One of the most significant challenges to traditional culture came through the Secession art movement. The Secession, started by Gustav Klimt, was an open rebellion against traditional art styles. Frustrated by conventional artistic methods,

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16 This matter is discussed in greater detail in George V. Strong, Seedtime for Fascism: The Disintegration of Austrian Political Culture, 1867-1918 (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 112.
17 For an examination of this culture see Malachi Haim Hacohen, “Dilemmas of Cosmopolitanism: Karl Popper, Jewish Identity and ‘Central European Culture’,” The Journal of Modern History 71 (1999): 105-49.
Klimt advocated "freedom" for artists. The movement eventually took the motto "Der Zeit Ihre Kunst: Der Kunst Ihre Freiheit" (To the age, its art: to the art, its freedom). Max Burckhard, a student of Nietzschean philosophy who defined the movement, envisioned the students of art rising up against the established artistic norms.20

Klimt drew inspiration for his art from mythological elements of the Greco-Roman tradition. In a radical departure from the landscapes and religious art typical of Vienna's traditional art schools, he focused much of his attention on developing a technique to relay instinctual, erotic impulses among men and women.21 Klimt's willingness to abandon a realist style and to experiment with art nouveau techniques also made him incompatible with traditional Viennese artists. The Secession's daring rejection of artistic norms made them popular among the bourgeoisie of the Ringstrasse. Vienna's new elite were eager to become patrons of the art style.

The artists of the Secession also collaborated with other artistic circles in Vienna. Gustav Mahler, conductor of the Vienna Opera and his wife Alma Mahler, befriended many of the artists.22 During his time at the Opera, Mahler challenged traditional artistic expression in his own right. When he was appointed to the Opera, he was known for productions which were "cleared" of tradition and given new

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21 Ibid., 223.
22 Alma Mahler was especially close to Gustav Klimt and often served as both a "muse" for his work as well as a confidant for the artist. Karen Monson, Alma Mahler, Muse to Genius: From Fin-de-Siècle Vienna to Hollywood's Heyday (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1983), 64-5; Mahler-Werfel, Diaries 1898-1902, 129-33.
interpretations. Together with his stage director, Alfred Roller, Mahler produced bold interpretations of Richard Wagner and other great Germanic composers.

Mahler’s career at the opera was short lived. Critics launched constant attacks on both his work as well as his Jewish heritage. He abandoned his post as conductor. Likewise, the Secession also faced its share of critics. The denunciation of traditional styles offended the working classes as well as the traditional aristocracy. Furthermore, they were enraged that the Secession artists rejected the style of Hans Makart, a famed Viennese artist who was known for his paintings of the ideal German folk-life. Catholic parties and traditionalist in the government protested government sponsorship of Klimt and others in his school and argued that the philosophy promoted by Secession art was degenerative. Some critics even attacked the overall aesthetics of the movement, especially Klimt’s art. Friedrich Jodl, a philosophy professor and critic of Klimt, once told the Neue Freie Presse that his struggle was “not against the naked and not against the free art, but rather against ugly art.” Overall, while the bourgeoisie embraced the developing artistic movements that came out of the Ringstrasse, its challenges to traditional artistic norms threatened the aristocracy and working class.

The rapid ascension of the bourgeoisie in both wealth and social status created enormous resentment among artisans and the working class. The artisan class of Vienna was composed of skilled craftsman who owned small shops, selling specific good. These artisans had inherited the guild system of the Middle Ages, and

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23 Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna, 27.
24 Ibid., 73.
26 Ibid., 274.
were dependent on a static social hierarchy, which prevented challenges to their place in society. They also depended on government protection of their industry, by means of legislation which guaranteed the status of guilds, their control over their trade, entry into markets, and price of goods. Since the successful capitalists generally emerged from this class, some artisans felt that the capitalists were betraying their heritage, and that the bourgeois attachment to the developing modern culture was an abandonment of their Austro-German background. This resentment was only strengthened as the working class, those relying on low wage employment, were pushed from the interior of Vienna to its suburbs. The Ringstrasse prompted the demolition or renovation of 75 percent of the buildings under two stories, buildings which were six to ten stories replaced them. As a result, rents increased, per capita, from 53 to 80 florins between 1869 and 1899. Most working class citizens could not pay these new rents and were forced to relocate. As the working class left the city, most small artisan shops also had to move or shut down. The culture of the Ringstrasse, the culture of the bourgeoisie, became isolated from the other classes of Viennese society.

The artisans were also isolated from the Viennese government once a coalition of Liberal parties dominated the capital’s politics from the 1860’s to 1897. Once in power, the Liberals passed legislation which reinforced and codified the reforms begun by Metternich in 1815, the Revolution of 1848, and the October Constitution of 1860. These included a guarantee of legal equality among all citizens

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28 Ibid., 249.
of the empire, as well as religious toleration, and the granting of the full rights of
citizenship to the Jews. The Liberals also insisted on maintaining the 1850
*Gemeindeordnung* which heavily restricted the franchise, allowing the wealthy to hold
a disproportionate influence in voting. By giving support to the Liberal coalition,
the emerging bourgeoisie ensured their dominance of Austrian politics. The growing
working class was effectively muted.

The artisan’s removal from any potential political power only augmented the
damage industrialization had already inflicted on their livelihood. Mechanization
made many trades obsolete, while the development of mass produced textiles and
other goods made it impossible for small artisan shops to compete against the newly
developed department stores. Once the Liberal coalition began passing economic
legislation, it became obvious the needs of the artisan would be overlooked.

The artisans had hoped for laws preserving their social status, but the Liberals,
following basic principles of *laissez faire* economics, began restricting the artisan’s
control over their trade during the 1870s. These restrictions removed an artisan’s
power over his journeyman and ended the remaining commercial monopolies by
attacking the guilds. By 1873, the coalition had removed guild control over entry into
markets as well as prices. Artisans had lost complete control over their trade and
were forced to compete with large, industrial firms. There was no way that an artisan,
who made goods by hand, could sell them at the same price as a factory.

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30 P. G. J. Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria* (New York: John
34 Ibid., 47, 55.
When the stock market crashed in 1873 and the Austrian economy spiraled into depression, the artisans were dealt another crippling blow. Prior to the crash, the Austrian press and developing industries had promoted the stock market as a tool for social mobility. It was seen as a source of endless wealth, where suffering members of the working class could buy stock and emerge wealthy and powerful. Hoping for an easy profit, the working and artisan classes began to invest heavily in the stock market, waiting for their promised returns. When the stock market crashed it was particularly devastating for these classes.

Individuals and businesses which had invested heavily in stocks were thrown into economic ruin. Throughout Vienna, banks foreclosed on mortgages and seized the shops owned by artisans. These same banking houses were generally unaffected by the crash, since they had insulated themselves from market fluctuations. It did not take long for bank foreclosures to be seen as theft. Especially since the banks, which were operated by Jewish families, appeared to profit unfairly from the crash. Jews quickly became scapegoats for economic hardships. Angry artisans began to accuse the Jews of stealing the money and livelihoods from the average, “hardworking” Viennese citizen. The crash itself became known as the “Jewish betrayal.” The stock market crash of 1873 also increased the artisans’ resentment of the Liberal government. The economic hardships of the 1870s strengthened

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36 Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, 144.
37 Karl Lueger, Fragmentary draft of a speech presented in Moravia in 1891, “I Decide Who is a Jew!”, 326. See also Eder, Der Liberalismus, 225.
38 McCagg, A History of Habsburg Jews, 156.
demands for election reform, which were designed to simplify Vienna's voting and expand the franchise to give the artisan and working classes more influence.

Municipal voting was organized into a complex system of caucuses which elected city officials. The Viennese electorate was divided into three curiae, each with 40 seats on the city council. The curiae divided voters based on income and education. The First Curia was composed of the wealthy *Großbürger*, those citizens who paid a minimum property tax of 500 florin; the Second Curia was composed of those paying 200 florin or possessing special academic credentials (including civil servants, men with doctoral degrees, or secondary teachers); while the Third Curia was for those paying less than 100 florins, but more than 10 florins. In total, approximately 18,000 men were enfranchised, with 16 percent in the First Curia, 25 percent in the Second, and 59 percent in the Third. The majority of Vienna's voting artisans and workers belonged to the Third Curia. (Many of each group did not even earn enough income to meet the 10 florins tax requirement.)

Obviously, since each curia selected an equal portion of the council seats, the First and Second Curiae held disproportionate influence over the election of city officials.

There was little effort among the Liberals to broaden the franchise or create more equality among the curiae. As economic hardships increased, the policy of franchise restriction caused portions of the underrepresented population to question the legitimacy of the Liberal coalition. Leaders of the Liberal parties did not help this situation, since many believed they were continuing in the tradition of imperial officials, appointed by the Kaiser. Cajetan Felder, elected mayor of Vienna in 1868,

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40 Ibid., 19.
openly acknowledged that he felt a barber could not govern as well as a lawyer or doctor. As demands for electoral reform grew, elements within the Liberal coalition wanted to see an expansion of democratic ideals within the government, and this included an expanded franchise. Both Georg von Schönerer and Karl Lueger emerged from this dissention, and these two men would eventually abandon ties to the Liberal parties of Vienna.

Schönerer was elected to the Austrian Reichsrat in 1873, establishing himself as an advocate for the farmer and artisan within the left-democratic wing of the Liberal coalition. By 1879, he had completely abandoned his party's platform, forged a new alliance with university intellectuals, and had the development of what would emerge as the Pan-German movement. Between 1873 and 1879, Schönerer developed more extreme views regarding modernity and nationalism. He openly supported extreme German nationalists, advocated that the German portions of Austria join with the German Empire, and publicly condemned modernism. What began as a career to defend the traditional interests of farmers and artisans developed into a career devoted to a fanatic defense of German nationalism. Schönerer refined his views when he joined the Leseverein der deutschen Studenten, a political discussion group with German nationalist leanings.

Ultimately, Schönerer and his allies summarized their platform in 1882, when they wrote the Linz program. It advocated notions of radical democracy, which

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41 Ibid., 56.
42 Ibid., 327.
43 Schorske, "Politics in a New Key", 125.
44 Schorske, "Politics in a New Key," 126.
45 Whiteside, Socialism of Fools, 73-75.
strengthened traditional German culture, social reform, non-industrial "honest labor," and promoted attacks against Jews. From this point forward, Schönerer and his fledging Pan-German movement were linked with extreme and revolutionary ideals. Schönerer reinforced his vision for supporting and defending German culture with the two major pillars of the Pan-German Nationalist Party: Los von Rom (away from Rome) and Los von Juden (away from the Jew.) With Los von Rom, Schönerer advocated cutting off German-Austria’s ties to the Catholic Church. He also aimed to reorient Austro-German culture away from its traditional southern European, Habsburg ties to the Protestant, German culture of the new German Empire. Los von Juden symbolized Schönerer’s desire to separate Austria’s dependence on capital and prevent further Jewish influence on German culture.

Karl Lueger emerged from the Liberal coalition in a drastically different manner than Schönerer. Lueger had humble beginnings in Vienna’s working class district. His father, a farmer from the Viennese countryside, had moved into the city and worked as a janitor at the Technical High School in an effort to provide a better life for Lueger and his two sisters. Lueger’s mother saw educational advancement as a means of social advancement for her son. Her passion for young Lueger’s education was such that he remarked that even though she was “a simple woman of the people, she [nevertheless] read Cicero’s orations [with me]. She understood not a word of them; she merely followed the words of the text with scrupulous

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47 Ibid., 237.
48 Both of these concepts are discussed in detail in Whiteside, Socialism of Fools, 243-262.
attentiveness-and woe to me if I recited a passage incorrectly! She held me to strict learning."\(^49\)

Lueger was among the first of the lower social classes to attend school, and during his time at the Theresianum, he gained a classical education and also knowledge of Vienna's society. Lueger mingled not only with day students, those, like Lueger, who could not afford boarding at the school, but also the sons of the ruling families of Austria.\(^50\) After this training, he went on to the University and obtained a degree in law and political science.

Unlike Schönerer, Lueger never aspired to be a national leader of Austria. Lueger began his political career with his election to Vienna's city council in 1875 and remained a municipal politician for the rest of his life.\(^51\) As a member of the city council, Lueger started as a member of the United Left, which openly advocated expanding the franchise to all taxpaying males.\(^52\) While Schönerer eventually abandoned the Liberals because of ideological conflicts, Lueger left the Liberal Coalition for practical reasons. Early on, Lueger realized the potential support he could gather from the Third Curia voters as well as those who were not yet enfranchised. When he found that the Liberals were determined to continue their restriction on the franchise, Lueger found it difficult to continue advocating the Liberal platform.\(^53\) Frustrated by the Liberal Coalition's unwillingness to see the potential support that could be garnished from his target voters, Lueger broke with the

\(^{49}\) Schorske, "Politics in a New Key," 134.
\(^{50}\) Ibid., 136.
\(^{51}\) Geehr, Karl Lueger, 44.
\(^{52}\) Ibid., 55.
\(^{53}\) Ibid., 43.
coalition. Free from the platform restrictions of the Liberal parties, Lueger was free to develop his own.

Lueger biographer and scholar Richard Geehr notes that Lueger had few ideological motivations for breaking with the Liberals. He simply wanted to achieve certain practical reforms in the city, such as a broader franchise as well as the expansion of public works. Lueger also wanted to tap into the potential support of the Third Curia and the unenfranchised lower classes. As Lueger developed his platform, he tailored it specifically to his target audience, adopting an ideology which would resonate with them. It was at this point that anti-Semitism entered into Lueger’s political platforms. Lueger realized that anti-Semitism could bring him the notoriety and support he needed to gain power in Vienna.

Anti-Semitic rhetoric joined Lueger and Schönnerer together in an uneasy political alliance during much of the 1880s. Both Lueger and Schönnerer realized that the anti-Semitic parties needed unity to defeat the Liberal coalition on both the national and local level. Unity was difficult, especially since many of the parties were skeptical of Schönnerer’s racial view of anti-Semitism. In the end, unity was marginally achieved due to common elements in their platforms. While this unity was preserved initially, their differences soon drove them apart.

The two broke their alliance following Schönnerer’s arrest following his vandalism of the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* offices March 8, 1888. The newspaper had prematurely announced the death of Kaiser Wilhelm I of Germany, and the Pan-Germans were outraged. Schönnerer, with a mob of followers, attacked the office and

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54 Ibid., 38.
were quickly arrested for assault and vandalism.\textsuperscript{56} Schönerer was convicted and imprisoned, losing his patent of nobility as well as his political privileges.\textsuperscript{57}

Schönerer’s arrest severely crippled the Pan-German movement. Many of his closest allies began to distance themselves. Karl Lueger first publicly supported Schönerer; however, he too began to consider ways to gain support without Schönerer’s party. In a private letter, Lueger stated that Schönerer and his followers “just can’t act without blundering.”\textsuperscript{58}

While Schönerer was in prison, Lueger withdrew his support from the Pan-Germans. Members of the Pan-German Nationalist Party were shifting to Lueger’s United Christians. Schönerer responded with a condemnation of the United Christians and officially ended his tenuous unity with Lueger.\textsuperscript{59}

Free from both the Liberal coalition and Schönerer’s extremism, Lueger was able to maneuver more freely, constructing a broader base of support. As his support increased, acceptance of his anti-Semitic rhetoric also increased. Lueger’s supporters and allies were more concerned with defeating the Liberals than challenging his use of discriminatory language. Lueger quickly began to unite the anti-liberal factions of Vienna, and by the end of 1888, all six of these political groups joined the United Christians.\textsuperscript{60} In 1889, Lueger joined the Christian Socialist party, bringing the United Christians with him, and their platform and agenda quickly found support among

\textsuperscript{56} Geehr, \textit{Karl Lueger}, 74.
\textsuperscript{57} The anti-Semitic issues regarding Schönerer’s arrest is addressed further in Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{58} Karl Lueger, Letter to Karl Freiherr von Vogelsang, July 26, 1888, in “\textit{I Decide Who is a Jew!}”, 225.
\textsuperscript{59} Geehr, \textit{Karl Lueger}, 80.
\textsuperscript{60} Pulzer, \textit{The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism}, 201.
Vienna’s populace. The Christian Socialists doubled in strength, and the Liberal coalition found its position threatened.

The Christian Socialists were able to succeed where the Pan-Germans failed because of their broad base of support. Their most loyal supporters came from the lower classes, who had also supported the Pan-Germans and traditionally supported anti-liberal, anti-capital, and anti-Semitic movements. But unlike the Pan-Germans, the Christian Socialists also enjoyed the tacit support of influential elements of Austrian society, most notably the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Lueger’s focus on social improvements and franchise expansion within the city, allowed him to gain nominal support from opposition parties, such as the Social Democrats. While the Liberals had maintained political dominance by restricting the franchise, Lueger would maintain his by fighting for expanding it.

By working to expand the franchise, Lueger was able to appeal to those who were most isolated and rejected by the changes occurring in Vienna near the close of the century. The Liberal Coalition had effectively isolated a large, volatile portion of the Viennese population. It made every effort to prevent the expansion of the franchise to new voters who might challenge their authority over the city and the country. The Liberal Coalition also openly catered to the needs of the bourgeois population. This only intensified the resentment created by the display of wealth along the Ringstrasse, a wealth not distributed to the working class. The culture of the

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61 Gechr, Karl Lueger, 77.
62 Strong, Seedtime for Fascism, 27.
63 The support of the Social Democrats would be gone by the time of Lueger’s death in 1907, by that time the Social Democrats were growing in strength and had become one of the most consistent adversaries of the Christian Socialist movement. However, in the 1880s and 1890s, they did not consistently resist Lueger’s aims. Boyer, Political Radicalism, 66-7.
Ringstrasse itself contributed to this feeling of alienation among the working class and traditional elements of Austrian society. In an effort to create a unique, personalized style, the bourgeoisie appeared to be abandoning the traditional culture of Austria. Lueger, sensing this alienation and resentment, began to unapologetically exploit these feelings among the working and artisan classes. As he developed his platform for the Christian Socialist party, he ensured that it reinforced traditional, Catholic, Austrian-German ideals.
CHAPTER III

ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE LANGUAGE OF POLITICAL EXTREMISM

By 1900, Karl Lueger and the Christian Socialist Party had undeniable control of Viennese municipal politics. For the first time, a modern, mass political party gained control over one of Europe’s capital cities. The success of Lueger’s Christian Socialists would have been impossible without the support of the disgruntled lower class, isolated by modern Viennese society. One aspect of Lueger’s support stemmed from his constant use of anti-Semitism as a political tool in his rhetoric and speeches. Anti-Semitism was not a new idea in European society. But Lueger and the Christian Socialists put notions of anti-Semitism to a sinister use. When Lueger used the term “Jewish,” he did not use it to denote a religious minority, but rather a cultural identity. This linked the Jews of Vienna and its emerging modern society to industrialization and capital.

Long before the Christian Socialist party was created, Georg von Schönnerer began using anti-Semitism in his political platforms. However, by 1900 Schönnerer and his Pan-German Nationalists had slipped into relative obscurity. Internecine fights made Schönnerer and the Pan-Germans easy prey for political foes. Ultimately, anti-Semitism was a liability and hindrance to Schönnerer’s success.

In light of Schönnerer’s failure, Lueger’s success is all the more significant. He used anti-Semitism successfully to legitimize his political agenda in a way Schönnerer never could. By successfully presenting anti-Semitism as a socio-cultural manifestation, Lueger made anti-Semitic rhetoric a legitimate means to express
economic and cultural frustration. Lueger further legitimized anti-Semitism by using it in a platform that was consistent with Austrian self-identity. By the time of Lueger’s death in 1910, he had integrated anti-Semitism into the politics of Vienna, creating a troubling and disturbing legacy for Germany and Austria in the twentieth century.

Karl Lueger had always seen the substantial workers and artisans of Vienna a critical to his political success. He realized that these volatile and agitated groups could provide his base of support and sought to tailor his platform to their needs. The Pan-German Nationalists had already been courting this demographic. Schönerer appealed to the workers and the artisans, because he viewed them as the preservers of German culture and society.¹ This is what had motivated his entrance into the Leseverein der deutschen Studenten, a move which radicalized his views.²

During his time with the Lesverein, Schönerer became convinced that German culture in Austria was under attack, especially by the Slavs and the Jews. When he ran for re-election to the Reichsrat in 1879, he vowed to fight against “the heretofore privileged interests of mobile capital and the Semitic rule of money and the word.”³ Schönerer sought to end the perceived Jewish influence on the banking industry and the press.

In a desire to “purify” the German national fraternities, Schönerer helped to pass the Waidhofer Resolution that expelled Jewish members from the

¹ Whiteside, Socialism of Fools, 73-75.
² Translated as: The Reading Association of German Students
³ Quoted in Schorske, “Politics in a New Key”, 127.
(He advocated the Waidhofer Resolution because he believed these organizations were “contaminated” by having Jewish members.\(^5\) Other national fraternities followed suit, prohibiting anyone with Jewish heritage from joining.

Influential politicians and artists, such as Theodre Herzl, Arthur Schnitzler, and Victor Adler, were removed from German national fraternities. All of these men were staunch supporters of German culture. Their removal from German national organizations displays the racial resonance of Schönerer’s anti-Semitic message.

In an effort to garner support against baptized and converted Jews, Schönerer used the slogan “Jewish or Christian, it’s only race, and nothing else, that’s the disgrace.”\(^6\) The racial tone of Schönerer’s anti-Semitism was a radical departure from the traditional anti-Semitism of Austria, which was based on religion. This led Schönerer to further personal attacks against Jews including public remarks against Austria’s most prestigious Jew, Baron Rothschild. Schönerer called for an annulment of Rothschild’s railway contract with the government and even went so far as to refer to Rothschild as the “Northern Railway Jew.”\(^7\) Schönerer’s supporters in German fraternities often turned to violence to show support for his anti-Semitic platform. Attacks against Jews and Jewish groups by Schönerer’s supporters became so frequent that many Jewish groups needed police protection to meet.\(^8\)

Tapping into artisan frustration, Schönerer formed the Society for the Defense of the Hardworker, to fight for the survival of the traditional shopkeeper and for the


\(^6\) Hamann, *Hitler's Vienna*, 242

\(^7\) Ibid., 242.

\(^8\) Haag, “Students at the University of Vienna,” 300.
survival of German culture and ethics. In a speech in 1882, Schöenerer vowed that the Society, which had merged with Austrian Reform Union, would fight against the “sucking vampire that knocks at the narrow-windowed house of the German farmer and craftsman-the Jew.”

Statements such as this indicate that Schöenerer began to co-opt the success of German Romanticism, with its idealized notions of pre-industrial German society, and tie it intimately with anti-Semitism. Condemning “Jewish modernism,” Schöenerer advocated a renaissance of German folk art to rekindle the German identity in Austria. Schöenerer’s romanticized German culture struck a chord with the artisans and started to draw their support. It also served to reinforce the stereotype that the banking industry and capitalists did not “earn” their money through work but through manipulation, trickery, and usury.

Lueger began using anti-Semitic rhetoric early in his political career, but the nature of Lueger’s anti-Semitism was drastically different from that of Schöenerer. While Schöenerer viewed anti-Semitism in racial terms, Lueger’s anti-Semitism was political and opportunistic in nature, and often was used as a means to an end, that is, a way for him to gain political support. As Arthur Schnitzler observed, Lueger attacked the Jewish population, not necessarily because he believed it was responsible for the changes occurring in Vienna, but because it was more “easily explicable” to the general public and allowed for faster success. Lueger’s principle concern was social improvement; however, through his use of anti-Semitism he created an atmosphere of intolerance towards Vienna’s Jewish population.

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9 Quoted in Schorske, “Politics in a New Key,” 128.
10 Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, 35.
11 Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna, 243.
In part, this intolerance was generated by the perception that the Jews of Vienna had benefited unfairly from the changes in Viennese politics, culture, and society. A visible portion of the Austrian bourgeoisie had Jewish backgrounds and following the Revolution of 1848, the Jews of Austria had rapidly assimilated into Austrian society. Students from Jewish backgrounds made up one-third of the enrollment in the University of Vienna. Once educated, Jews entered into law, medicine, and industry. By the end of the nineteenth century, Jews were the most economically successful minority in Vienna.

Their economic success led them to actively participate in the development of the Ringstrasse and the efforts of the Liberal Coalition. All of the major bankers and business owners owned a meitpalais, and Jewish business leaders were being elected to the Vienna city council. Most of the members of the Wiener Kreis, including Sigmund Freud, came from Jewish backgrounds. The presence of Jewish artists in the Secession was so significant that the movement's art was often referred to as "Jewish art." The Jewish presence within Viennese haute culture prompted many to perceive "Jewishness" as a socio-cultural manifestation dependent upon materialism, capitalism, and modernism. As this perception spread, the religious implications of the term "Jew" weakened and "Jewish" could be used to describe persons or organizations which had little or no Jewish religious affiliation.

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14 Hamann, Hitler's Vienna, 327.
17 Beller, Vienna and the Jews, 79.
18 Baker, Wittgenstein, Frege, and the Vienna Circle, 42.
Lueger became a master in exploiting this perception among the artisan and working class, as he developed the Christian Socialist's anti-Semitic message.

Jews were also Vienna's most rapidly growing minority. During the 1890s, the Jewish population exploded from 40,227 to 99,441. By 1900, 12 percent of the population was Jewish. The majority of Vienna's Jews were assimilated into the city's German culture and were prosperous. Only 16 percent of Vienna's Jews lived in poverty, compared to the 75 percent of the non-Jewish population. Those not in poverty either owned or rented apartments in the city's more prosperous districts, such as the Ringstrasse. In these districts were fully integrated with other citizens of equal economic status. Jews living in poverty tended to rent rooms in the Leopoldstadt district. By 1900, this district was made up primarily of immigrants, a majority from Galicia, Austria's Polish territory, or from Russia, victims of tsarist persecution and pogroms. Immigrants coming into the city had an identity different from Vienna's native-born Jewish population. They worked wage-labor jobs in factories or in the service industry, were less educated, and were more orthodox in their following of Jewish tradition. Most spoke Yiddish, rather than German, and wore traditional Jewish clothing. Their foreign clothing and culture easily targeted them as outsiders. Their willingness to work wage-labor jobs caused them to be seen as a threat to German workers.

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19 Beller, Vienna and the Jews, 43.
21 A thorough examination of life in the Leopoldstadt is found in: Klaus Hödl, Als Bettler in die Leopoldstadt: Galizische Juden auf dem Weg nach Wien (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 1994).
23 Ibid., 146.
The “foreign” element immigrating into Vienna provided a powerful image for the scapegoat Lueger and Schönerer sought. But the Viennese press provided an even better one. As exclusionary laws were repealed, Jews became actively involved in the press and journalism. By 1900 almost every major Vienna daily paper was owned and operated by a Jewish management and staff. Lueger and Schönerer viciously attacked the press of Vienna, arguing Jewish owned papers were promoting ideas beneficial to the bourgeoisie. Editorial impropriety discovered within Vienna’s Neue Freie Presse strengthened claims of bias. Attempting to combat the destructiveness of the nationality conflict within Austria, the Neue Freie Presse chose to simply not report about issues of nationality. This decision was painted by critics as an attempt to manipulate events and unjustly influence readers of the paper. Karl Lueger summed up his criticisms against the Neue Freie Presse in a speech given at a Democratic Club meeting in 1886:

That is how it is with the “Presse.” In addition, it mostly belongs to Jews, and all events, therefore, are treated solely on the basis of whether or not they are useful or damaging to the Jew....

I said: lies and hypocrisy; corruption and thirst for power. That the liberal press is full of lies and needs no further proof....

It lies in editorials, reports, in local news, in municipal reports, in telegrams in the economic section; it lies between the lines in the feuilletons, it lies in novels, it lies in advertisements....

It lies directly by inventing untruths, deliberate untruths

It lies indirectly by ignoring important facts and thereby inducing readers to draw incorrect conclusions.  

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25 Karl Lueger, Speech Draft to the Margarethen Meeting, 1886, in “I Decide Who is a Jew!”, 332-333.
Such a vicious indictment resonated with a population looking for a means to explain their faltering livelihoods, especially following the stock market crash of 1873. With such speeches, Lueger presented himself as the defender of “average” Viennese citizens.

Scherer also spent a good deal of his efforts battling the press, which he considered the tool of “Jewish” capital. Like Lueger, he openly and sharply criticized their methods, calling the reporters “obscenely sensationalistic Jewish animals from the press, Semitic lindworms.” He went even further in a statement to the Kaiser asking him to “deliver the people from the yoke of the Jewish press,” which “like vampires [wanting] to suck their vital force from the strength of the Aryan peoples.” Eventually Schönerer incorporated his desire to reform the press into his Pan-German platform. He felt that it was the legislature’s job to first centralize and then restructure the press according to the principles of the Linz Program.

Schönerer’s desire to weaken the power of the press led him and his supporters to vandalize the offices of the Neues Wiener Tagblatt. In the wake of these attacks, Schönerer was arrested. Unable to regain its momentum the Pan-German Nationalist Party disintegrated. In the end anti-Semitism precipitated the final breakdown of the party. Some elements of the movement wanted to form an alliance with the Liberals, and advocated removing the anti-Semitic rhetoric from the party’s platform. Schönerer flatly refused any adjustment and insisted on

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26 Quoted in Hamann, *Hitler’s Vienna*, 246.
27 As discussed in Chapter 1.
maintaining the party’s anti-Semitic orientation. The group split into two parties, and Karl Lueger emerged as the voice of Viennese anti-Semitism.

Unlike the Pan-German’s racial vision of anti-Semitism, the platform of the Christian Socialists focused mainly on anti-capitalism. Anti-Semitism acted as the vehicle to convey the anti-capitalist message. The platform’s focus on anti-capitalism and anti-modernism mirrored that of the Linz Program, but the Christian Socialist platform maintained its distance from the racial implications of Schönerer’s anti-Semitism. Rather than focus on issues of nationality and race, Lueger’s platform appealed to the economic concerns of those embittered following the crash of 1873. Lueger called for protection of the farmers and artisans, guaranteeing debt relief as well as reforming property laws to evenly distribute wealth. In a speech given in Moravia in 1891, Lueger firmly stated his perception of capital and industrialization in general:

Shares were printed, banks were founded, wildest speculations were carried on at the stock market; then came the crash and lo and behold: the people were left with printed paper, while others prospered with money....

Of course, in Austria, the so-called freedom turned into incredible fraud....

Representatives of the people became representatives of capital and oppressors. The representatives were the ones who participated in all the fraudulence proceeded on the premise of *manus manum lavat*. You bow to me, I’ll bow to you....

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32 Brown, *Karl Lueger, the Liberal Years*, 239. Karl Lueger, Fragmentary draft of a speech presented in Moravia in 1891, in “I Decide Who is a Jew!” 327.
33 The Latin phrase used in this speech, *manus manum lavat* (one hand washes another hand), is never actually translated by Lueger for his listener. He chose instead to paraphrase its meaning in the context of his speech. Karl Lueger, Fragmentary draft of a speech presented in Moravia in 1891, in “I Decide Who is a Jew!”, 326.
In this speech, Lueger clearly exploited the artisan’s notions of betrayal. Even though he never specifically mentions any person, it is clear that his statement “while others prospered” took aim at the Jewish owned banking houses that had weathered the economic depression following the crash of 1873.

Lueger constantly reminded the Viennese population that anti-Semitism was “coterminous with anti-capital.” In 1886, Lueger announced his primary goal, the “liberation of the [Catholic] Christian People and states from the discreditable rule of the power that we Democrats call big business and the anti-Semites call Jewry.” By the end of his career, Lueger’s flagrant use of anti-Semitism had made him a master of the politics of victimization. He maintained his support by convincing his followers that they had been wronged by capital and industry, then provided a scapegoat for their misfortune, the Jew. As the connection between anti-capital and anti-Semitism grew, so did the legitimacy of using anti-Semitism in politics.

Lueger also connected anti-Semitism with Austrian patriotism, using historical examples to explain his fight against the Jews of Vienna. He equated the struggle against Jewish capitalists with the Austrian struggle against Napoleon. He also compared the threat of Jewish domination to the greatest threat Austria had faced throughout its history, the Turkish siege. On the anniversary of Austria’s victory over the Turks, Lueger stated that “today is the memorable day of Vienna’s liberation from the Turks, and let’s hope that we...can avert a danger that is greater than the

34 Quoted in Pulzer, The Rise of Antisemitism in Germany and Austria, 204.
35 Lueger, Draft speech from 1886, 331.
36 Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna, 332.
37 Under the command of Suleiman the II, the Ottoman Turks laid siege to Vienna in 1529. The siege, if successful, would have most likely resulted in the collapse of Habsburg control over Austria and allowed the forces of the Ottoman Empire to invade deeper into Europe. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 38, 62.
Turkish threat: the Jewish threat!" 38 Such rhetoric helped to strengthen the feelings of paranoia and heighten the sense of alarm already felt by the artisans of Vienna. It also validated the suspicions that the emerging modern society did not represent an evolution of culture, but an invasion of a foreign identity. By making this connection, Lueger implied that in order to be a patriotic citizen of the empire, one must also be an anti-Semite.

Lueger eventually tied anti-Semitism to his efforts preserve Austria’s “German character.” 39 He criticized Vienna’s developing cosmopolitan society, attributing its support of modern art styles to Jewish influence. 40 Lueger actively fought to support German folk culture and to weaken modern art movements. In 1892, Lueger pushed heavily to include funding for the construction of a Boranschlag in Vienna’s budget. He argued this art stage and performance area would maintain Vienna’s German cultural identity. 41 Lueger saw support for traditional arts and traditional culture as the only way to fight off the influence of capital and modernity in Viennese society. Lueger’s fight for the supremacy of Austro-German culture only strengthened his support among the traditional Catholic, German portion of Vienna.

Unlike the Pan-Germans, Lueger understood the Viennese attachment to Austria’s German, Catholic heritage. When he argued that the struggle of the Christian Socialists was the “struggle for the liberation of [Catholic] Christian people,” he announced his desire to return to the culture that was so integral to

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38 Quoted in Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna, 326.
40 Geehr, Karl Lueger, 266.
41 Weiner Zeitung, (Vienna), 1 April, 1892. The Boranschlag was an art stage, designed to feature German art.
Austrian identity. Voters saw Lueger as an advocate of socialism who was tied to the foundations of the Austrian state: the Habsburg dynasty and the Catholic Church. Therefore, Lueger’s use of anti-Semitism was tied to these tradition elements of Austrian society as well.

While Lueger’s defense of these traditions gained him support among the population of Vienna, it did not help him win support of the Kaiser. Lueger led the Christian Socialist party to a resounding success in the municipal elections of 1895, but was dealt a personal defeat; the Kaiser refused to sanction his election as mayor.

Franz Joseph, who had ruled Austria since 1848, was deeply troubled by the radical nature of Lueger’s movement and shocked by his flagrant use of anti-Semitism. Since the city of Vienna was also the imperial capital, Franz Joseph enjoyed the privilege of approving the mayor of the city, a hold over from absolutism. The aging ruler had hoped his refusal to sanction Lueger and the appointment of a new chancellor, Count Casimir Badeni, could halt the success of the Christian Socialist Party.

The Kaiser’s refusal to sanction the electorate’s choice only intensified Lueger’s popularity. It was seen as reaffirmation of the corruption of Liberal rule. Propaganda from the Christian Socialist party even went so far as to claim that Lueger was a martyr for the movement. A political cartoon equated Lueger’s snubbed election with the persecution of Jesus, showing Lueger outfitted with a reed and crown of thorns. This image ignored the reasons for the Kaiser’s action, and

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42 Geehr, Karl Lueger, 95.
43 Strong, Seedtime for Fascism, 30-31.
45 Geehr, Karl Lueger, photo insert.
only served to reinforce the claim that he was a defender of traditional Catholic, German culture against “Jewish” modernism. These efforts paid off, Lueger eventually became mayor.46

Once mayor, Lueger worked hard to make visible improvements to the city. He had spent his career specifying the “corruptions” of the modern political, economic, and social system, and he realized that his political livelihood depended on making swift and obvious changes. Once in office, he relied on the very elements of society that he had sought to alienate. He had to maintain the increasing standard of living provided by capital’s affluence, while attempting to weaken the influence of the capitalists themselves. He did this by actively developing the infrastructure of Vienna and supporting government sponsored civic improvements. Support for projects, such as expanding the gasworks of Vienna to bring lighting to more of the city, created the perception that Lueger was a politician concerned with the expanding the comforts of modernity, while at the same time ensuring that Austria’s cultural identity remained intact.47 Lueger’s campaign for subway development to provide cheaper transportation strengthened this perception.

To finance such projects as the gasworks and subway expansion, Lueger was forced to approach the Jewish banking houses he had criticized to become elected. In order to avoid any serious setbacks, when gave speeches to anti-Semitic organizations he used the politics of “liberation” to support his use of “Jewish” capital. That is,

46 Beller, Francis Joseph, 149.
47 Geehr, Karl Lueger, 96-97, 149.
Lueger justified that the only way for Vienna to remove its dependence on capital was to use capital to improve Vienna.\textsuperscript{48}

Eventually, Lueger began to adjust his anti-Semitic rhetoric. He was increasing his reliance on the \textit{bourgeoisie} and he also faced criticism from the Habsburg dynasty because by law, discrimination on the basis of nationality or religion was forbidden. Lueger was forced to announce publicly that he was not anti-Semitic.\textsuperscript{49} Following this statement, he began to adjust his behavior toward Vienna's Jewish notables. Upon the completion of the gasworks, he publicly praised the Rothschilds, whose bank had helped to finance the project.\textsuperscript{50} Lueger's subtle change in attitude cost him the support of his extremist following, but it did not affect his overall popularity. Until his death in 1910, Lueger maintained control over Vienna.

By changing his platform Lueger proved he was not incapable of adjusting and maneuvering to maintain his influence. Schönerer was unwilling to adjust his platform, no matter how much pressure was placed on him or his party. In the end, being an opportunist rather than an idealist made Lueger a more successful and ultimately a more dangerous politician.

It would be easy to view Lueger’s denial of personal anti-Semitic beliefs as a necessary step taken by a master politician trying to stay in office, but it is more complex than that. Lueger never acted on his anti-Semitic rhetoric with the same devotion as Schönerer. Throughout his career as both a liberal and as the leader of the Christian Socialists, Lueger had close, personal Jewish friends.\textsuperscript{51} He worked

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 149.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 232-265
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 153.
\textsuperscript{51} Geehr, \textit{“I Decide,”} 293-296.
willingly with Jewish businessmen and Jewish politicians, clearly in contradiction to his calls for the rejection of Jews and Jewish culture. Because of these contradictions, as well as a lack of sufficient documentation on and by Lueger, the true nature of his anti-Semitism remains a mystery.\(^{52}\)

This personal ambivalence cannot be used to excuse or justify Lueger's use of anti-Semitism. His use of anti-Semitism as a vehicle to political success left a tragic legacy for which he bears total responsibility.\(^{53}\) His public statements were made to a population that misunderstood his intentions. Lueger's continued use of anti-Semitism indicates that he either did not consider this fact or did not care. This negligence sacrificed the future stability of his society to obtain immediate success.

Lueger's success in using anti-Semitism as a valid political platform helped to make anti-Semitism a politically and socially accepted agenda. Even in the years following Lueger's death, the significance of this contribution had not been realized. Histories of Lueger and the Christian Socialists prior to World War II often overlook the significance of the party's anti-Semitic orientation, and there is little debate regarding Lueger's use of anti-Semitism.\(^{54}\) However, in the wake of the atrocities of the Holocaust, it is impossible to view Lueger's anti-Semitic statements without the Nazi movement coming to mind. It appears that Lueger, himself, never conceived of anything as horrendous as the Nazi Holocaust and never advocated the use of violence against the Jewish population. But, he made anti-Semitism a convenient means of conveying platform and agenda. He was the first politician to incorporate

\(^{52}\) Ibid., 322.  
\(^{53}\) Ibid., 331.  
\(^{54}\) For example, see Salo Baron, "The Jewish Question in the Nineteenth Century," The Journal of Modern History 10 (1938): 51-65.
anti-Semitism successfully into his political agenda. Even though he may not have personally been anti-Semitic, he is responsible for legitimizing anti-Semitism in a way no other politician of his time did.
CHAPTER IV

LUEGER, SCHÖNERER, AND CATHOLICISM

The Roman Catholic Church was one the defining characteristics of the Austria Empire and Habsburg dynasty. Since the time of the Catholic Reformation, the Habsburgs had been one of the most reliable allies of the Church and had consistently defendered Catholicism. The baroque aestheticism of Catholic Europe and Catholic influence marked Habsburg culture in both the public and private sphere. As with most of Catholic Europe, the Church had operated most of the schools and was responsible for the religious and secular education of the Austrian people. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Church’s role in Austrian society was threatened. The Liberals, who dominated the Austrian government, pursued a steady series of anti-clerical initiatives aimed at undermining Catholic influence in Austria and Vienna. The traditional political voice of Catholicism, the Catholic Conservatives, failed to respond, even though they constituted a dominant group in the post-Liberal coalition which governed the Empire.

Rather than defend a vital element of the German Austrian identity, Georg von Schönerer took advantage of the Catholic Conservative’s failure. Following the Liberal anti-clerical movement, he and the Pan-Germans began to aggressively pursue policies which would break the German Austrian ties to Catholicism and re-orient their religious allegiance to Lutheranism. By doing this, Schönerer hoped to increase ties to the German Empire.
In the face of political challenges, popular attachment to the Catholic faith remained strong. Scores of Austrian citizens, specifically those in the artisan and lower classes, were resentful of the Liberal attempts to alter the society of Austria through their anti-clerical initiative. At the same time, they hesitated to give their support to the Catholic Conservatives, who appeared unable to defend the Catholic faith.

Karl Lueger’s platform not only anticipated these feelings, but also embraced Austria’s Catholic heritage. He correctly predicted that Catholic Vienna would reject Schönerer’s call for Lutheran conversion. He also gambled that defense of Catholicism as well as German nationalism, would provide a popular political platform which would be embraced by the Catholics of Austria.

Since the reign of Joseph II, the power and stature of the Roman Catholic Church and its hierarchy had fluctuated in the Habsburg realm. Under Joseph, the Church’s control over schools was threatened and the Catholic hierarchy lost some of its control to the monarchy. In an effort to increase the centralization of the government, Joseph issued several decrees which attempted to make the Catholic Church the state church of Austria rather than an international organization of which Austria was a member. He permitted Jewish subjects to enroll in Christian schools, while at the same time increasing government control over those schools.¹ For obvious reasons, Joseph’s efforts were met with outrage and criticism from Church officials.

With Napoleon’s defeat and the rise of conservative neo-absolutism, the Church began to increase its authority, and the Church hierarchy regained much of its power and autonomy. The efforts of Franz I aimed at restructuring the power dynamics of the Church, granting the upper clergy more control over religious affairs. Catholicism found its own Prince Metternich, Clemens Maria Hofbauer, a Slovak preacher, who rose in predominance and began controlling the direction of these initiatives. Under Hofbauer’s guidance, many of the policies implemented under Joseph II were quickly rolled back, especially state control of the Church. Hofbauer and his colleagues, who became known as the “Hofbauer circle,” sought to return Austrian Catholicism to an international orientation, making the church and its policies supranational rather than national.

The Hofbauer circle was also greatly concerned with a return to personal piety and preventing the spread of Protestantism, especially in Bohemia. Given Austria’s role in the Catholic Reformation, this concern was not novel. Among their top goals were increasing Church attendance and the influence of the Church morality and values on the Austrian people. These reforms had an enormous impact, especially on the peasant and rural populations, and the Church returned to prominence in Austrian society.

Reforms continued into the reign of Franz Joseph. He signed a Concordat with the papacy in 1855, a culmination of all the previous reform efforts. The Concordat of 1855 reversed statist controls created by Joseph II and returned full sovereignty of Church affairs back to the papacy. Franz Joseph surrendered control

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3 Ibid., 62.
4 Ibid.
of the education system as well as control over marriage laws to the Church.\textsuperscript{5} While this sacrificed significant authority and sovereignty, the Kaiser earned a faithful ally in the papacy.

The increased authority of the Church was short lived. When the Liberals emerged as the dominant force in Austrian government, following the Seven Weeks War of 1867, they immediately attempted to reverse the limitations imposed by the Concordat of 1855. Most of the Liberals perceived the Concordat as a betrayal of Austrian sovereignty, specifically over matters of societal importance such as education.\textsuperscript{6} In 1868, after only a year in power, the Liberals created laws which permitted the government to dissolve marriages in certain circumstances, remove Church officials from the educational system (except in religious instruction) and even allowed people over the age of fourteen to declare their own religious affiliation.\textsuperscript{7} All of these changes came without directly rejecting or revoking the Concordat, which gave the clergy the right to communicate with the Curiae of the government.

These anti-clerical policies, which became a hallmark of Liberal rule, were motivated by several factors. Because of the connection between the Liberal coalition and bourgeoisie, many of whom were Jewish, leaders in the coalition felt the need to promote policies which would secularize Viennese society. They sought to increase government control over areas such as education in an attempt to remove Church influence and ensure that the Jewish population had full access to these

\textsuperscript{5} Beller, Francis Joseph, 58-9. See also McCagg, A History of Habsburg Jews, 137.
\textsuperscript{6} Boyer, Political Radicalism, 28.
\textsuperscript{7} William A. Jenks, Austria Under the Iron Ring, 1879-1893 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1965), 122.
programs. Anti-clericalism signaled a change in the official position of the Parliament to a secular, “modern” affiliation.

However, due to the power dynamics of the Austrian state, the Parliament was almost always subordinate to the Kaiser. Franz Joseph had ruled following and absolutist model until the 1860s and still exercised strict control over the government. It was difficult to challenge the monarch outright, without seeming disloyal. Therefore, the anti-clerical program pursued by the Parliament also served as an indirect way to challenge the power of Kaiser. The Concordat of 1855 had been established with little debate or consideration from anyone outside the royal court. Yet the Liberals were able to undermine the agreement, even forcing the Kaiser to weaken a decision he personally made and promoted.

Beyond this power play, through its anti-clerical reforms, the Liberal coalition was able to directly increase its own power and that of Parliament against the absolutist aspects of the government. The areas targeted, religious controls over schools and school entrance; religious controls over civil institutions such as marriage; allowing freedom of choice in religion; had all been under the control of the Church hierarchy. Since, for the most part, high ranking clergy (such as bishops and archbishops) were of the nobility, they also had very close ties to the monarchy. This gave the Kaiser influence over these matters. By placing such institutions under government control, the Liberals increased the direct power of Parliament and secular officials, politically increasing their own influence and power.

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9 Jenks, Austria Under the Iron Ring, 122-3.
10 Boyer, Political Radicalism, 28.
As was so typical of Viennese politics, this struggle even affected the landscape of the *Ringstrasse*. Traditional elements of Austrian society held considerable sway over the construction. The Church was among these elements. Coming off of their victory with the Concordat of 1855, the Catholic hierarchy also secured a prominent location along the *Ringstrasse* for a large, new church. The *Votivkirche*, constructed in neo-Gothic style, was built to display the Church’s continued role in Austrian society. Its Gothic twin spires provided a dynamic presence for the new center of Viennese life, just as the Gothic spire of St. Stephen’s had done for the old. The new church was meant to communicate not only the presence of the Church, but also the spirit of Catholic revival which also appeared to be sweeping through Austria. While this revival had tremendous success in the countryside, it did not initially have a large impact on Vienna. The capital was on the eve of the creation of the Liberal coalition. The Vienna of the Liberals would not be rooted in Church and tradition but in capital and change.

Once the Liberals assumed control, the Church, like the army, lost most of its influence in the development of the *Ringstrasse*. No other religious buildings were constructed along the boulevard. In fact, the Liberal developers of the *Ringstrasse* surrounded the neo-Gothic *Votivkirche* with the Renaissance-style university. Placing the university, a symbol of human reason and secular power, directly adjacent to the church, a symbolize of the renewal of Catholic authority, was a testament to the

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authority of the Liberals (especially since the Liberals fought for the University’s location.)

The Catholic Church and politicians of the Conservative Catholic party were totally incapable of resisting the changes implemented by the Liberal Coalition. During the 1870s, the only thing which united the Catholic politicians was their general disdain for Liberal rule. Factions within the Catholic party fought constantly among themselves and could not even decide on a method to challenge Liberal, anti-clerical policy. Some, led by Cardinal Rauscher, desired practical, “realistic” aims, such as working within the framework of the new anti-clerical laws in an attempt to expand Church power. While others, such as the Bohemian aristocrat Leo Thun, wanted direct resistance. This faction even attempted to gridlock the Parliament. Ultimately, no decision was reached and no significant opposition created.

The effects of both Liberal anti-clericalism and the upper clergy’s impotence in the face of the Liberal challenge had a profound impact on Austrian and Viennese politics for the remainder of the nineteenth century. The lower clergy, who tended to be more radical, more nationalistic, and younger, often called for fierce resistance and often condemned the secular policies of the Liberal coalition. By the end of the 1870s, these members of the clergy began to gain more influence over the Catholic population of Austria. The old, traditional Catholic political powers were becoming

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13 Brown, Karl Lueger, the Liberal Years, 38-9. Also, Wibiral and Renata Mikula, Heinrich von Ferstel, in Wiener Ringstrasse, 47-9.

14 Boyer, Political Radicalism, 28.

15 Ibid., 28-9. Thun’s suggestion of “resistance” came directly out of his exposure to the Czech nationalist movement, which had a tradition of gridlocking legislative procedure to gain concessions.
increasingly irrelevant. Since these clergymen could not find a receptive audience in the Catholic Conservatives and other Catholic parties, many became followers of Karl Lueger and his United Christians, the precursor of the Christian Socialists.

The Catholic Conservatives did have some political success. They joined the “Iron Ring” coalition of Eduard von Taaffe, the Irish-born noble who became Minister-President of the Parliament in 1879, following the collapse of the Liberal Coalition. The Iron Ring, which dominated Austrian politics for the next fourteen years, was composed of Czech, Polish, German, and Slovene nationalist parties, clerical parties, and conservative parties. For further stability, Taaffe kept Liberals on his cabinet as well. The goal of such a diverse coalition was to keep government processes operating and to prevent the obstruction of legislature due to the spreading nationality crisis. Diversity also ensured that no single group would be come dominant and no one agenda pushed too far. This was Taaffe’s aim, to keep each group in a “well-tempered discontent,” so that the Parliament could still function. While the involvement of the Catholic parties ensured a degree of influence, it was far from the emphasis of Taaffe’s policy. In spite of this weakness, there was a growing perception that the “Iron Ring” represented a revival of clerical interests, and a return of “traditional” and conservative aspects of Austrian society. Those opposed to the changes created by the Liberals as well as the changes brought by capital and modernity, welcomed Taaffe’s coalition. The artisans and shopkeepers hoped that the Iron Ring would work to reverse many of the Liberal policies.

17 Ibid., 52-3
However, when the stock market crashed in 1873, many within the petit bourgeoisie became infuriated with Taaffe and his government. Soon Taaffe was being implicated in charges of corruption, just as the Liberals had. As members of the Iron Ring, even the Catholic Conservatives became associated with a government many saw as betraying the Christian people. The impact of this connection was devastating for the traditional political voice of Catholicism within Austria. It had been unable to protect artisan and petit bourgeoisie interests during the period of Liberal domination. Once the Catholic Conservatives returned to a position of authority, they were seen as unwilling to protect the Catholics of Austria. This had a polarizing effect, creating both more radical anti-clericalism as well as a more radical, popular defense of Catholicism in the empire.

During the 1870s and well into the 1880s Georg von Schönerer and the Pan-German Nationalist Party were explicitly promoting anti-clericalism and anti-Catholicism. They combined these positions with their existing anti-Liberal, anti-Semitic, anti-Habsburg, and anti-capital platform. To Schönerer, the Catholic Church was a divisive element within the German nation. He subscribed completely to the notion that the German nation should exist as “Ein Volk-ein Reich-ein Gott.” In fact, he and many of Pan-Germans held to the notion that the separation of the German nation, Germany and Austria, would never have occurred had the Reformation swept through all German lands.

Ultimately, Schönerer was motivated less by theology than personal ambition and his desire to unite the German nation, or at least ensure its dominance over other

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21 Schorske, “Politics in a New Key,” 129. See also, Höbelt, “Well-Tempered Discontent,” 54.
22 Whiteside, *Socialism of Fools*, 207. Translated as: “One nation, one empire, one God.”
nationalities, especially the Czechs. Schönerer’s principle political ties were to the nationality struggle occurring in Bohemia and affairs in that region were always of highest priority to the Pan-German movement. Already seeing the Catholic Church as divisive, the participation of the Catholic Conservatives in the Iron Ring, of which the Czech nationalists were also members, convinced Schönerer that the Church was an enemy to the German people of Austria. His attacks on the Catholic clergy rivaled his attacks on the Jews of Austria. He implied that the Jesuits abused their role as the primary teaching order of Austria. He even went so far as to tell supporters not to allow daughters and wives to go to confession, implying the clergy was apt to use this opportunity to engage in sexual misconduct. These charges were summarized in his pamphlet “Unadulterated German Words” in which he described instances of these accounts in often pornographic language. These attacks were meant to create doubt and mistrust and erode the clergy’s political and social support.

In the years following his release, after his arrest for vandalizing of the Neues Wiener Tagblatt offices in 1888, Schönerer focused more heavily on his crusade against the Catholic Church. During the 1890s he began promoting his Los von Rom (Away from Rome) movement heavily and developing support for the movement. Once again, nationalism was the chief motivation for Schönerer’s efforts. He became convinced of the notion that true Germans must be Lutheran and began to appeal for conversion especially in the Sudetenland of Bohemia. Los von Rom promoted the idea that due to its ties to Catholicism, and the implied internationalism of the Church, Austria was culturally unable to defend the German nationality and the

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23 Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna, 248.
dominant German culture within the empire. Therefore, Schönerer contended that the
Austrian Germans had to turn away from Catholicism. This implied that they also
had to turn away from the Catholic Habsburg dynasty, a monarchy too international
in spirit. By doing so, Germans in Bohemia and Austria in general would help to set
the stage for eventual Anschluss with the German Empire. Such a policy was not
only drastic but totally revolutionary in spirit. By calling for an outright rejection of
Catholicism, Schönerer was calling for Austrians to abandon one of the central
features of their state’s identity. In spite of its radical nature, the movement gained
momentum, especially in Bohemia, which was Schönerer’s primary interest. This
appeal was welcomed by many Bohemian Germans, especially due to the bitter
feuding that was occurring between the Germans and Czechs of Bohemia. Since the
Czechs were also technically Austrian, many of the Germans preferred Schönerer’s
appeal rather than the status quo in the Austrian government, which was, by
necessity, international in orientation.

The Los von Rom movement was very successfully in the Sudetenland of
Bohemia because of Schönerer’s focus on German nationalism. His attacks on the
international context of the Catholic Church played easily into the already distinct
anti-Slavism present among the Germans of the region. Schönerer was quick to point
out parishes in which a Czech priest served a German parish and other ways in which
the Catholic Church could be seen as an enemy of German culture.

25 Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna, 248.
26 For an excellent account of this rivalry see Pieter M. Judson, Exclusive Revolutionaries: Liberal
Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in the Austrian Empire, 1848-1914 (Ann Arbor:
27 Whiteside, Socialism of Fools, 255.
By 1900, the movement was having substantial impact on Bohemia. Schönnerer allied himself with the Protestant minister Pastor Heinrich Bräunlich, who was working within the *Evangelisher Bund* (Evangelical Alliance), which encouraged Lutheran ministers to come into Bohemia to convert Catholics to the Lutheran faith. The *Evangelisher Bund* also worked with local landowners and Lutherans from the German Empire to encourage settlers to move into the Sudetenland.

The movement was even having some initial impact in Vienna. Primarily it was limited to German student radicals from Vienna’s universities. A pamphlet entitled “A Handbook for the Ostmark Fraternity Student” gave students not only the ideological justification for *Los von Rom* but also encouraged them to win converts from Catholicism. While this proved to be some what popular among German fraternities, the movement never received the same level of acceptance as it did in Bohemia.

It was also during this period that Schönnerer himself converted to Lutheranism. In speeches and pamphlets Schönnerer praised Luther as a true hero of the German people and a model of German patriotism. Oddly, even though he was encouraging Germans to convert to the Lutheran faith, Schönnerer hardly ever mentioned Luther’s religious conviction or principles. Primarily, Luther served as an example of a nationalist rather than religious leader in the rhetoric of the Pan-Germans. The fact that Schönnerer’s promotion of Lutheranism for purely

28 Ibid., 243.
29 Ibid., 246.
nationalistic reasons would ultimately damage the *Los von Rom* movement as well as his ties with the *Evangelisher Bund*.

Several of his allies within the *Bund* grew resentful that Schöenerer was less concerned with the religious aspects of the movement and remained almost entirely devoted to its political and nationalistic roots. They broke from the Pan-Germans to pursue their own policies.\(^\text{32}\) *Los von Rom* faced even greater challenges once it began to lose the support of mainline German groups as well as the Lutheran organizations. Schöenerer attempted to force the German School Association to refuse entry to Jews and Catholics and adopt a policy which specifically demanded “Aryan” heritage from its students. Schöenerer broke his connection with this group, which had served as an ally and formed the School Association for Germans which allowed only Protestant teachers and students.\(^\text{33}\) The Association was a miserable failure.

Constant attacks on the Catholic faith as well as outright disloyalty to the Habsburg crown brought down the scathing ire of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The Habsburg heir chose to combat Schöenerer, his School Association, and *Los von Rom* by avidly supporting the Catholic School Association both politically and financially. The archduke promoted the Association and mocked Schöenerer by adopting the slogan “Away from Rome means away from Austria.”\(^\text{34}\) In an attempt to distance himself from Schöenerer’s movement, Lueger joined in the assault against Schöenerer’s movement, providing special municipal protection for the Catholic School Association. Schöenerer had formally broken his connection with Lueger prior to this point, when Lueger refused to renounce the Catholic faith. When questioned about

\(^{32}\) Ibid., 252.


\(^{34}\) Ibid., 249.
his position on Schönnerer and Pan-German policies, the Viennese mayor proclaimed that “These are not Germans but political buffoons.” The obvious implication: Lueger’s Christian Socialists were the true German nationalists, not Schönnerer and the Pan-Germans.

Schrönerer’s Los von Rom movement proved to be a short lived phenomenon. The conversions to Lutheranism jumped from its typical number of 500-1000 converts in 1898 to 6,385. During the initial years of the program it remained above 5,000. By 1902 the number of converts had fallen to 4,624 and by 1910 had reached the previous norms of the 1890s. As previously mentioned, a majority of these converts were on the Sudetenland border with the German Empire. Oddly, most of them were not the workers, peasants, and artisans that Schönnerer saw as his base of supporters. Instead the largest supporters and number of converts came from the middle class and bourgeoisie, the very groups Schönnerer sought to weaken.

These facts are very telling of the impact of the Los von Rom movement. Primarily it shows that those who supported the movement, being from the same groups criticized and demonized in Schönnerer’s other policies, most likely did not subscribe to the other major tenants of the Pan-German platform, except those dealing with support for German nationalism. Secondly, given that the movement had a sustainable momentum of only a decade and had lost most of its momentum within three years, it also demonstrates that it did not have widespread appeal to the people of Austria.

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35 Quoted in Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna, 249.
36 Whiteside, Socialism of Fool, 254.
37 Ibid., 255.
While Schönerer was promoting the slogan *Los von Rom*, Lueger was defining his movement with the slogan “Catholic, Austrian, German.” Lueger realized that religion could play a valuable role in his career and sought to appeal to the Catholic heritage of Austrians to gain support. Building on the discontent with traditional Catholic parties, Lueger began to ally himself with frustrated Catholic groups. Many of his earliest promoters were the very same members of the lower clergy who criticized the seemingly impotent behavior of their superiors. With the support of these members of the clergy and through his political maneuvering, Lueger was able to use traditional Austrian rhetoric within his ideology, which supported egalitarian democracy and municipal socialism. Through his blending of anti-capitalist rhetoric and anti-Semitic language, he was able to use a traditional prejudice of the Austrian people to coincide with his crusade against capital and Liberalism. By the end of the 1880s Lueger was able to successfully use Catholicism to help him create a mass political party with unprecedented popular support.

Lueger was quick to capitalize on the struggle between the younger, more radical members of the clergy and the older clergy who primarily came from aristocratic backgrounds. He was able to win the support from many of the local parish priests through his support for education reform. In rallies he constantly appealed to his listeners to ensure that all of their children be educated as faithful Catholics. When the member parties of the “Iron Ring” began debating over school reform, Lueger enthusiastically supported the clerical movement. He specifically

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40 Schorske, “Politics in a New Key,” 133, 140.
endorsed those calling for segregation in schools, which would separate Jewish students from Catholics students. He further appealed for parents to enroll their children in schools where they could be educated by priests and the Church, making the Christian Socialist movement an avid supporter of Catholic schools.

Anti-Semitic platforms as well as his early ties to Schönerer and the Pan-Germans, forced Lueger to deal with resistance from several Catholic political organizations. To allay Catholic hesitations, Lueger began to actively court these groups and began to consciously divest his politics from those of Schönerer. He became a regular speaker at the Katholikentag (Catholic diet) which began meeting to discuss concerns regarding the state of Catholic affairs in Austria. In these meetings, Lueger not only promoted his politics but also made various pronouncements of faith. The major tenet of all these arguments was always the same, the state needed Catholic Christian influence, the Church did not need state influence. His time at the Katholikentag was well spent, Lueger earned loyal, consistent supporters from these groups who would form the backbone of his initial movement.

Beyond the local clergy, Lueger was also quick to exploit the Catholic revival that was occurring among the lower classes and the rural population of Vienna. Lueger frequently appealed to a Romanticized image of medieval Catholicism, which many saw as a pure, unifying element; he would then juxtapose this against what he presented as the hedonistic, irreligious liberal culture. Lueger called for a return to

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45 Ibid., 86.
this medieval, Catholic mindset which many saw as providing cultural and social solidarity and united the people of Austria under a single faith and entity.\textsuperscript{47}

While he supported the resistance against the Catholic Conservatives and other traditional Catholic parties, Lueger was careful to avoid Schönerer’s mistake of alienating the aristocratic and clerical powers of Austria. Whenever possible he connected the dynasty and Church. He referred to the Habsburgs as the “defenders of Christians society,” while praising their commitment to the Church.\textsuperscript{48} This praise did little to win him significant support from the royal family, but he gained a tremendous boost in legitimacy when Pope Leo XIII issued an endorsement for Lueger, saying “The leader of the Christian Socials should know that he possesses a warm friend in the pope who blesses him; he values the Christian Social efforts and has complete understanding for certain difficulties, ‘but they will overcome.’”\textsuperscript{49} This letter came in open rejection of the opinions the pope had received from Austrian archbishops and after the papal endorsement, Lueger never had to fear the loss of support from the lower clergy.

Lueger’s defense of the faith and willingness to fight against the Liberals and other perceived threats to German, Catholic control in Vienna energized lay Catholics. Beyond his call for education reform, Lueger created a number of initiatives which he claimed were to aid the Christian population of artisans and workers against the capitalist, Jewish bourgeoisie. He began the “buy only Christian”

\textsuperscript{48} Karl Lueger, Draft Speech for the Muncipal Council on December 2, 1898, in “I Decide Who is a Jew!”, 258.
\textsuperscript{49} Geehr, \textit{Karl Lueger}, 89.
movement, in which he encouraged followers to support only Christian businesses.\textsuperscript{50} Implied in this movement was also that his followers buy not only Christian, but avoid support of capitalists and industrialists in favor of small, artisan shops.

Such movements as well as Lueger’s careful development of his message earned him a loyalty among members of the Christian, Catholic community. Early in his career, loyalty from lay Catholics provided Lueger with incredible support. By far, the most enthusiastic of these supports was the Christian Woman’s Association.\textsuperscript{51} The Christian Woman’s Association, which was formally created during Lueger’s fifth term as mayor, had been aiding Lueger since he first began running for municipal office in 1885.\textsuperscript{52} This group of women became a fixture of Lueger’s campaign and of the Christian Socialist movement. Their level of activity and effectiveness is unique, primarily due to the low level of political influence women typically had in Austria. Yet, the Christian Woman’s Association and its members were the backbone of Lueger’s support. There were one of the most well organized group functioning in a political party at the time and were vital in providing workers to canvass voting districts and in raising money. They were also the first group to be sent out as “political shock troops,” when volatile situations arose.\textsuperscript{53}

Even though they lacked suffrage these women were successful in gaining votes for Lueger. Often times their enthusiasm for the Christian Socialist movement spread into their home and garnered support among their male family members and neighbors. Even the Wiener Sonn – und Montags – Zeitung, which had a history of

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 212.
\textsuperscript{51} Hamann, \textit{Hitler's Vienna}, 292.
\textsuperscript{52} Boyers, \textit{Political Radicalism}, 213.
\textsuperscript{53} Geehr, \textit{Karl Lueger}, 210.
sharp criticism for Lueger, acknowledged that: “it was they (Lueger’s Christian, female supporters) who decided the men to side with Lueger, it was they who became the prophets of der schöne Karl.” Never has a tribune fought with more clever means. The Christian Social Women’s League, scorned by their opponents, penetrated their families, moved from home to home, and through their words he became a brilliant leader.” Through his support of Catholicism and Austria’s Catholic tradition, Lueger was able to develop the popular following Schönerer, the Liberal coalition, and even the traditional Conservative parties never could.

For the most part, there seems to have been very little genuine religious fervor in Lueger’s rhetoric. Instead, his religiosity was designed to increase his overall electibility and support among a population, which he accurately predicted felt threatened and isolated. However, Lueger was not alone in promoting a religious viewpoint out of political consideration. For all of his talk of Los von Rom and for all of his ideological and radical orientation, Georg von Schönerer also primarily used religion as a political tool. Even though he urged German Austrians to reject their faith and loyalty to the Catholic Church, there was no missionary zeal in his call on a political agenda. Instead, conversion was merely a part of making them “more” German. In Schönerer’s mind, Lutheranism was not superior due to any theological point and he did not promote it as such. To him, Lutheranism was superior to Catholicism because it brought the Germans of Austria closer to their Imperial brethren. For the most part, all of Vienna’s politicians spoke passionately about religion and the role religion, specifically the Catholic Church, should take in

54 “Der schöne Karl,” or beautiful Karl, was a nickname that developed for Lueger, in light of his successful ability to earn the support, and often charm, the female population of Vienna.
55 Geehr, Karl Lueger, 211.
Viennese society. Yet most of them never addressed the issue from a religious standpoint.

Lueger was successful in his use of religion and of Catholicism because he provided a way for the citizens of Vienna to remain with the Catholic Church while also supporting the German dominance of Vienna and anti-capitalist measures. In fact, as Lueger’s platform materialized, it soon became clear that according to the Christian Socialist party a good German was also a loyal Catholic, which then made him/her a loyal Austrian. Lueger blended popular support for the Catholic faith with his message in a way neither the Liberals or Pan-Germans ever could. He understood the Austrian attachment to the faith and rather than attempt to change it, he conformed his message to it.
CHAPTER V
GERMAN NATIONALISM AND THE HABSBURG DYNASTY

In a speech given at a Municipal Council festival on December 2, 1898, Lueger extolled the German nation and the House of Habsburg with the following:

They [the men portrayed in portraits in the Rathaus] remind us of the heroic courage of our forefathers, of the rescue of Vienna and all of Western Civilization from the Turkish threat; they tell us that the German Emperors of the House of Habsburg were the champions of Christian culture and Vienna the bulwark of the German Empire; they tell us of the loyalty of the lawful ruler, which could not be broken even by death on the gallows.  

In many ways, this single paragraph summarizes Lueger's platform regarding German nationalism and its place within the Habsburg state. For him the two were bound together. The cultural heritage of the Germans was the civilizing force in the diverse Austrian lands. The Habsburg dynasty was the historic leaders of the German people, as well as the steward of German cultural dominance in the Austrian lands. This image appealed to the Romanticized notion of the Holy Roman Empire, which had united all of German Europe.

While this image of the German nation and the Habsburg dynasty was powerful, in many ways it was not always realistic. The last decades of the Habsburg Empire's existence were plagued by ethnic rivalries. In 1867, the Magyars in Hungary successfully negotiated a compromise with Kaiser Franz Joseph, creating the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. The Hungarian portion of the Dual Monarchy was given the capability to create its own domestic policies and following the Ausgleich the Hungarian kingdom was able to bully and coerce national cohesion

\[1\] Karl Lueger, “Draft Speech, I N 41.515,” in “I Decide Who is a Jew,” 258.
under Magyar dominance. The Austrian half of the Empire was less fortunate.

Perceiving the Ausgleich as a total victory for the Hungarian nationality, the non-German nationalities of Austria began pushing more feverishly for their own compromise, the strongest coming from the Czechs of Bohemia. The result was endemic gridlock of the Austrian Reichsrat and local diets. During the frequent periods of legislative inaction the Empire was ruled by decree and operated through bureaucracy. At times, it seemed as though the centrifugal force of nationality conflict would rip the empire apart.

The Habsburg dynasty was often at odds with the nationalist parties. The political groups representing such minorities as the Czechs often criticized the monarchy for doing too little to grant national equality. The German nationalist parties, conversely, would often attack the monarchy for doing too little to preserve German cultural dominance in Austria. As the fights between the groups grew more intense, some nationalist parties, such as the Pan-Germans, often accused the Habsburgs of being anti-German and pro-Slavic. Georg von Schönerer was especially critical of the Habsburgs, and often advocated a union of German-Austrians with the Wilhelmine German Empire.

Even though Karl Lueger ascended to the position of mayor during this tumultuous period, he always attempted to maintain a platform which supported both German cultural dominance and the Habsburg dynasty. Even though he belonged to

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2 The Ausgleich was prompted by the Habsburg defeat in the Seven Weeks War. The Hungarian portion of the dual monarchy received almost total domestic autonomy, united to its Austrian counterpart only by the monarchy and the Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs. See Alan Sked, The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire: 1815-1918 (New York: Addison Wesley Longman Ltd, 1989), 187-98. For more on the Hungarian reaction to the nationality question see Sked, The Decline and Fall, 208-18.
the ranks of the German nationalist parties, Lueger never adopted the extreme nationalist position supported by Georg von Schönerer and the Pan-German Nationalists. In a sense, Lueger’s nationalism was more closely tied to patriotic support of the classical German heritage of Austria’s past. He supported German society and culture with the assumption that it should be successfully spread throughout Austria.

At times, his role as Habsburg defender was difficult, given his icy relationship with the Kaiser. But, Lueger was careful to maintain his public and private support of the dynasty. He gambled, correctly, that his popularity would only increase through open support. Even when he joined in protest with the other German nationalist parties, Lueger was always careful to criticize particular initiatives or ministers, never the dynasty itself. Ultimately, Lueger understood, even in the tense atmosphere created by the ethnic conflict, his supporters in Vienna were most satisfied when German nationalism and Austrian patriotism were cooperative rather than combative.

Part of this attitude was due to the general popularity of the Kaiser in both Vienna and Austria. The Kaiser occupied a uniquely powerful role in Austria during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Like most Habsburg rulers, Franz Joseph saw himself as both chief executive and head of state.³ When he took the throne at the age of eighteen, following the Revolution of 1848, the Kaiser enjoyed a period of absolute rule. Even after the October Constitution of 1860 theoretically created a constitutional state, Franz Joseph maintained considerable control over the Austrian

Empire. During the periods of frequent parliamentary gridlock, the Kaiser became the ‘first bureaucrat’ of the Empire as well as its sovereign. He controlled legislative initiation, frequently ruled by decree, so much so that the style of his reign bordered on micromanagement. Even when the Reichsrat was functional, the Kaiser maintained vast control over policy and legislature. He was never truly comfortable with turning over power to a legislative body of any sort and during every constitutional compromise, Franz Joseph attempted to retain as much authority as possible.  

But this authority came with immense responsibility. Unlike the other politicians of Austria, who left office through retirement, the loss of an election, or resignation, the Kaiser was unable to abandon his duties. Even though he attempted to find capable Chancellors to aid him, ultimately the responsibility of managing the empire was always in his hands. As Kaiser, he was first politician of Austria-Hungary. 

But as Kaiser, he was more than just a politician, and by the time of his death Franz Joseph attained unparalleled cultural significance within the Habsburg Monarchy. He became one of the most critical forces of unity within his diverse empire. So much so that at the time of his death in 1916, one could argue that Franz Joseph had become an icon of the Austrian state. Part of this status came simply from the monarch’s longevity. During a speech at Franz Joseph’s sixtieth jubilee, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany praised Franz Joseph as a “model for three generations of

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4 For more on Franz Joseph’s early years as Kaiser, see Beller, Francis Joseph, 31-107.  
5 Ibid., 80-1.  
6 Strong, Seedtime for Fascism, 63.
German princes.” Indeed, by the time Karl Lueger became mayor of Vienna, there was hardly a statesman or citizen in Austria who had live under another Habsburg monarch. This unprecedented continuity provided a striking force of stabilization for the Empire. Evoking the Kaiser’s name had a calming effect on even the fiercest nationalist, so much so that most political parties were willing to avoid serious efforts to restructure the Austrian state until after Franz Joseph’s death. On the street, as well as in political halls, calls for another Ausgleich, in favor of the Czechs, or calls for the Empire to break into its national components were often met with the statement “Surely you can’t do that to the old man.”

Franz Joseph was viewed by many as a father-figure as well as a ruler and he encouraged this perception and attempted to fill the role. Any subject, of any nationality or class, could have an audience with the Kaiser regarding any matter which personally affected him/her. While these audiences were generally very short, they nevertheless were a comfort to the people of the Habsburg Empire. They also reassured the populace that the Kaiser was a figure above politics and nationality. In fact, even though he saw himself as a German prince, Franz Joseph’s most loyal subjects were often non-German. Many of the national minorities viewed the Kaiser as their protector from discrimination by the Germans.

Loyalty among his subjects was also increased in a peculiar way, through Franz Joseph’s series of personal tragedies. By the end of the nineteenth century, the

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7 Hamann, *Hitler’s Vienna*, 95.
8 Ibid., 90. This is also discussed throughout the chapter “Kaiser as a Political Icon,” Strong, *Seedtime for Fascism*, 47-67.
9 Audio guided tour of the Royal Apartments, the Hofburg Palace complex, Vienna, Austria.
11 Strong, *Seedtime for Fascism*, 61-4. This reputation was well deserved, as the Kaiser personally enforced the law which forbad discrimination based on nationality.
Kaiser had lost his brother to a revolution, his son to suicide, and his wife to assassination. These events gave the Kaiser a tangible human quality as well as the air of a tragic figure. As historian Brigette Hamann points out, the Kaiser became shrouded in myth, a figure personified by constant work and diligence as well as personal sacrifice. These personal qualities, paired with the baroque pageantry of Habsburg court life, created a figure who seemed larger than life while undeniably human. This balance endeared the Kaiser to his subjects.

Karl Lueger not only understood the Kaiser’s cultural significance in Vienna and Austria but also understood how to use the iconic power of the Kaiser to his political advantage. The perception of Franz Joseph as a benevolent father figure played well into Lueger’s romantic vision of medieval society, which centered around the notion of a cooperative and corporate medieval state based on loyalty and community. With speeches, such as the one made during the Municipal Council festival on December 2, 1898, Lueger called upon the image of Austria’s earlier history, when it was not only triumphant in a major conflict but also when its subjects worked cooperatively together. And part of that cooperation centered on loyalty to the “lawful ruler” of the House of Habsburg.

His speech concluded by drawing on Franz Joseph’s image as the selfless father, when he dedicated the festival to the Kaiser, “who always endeavored to show

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12 Franz Joseph’s brother, Maximillian, became Emperor of Mexico, was killed by firing squad during the Mexican revolution of 1867, Empress Elizabeth of Austria-Hungary was assassinated by an Italian anarchist in Geneva in 1898. For more on Elizabeth’s assassination see: Beller, Francis Joseph, 15. For a primary source account of Maximillian’s reign in Mexico and his execution see: Brigitte Hamann, *Mit Kaiser Max in Mexiko: Aus den Tagbüchern den Fürsten Carl Khevenhüller 1864-1867* (Munich: Piper, 2001). For details on the suicide of Crown Prince Rudolf see: Brigitte Hamann, *Rudolf: Kronprinz und Rebell* (Munich: Piper, 1999), 437-97.
13 Hamann, *Hitler’s Vienna*, 89.
15 This speech was quoted in the opening paragraph on page 67.
us only benevolence, who always had the welfare of his peoples at heart, and with whom we share joy and pain."16 This dedication, which at first glance appears as a mere formality, is very significant. Beyond a simple dedication, it served as a functional reinforcement of Lueger’s evocation of a traditional, paternalistic state which was so central to the platform of the Christian Socialists.17 While he is paying homage to the Kaiser, one could easily argue that Lueger is reinforcing the notion that the citizens of Vienna should expect that behavior from all of their leaders.

The speech is also significant because it displays the nature of Lueger’s German nationalism and Austrian patriotism. In his platform, Lueger merged the two attempting to make them inseparable. In order to do this, Lueger evoked Vienna’s previous role as the central city of the Holy Roman Empire.18 Through this image, Lueger is once again calling for a return to a time when Austria was traditional and united, through the common German, Catholic culture.

As a politician, Lueger fought for every opportunity to remind the people of Vienna of this background. When the Municipal Council planned a small fireworks display in honor of the bicentennial of the victory of the Habsburgs over the Turks in 1683, Lueger submitted a scathing resolution to the Council. He criticized the Council for having “slight regard for the people” and for not providing adequate events which “should suffice to remind them of the significance of [that] memorable day.”19 Lueger appealed to the council to remember its duty “as the Imperial and

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16 Karl Lueger, Draft Speech, I N 41.515, in "I Decide Who is a Jew," 259.
17 Janik, “Vienna 1900, Revisited,” 35.
18 Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna, 86.
19 Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, Austria. Nachlass Karl Lueger, St. Sig. Zl. 1257/12, Box III, Mappe: Saekularfeier 1883.
Residential Capital of Austria and as a German city” to properly honor the victory. While the resolution to reorganize the event failed, Lueger successfully used the opportunity to once again combine German nationalism and Austrian loyalty.

Lueger’s defense of the Habsburg monarchy and loyalty to the Austrian state were not enough to garner support with the monarch. In fact, Franz Joseph would become one of the most significant obstacles to Karl Lueger’s election as mayor. By all accounts, the Kaiser appears to have been personally revolted by Lueger, his party’s platform, and political rhetoric. Franz Joseph, following the model set by Kaiser Joseph II, attempted to end discrimination against national minorities within the empire. He also viewed the protection of his subjects’ rights as a personal responsibility. The crown and the Christian Socialists were bound to conflict eventually, especially since Franz Joseph saw the nationalistic and anti-Semitic language of Karl Lueger as both divisive and dangerous.

This conflict came to a head during the mayoral elections of 1895. These elections delivered Lueger 97 of the 137 votes cast in the city council, giving him a firm victory over his opponents. Even though he won the election, he would not become mayor until his election was sanctioned by the crown. The Kaiser was already hesitant to permit Lueger to become mayor. Beyond his personal inclination to reject Lueger’s election, Franz Joseph was under enormous political pressure to do so. Baron Desiderius Bánffy, the Hungarian Prime Minister, sharply condemned Lueger’s election and opposed confirmation. Likewise, a coalition of Liberals and

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20 Ibid.
21 Boyer, Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna, 163.
22 Strong, Seedtime, 70.
23 Geehr, Karl Lueger, 91.
bankers, led by the Rothschilds, called for the Kaiser to reject Lueger’s election. The Rothschilds even went so far as to threaten to pull their business from Vienna and move their operations to Budapest, if Lueger became mayor.\textsuperscript{24} The Neue Freie Presse condemned the election as proof that the “imperial city” was being “degraded” as Lueger brought “the dregs of the city to the surface.”\textsuperscript{25} After the new Austrian Minister-President, Count Casimir Badeni, also came out against confirmation, the Kaiser formally rejected Lueger’s election.\textsuperscript{26}

Predictably, Lueger’s supporters were outraged. Lueger submitted a motion to the Reichsrat demanding an inquiry into the reasons for non-confirmation, with support from German nationalist parties as well as some Czech nationalist parties.\textsuperscript{27} In a blunt response, Badeni replied that Lueger possessed neither the “objectivity” nor “rationality” expected of the mayor of the imperial capital.\textsuperscript{28} Lueger immediately called for new elections, and on November 13, he received 92 of the councils’ 137 votes.\textsuperscript{29} This time the council was dissolved, and the elections results nullified. Lueger’s supporters began to descend on the Rathaus, while armed guards had to prevent angry protesters from breaking into the royal apartments.\textsuperscript{30} When new elections were set for February, Lueger was expected to emerge victorious once again. This time, the Kaiser’s resolve was weakening, and Count Badeni was facing considerable political pressure to support Lueger. Franz Joseph began receiving letters in support of Lueger, from aristocrats and commoner alike, and Badeni could

\textsuperscript{24} Richard Geehr, Karl Lueger, 91.
\textsuperscript{25} Neue Freie Presse (Vienna) 2 April, 1895.
\textsuperscript{26} Boyer, Political Radicalism, 374-5. Also, Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna, 282.
\textsuperscript{27} Geehr, Karl Lueger, 91.
\textsuperscript{28} Boyer, Political Radicalism, 377.
\textsuperscript{29} Geehr, Karl Lueger, 92.
\textsuperscript{30} Rudolf Kuppe, Karl Lueger und seine Zeit (Vienna: Österreichische Volksschriften, 1933), 349-52. Also, Boyer, Political Radicalism, 377.
no longer continue to ignore the negative impact the situation was having on his conservative allies.\(^\text{31}\)

The controversy over Lueger’s election even began to affect the Kaiser’s popularity among the citizens of Vienna. Many assumed that Franz Joseph’s decision to reject Lueger’s election was due to pressure from outside forces, such as the bourgeoisie, some others found it easier to blame the situation on the Polish born Badeni.\(^\text{32}\) The impact of the Lueger controversy on the Kaiser’s popularity became clear in 1896, during the Corpus Christi Day parade. The Kaiser, following traditional protocol, led the procession, followed by dignitaries. Lueger was among them. To the surprise of many eye witnesses, Lueger received more applause and cheers from the crowds than the Kaiser. One of these witnesses wrote: “The Emperor walks in the procession as if in the wake of that man. Before him, the roaring of the ovations, and around him, silence. It was Lueger’s triumphant march.”\(^\text{33}\) Franz Joseph would be unable to use his power to resist Lueger’s election.

Realizing this, the Kaiser and Badeni, offered Lueger a compromise. Lueger would be elected to vice mayor, a substitute mayor elevated instead. After a certain period of time, the substitute would resign, allowing Lueger to become mayor by 1897.\(^\text{34}\) Following the election in 1896, and the Christian Socialist victory, Lueger and his party used the next year to consolidate their power. They began initiating popular financial and social reforms for the city. When the “stand-in” mayor resigned

\(^{31}\) Geehr, Karl Lueger, 92 and Boyer, Political Radicalism, 380.

\(^{32}\) This perception was warranted, considering the Rothschilds and Badeni were pushing for the Kaiser’s rejection. But the populace seems to have been unaware of Kaiser’s personal dislike of Lueger, or unwilling to acknowledge it. Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna, 282.

\(^{33}\) Quoted in Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna, 283.

\(^{34}\) Boyer, Political Radicalism, 383.
in 1897 and the council elected Lueger as mayor, the Kaiser agreed. After five elections, Karl Lueger finally became mayor of Vienna. During his inaugural address, Lueger made sure to continue his unquestioned support of the Kaiser. As Brigette Hamann remarks: “In the eyes of his follower, the ‘martyr’ magnanimously forgave his emperor, which only further enhanced his popularity.” Lueger had successfully endured the controversy surrounding his election and his conflict with the crown while keeping his professed loyalty to the Habsburg throne in tact.

As mayor, Lueger hoped to incorporate himself into the ceremonial life of the Habsburg state. During his entire political career, he had extolled the virtues of the medieval society, co-opted the religious and state pageantry of Austria’s heritage, and as mayor he was able to place himself within the mythic framework he had so greatly romanticized. He was able to finally assume the role of the patrician and wrapped himself fully in the garb of the “imperial” mayor. Critics attacked Lueger for what they viewed as pretensions. One of the leading Pan-Germans, Karl Hermann Wolf, went so far as to state: “What differentiates Dr. Lueger indeed from a Monarch? In his own mind he imagines himself to be an imperial ruler in any event, and those who live from ‘his grace’ are legion.” The same journalist also criticized Lueger’s need to accompany personal appearances with flags, flower girls, and other trappings of procession.

While Wolf was mocking Lueger as pretentious, something more significant

35 Ibid., 409
36 Hamann, Hitler’s Vienna, 283.
38 Quoted in Boyer, Cultural and Political Crisis, 61.
was at work. Lueger was in the process of attempting to legitimize his rule. One could argue that his five elections to the office of mayor, though rejected or nullified, constituted a degree of legitimacy. But Lueger was after more than an election by the citizens of Vienna. He was attempting to co-opt part of the subject/ruler relationship enjoyed by the Kaiser. As an elected official, the only relationship he could enjoy was the relationship between citizen and representative. Using the trappings and ceremony associated with the monarchy, allowed Lueger to access the paternalistic image of Franz Joseph.

Lueger also maintained his popularity through significant reforms and public works.\(^3^9\) Lueger understood, even as a council member, that he had to work at compromise with diverse political groups in order to deliver on his promises. Political pragmatism often led Lueger into contradiction with his political rhetoric. Although he advocated the supremacy of German culture in Austria, he frequently worked with Czech political groups. This was especially true when it came to securing reforms. When a German political party attempted to push through a series of tax reforms which threatened Lueger’s voting base, he allied the Christian Socialists with the Young Czech Party in an effort to block the legislation.\(^4^0\)

He also constantly worked to keep nationalities from obstructing parliamentary procedure.\(^4^1\) Lueger realized that his power could only be exercised within the framework of a functioning legislature, both on the municipal and imperial levels. When conflicts among nationalities drove the legislatures into gridlock, older,

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\(^{3^9}\) Paul Boyer goes into great detail describing the impact of Lueger on Vienna’s municipal structure in his two works *Political Radicalism* and *Cultural and Political Crisis*.

\(^{4^0}\) Boyer, *Political Radicalism*, 338.

\(^{4^1}\) Boyer, *Cultural and Political Crisis*, 40.
more absolutist mechanisms where used to keep the government functioning. The Kaiser or Minister-President would rule by decree. If this happened, Lueger would have little control over the direction of municipal policy. Ironically, Lueger, who is remembered as one of the most prominent political extremists of Vienna’s history, often called for parties to avoid public confrontation and advocated compromise to keep the legislatures open.\textsuperscript{42}

These considerations even led Lueger into conflict with the German nationalist parties. In 1897, several groups attempted to create and maintain exclusive German schools, rather than incorporate other national minorities into their student body. This initiative not only heightened agitation between the German and Czech parties, but also agitated the Catholic Conservatives, who felt the Church’s traditional authority was being attacked. Ironically, Lueger, who in 1885, had said “one must concede the Germans have earned [supremacy] through 600 years of cultural development,” found himself on the side of the Czech opposition.\textsuperscript{43} In fact, he argued that while the nationality question and Church authority of schools much be dealt with, it must be done in “accordance with tradition and compromise.”\textsuperscript{44} Lueger presented himself as the defender of Catholic interests in Austria, but he also presented himself as the defender of Austro-German interests in Austria. In the case of school reform, the two were in opposite camps. Unable to side with each, Lueger proposed a compromise, favoring the Church and the Czechs.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 41.
\textsuperscript{43} Karl Lueger, \textit{Rede des Gemeinderathes Dr. Karl Lueger in der am 27 April 1885 stattgefundenen versammlung des Mararethener Wählervereins anläßlich seiner Candidateur für die am 1. Juni 1885 stattfindende Reichsrath smahl und Bericht über die erwähnte Versammlung}, (Vienna: Josef Baht, 1885).
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Fortschritt} #13 (Vienna), 1 July, 1897.
Luenger’s German nationalism would be more sharply challenged immediately following his election as mayor. Just as the controversy of his confirmation was settled, Austria was plunged into a deeper and more severe crisis. During April of 1897, Count Badeni oversaw the creation of a series of language ordinances for Bohemia. These new ordinances created a new protocol which ordered that correspondences among divisions in the bureaucracy be conducted in their language of origin.\(^\text{45}\) For example, if a division submitted papers in Czech, all subsequent correspondence related to those papers would also be required to be in Czech. Beyond this, the ordinances also mandated petitions in Bohemia be answered in their language of origin. Badeni’s language ordinances were seen as favorable to the Czechs of Bohemia. Most Czechs had already been educated in both Czech and German and therefore would have no problem corresponding in either language. In contrast, very few German officials had fluency in Czech. Therefore, in order to keep their jobs, they would be forced to learn Czech. The announcement of these ordinances sent German nationalist groups into a frenzy.\(^\text{46}\)

The language ordinances exacerbated tensions between the German political parties and Count Badeni. Following the collapse of Count Taaffe’s “Iron Ring,” Franz Joseph had hoped to pick another Minister-President who could forge a coalition that would provide the relative stability of the Taaffe period. Just as he had done with the selection of Taaffe, the Kaiser chose a traditional aristocrat, who was also a member of a national minority. Casimir Badeni had achieved relative success as an official in the Polish province of Galicia. He was of Polish origin, allowing him

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\(^\text{45}\) Judson, *Exclusive Revolutionaries*, 256.

\(^\text{46}\) Ibid.
some separation from personal ties to the Czech/German rivalry which had helped to break Taaffe’s Iron Ring.Unfortunately, Badeni lacked the political tact and savy of his predecessor. Like Taaffe, Badeni viewed himself as a Kaiserminister and therefore felt little loyalty to the elected parties of the Reichsrat. Unlike Taaffe, Badeni also viewed himself as a “strong man” who could muscle and bully legislature and initiatives through the parliament. While this tactic proved successful in Galicia, it met with considerable opposition in Vienna. He had already alienated several factions during the controversy over Lueger’s election, as well as through several other affairs related to the rivalry between the Germans and the Czechs.

The crisis over the language ordinances were just the last in a long line tensions between the German nationalist parties and the Prime Minister. Georg von Schönerer, struggling for relevance in Austria’s political arena, took advantage of the opportunity to condemn Badeni. The anger among the German population presented a realistic opportunity for the Pan-Germans to increase their political strength and Schönerer began providing rhetorical fuel to the crisis. He declared on the Reichsrat floor, “German rights come before the Czech constitution...Yes, laugh; we’re not frivolous like you, we’re serious German men who are fighting for the rights of the German people...you laugh and eat out of the government trough.”  Following the session of the Reichsrat, the Pan-Germans began to maneuver to paralyze the

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47 While the Poles were attempting to mirror the Czech success in gridlocking parliament, as a rule, they were not nearly as disruptive. Boyer, Political Radicalism, 317-9.
48 A Kaiserminister, a minister selected by imperial mandate, was often called during periods where no parliamentary coalition was present to select a government. While these ministers often attempted to forge a coalition to give themselves legislative legitimacy, some, such as Taaffe and Badeni, avoided this temptation, instead deriving their authority from their imperial mandate. Boyer, Political Radicalism, 318.
49 Boyer, Political Radicalism, 319.
50 Quoted in Whiteside, Socialism of Fools, 163.
legislature. Schönerer defended using parliamentary disruption, saying it was to "prevent legal illegalit." Soon other German nationalist parties were joining the Pan-German efforts to obstruct the Reichsrat and the legislature slid into gridlock. Even the more moderate German nationalist parties, such as the German Liberal Party, were adopting more extremist language during this period.

Attacks on Badeni began to occur almost immediately, and it became clear that the aim of the Pan-Germans was to bring down the Badeni government. During one of his filibusters on the Reichsrat floor, Karl Hermann Wolf, a Pan-German deputy, condemned Badeni, stating that the Slavic peoples of the empire planned on "using the Polish scourge to whip the German people in Austria out of its own skin and into the Slavic skin." Brawls and fistfights became almost daily occurrences. Badeni himself ended up in a duel with Wolf, where the prime minister was injured.

Lueger initially hoped to avoid being drawn into the Badeni crisis. He lobbied with the Volkspartei and the Pan-Germans, hoping to get them to back down from their obstructions. He was fearful that the gridlock in the Reichsrat would interfere with his reform efforts, just as he took office. It quickly became clear he could not stand aloof and he vowed to stand with the volkish farmers who he portrayed as the "root of the German people."

The opposition to Badeni was taking its toll. In the face of German filibusters, the Minister-President was forced to rule by decree. He abandoned any attempt to

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51 Ibid.
53 Quoted in Hamann, Hitler's Vienna, 264.
54 Ibid., 265.
55 Whiteside, Socialism of Fools, 169.
56 Quoted in Geehr, Karl Lueger, 97.
gain legislative approval, given the unified resistance of German nationalist parties which was composed of liberals, the Volkspartei, Catholics, democratic socialists, socialists, and aristocrats.\textsuperscript{57} Ultimately, the crisis reached a climax when Schönerer, Wolf, and other Pan-German nationalists met in the Eger to demand the repeal of the ordinances. A riot broke out and had to be suppressed by the police. No one was killed but several hundred were wounded and for the first time in recent memory, the army had been called to ensure the peace. Schönerer capitalized on the riot, calling the injured “German citizens of a German city, struck down by the sabers of Czech police.”\textsuperscript{58} Whatever hope Badeni had for resolving the crisis through negotiation with the Germans was lost. Both the Germans and the Czechs were too embittered to break the gridlock and Badeni suspended the \textit{Reichsrat} and resigned.\textsuperscript{59}

The Badeni crisis was significant, not only in the development of Austria’s nationality conflict, but also in the testing of the political feasibility of Karl Lueger’s platform and appeal. For a short period, Lueger was forced to abandon the delicate balance of German nationalism and Austrian patriotism, and lobby with the Germans. For Schönerer, Badeni’s language ordinances were an ideal situation to promote his Prussophile rhetoric and gave him “proof” that the aristocrats and ministers of the Habsburg Empire were in fact opposed to German dominance in Austria. For Lueger, the ordinances threatened to disturb his mythic image of Austria as the traditional home of German culture. Fortunately for Lueger, a majority of Vienna’s citizens seemed to have shared Lueger’s assumption that German nationalism and Austrian patriotism were not only compatible but also logical partners. The American

\textsuperscript{57} Whiteside, \textit{Socialism of Fools}, 172.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 175
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 185.
ambassador, Bartlett Tripp, acknowledged this in a letter to Secretary of State Richard Olney. He marveled at the popularity of the monarchy stating:

The most remarkable thing of this whole matter...is, that during all this excitement and in all the noisy demonstrations upon the streets and discussions in public places and otherwise, while the most bitter feeling is exhibited against the Government of the province and the ministry, while the cry "down with the foreigners,"... "back to Galicia with the minister"...not a word is ever heard against the Emperor himself, even in private conversation. The personality of the Emperor Francis Joseph is felt everywhere among the people....

Other politicians seemed to have shared Tripp's observations. Immediately following Badeni's resignation, almost all of the parties professed their unending loyalty to the crown. Viktor Adler and the Social Democrats, who had joined in with the German opposition made sure to announce a distinctly pro-Habsburg platform following the crisis. Their shift was followed by similar changes in almost all of the moderate German parties. Even the most extreme anti-Habsburg voice, the Pan-Germans, began to shift. Following Badeni's resignation, Schönerer wanted to keep the opposition to the crown as a fundamental principle of the party. Wolf, who at this point was a leading deputy, broke from Schönerer, declaring his loyalty to Franz Joseph. A majority of the Pan-Germans followed.

Lueger's combination of German nationalism and Austrian patriotism probably would have to be restructured if he were a national deputy or a politician in Bohemia. But Lueger was aiming for dominance in Vienna, with no ambitions higher

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60 Quoted in Geehr, Karl Lueger, 92-3.
61 McGrath, Dionysian Art, 213. Around the period of Lueger's election as mayor and the Badeni crisis, the Social Democrats were virtually powerless on the civic level. (They were unable to capture a single seat on the city council) However, on the state level they were growing in power. In fact, after Franz Joseph initiated universal malehood suffrage in 1907, the movement exploded. The Social Democrats, who were among the most leftist of Austria's political parties, would become synonymous with the worker's movement in Austria and pull the support of the workers away from the Christian Socialists. Boyer, Political Radicalism, 324, 383. Also, Boyer, Cultural and Political Crisis, 39-40. For an analysis of the Social Democrat Movement, see: Julius Braunthal, Viktor und Friedrich Adler: Zwei Generationen Arbeiterbewegung, (Vienna: Wienervolksbuchhandlung, 1964).
62 Hamann, Hitler's Vienna, 265.
than the municipal level. He achieved his ultimate success when he became mayor of Vienna. Part of his success was motivated by his understanding of Vienna’s patriotism. Beyond being a German city, Vienna was an imperial city, the seat of one of Europe’s traditional great powers. Some Viennese undoubtedly argue that Vienna was the imperial, German city. Lueger tailored his platform to this attachment and his rhetoric was designed to not only appeal to the cultural heritage of Germans, but also to assure their place within Austria’s history. Rather than criticize and attack the Habsburg monarchy, as Schönerer and the Pan-Germans, Lueger embraced the monarchy and co-opted the image, prestige, and popularity of Franz Joseph.

Lueger successfully navigated through the Kaiser’s challenge to his election and as a result appeared gracious as well as loyal when he professed his allegiance to Franz Joseph during his mayoral inauguration. Lueger seemed to naturally assume his popularity was contingent on the perception of his faith and loyalty in the Habsburg dynasty. Even though his language was extreme, his politics divisive, and he was branded a radical, Lueger often rooted all of these in a sense of history and entitlement which appealed to the citizens of Vienna as Austrian patriots. His connection between German nationalism and Austrian patriotism is so taken for granted that it often seems to ignore the clear tension between the two in the society of fin-de-siècle Austria.

Given the bitter rivalry between the Germans and the other nationalities of Austria, the dynastic state was often at odds with German leadership. This tension posed a problem for Lueger, who had to reconcile his rhetoric to the political reality. Fortunately, his supporters faced the same tension. One could argue that Lueger was
able to successfully continue the merger of German nationalism and support for the Austrian state because a majority of Vienna’s population also desired that merger. To many, the conflict between crown and nation seemed unnatural and Lueger was able to use this feeling to ensure that his platform remained viable in the tumultuous atmosphere of Austria’s nationality conflict.
The political rhetoric of Karl Lueger was a radical change from that of previous politicians. He not only spoke of desired change, but appealed to the emotions, prejudices, hopes, and fears of voters. Such a focus had never been seen before. It would go on to influence the behavior of political movements long after his death. Georg von Schönerer used a very similar style. Driven by angry and frenzied speech, his rhetoric tapped into the discontent among the German artisans and working class. In many ways, both men exploited the resentments of their target audiences in hopes of political gain.

However much Lueger and Schönerer condemned modernism, capitalism, and the effects of industrialization, they were dependent on them as well. The isolation of the artisans and working classes was driven by the changes of modernity. The livelihood of the traditional artisan was becoming increasingly obsolete in the age of mass-production and the factory. The markets of Vienna had little use for an expensive handmade good, when cheaper, mass-produced goods met the demand. As their products went unsold, the artisans were pushed to the periphery of society. The lower classes of Vienna were not so much becoming obsolete as much as being exploited by the industrialization process. They watched as factory owners and bankers prospered from industrialization, while the workers appeared unable to access this prosperity.¹

¹ Once again, class agitation brought by the unequal prosperity of industrialization is certainly not limited to Vienna, but rather a characteristic of industrialization as a whole.
The wealth and success of the industrialists, bankers, and other bourgeoisie were visible throughout Vienna. The constitutional reforms of the 1860s gave the bourgeoisie unprecedented political influence in the form of the Liberal Coalition. Operating during a time of increased legislative prerogative, the Liberal Coalition set an ambitious agenda to reorganize the landscape of Vienna as well as the traditional power structure of Austria. Its efforts to increase the parliamentary power over the government chipped away the traditional power of the monarchy and aristocracy. Their anti-clerical reforms restricted the traditional authority of the Catholic Church over marriage, education, and government.

The artisans and working classes were almost completely shut out of this increase in legislative authority. While the Liberal Coalition sought to increase its own power, it had little desire to expand the suffrage of Austria. Instead, Liberals to restrict the franchise, in an effort to maintain their control over the legislative bodies of Austria. The artisans and working classes were also shut out of the development of the Ringstrasse, which reshaped Vienna and seemed to reinforce the changes occurring from Vienna’s transition to a modern city.

While the Ringstrasse’s development first reinforced the traditional powers of Austria, the army, monarchy, and Church, this quickly changed with the ascension of Liberal rule. Soon liberal values were represented in the architecture and design of the Ringstrasse, expressing admiration for secular education, humanism, and constitutional monarchy. With the construction of elaborate meitpalais for the wealthy bourgeoisie, the Ringstrasse also seemed to express and admiration for material success.
The subculture developing rapidly along the Ringstrasse was foreign and inaccessible for the artisans and working classes of Vienna. Art movements, such as the Secession, openly rejected traditional Viennese art styles. The intellectual developments created by such thinkers as Sigmund Freud openly challenged traditional Viennese values. With such challenges, it was easy for both Schönerer and Lueger to present the culture of the Ringstrasse and the bourgeoisie as a foreign culture jeopardizing the role of traditional German culture in Vienna.

Both men labeled the Jews as the foreign element undermining traditional Austrian society. Anti-Semitism became a cornerstone of both the Christian-Socialist platform as well as the Pan-German Nationalist platform. Exploiting the traditional prejudice against Jews, Lueger and Schönerer transformed anti-Semitism into a modern political tool.

Georg von Schönerer viewed anti-Semitism in racial and ethnic terms. When he argued that Vienna had to eliminate the “foreign” elements in its culture, he meant that Jews themselves should be expelled. He included those Jews which had already fully assimilated into German-Austrian society. The Pan-Germans led initiatives to ban Jews from joining nationalist parties, German fraternities, and other organizations. Schönerer also led attempts to prevent Jewish owned business from gaining government contracts or from operating with the government in any capacity. Schönerer’s attempts to reform the government in this capacity failed, he gained notoriety only for his extreme behavior.
Karl Lueger never adopted Schönerer's racial notion of anti-Semitism. Instead he chose to express anti-Semitism in a way which addressed economic and cultural frustration. "Jewish" was no longer a religious or ethnic term in the Christian Socialist platform, but rather a signifier of socio-economic and cultural status. The art of the Secession was "Jewish" because it reinforced the values of capital and modernism, while the bankers were "Jewish" because their prosperity drove the changes occurring. The Jewish heritage of many bankers and industrialists strengthened this perception.

While they used anti-Semitism in different ways, both Lueger and Schönerer attacked the same institutions and developments. A favorite target for both was the press of Vienna. They each argued that it was a tool of the "Jewish" bourgeoisie and not to be trusted. Both accused the papers of Vienna of publishing lies and deceiving the "honest" citizens of Vienna. Following events such as the stock market crash, these accusations resonated especially with the artisans and working classes.

Lueger used his criticism of the press to fuel his platform as well as provide an easy way to deflect the attacks of journalists who criticized him and his party. He also used his criticism of the press to further reinforce the assertion that "Jewishness" was a cultural and economic condition. According to Lueger, the press attacked him because his party was opposed to the values and culture promoted by capital and the bourgeoisie, while Lueger opposed the press because they reinforced the society which was undermining the traditional society of Vienna.²

² Lueger, Fragmentary draft speech given in Moravia in 1891, "I Decide Who is a Jew," 326.
Schönerer’s attacks on the press were more extreme. In fact, battling the press devastated Schönerer’s career once he took the radical step of vandalizing press offices to voice his discontent. Most citizens were unwilling to support the use of violence and illegal actions, while most politicians did not want to be associated with such actions. Yet attacks on the Neues Wiener Tagblatt office only begin to explain the failure of Schönerer. While this event is certainly pivotal in the decline of the Pan-Germans, there were fundamental elements of his platform which were too extreme and radical to be successful.

Schönerer’s platform and agenda called for his supporters to abandon traditional elements of their identity, which had already been threatened by the changes of the Liberal Coalition. His Los von Rom movement exemplifies this call. According to Schönerer, the Catholic Church, which was international by its nature, was too foreign and un-German to be an adequate church for the Germans of Austria. Furthermore, since the Catholic Church did not differentiate pastors and parishioners strictly by nationality, the Church was aiding in the decline of German control of Austria. Schönerer argued this occurred every time the Catholic Church placed a Czech priest in a German parish.

Schönerer completely discounted the Austrian attachment to the Catholic Church, a key component of their cultural identity. The Los von Rom movement enjoyed temporary success in Bohemia, but it stood little chance of long term success in Vienna. Most Austrians did not view the Catholic Church as explicitly anti-German nor did most Viennese share his implication that Catholics could not be nationalistic.
Just as Schönerer miscalculated the people’s attachment to the Church, he greatly miscalculated their affection for the Habsburg monarchy. Throughout his career, Schönerer displayed ambivalence toward the monarchy vacillating from total disgust to quiet hatred. While his anti-Habsburg rhetoric was not always prevalent, it was always implied. Schönerer always felt the Germans of Austria would be better served as part of a greater Germany, grafted on to the German Empire of Wilhelm II. His anger toward the Habsburg dynasty was entirely motivated by his extreme nationalism. For Schönerer, the Habsburgs could never provide leadership for the Germans of Austria since he felt they were preoccupied with satisfying the other nationalities.

The Badeni administration only appeared to reinforce this notion. Not only was Badeni a member of a national minority, but his office pushed through legislation which pacified the Czechs of Bohemia at the “expense” of the Germans. When the German national parties broke into outroar over Badeni’s language ordinances, Schönerer attempted to use the event to push his anti-Habsburg platform. This worked temporarily. Almost all of the German nationalist parties banded together to protest the Kaiser’s Minister-President, and even forced his resignation. However, Schönerer could not use this event to solidify resistance to the crown. After Badeni’s resignation, Schönerer’s call for opposition were abandoned and he found his position overshadowed by others in the Pan-German Nationalists who pledged support for the dynasty. Schönerer could not understand the implicit desire of most Viennese to remain loyal to the Kaiser and to operate harmoniously with the traditional elements of Austrian culture and identity.
Lueger, on the other hand, seemed to have an intimate understanding of these desires. While his platform was both extreme and radical, it surprisingly reinforced traditional themes. Like Schönerer, Lueger understood that the artisans and lower classes were isolated and frustrated due to the changes resulting from modernity. Unlike Schönerer, Lueger understood that this isolation and frustration was prompted from the perception that these changes came at the expense of the traditional culture of Austria.

Lueger appealed to the attachment to tradition and core elements of the Austrian identity, specifically the Catholic Church and the dynasty. He openly and actively courted the Catholic voters of Austria, many of whom were still bitter over the anti-clerical reforms of the Liberals and the apparent inaction of the Catholic Conservatives. Lueger knew that these voters would provide a loyal and energized base, as well as a coordinated and organized group which could provide the logistical support needed to run his campaign.

Catholic organizations were critical to Lueger’s success. Catholic women’s organizations provided the volunteers and supporters that helped to run his campaigns. Catholic men’s groups provided the chance for Lueger to give speeches and spread his political message. The younger Catholic clergy provided a base of active supporters who could voice their support of Lueger among their parishes. Lueger even gained support from the Pope, who openly praised Lueger’s efforts to restore the position of the Church within Vienna. Without supporting the Catholic Church, Lueger would have been unable to secure this critical support.
The Catholic Church was also critical to Lueger’s use of Vienna’s heritage. While Lueger’s platform was defined by his condemnations of modernity, it was also defined by his constant reference to a Romantic vision of the past which served as the model society for Lueger’s politics. Lueger’s notion of the medieval past, in which society was unified by their common faith and loyalty to the state and governed by noble rulers. This required Lueger to support the Habsburg dynasty as well.

Evoking an image of a noble ruler was easy for Lueger, given the tremendous popularity of Kaiser Franz Joseph. Lueger effortlessly co-opted the Kaiser’s political image as a self-sacrificing ruler into his political rhetoric. Unlike the Pan-Germans, Lueger used the Kaiser as a means of communicating German nationalism. He appealed to Viennese pride in their historical significance to German culture and their crucial role in Europe’s past. He understood that the Habsburg dynasty was a critical element to Vienna’s identity and made a platform compatible with this image.

Lueger’s platform was successful because it required very little change to his target audience’s notions of identity. It reinforced their feelings of alienation, made them feel that these feelings were warranted, and provided a scapegoat which could be made responsible for this alienation. But it also reinforced their attachment to elements of society which were either being challenged or subverted. For this reason, Lueger’s platform required little reexamination of these attachments and implied that society would be better off if the principles of the past were the principles of the present, as well as the future, and the elected officials of the city should promote them.
While Lueger’s platform was unquestionably successful in Vienna, it is important to realize that Lueger never attempted success on the state level. Even though it was often the epicenter of ethnic conflict, because Vienna housed the state legislatures, its population was never as embroiled in the conflicts as deeply as other regions of the empire. For the most part, Vienna, as the capital, remained true believers in the Austrian state. The city’s status was dependent on the empire’s survival, and the Viennese realized this. There was obviously a desire among the population to assume that the central tenants of the Austrian identity, such as Catholicism and the Habsburg dynasty, were viable and compatible in the modern world. Lueger’s appeal to the Church and dynasty were in part successfully because his intended audience and even his opponents were already inclined to support the traditional aspects of his platform.

It is unclear if Lueger’s platform could have succeeded in Prague, or another city which had a population embittered by ethnic conflict. It is important to note that Schönerer’s more extreme platform enjoyed its greatest success in these areas. There is clearly room for the examination of this question. The Christian Socialist party did have state level organizations and other offices throughout Austria. It would be interesting to examine how Lueger’s support for the Church and dynasty resonated on the state level or in different regions. It would also be interesting to see how Lueger’s platform was altered to meet the needs of these different audiences.

Lueger’s death in 1910 also marks the decline of the Christian Socialist Party as well. With the rapidly changing political and ethnic situation in Austria it is clear the movement was unable to adequately adjust to meet new challenges. The Kaiser
introduced universal manhood suffrage in 1907, and ironically the Christian Socialists suffered from this action. More workers began supporting the Social Democrats and other worker’s parties. The Christian Socialists also suffered from a lack in leadership as Lueger’s successors failed to match his charisma and political skill.³

As for Lueger himself, there is still debate regarding his intentions and his legacy. Undoubtedly this is motivated in large part by his use of anti-Semitism. Beyond any other element of his platform, his use of anti-Semitism is the most closely examined and greatest source of controversy. Almost a century after his death, there is still no consensus regarding his motivations for using anti-Semitism. Even more significantly, his use of anti-Semitism has left an ambivalent account of his legacy. Lueger was a very successful politician and his career as mayor was also productive and prosperous. Yet, this success and prosperity came from the appealing to the prejudice and hatred for a minority of the city.

The city of Vienna continues to wrestle with the ambivalence of Lueger’s career. In an attempt to honor his achievements as mayor, the city has a monument to Lueger, and has named a section of the Ringstrasse in his honor. Yet to many observers, these memorials also honor his use of anti-Semitism and political extremism. The city seems to be unable to resolve the contradictions inherent in lauding the municipal achievements of the Christians Socialists while condemning their political tactics.

The question of Lueger’s legacy is tied directly with the legacy of Austria’s history following the First World War. The Lueger’s politics would not be as haunting if Austria had not played such a pivotal role in the Nazi state. The issue of

Austria identity is especially relevant considering the ease in which Germany achieved *Anschluss* in 1938. For Lueger, as well as a majority of Vienna’s citizens during the reign of Franz Joseph, the Habsburg dynasty was key to their identity.

Vienna was a city German in culture, but it was an Austrian city as well. It was an Austrian city because of a rich heritage linked with the monarchy, the Catholic Church, and the broader Austrian Empire. Lueger understood this notion and used it for his political success.
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