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PORT VISITS AS A COMPONENT OF SOVIET NAVAL DIPLOMACY
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA

1967-1986

by

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B.A. September 1980, University of the State of New York

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of
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May, 1992

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ABSTRACT

PORT VISITS AS A COMPONENT OF SOVIET NAVAL DIPLOMACY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA 1967-1986

John Mark Ickes
Old Dominion University, 1992
Director: Dr. Patrick J. Rollins

The Soviet Union used its navy as an instrument to support its political agenda, particularly after 1967. This thesis examines 1785 Soviet port visits in the Mediterranean Sea to identify characteristics of the Soviet naval port visit program, particularly the significance of the country visited, the length of the visit, and the ships selected for the visit. The results indicate that certain Mediterranean countries were visited more than others, that the length of the visit can be associated with various Soviet political intentions, and that certain warships made significantly more visits than others.

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(who pursued the Soviet Navy with me worldwide)
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(formerly CTT1, USN)

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unfailing faith and support

Heather and Rebecca

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DEFINITIONS AND TERMS

| | |
|------------|--|
| ADM | Admiral (naval rank) |
| AEM | Missile Support Ship |
| AGI | Intelligence Collector |
| AS | Submarine Tender |
| AX | General Purpose vessel |
| AXT | Training vessel |
| CDR | Commander (Naval rank) |
| CG | Guided Missile cruiser |
| CHG | Guided Missile Helicopter carrier |
| CVHG | Guided Missile Helicopter/VSTOL Carrier |
| DD | Destroyer |
| DDG | Guided Missile Destroyer |
| Deployment | The assignment of a naval vessel, usually of some extended duration, which takes it from the vicinity of its homeport and frequently (although not always) to waters bordering foreign countries |
| Eskadra | Squadron (until the latter 1960s/early 1970s the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean was known as the Fifth Eskadra) |
| FF | Frigate |
| FFG | Guided Missile Frigate |
| FFL | Light Frigate |
| LSM | Medium Landing Ship |

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| LST | Tank Landing Ship |
| MSC | Coastal Minesweeper |
| MSF | Fleet (Ocean-going) Minesweeper |
| MHC | Minesweeping Boat |
| OTC | Officer in tactical command. Normally the senior officer in a group of ships, exercising overall control over the activities of the group as a unit |
| PCE | Escort Patrol Craft |
| PGG | Guided Missile Patrol Craft |
| Port visit | A visit by a naval unit, usually of relatively brief duration, to a port other than its established homeport (also referred to as a "port call") |
| Presence factor (PF) | A value, expressed as a percentage, representing that part of one calendar year during which at least one warship of a specific nationality was present in a specified foreign port. |
| RADM | Rear Admiral (naval rank) |
| Ship days | A figure derived from multiplying the total number of ships involved (in a visit) times the duration of that visit (in days). |
| SS | Submarine |
| SSBN | Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine |
| SSG | Guided Missile Submarine |
| SSGN | Nuclear Powered Guided Missile Submarine |
| SSN | Nuclear Powered Submarine |
| VADM | Vice Admiral (naval rank) |
| VSTOL | Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing (aircraft) |

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The presence of a warship in a foreign port attracts attention and prompts the question: what takes it there? To replenish stores, rest the crew, or convey some political or diplomatic message? The question is likely to be posed by two sets of interested parties--those who welcome the visit, and those who might see in it something more challenging. The Soviet Navy, like navies of other major world powers, prompted that question. Accepting that the Soviet Navy characteristically made historically fewer port visits per deployment than its Western counterparts, what significance should be placed on the port visited, the frequency and duration of such visits, and the units conducting the visit? The focus of this thesis is to examine the pattern of Soviet naval port visits in the Mediterranean Sea from 1967 through 1986 and the significance of those three factors.

HYPOTHESES

1. The particular port visited by a Soviet naval combatant is significant.
2. The length of a specific port visit by a Soviet naval combatant is significant.
3. The particular Soviet naval combatant conducting a

port visit is significant.

ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

1. Soviet port visit practices were, with some minor variations, common throughout the four major Soviet Fleets (Northern Sea, Baltic Sea, Black Sea and Pacific).

2. The rationale which was the impetus for a particular port visit held true through the four major Soviet Fleets.

3. The number of port visits studied is adequate to draw valid conclusions.

4. Lack of access to specific Soviet operational orders prevents certification of some conjectures regarding their intent.

5. There is a lack of verifiable data associating port visits with specific events.

6. Factors may exist which, unknown to the researcher, have prompted a port visit (equipment or personnel casualties).

7. Unforeseen political changes within the Soviet political hierarchy might significantly modify future Soviet naval missions.

METHODOLOGY

A listing of 1785 port visits conducted by Soviet combatant naval units between 1967 and 1986 in the Mediterranean Sea has been compiled. The listing was drawn from the following sources:

1. US and allied naval publications

2. Open source documents (newspaper accounts and broadcast news accounts)
3. Personal observations, diaries and notes
4. Personal interviews

Visit data have been cross-referenced to the extent possible. Where discrepancies exist among reported length of stays, they have been resolved to the more conservative number. When differences in ship names occurred (not uncommon when transliterating Cyrillic to English), the ship name is given in the form customarily used by U.S. Navy intelligence sources.

The data have been grouped by ports visited, dates of the visits (including duration), and names of the units conducting the visit. The groupings have been examined for patterns, special circumstances surrounding the visit and collateral events which might be considered as associated with the visit. From this analysis, conclusions have been drawn regarding the significance of the visits and recommendations offered.

In some instances, ships have visited ports for other than diplomatic or political purposes. Vessels require repair and maintenance, periodic overhaul, and resupply of provisions and fuel. It can be extremely difficult to differentiate between a political visit and one for a reason indicated above, especially when data is limited to "externals" (ship type and dates of the visit). Naval

analysts (particularly Anne Kelly and Charles Petersen) have generally considered a "standard" port visit to be between five and seven days long.¹ Of the total studied, slightly greater than 95 percent were 37 days or less; 69.7 percent were ten days or less, and 61 percent were eight days or less. A graphic representation of 1655 visits (representing 95.2 per cent of the total) is shown in Figure 4. The preponderance of visits of less than ten days duration is clearly evident, with a dramatic "spike" at five days. Given the characteristic Soviet ship visit length (five to seven days), when a visit exceeds that duration it may be identified as other than diplomatic in nature and analyzed accordingly. In some instances, actual diplomatic visits have exceeded the "norm," and every effort has been made to identify them as such and consider them in the diplomatic or political context.

Logistics requirements aside, the other reasons a Soviet ship might make a port visit (especially in a Mediterranean port) would be for upkeep, repair or politico-diplomatic reasons. The duration of the visit is a major determinant in differentiating between port calls intended primarily for diplomatic reasons and those for maintenance and repair. Although not an absolute, the length of time a ship spends in a foreign port tends to be a feature of the

¹Anne M. Kelly, Port Visits and the "Internationalist Mission of the Soviet Navy (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, 1976, CNA 145), 23.

purpose of the visit. In the same vein, visit anomalies (based on duration) are relatively simple to identify.

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

NAVAL DIPLOMACY

Warships have long enjoyed the capacity to deliver subtle political messages as well as munitions. Maritime empires have, from the beginning of history, used their naval vessels to influence other states with which they came in contact. In modern terms, the first large-scale practitioners of this art were the British. By the eighteenth century, Britannia in fact "ruled the waves," and influenced a significant portion of the coastlines as well. From the icy North Sea to the Caribbean, through the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and Pacific, the Cross of St. George flying from proud mastheads carried with it the implied power of the entire British Empire.¹ Although challenged by the French, Spanish, and Dutch (maritime powers in their own right), "Pax Britannica" was based on British naval supremacy into the latter nineteenth century.² As the war-fighting capability of a navy became universally accepted, its effectiveness in the diplomatic

¹James L. Stokesbury, Navy and Empire (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1983), 105.

²Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 135.

realm grew apace. The American naval theoretician, Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, suggested that once a navy is developed, it begins to take on functions additional to the basic role for which it was created. A navy, he wrote, "converts contacts into interests and consolidates interests as political influence."³ Modern naval writers continue to echo that theme, particularly the observation that naval diplomacy is implemented by ships primarily designed for combat roles.⁴ So widespread became this belief that

dispatching (of) naval forces to trouble spots became during the nineteenth century a highly conventional, even slightly ritualized codebook for the demonstration of a commitment--the size of the squadron or fleet dispatched often serving as an index of the power's commitment and perception of the seriousness of a crisis. So frequently was this technique resorted to--especially by Britain--that it apparently proved itself to be an ideal demonstrative device.⁵

If, in fact, its purpose is to influence the behavior of other countries⁶, it can be accomplished in a variety of ways. Ships can, suggests historian Donald Mitchell, be "used as a threat, as a medium of propaganda, or as a link

³William Reitzel, "Mahan on the Use of the Sea," in To Use the Sea, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1977), 5.

⁴Geoffrey Till, Modern Sea Power, (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987), 1:167.

⁵Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 16.

⁶Till, 167.

to overseas allies."⁷ Blechman and Kaplan point out that ships can be deliberately used to influence, or be prepared to influence specific behavior of individuals in another nation.⁸ Till observes that warships offer "flexibility, controllability, and strategic mobility."⁹ More so than divisions of soldiers or flights of aircraft, they can be used to subtly support foreign policy objectives.¹⁰ They can, with relative ease and rapidity, appear over the horizon and just as quickly vanish, leaving behind the unmistakable impression that their overt use depends only on the will of the political entity controlling them. Naval diplomacy, suggests noted naval analyst Edward Luttwak, is "a continuous reminder to allies and clients of the capabilities that can be brought to their aid."¹¹ It is exactly this sort of flexibility and range of employment that have made the use of warships so attractive (and so widely employed) as diplomatic instruments. It is also a similar reminder to opponents of the potential force which

⁷Donald W. Mitchell, A History of Russian and Soviet Seapower, (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1974), 568.

⁸Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, "U.S. Military Forces as Political Instruments Since WW II" in Perspectives on American Foreign Policy, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 16.

⁹Till, 169.

¹⁰Blechman and Kaplan, 75.

¹¹Edward Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), 13.

could be used against them. Luttwak's comprehensive study, The Political Uses of Seapower, examines at length his theory of naval influence ("suasion") and the several forms it may take. Active suasion, he proffers, are those actions seeking to elicit a specific reaction from a specified party, while suasion in its latent form includes those evoked by naval deployments on a routine basis.¹² The exercise of suasion (and thus naval diplomacy in toto), he warns, is unpredictable. Parties involved must perceive that actions are being taken which involve them and that they hold potential ramifications. James Cable, author of Gunboat Diplomacy, proposes the concept of "coercive diplomacy," or action intended to obtain some specific advantage from another state as an alternative to war.¹³ Although he suggests that coercive diplomacy is "fairly low on the preferential list"¹⁴ he offers a variety of forms from which a state wishing to exert such diplomacy might choose. Within the concept of coercive diplomacy he lists "definitive" (presenting a *fait accompli*), "purposeful" (threatening to inflict damage), "catalytic" (raising the temperature of a situation), and "expressive" (emphasizing

¹²Luttwak, 6.

¹³James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 17.

¹⁴Ibid., 4.

an attitude rather than influencing conduct).¹⁵

Curiously enough, the expressive use of coercive diplomacy is sometimes better attempted by actions than words, by warships rather than politicians or diplomats. Verbal threats, for example, must often be pitched rather high, must even be inconveniently explicit, to carry such conviction. The days have long passed when a mere reference to an 'unfriendly act' would agitate the Chancelleries of Europe. The movement of warships, however, can still convey a sense of menace that is plausible to the victim because it is potent yet undefined, but convenient to the aggrieved government, because it is simultaneously impressive to domestic opinion and non-committal. Warships can always be withdrawn, provided the purpose of their movement has been if they are neither productive nor implemented.¹⁶

Soviet use of seapower as a political tool has been notably more latent than active. Aside from its 1967 entry into Alexandria and Port Said, the Soviet Navy was used almost exclusively to posture rather than to actively enforce a political aim. Unlike American use of active military means such as engaging Libyan warplanes over the Mediterranean, the Soviet Navy was never used to conduct combat operations against forces of adversarial states or with an allied or client state.

For warship diplomacy to be most effective, it must be clearly conveyed to the intended audience. Indistinct forms on a distant horizon do not have nearly the impact of a ship-of-war tied to a pier in full and dramatic view. The port visit (or port call) is therefore a critical part of

¹⁵Cable, 18-19.

¹⁶Ibid., 29.

influential naval diplomacy.¹⁷ Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell, noted political observers, feel that

although in certain circumstances port calls can be politically counter-productive, leading the host country to see an implied menace in the visiting warships, this has not been the usual reaction. During a visit, the host country shares directly in a small portion of the visitor's most valued possession--his military establishment. As long as the warships are in port officially, the host openly enjoys the friendship of a great power, or in special circumstances, as we have seen in the cases of Somalia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Egypt, may even be considered to some extent to be under its protection. In short, visits can perform a unique function in the world of diplomacy. They cannot substitute for other instruments of policy, but are themselves not easily replaced. They are one of the most effective ways of expressing symbolically a limited willingness to share one country's military power with another. As such, their positive impact should not be underestimated nor, of course, exaggerated.¹⁸

Warships, especially if seen as modern and capable, enhance the image of the visitor as a major player.¹⁹ The ship itself, freshly painted and fluttering with pennants, calls to the viewer's mind a picture of the country of origin--real or imagined or desired. Therein lies another of the potential pitfalls of naval diplomacy--the use of ships as symbols, rather than instruments of power.²⁰ Although the vessel may itself appear impressive, its symbolic power is proportional to the genuine naval power of

¹⁷Till, 167.

¹⁸Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell, eds., Soviet Naval Diplomacy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), 288.

¹⁹Gilpin, 175.

²⁰Luttwak, 29.

the visiting power.²¹ Failure to recognize the relationship between the ship and its origin can lead both the implementing power and the observing powers to react to form rather than substance (as with the attractive but militarily ineffective Italian navy of the 1930s).

The more regular the visits, the more the concept is reinforced that the visitor is a force of genuine impact in the area of operations. Isolated port visits to regions where deployments are not maintained are likely to have only limited significance.²²

As with naval diplomacy in general, port visits can be intended to promote different goals. Luttwak proposed that port visits can either evoke coercive or supportive effects in general where no direct relationship to any enemy threats obtains, or show concern in general where no specific goals or client affiliations obtains, i.e., in a crisis involving only third parties or only allies.²³ Indicative of the former is the visit of the USS Missouri to Turkey shortly after the end of World War II. Its visit, Luttwak observes, was "not intended to alter the local balance of power (especially in the Turkish Straits question) but to affirm a commitment."²⁴ Similarly, Blechman and Kaplan point out

²¹Luttwak, 30.

²²Dismukes and McConnell, 287.

²³Luttwak, 32.

²⁴Ibid., 32.

that "U.S. military forces (citing specifically the Missouri visit) were used without significant violence [in order] to underscore verbal and diplomatic expressions of American foreign policy."²⁵

Finally, the effectiveness of a port visit is measured, in part, by the response given it by local authorities. Frequently visits will include festive events (luncheons, tours, cocktail parties) designed to entertain and woo host country dignitaries. Naval analyst Charles Petersen has observed that

the format of official visits means they are a direct form of government-to-government interaction . . . the level of (host country) governmental representation at such functions is thus a good barometer of the success of a visit. If the host nation wishes to play down the visit, it will do so by limiting its official participation and press coverage.²⁶

Soviet port visits, however, are quite different from those of their Western counterparts. The very fact of a visit is an unusual circumstance for a ship deployed from home waters. In the Mediterranean, as the best example, most deployed Soviet units spend their entire time away from home port without ever entering a foreign port. Maintenance, repair, rest, and replenishment are carried out almost exclusively at one of several shallow water

²⁵Blechman and Kaplan, 63.

²⁶Charles C. Petersen, Third World Military Elites in the Soviet Perspective (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1979, CNA 262), 101-2.

anchorage scattered the length of the Mediterranean. Western analysts have studied this idiosyncrasy of the Soviets for some time, and offer a variety of reasons for them. Some feel that the strategic locations of these anchorages make them attractive (Figure 1). The string of anchorages stretches from the Dardanelles to the Straits of Gibraltar. The anchorages most favored by the Soviets are in the vicinity of Kithira Island (near Greece), the Gulf of Sollum (near the Egyptian-Libyan border), the Gulf of Hammamet (in close proximity to the Straits of Messina) and west of Melilla Island (in the approaches to Gibraltar). Lesser anchorages near Cyprus, in the Aegean Sea, and north of Tunisia are also available to them.

Others believe that the intent is primarily logistical and economic. In his study of Soviet deployments and the Turkish Straits, Roberts observes that

deployed combatants (including submarines) receive fuel, supplies and munitions from a large number of auxiliaries that incessantly shuttle between the fleet and the Soviet Black Sea bases. The Soviets appear to be concerned over the difficulty and vulnerability of this supply line, for they consume these resources slowly: their ships spend a substantial part of their deployments moored at anchorages. Since the loss of their shore facilities in Alexandria in 1976, the Soviets must also rely on Black Sea bases for most repairs that cannot be accomplished by repair ships at anchorages, although some regular overhauls are now being performed in shipyards in Yugoslavia and, to lesser extent, in Tunisia and Greece. No logistic support of any importance comes from the Northern or Baltic Fleet, even for submarines, and maintenance of logistic communications with the Black Sea is clearly essential to the maintenance of the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean at its current level,

as supporting any prolonged crisis response.²⁷

Dismukes and Weiss also feel the time spent at anchorage is substantial (the "majority of time")²⁸ and Petersen believes that more than three-fourths of their time is spent in port or at anchor in international waters.²⁹ With anchorage the norm, Dismukes and McConnell accurately surmise that "through a policy of selective port visits, they have indicated special relationships"³⁰

It is evident that the Soviets carefully select those few ships which will make overseas port visits. By contrast, most other navies, including that of the United States, schedule multiple visits by each ship on a deployment. The majority of Soviet warships deployed to foreign waters spend the entire duration of their deployment (nominally six months long) without ever calling at a port. In any given year, a comparison of ship-days deployed (total number of ships times days deployed from home port) compared to total days spent in foreign ports clearly exemplifies the Soviet preference for avoiding port visits.

For example, the Soviet Navy has averaged slightly

²⁷Stephen S. Roberts, Superpower Naval Crisis Management in the Mediterranean (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1981, CNA 317), 13.


²⁸N. Bradford Dismukes and Kenneth G. Weiss, Mare Mosso: The Mediterranean Theater (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1984, CNA 423), 7.

²⁹Petersen, Third World Elites, 47.

³⁰Dismukes and McConnell, 283.

Soviet Ports of Call and Anchorages in the Mediterranean Sea

Figure 1



better than 16,000 ship-days per year in the Mediterranean Sea. In 1983, Soviet ships spent 934 days in ports (discounting 692 days spent by two submarines and two days spent by two submarines and two submarine tenders in an extended repair period in Tivat, Yugoslavia). Of that 934, better than 78 percent (731 days) were spent at Tartus, Syria, a repair base that serves a similar purpose to the US Navy base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (and thus is discounted for some of the diplomatic-political purposes of this study). Of the balance, a total of 203 days were spent in port by 32 ships (averaging six days per visit per ship). The 32 ships called in only nine ports (Split, Yugoslavia; Bizerte and Tunis, Tunisia; Mers El Kebir and Algiers, Algeria; Piraeus, Greece; Tobruk and Tripoli, Libya; and Latakia, Syria). In comparison, the American frigate USS Donald B. Beary, actually in the Mediterranean from April through late August of that year visited six ports, averaging six days per visit. Examples of characteristic American port call schedules are given in Appendix A.

It is widely accepted among Western naval analysts that the Soviets consider diplomatic port visits as serious undertakings.³¹ The type of ship selected, crew, port visited, specifics of the visit itself are apparently selected well in advance of the visit, and, once stipulated, are unlikely to change. Bruce Watson characterizes their

³¹Petersen, Third World Elites, 102.

visits as "highly stylized and orchestrated."³²

Soviet port visits have been categorized by Kelly into three types: operational, goodwill, and special operations. The first, she contends, make up 80 percent of the total number of visits, are conducted primarily for business (e.g., replenishment), and are conducted mostly by auxiliaries and support vessels.³³ The second category are goodwill visits, conducted primarily by major combatants, and the third (special operations) range from protection to promotion of Soviet interests, and represent Soviet initiatives.³⁴ Watson largely concurs with Kelly, differing only slightly in his definition of "official" and "goodwill".³⁵

In the realm of operational visits outlined by both Kelly and Watson, Petersen delineates three subcategories based on the country visited. One category includes those countries with which the Soviets have had close political relations and in which the Soviet Navy has received preferential treatment (Egypt, prior to 1972, Syria and Algeria, among others). A second category is those countries with which the Soviet Union has dealt on a

³²Bruce W. Watson, Red Navy at Sea: Soviet Naval Operations on the High Seas, 1956-1980, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 13.

³³Kelly, Port Visits, 1.

³⁴Ibid., 1.

³⁵Watson, 13.

strictly commercial basis for the maintenance or replenishment of auxiliaries (Spain, Italy and Gibraltar). The third category encompasses those with which the Soviets have dealt on a quasi-commercial basis (Yugoslavia).³⁶

Petersen goes on to theorize that 15 percent of Soviet diplomatic visits can be categorized as "unofficial friendly" visits. Through 1976, they have been made only to Third World countries and primarily to those where the Soviets regularly made operational visits, such as Cuba, Algeria, Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Mauritius. These visits, he feels, are not as highly publicized or as rigidly structured as official ones. Their relative informality, he suggests, indicates that they are intended for crew rest, housekeeping, and minor repairs. Contacts with host nation military personnel are limited, and little or no contact is permitted with the local civilian population or foreign diplomats.³⁷

Both Watson and Petersen contend that the Soviets believe a relationship exists between the size and sophistication of a ship and the influence it projects.³⁸ Those visiting Western European ports have included major combatants in over three-fourths of the visits, but few minor combatants (small escort ships or patrol boats), fewer

³⁶Ibid., 67.

³⁷Petersen, Third World Elites, 102.

³⁸Ibid., 13.

auxiliaries, and even fewer submarines. Third World visits more frequently include auxiliaries, almost a fourth included a minor combatant, and a fourth included submarines. Intelligence collectors (AGI), they suggest, very rarely visit foreign ports.³⁹ Few SSBNs (and no modern ones) are seen making port visits. If Petersen is correct, a part of the statement being made by a visiting Soviet task group can be interpreted by analyzing the type of ship(s) involved.

The activities in which ships companies take part during port visits differ dramatically between the Soviet and Western navies. Where the latter enjoy significant periods of free time, (usually) ample funds to spend locally, and a minimum of structured events, Soviet bluejackets enjoy very few, if any, of those amenities. Their liberty is confined to organized daylight sightseeing and shopping excursions supervised by commissioned or senior petty officers. Local currency is expended in tiny amounts, if at all. The crew's contact with the local population is always circumscribed in the hope of avoiding embarrassing incidents.⁴⁰ For most Soviet sailors, a port call means only that his ship is not underway and watch-standing requirements can be relaxed.⁴¹

³⁹Ibid., 93.

⁴⁰Ibid., 101.

⁴¹Ibid., 69.

This researcher enjoyed a rare, first-hand look at Soviet sailors at liberty during the visit to Norfolk, Virginia of a Soviet task group in 1989. The group (cruiser *Marshal Ustinov*, destroyer *Otlichnyy* and replenishment ship *Genrikh Gasanov*) were conducting the first American visit by naval units since 1975. Although this was not a typical port visit, much of what earlier researchers outlined was validated. The visit itself was highly orchestrated, minutely planned, and modified only slightly (with the exception of the official party from the Soviet embassy in Washington, D.C., which changed up to the very last minute). The visit was planned as a navy-to-navy visit, with public exposure secondary. The expenses of the visit were very much on the minds of the Soviets, in keeping with their historic reluctance to part with what hard currency they had. (They preferred to offer reciprocity when U.S. Navy units called at Sevastopol later in the summer.) They offered, for instance, to provide port services in the USSR in exchange for no-cost services in Norfolk and declined to use services available to them for trash and sewage removal. While ashore, Soviet sailors remained for the most part in organized groups and stayed with the tours and visits which had been arranged for them. During one barbecue in downtown Norfolk, several sailors were observed leaving with local youths, and some American liaison personnel believed the sailors felt free to come and go as they wished. There was,

however, no unrestricted liberty for the Soviets. Although the normal "closed-city" status of Norfolk had been relaxed for the visit, most of the Washington-based attaches and ships companies did not take advantage of it.

In one instance, sailors visiting a U.S. Navy ship were discouraged by their supervisor from entering the ship's store and, although they expressed surprise at the level of material wealth evident, they purchased very little.

Their behavior was flawless during the entire visit, and it appeared that they were going to some lengths to avoid a hint of misconduct. Following one party with American sponsors, returning Soviet sailors were mustered aboard their ship late in the evening for a reason that remained unclear. Some speculation exists that there had been excessive drinking and, in fact, the Soviets pleaded fatigue the following day and cancelled the last of the scheduled gatherings.

Ship visiting had been planned, but the Russians were clearly unprepared for the thousands of visitors who flocked to the piers in extremely hot, humid weather to see the ships and talk with the sailors. The Soviet schedulers had asked for a group of school children to be the first visitors upon the ships' arrival, and they arranged a private tour for author Tom Clancy (author of The Hunt for Red October). The task group presented several shows by a very polished song-and-dance troupe, laid a wreath at a

nearby military memorial, and took pains to affirm that their ships carried no nuclear weapons.

With all of the painstaking planning that goes into a Soviet port visit, what do they hope to gain from them? Calhoun feels their aims are threefold: to gain overseas submarine facilities, to gain facilities for surface units, and to garner support for foreign policy objectives.⁴² Watson, too, believes that the search for port facilities is a prime objective.⁴³ Others contend that political motivations figure more prominently in the Soviet program. Hottinger suggests that Third World nations will ultimately incline toward the West or the Soviet power bloc, and that combat fleets will influence their decision.⁴⁴ Herrick sees the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean as an effort to gain a foothold in the countries on the Mediterranean rim⁴⁵ while Margaritis suggests that their foremost aim is the "expansion of Russian political and economic influence."⁴⁶ This thought is echoed by Blechman and

⁴²Kelly, Port Visits, 2, 31.

⁴³Watson, 14.

⁴⁴Arnold Hottinger, "The Soviet Fleet in the Mediterranean," Swiss Review of World Affairs, August 1971, 4-5.

⁴⁵Robert Waring Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1968), 154.

⁴⁶C. Margaritis, "A Strategic Analysis of the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1977, 140.

Weinland with the caveat that, given the newly-independent status and nationalistic feelings of the non-European states on the Mediterranean littoral, the Soviets actually had incentives to stay out of some ports.⁴⁷ Fisher is less sanguine about Soviet intentions, believing that their intent is to "secure friendship and sympathy . . . win governmental cooperation . . . [and] keep the area in unrest."⁴⁸ Former British Foreign (later Prime) Minister Sir Alexander Douglas-Home offers the theory that

visits by Soviet naval squadrons help to instill into the minds of many North Africans, already attuned to anti-Western propaganda, the notion that NATO represents the spent forces of yesterday and Russia the shape of tomorrow.⁴⁹

Not all countries, of course, are eager to host a Soviet visit. Some, observes Charles Petersen, have "less than cordial relations" with the Soviet Union. Other countries

may feel that the potential benefits of a Soviet diplomatic visit are outweighed by the likelihood that it would provoke domestic, regional, or even Western displeasure. Still others refuse to host diplomatic visits because of their commitment to neutrality vis-a-vis the superpowers.⁵⁰

Nevertheless, most of the countries bordering the

⁴⁷Blechman and Kaplan, 93.

⁴⁸Sidney Nettleton Fisher, The Middle East, A History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 745.

⁴⁹Alexander F. Douglas-Home, "The Red Fleet off Suez: Mediterranean Challenge," Atlantic Community Quarterly, Spring 1969, 85.

⁵⁰Petersen, Third World Elites, 91.

Mediterranean Sea have hosted Soviet ship visits. The following chapter examines the extent to which they did, and the significance of those visits.

Chapter 3

DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The data were analyzed to determine the significance of the port or nation visited, the duration of the visit, and the identity of the units conducting the visit.

PORTS VISITED

The distribution of ports visited by Soviet naval vessels clearly shows a marked preference for ports of certain nations over those of others. Tables 1 and 2 list Soviet visits by ports and countries visited. Syria and Egypt account for nearly three-fourths of all visits, with the remaining visits spread among eight Mediterranean nations. A nation-by-nation analysis of the data follows.

FRANCE

The visits addressed in published accounts were those made by the *Zhdanov* and *Krasny Krym* to Toulon (July 3-7, 1975) and the *Ochakov* and *Smolnyy* to that same port June 11-16, 1979. Not reflected, and perhaps more significant, were two earlier visits, one to Toulon and the other to Marseille. The latter, conducted by the cruiser *Groznyy* and destroyers *Provornyy* and *Krasny Kavkaz*, took place from July 2-7, 1973 (almost identical dates to the 1975 visit). Although the dates could be coincidental, it is interesting

to note that the Franco-American community holds annual festivities marking American Independence Day in Nice, an

TABLE 1

PORTS VISITED BY SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS
MEDITERRANEAN SEA, 1967-1986

| Number of Ports | Visits | Percentage of Total |
|---------------------------|--------|------------------------|
| Tartus, Syria | 447 | 34.2 |
| Alexandria, Egypt | 189 | 14.5 |
| Lattakia, Syria | 156 | 12.0 |
| Port Said, Egypt | 86 | 6.6 |
| Annaba, Algeria | 83 | 6.3 |
| Mersa Matruh, Egypt | 65 | 5.0 |
| Tivat, Yugoslavia | 58 | 4.4 |
| Bizerte, Tunisia | 30 | 2.3 |
| Menzel Bourguiba, Tunisia | 26 | 2.0 |
| Algiers, Algeria | 24 | 1.8 |
| Split, Yugoslavia | 23 | 1.8 |
| Tobruk, Libya | 21 | 1.6 |
| Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia | 18 | 1.4 |
| Tripoli, Libya | 12 | 0.9 |
| Oran, Algeria | 10 | 0.8 |
| Tunis, Tunisia | 9 | 0.7 |
| Rijeka, Yugoslavia | 8 | 0.6 |
| Ras al-Kanais, Egypt | 7 | 0.5 |
| La Goullette, Tunisia | 6 | 0.5 |
| Kotor, Yugoslavia | 5 | 0.4 |
| Piraeus, Greece | 4 | 0.3 |
| Messina, Italy | 3 | 0.2 |
| Toulon, France | 3 | 0.2 |
| Mers el-Kebir, Algeria | 2 | 0.2 |
| Pylos, Greece | 2 | 0.2 |
| Taranto, Italy | 2 | 0.2 |
| Benghazi, Libya | 1 | 0.1 |
| Gibraltar, Gibraltar | 1 | 0.1 |
| Istanbul, Turkey | 1 | 0.1 |
| Livorno, Italy | 1 | 0.1 |
| Marseilles, France | 1 | 0.1 |
| Sfax, Tunisia | 1 | 0.1 |
| Susa, Tunisia | 1 | 0.1 |
| Trogir, Yugoslavia | 1 | 0.1 |

TABLE 2

COUNTRIES VISITED BY SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS,
MEDITERRANEAN SEA, 1967-1986

| Country | Number of Visits | Percentage of Total |
|------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Syria | 603 | 46.1 |
| Egypt | 347 | 26.6 |
| Algeria | 119 | 9.1 |
| Yugoslavia | 113 | 8.6 |
| Tunisia | 73 | 5.5 |
| Libya | 34 | 2.6 |
| Greece | 6 | .4 |
| Italy | 6 | .4 |
| France | 4 | .3 |
| Turkey | 1 | .1 |

event that attracts large crowds from vacationers along the *Cote d'Azur*. American warships normally make calls in ports along France's Mediterranean littoral during that period, and a Soviet visit to Toulon (France's largest Mediterranean naval base) or Marseille could be intended to show them in a comparable light.

The earlier visit, although falling outside the chronological scope of this thesis (October 15-20, 1966), is significant in that it came at a time of very little Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean but did coincide with France's departure from the military committee of NATO (March-April, 1966).⁵¹ A port call by major Soviet naval units to the sprawling base at Toulon could well be

⁵¹Roy C. Macridis, Modern Political Systems: Europe (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1978), 96.

interpreted as Soviet encouragement for French independence. The task group composition for each visit (a cruiser, destroyers and a cadet training ship) supports Petersen's contention that only first-line warships are selected to make port visits to Western nations.

ITALY

Soviet visits to Italian ports were limited during the period studied in this thesis, numbering no more than a half-dozen in two decades. In keeping with established Soviet practices, those few calls were conducted by major warships. Two visits in 1973 (Taranto-October 15-18 and Messina immediately thereafter-October 19-22) were unusual in two respects. The Soviets rarely conduct consecutive port visits with the same task group, yet the visits to Taranto and Messina featured the Sverdlov cruiser *Admiral Ushakov* and the Kashin guided missile destroyer *Otvazhny*. The timing of the visits (proceeding directly from one port call to another) was also out of the ordinary for the Soviet Navy. This "peak" in naval visits to Italy is still more significant considering the length of inactivity which preceded it and the three year hiatus which followed.

There were no further visits reflected until mid-1976, when a second pair of calls occurred. The first, a brief stop by a Foxtrot class submarine to Taranto (August 9) was followed shortly by a more conventional visit to Messina by the Sverdlov cruiser *Zhdanov* and the Kashin guided missile

destroyer *Smelyy*. In line with Peterson's earlier observation, first-line combatants conducted the visit.

The final pair of visits featured the training vessel *Smolnyy*, which called in Livorno September 20-25, 1977 and the Kashin class destroyer *Reshitelnyy*, which stopped in Messina October 6-9, 1978. The latter visit was touted as an anniversary call commemorating the assistance rendered by a Russian naval task group following a major earthquake in 1908.

There is little empirical data from which to draw conclusions regarding the Soviet rationale for these visits, but several points are worth noting. The last of the six visits presented an excellent opportunity for the Soviet Navy to reinforce the positive nature of the 1908 call and generate a sense of naval history (something lacking in the Soviet Navy). The earlier calls came during a period of unprecedented achievement for the Italian Communist Party (PCI). The PCI enjoyed substantial domestic growth during the decade of the 70s, particularly between 1972 and 1976. In that four-year span, the PCI share of the electorate grew from 27.1 percent to 34.4 per cent, giving the communists more than one-third of the seats in the Italian legislature and requiring their participation in the government.⁵² Although the PCI had been the first of the western communist parties to publicly disassociate themselves from Moscow's

⁵²Ibid., 495.

ideological philosophy (the "Eurocommunism" of the period), it is probable that the Kremlin would seize the opportunity to exert what influence it could, particularly if it could successfully portray itself as a noteworthy power in the area.

TURKEY

Diplomatic relations between Turkey and the USSR have been cautiously correct but rarely warm. Historically, The Russians have seen Turkey as an impediment to free access from the Black Sea and, as a NATO member, a moderately hostile neighbor. For centuries, Turks and Russians warily faced each other across their common border and the waters of the Black Sea--waters where their respective navies fought more frequently than they visited.

Still, the Soviets made one perfunctory attempt at naval diplomacy during the period covered by this thesis. Following the signing of a treaty in 1978, the Sverdlov-class cruiser *Dzerzhinsky* and the Kashin-class destroyer *Reshitelnyy* called at Istanbul November 16-20 of that year. The call stands out as the only effort made by Moscow to use port-visit diplomacy with Turkey and is primarily significant for that aspect. Interestingly, the vessels selected for that visit included a cruiser which, although not particularly capable militarily (being twenty years old and equipped with a fairly crude adaptation of the land-based SA-2 missile system) was an attractive ship. The

cruiser was accompanied by the same destroyer which, in addition to boasting the Kashin's rakish lines, had spent a considerable part of its 1978 deployment making diplomatic port calls (e.g., to Messina, above).

TUNISIA

Soviet naval interactions with Tunisia have been quietly consistent after the inaugural visits in 1974. In contrast to the somewhat skeletal pattern developed from published literature, analysis of collected data suggests a more complex series of diplomatic port visits and commercial dealings.

Initial Soviet visits to Tunisian ports generally followed the pattern addressed earlier by Kelly and Peterson. The first visits were conducted by minor combatants (Petya and Mirka frigates), followed by more advanced cruisers and destroyers (Kynda, Kresta II, and Kashin) in late 1974 and throughout 1975. Although the number of visits increased in 1976 (a total of eight as compared with four in 1975 and two in 1974), the vessels involved were all minor combatants, auxiliaries, or conventional submarines. Figure 2 shows total ship-days (number of ships X number of days in port) spent by Soviet units in Tunisian ports.

Following execution of a consular agreement in 1977 the Soviet presence dramatically increased, reaching a peak of 200 ship-days in 1979. Coincident with the consular

agreement (and very possibly a consequence of it), Tunisian repair facilities at the port of Menzel Bourguiba were evidently made available to the Soviets.

From March 1977 through December 1986, 44 percent of all Soviet naval port visits to Tunisia were made to that port. Aside from a few exceptions, the majority of those calls were made by Foxtrot-class (conventional) submarines or Natya-class minesweepers. The duration of the visits and the fact that the Natyas are not characteristically used for diplomatic port visits strongly suggest that they were in port for shorter maintenance or repair. On some occasions, Soviet repair vessels were in port coincident with the combatants, but there exists no pattern supporting the possibility that the repair vessels were conducting the work themselves. Consequently, it is reasonable to suggest that Tunisian yards were performing necessary repairs.

The sequence of diplomatic visits (normally to Tunis, Bizerte, or La Goulette) interspersed with calls for repairs at Menzel Bourguiba continued throughout the period covered by this thesis. Interpreted as a function of ship-days in port, the level peaked in 1979, decreased slightly to 45 and 15 percent of the 1979 levels, then increased in 1984 to just short of the 1979 peak. Levels for 1985 and 1986 remained reasonably high, though notably short of the highest point reached.

Naval analyst Charles Petersen has theorized that the




Figure 2

size of the warship the Soviets selected to make a port visit is directly proportional to the stature of nation visited (i.e., larger warships generally visit Western European or American ports and minor combatants visit Third World nations).⁵³ If true, then the pattern of Soviet port calls to Tunisian ports suggests that the Soviet Union considered Tunisia a Third World nation. In the thirteen years examined, the Soviets made a total of 73 visits, including those for maintenance and repair. Of the 73, 13 (17.8 percent) included larger combatants (guided missile destroyers or larger). The balance, averaging 4.6 calls per year, consisted of auxiliaries and minor combatants.

There are, however, several features of Soviet naval diplomacy regarding Tunisia that appear at odds with criteria established earlier. Task group composition notwithstanding, the annual average of 5.6 calls indicates that a Soviet unit or units was in a Tunisian port roughly every other month. Even if half of those were primarily for maintenance, the intended political impact seems greater than what would be expected for a non-client, Third World nation. Secondly, the first documented visit by Admiral Gorshkov's successor, Admiral V. N. Chernavin, was to Tunis, within days of his assuming the post of Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy. (The announcement of Gorshkov's retirement was made on December 12, 1985 and the Soviet

⁵³Petersen, Third World Elites, 93.

announcement of Chernavin's visit the following day.) The significance of this event indicates that the Kremlin was taking pains to demonstrate to Tunisia's importance in Moscow's eyes.

A third factor is even more difficult to categorize. The number of visits vessels made to Menzel Bourguiba suggests that the Soviet Navy required not insignificant levels of services from the Tunisian yards. Given the Soviet reticence to part with limited hard currency, identifying the *quid pro quo* for those services challenges the analyst. Other client states frequently receive armaments in exchange for services or basing rights, but available documentation indicates Tunisia procures all of its military necessities from the United States, France, Germany, Italy, and a small group of other nations, wholly excluding the Soviet Union.⁵⁴ Considering the role Tunisia plays as "honest broker" in the Arab world (hosting a 1982 Arab League meeting, providing a headquarters for the Palestine Liberation Organization when that group was forced from Lebanon in 1985, and acting as a focal point for US diplomatic efforts following the *Achille Lauro* affair that same year), the possibility exists that Tunisia provided repair services for Soviet naval vessels in return for

⁵⁴Congressional Quarterly, The Middle East, 6th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1986), 96; and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1986 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987), 144.

considerations (particularly armaments) made covertly in Tunisia's name to Arab organizations, especially the PLO. Such a scenario would allow Tunisia plausible deniability as far as providing arms to the PLO is concerned while still maintaining high levels of credibility among Arabs.

GREECE

Soviet efforts to gain influence in Greece was evidently conducted more through commercial than military channels. The number of naval port visits during the period covered is quite small (six between 1978 and 1983) and, in the context of the vessel selected for the visit, very low-key. Of the half-dozen visits, four featured only cadet-training ships (Smolnyy- and Ugra-class) and two of those were to the secondary port of Pylos rather than in Piraeus (the port which serves Athens).

As indicated earlier, the Soviet Union made several efforts to gain access to maintenance and repair facilities in Greece over a period of several years. Although Moscow enjoyed a commercial relationship with Yugoslavia and Tunisia, the facilities available in Greece and the esteem in which Greek shipbuilders were held made access to them even more desirable. Then, too, the Soviets were alert to any opportunity to exploit cracks in NATO solidarity however small. Arguments which later developed regarding the status of naval auxiliary ships or those of commercial registry subordinate to naval control illustrate the extremes to

which the Soviets and Greeks were prepared to go.

Those task groups which did visit Piraeus (one in 1978 and a second in 1983) had nearly identical configurations--a Sverdlov cruiser and a destroyer--substantiating Peterson's model for visits to major Western maritime nations.

Interestingly, the cruiser which called in 1978 (the *Dzerzhinsky*) later that year conducted the Soviets' sole visit to Istanbul, apparently as part of a task group configured for diplomatic missions. The second warship visit to Piraeus (in 1983) was part of a bi-national exchange of naval visits arranged earlier that year.

YUGOSLAVIA

The Soviet Union's program of naval diplomacy with Yugoslavia was conducted on terms dictated by Belgrade rather than Moscow. Port visits conducted from 1967 through 1974 appear to have been governed by Yugoslavian law. Table 3 listing Soviet port visits to Yugoslavia differentiates between those apparently intended for politico-diplomatic purposes and those arranged for ship repair or overhaul. The dearth of visits for repair is clearly evident through 1974, despite the pressures exerted by Leonid Brezhnev in the early 70s for port rights along the Adriatic coast. Considering the factors that then faced the Soviet Navy (loss of Egyptian ports, uncertainty of security in Syrian facilities, omnipresent chokepoint at the Turkish Straits), secure port facilities in the eastern Mediterranean were

TABLE 3
SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN FLEET PORT VISITS TO
YUGOSLAVIA, 1967-1986

| Year | Politico-Diplomatic | Repair-Overhaul |
|------|---------------------|-----------------|
| 1967 | 3 | 2 |
| 1968 | 2 | 3 |
| 1969 | 3 | |
| 1970 | 2 | |
| 1971 | 2 | 1 |
| 1972 | 2 | |
| 1973 | 3 | |
| 1974 | 3 | |
| 1975 | 2 | 2 |
| 1976 | 2 | 3 |
| 1977 | 3 | 2 |
| 1978 | 3 | 2 |
| 1979 | 3 | 2 |
| 1980 | 3 | 3 |
| 1981 | 3 | 2 |
| 1982 | 3 | 2 |
| 1983 | 2 | 3 |
| 1984 | 3 | 1 |
| 1985 | 3 | 2 |
| 1986 | 1 | |

very probably a high priority. Nevertheless, Tito successfully avoided Moscow's efforts.

The data covering 1975 through 1986 reflects the revision in Yugoslav law which allowed longer visits and extended overhauls. Data for that period shows a strong annual pattern of three politico-diplomatic calls and two repair visits with very little variation (Table 3). Overhaul visits were largely conducted by submarines and limited to conventionally powered vessels with little variation.

The port visited in each instance was Tivat.

Characteristically, a support vessel (a Don- or Ugra-class submarine tender) would arrive in Tivat, followed shortly by the submarine. The overhaul period was always less than six months, after which the submarine would depart, followed within days by the tender. At nearly the same time (and sometimes overlapping), a second tender would arrive, followed by the next submarine requiring overhaul, and the pattern would continue. This visit profile held essentially constant for the eleven years (1974-1986) covered by this study.

Soviet visits with politico-diplomatic overtones followed a similarly repetitious pattern. The visits were conducted to one of four ports--Kotor, Rijeka, Dubrovnik or Split (although none were made to Kotor after 1971). Four visits were made to Kotor, eight to Rijeka, 18 to Dubrovnik, and 22 to Split. Moscow was evidently courting Yugoslavia, as evidenced by the composition of the task groups sent to Yugoslavia compared to other Mediterranean countries. The capable and attractive Kresta II- and Kara-class cruisers made a large percentage of their port calls to Yugoslav ports--30 percent and 33 percent, respectively. The two Moskva-class helicopter carriers (for years the largest warships in the Soviet fleet) made 37.5 percent of their Mediterranean visits to Yugoslavia. Compared with the single call comprised only of minor combatants and the two made up of a submarine tender and submarines it becomes

apparent that the Soviets were sparing little effort to demonstrate to Belgrade that they considered Yugoslavia equal in stature to France, Italy, and the other major western powers. For their efforts they obtained commercial concessions that benefitted Yugoslavia as much as the USSR.

ALGERIA

Soviet efforts to gain influence or concessions in Algeria through naval diplomacy may have been only partially successful. The USSR made a concerted effort to establish a major presence in Algeria, and it appears that the Algerians held their efforts at arm's length.

The Soviet Navy made regular calls at Algerian ports throughout the period of this study. The average number of visits made annually and the average duration of each call fell within reasonably consistent ranges. Soviet warships called at Algerian ports an average of 6.2 times annually. The fewest visits occurred in 1983 and 1985 (one each), and the most frequent visits came in 1971 and 1977 (11 visits each). From 1971 through 1980 visits averaged just over seven per year, and from 1981 through 1986 the average dropped by more than half, to three annually.

Initially, all visits were made to the capital city, Algiers. From 1967 through 1969, a total of 12 visits were made to that city. Nineteen sixty-nine appears to have been a pivotal year in Algerian-Soviet relations. The Soviets made their visit to Annaba that year along with two visits

to Algiers. From 1970 on, the majority of calls were made to Annaba, the next most to Algiers, and the fewest to Oran. Throughout the two decades studied, no visits were made to the former French naval base of Mers el-Kebir.

The duration of each call changed somewhat as the emphasis shifted from Algiers to Annaba. Initially, calls to Algiers averaged 11 days each (through 1969). As more visits were made to Annaba, the length of each visit decreased by almost half to 6.5 days. The average visit to Annaba through the balance of the period studied hovered at the six-day level, with three peak years (1979--11.1 days; 1980--13.6 days and 1981--17.6 days per visit). Thus the Presence Factor for Algeria is highest for Annaba (Tables 4 through 8). The highest Presence Factor achieved in an Algerian port was in 1979, (23.9 in Annaba). From then through the end of the period studied, the Presence Factor declined sharply and remained very low in the last five years of the study.

Nevertheless, the Soviets appeared to have gained certain concessions from the Algerians. After September 1974, Soviet units made a number of extended visits (greater than 10 days) to Algerian ports. Of fourteen visits, thirteen involved Annaba and averaged 15.6 days. These visits were evidently related to submarine maintenance, since the same ratio (thirteen of fourteen) were made by submarines. All visits longer than twenty days were made by

submarines, and all were made to Annaba. No major warship made an extended visit to an Algerian port. The number of visits by submarines, the length of their visits, and the fact that there was no concomitant visit by a submarine support vessel strongly suggests that submarines were receiving support from facilities ashore. No evidence suggests the Soviets enjoyed the same type of relationship with Algeria as they evidently did with Syria, but some level of Soviet presence was apparent in Annaba.

Analysis of the data by ship type indicates that the Soviets placed a qualitative emphasis on calls to Algiers. Although the number of visits to Algiers is less than that to Annaba, more warships called in the capital than in the smaller port. Fully one-third of all visits to Algeria included a major warship, while only 8 percent of those to Annaba included one. Conversely, less than 9 percent of all the visits to Algiers included submarines, while nearly one-fourth of all the calls to Annaba were comprised of submarines. Annaba received 86 percent of all submarine visits made to Algeria.

In the same vein, intelligence collection vessels called far more frequently at Annaba than Algiers. Beginning in 1971 and ending in 1977 (not long before American ballistic missile submarines ceased operating from the base at Rota, Spain), twelve visits by AGIs were made to Algerian ports, all to Annaba. By contrast, the higher-profile units

TABLE 4

PRESENCE FACTORS IN SELECTED MEDITERRANEAN PORTS,
1967-1970

| Port | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 |
|------------------|------|------|------|------|
| Alexandria, EG | 11.5 | 43.0 | 7.0 | 7.4 |
| Port Said, EG | 35.4 | 52.6 | 37.0 | 15.3 |
| Mersa Matruh, EG | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Lattakia, SY | 20.0 | 57.2 | 8.5 | 14.5 |
| Tartus, SY | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.9 | 0.0 |
| Annaba, AL | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 0.0 |

TABLE 5

PRESENCE FACTORS IN SELECTED MEDITERRANEAN PORTS,
1971-1974

| Port | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 |
|------------------|------|------|------|------|
| Alexandria, EG | 91.4 | 16.1 | 15.9 | 90.6 |
| Port Said, EG | 83.5 | 38.0 | 12.9 | 0.2 |
| Mersa Matruh, EG | 18.4 | 4.3 | 19.7 | 91.2 |
| Lattakia, SY | 0.0 | 7.9 | 5.7 | 10.9 |
| Tartus, SY | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.9 | 0.0 |
| Annaba, AL | 12.3 | 11.2 | 9.3 | 12.0 |

TABLE 6
PRESENCE FACTORS IN SELECTED MEDITERRANEAN PORTS,
1975-1978

| Port | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 |
|------------------|-------|------|-------|------|
| Alexandria, EG | 100.0 | 28.4 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Port Said, EG | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Mersa Matruh, EG | 43.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Lattakia, SY | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Tartus, SY | 81.8 | 73.1 | 100.0 | 99.1 |
| Annaba, AL | 7.9 | 11.7 | 19.2 | 18.1 |

TABLE 7
PRESENCE FACTORS IN SELECTED MEDITERRANEAN PORTS
1979-1982

| Port | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 | 1982 |
|------------------|------|------|------|------|
| Alexandria, EG | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Port Said, EG | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Mersa Matruh, EG | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Lattakia, SY | 0.0 | 5.7 | 0.6 | 1.6 |
| Tartus, SY | 95.3 | 92.8 | 73.9 | 99.4 |
| Annaba, AL | 23.9 | 20.8 | 16.4 | 0.0 |

TABLE 8
 PRESENCE FACTORS IN SELECTED MEDITERRANEAN PORTS,
 1983-1986

| Port | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 |
|------------------|------|------|------|------|
| Alexandria, EG | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Port Said, EG | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Mersa Matruh, EG | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Lattakia, SY | 1.3 | 0.8 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Tartus, SY | 97.5 | 76.0 | 68.0 | 89.9 |
| Annaba, AL | 0.0 | 5.4 | 0.0 | 1.9 |

were sent to Algiers.

Visits to Algiers were usually made by the newest or most capable ships of the Soviet Navy. Sverdlov- and Kynda-class cruisers were regular visitors to Algiers from 1968 through 1986, but visits by the Moskva-class CHGs, Kresta- and Kara-class cruisers, and the inaugural visit of the Soviet's first true aircraft carrier, the *Kiev*, point up the importance with which Moscow held naval visits to Algeria.

Additionally, regular visits by the Soviet naval Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Gorshkov, highlight the Kremlin's efforts to woo Algeria. Gorshkov visited Algeria in 1970, 1979 and 1984--more often than any other Mediterranean country. His visit in 1970 preceded the first visit by a task group including a new Kynda-class cruiser, and his 1984 visit presaged the first visit by the *Kiev*.

That, plus the visit of another senior Soviet figure in conjunction with major warships were not equalled by other countries along the Mediterranean littoral. In spite of this level of attention (and a strongly Marxist constitution adopted in 1976), the Algerians, not long independent from France, constrained Soviet naval diplomacy to a fairly well defined set of limits which lasted for two decades.

LIBYA

Soviet diplomatic efforts to gain influence in the Maghreb included overtures to Libya. From the naval perspective, however, they bore little fruit until 1981. A frigate had called in Tripoli for a week in May 1969, but for more than a decade Mu'ammarr Qaddafi remained true to his vow to deny visitation rights to either of the two superpowers. By 1981, however, he evidently decided to alter that stance. Shortly after a visit to Moscow in April (his first since 1976), and in the wake of deteriorating relations with Washington (where the Libyan diplomatic mission had been closed the week after his visit to the USSR), a pair of Krivak-class guided missile frigates were in Tripoli. This was followed by a call that fall to Tobruk by a Don-class submarine tender and a Natya-class minesweeper. These visits and the results of his visit to the USSR may have emboldened Qaddafi to challenge the U.S. in the Gulf of Sidra that summer, when two Libyan Su-22 attack aircraft were shot down by U.S. Navy F-14s on August

19. The following month, Libya hosted a meeting of representatives from Algeria, Libya, Syria and South Yemen at which they agreed to develop an Arab-Soviet strategy to offset U.S.-Israeli ties and what they perceived as lack of cooperation from Egypt.

From a total of just over 100 ship-days in port in 1981, the Soviet presence almost doubled the following year (Figure 3 shows Soviet visit profiles through 1986). The visits were divided between the ports of Tripoli and Tobruk (not far from the Gulf of Sollum anchorage, a primary one for Soviet Mediterranean Fleet units). The task group configurations appear tailored to the port visited. Unlike neighboring Tunisia, Soviet visits began with major combatants which called at the capital city. Of seven visits to Tripoli between 1982 and 1984, four included a cruiser, and all included either major combatants or a Smolnyy-class cadet training ship. The remaining visits included a broad variety of units ranging from guided missile cruisers and destroyers through submarines. Nineteen of 33 visits featured a primary combatant, while seven included submarines. The latter were either Juliett-class missile-firing submarines or the latest class of conventional submarines, the Tango. The Soviets were clearly making an effort to put their best nautical foot forward. Rumors persisted that the Soviets were seeking basing rights in Libya, but there is no evidence of that.




Figure 3

There were no extended visits by support vessels or extraordinarily long calls by combatants. That suggests that calls exceeding the seven-to-eight day norm were probably made for rest.

Soviet port calls in Libya reached a peak in 1982 and dropped precipitously between 1983 and 1985. The Russians made only two calls to Tripoli in 1985 and three to Tobruk. Compared with the nearly 200 ship-days spent in port in 1982, in 1984 Soviet presence fell to 50 ship-days and in 1985 plunged to 17. Events in those two years involving Libya may have caused the Soviets significant concern and led them to reconsider the level of support for Qaddafi. In 1984, a series of ships sailing the Red Sea were damaged by maritime mines and although incontrovertible proof was never made public, the Libyan roll-on, roll-off vessel *Ghat* was the prime suspect. Continuing difficulties with the United States coming at a time when Gorbachev was lobbying hard for American support for *perestroika* made the Moscow-Tripoli link less attractive to the Soviets.

The Soviets evidently decided to strengthen their posture in Libya, although the means they chose were, from a military perspective, perhaps more symbolic than substantive. Following charges by President Reagan that Qaddafi was a "barbarian" and deserved to be treated as a "pariah,"⁵⁵ a Don-class submarine tender (with a senior

⁵⁵Congressional Quarterly, 290.

commander embarked) arrived in Tripoli on a visit that extended into early March. Shortly after the Don departed, a pair of modified Kashin destroyers arrived in Tobruk for a week and joined by a Kresta I-class cruiser. The Don returned to Tripoli on the day the others left Tobruk and remained in port until early April. All the Soviet ships had departed by the time U. S. forces conducted Operation "El Dorado Canyon", the raids on Libya of April 15, 1986.

There have been suggestions that the Libyans were displeased that the Soviets left just before the raids and returned when the danger was past.⁵⁶ Ten days after the raids, two of the newest Soviet warships, a Sovremenny- and Udaloy-class destroyer arrived in Benghazi for the inaugural visit to that port. They remained only three days. A Don-class tender and a Smolnyy-class cadet training ship returned to Tobruk in June and July and a Krivak-class frigate was in Tripoli from late August until September.

SYRIA

Soviet naval relations with Syria had origins similar to those with Egypt, but their development followed a distinctive path. Although the first of the USSR's post-war Mediterranean port visits was to Lattakia in 1957, no regular program of port calls emerged until a decade later. Following the debacle of the 1967 war, Syria found itself

⁵⁶"Libya-Soviet Ties Reported Strained," New York Times, 6 May 1986, p. 3.

close to *extremis*. The Kremlin recognized this and was able to exploit Damascus' need for weapons and support for their own naval requirements in the Mediterranean.

Soviet visits to Syria began well after the hostilities had ended. The first group to visit arrived in the latter part of October 1967, and some of the units remained until after Christmas. The makeup of that first task group did not include a major combatants. It consisted of two minesweepers, two amphibious warfare ships, and a frigate. In the language of naval diplomacy, that composition was conveniently ambiguous. The presence of warships (especially for extended visits) can mean that the visitor supports the host nation, but a low-key task group suggests that support is minimal. The Soviets maintained their non-committal posture until the middle 70s. Presence Factors for the Syrian ports of Lattakia and Tartus suggest a reasonably high Soviet posture in 1967 and 1968 (Presence Factors of 20.0 and 57.2, respectively), diminishing noticeably in 1969 and remaining low through 1974. Port calls were generally conducted once per month with two notable exceptions. There was a hiatus from July 1969 through March 1970 (with the exception of a single, one-day call at Tartus by two minesweepers.) During that time, the Syrians initiated several raids on Israeli posts on Mount Hermon and along the Israeli-Lebanon border, and Arab hijackers landed a TWA airliner in Damascus, blowing it up

after the Syrians had negotiated the release of the passengers (less six Israeli citizens). Similarly, the Soviets were absent from Syrian ports from August through December 1973 (again, excepting one single-day call). The Yom Kippur war may have convinced the Soviets that Israeli counter-attacks were imminent and, rather than participate in hostilities which they opposed or risk the loss of credibility in the Arab world, the Soviets simply left port until the hostilities were resolved. Soviet presence in Tartus was practically nil during that same period (1.9 in 1969 and 1973, and 0.0 in the remaining years).

Furthermore, the composition of the groups that did visit Syria was decidedly minor. Of 87 visits made through 1974 (averaging 10.8 per year), only twelve included major combatants. In fact, the entire period of 1967-1986 reflects an absence of capital ships. In those two decades, there were no recorded visits by either of the two Moskva-class helicopter carriers or the Kresta-class cruisers, but there were three by Kara-class cruisers (the last in 1979), four by Kynda-class cruisers (ending in 1982), and fifteen by Sverdlov-class cruisers. Classes of ships not seen or infrequently seen in other ports were over-represented in Lattakia and later in Tartus. Minor combatants (Petya, Mirka, and Nanuchka frigates, T-43, Yurka, and Natya minesweepers, and Romeo, Whiskey and Zulu-class submarines) appeared there far more often than in ports of other

nations.

After the Soviet forces left Egypt, Syria became their base of operations in the eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, Soviet ship-days in Lattakia dropped dramatically while their presence in Tartus jumped from none in 1974 to 81.8 in 1975 and remained extremely high through the period covered. There were 411 Soviet port calls from 1975-1986 averaging 34.25 per year, a four-fold increase over 1967-1974.

The 1972 Soviet-Syrian security agreement provided for improved facilities in both ports. Presence Factors indicate that Moscow opted for Tartus as its primary site. Lattakia was evidently not used between 1975 and 1979, and then was used sparingly from 1979 through 1986.

The data strongly suggests that the Soviets established bases in Syria, similar to those in Egypt. The Presence Factors for Tartus averaged 87.23 during the latter twelve years of this study (in actual terms, a Soviet vessel was in Tartus 317 days a year). This unusually high value represents activity levels associated with permanent bases rather than diplomatic port calls (Tables 4-8).

Similarly, a pattern of visits by intelligence collection ships (AGIs) like that seen in Egypt was evident in Syria. Soviet AGIs were in port 17 ship-days in 1975 and five in 1976. Beginning in 1977, the amount of time in port increased to an average of 18 through 1986, with peak years

in 1979 (38) and 1986 (40). The latter included an unprecedented visit of 23 days by a Mirnyy-class AGI. Regular visits by such ships are further evidence of facilities the Soviets consider sufficiently secure--bases rather than ports controlled by the host nation.

Further confirmation of the status of the Soviet Navy in Syria is evident in the pattern of port calls by submarines. As outlined above, classes of submarines not reflected in other port visits (the older Whiskey, Zulu, and Romeo classes) were commonplace in Syria. The frequency of visits and duration of their stay in port also differed greatly from that expected in politico-diplomatic port calls. Submarines first visited Lattakia as part of a seven-unit task group in April 1968. With the exception of 1969 when no visits were reflected, periodic visits continued through 1974 and averaged just over 12 days per visit. On three occasions, submarines stayed significantly longer than that--three units stayed 74 days in late 1968, one was in port 25 days at approximately the same time, and another 36 days in late 1972.

After a week-long call in mid-1975, Soviet submarines began a series of visits that resulted in a virtually uninterrupted presence in Tartus through 1986. Although there were several instances where both submarines and tenders were in Tartus simultaneously, the reverse was much more frequently the norm. As in Egypt, the long-term

presence of submarines with without a tender is a very strong indicator that those services were routinely available ashore. Since Syria did not have the industrial infrastructure to support such specialized services, the rational alternative was to place Soviet personnel and equipment permanently in Tartus.

EGYPT

The Egyptian-Soviet relationship was born in crisis and ended in acrimony but at its zenith represented one of the more significant successes for Russian naval diplomacy. Analysis reveals several patterns and provides no little insight into parts of the Cairo-Moscow bond.

The Soviet naval presence in Egypt did not begin in earnest until well after the cease-fire of the 1967 War. Based on Soviet naval activity after the war, it is difficult to believe that Moscow had much forewarning of its outbreak. Initial Soviet task groups did not arrive in force until July 10, 1967, a month after the cease-fire went into effect and on the day that Egypt and Israel mutually accepted United Nations supervision of the cease fire in the canal zone. In Port Said, closest Egyptian port to the front lines, the Soviets maintained a near-constant presence from their arrival in July through the end of 1967. Their presence in Alexandria (farther to the west and thus in less immediate danger) was significantly less, at least through 1967. (Tables 4 through 8 list Presence Factors for

Alexandria, Port Said and Mersa Matruh from 1967 through 1986.) Of particular interest in the early stages was the preponderance of amphibious warfare vessels in Port Said. These units may or may not have had naval infantry (roughly the equivalent of U.S. Marines) embarked, but the inference was clear--the Kremlin was perceived as ready to use Soviet personnel to protect an ally.

In the first year following the Six Day War, the Soviets maintained a relatively high Presence Factor in Alexandria and Port Said (43.0 and 52.6, respectively). This suggests that a Soviet warship was in port, on the average, every other day. By 1970 the Soviet Presence Factor in both major ports had diminished substantially. During that time, reports had surfaced of Soviet ground troops and missiles in Egypt and that Soviet-manned aircraft were flying air defense patrols over the southern Suez.⁵⁷ In the latter days of 1970, General Nasser died suddenly and Anwar Sadat became President, events which normally require a re-evaluation of relationships on the part of allies. By 1971, however, the Soviets had dramatically increased their naval presence not only in Alexandria and Port Said (Presence Factors of 91.4 and 83.5) but for the first time were reflected in the far western port of Mersa Matruh (Presence Factor of 18.4). These unusually high numbers indicate a vessel in port nearly every day, a posture

⁵⁷Congressional Quarterly, 254.

associated far more with bases than with "visiting ports" in a sovereign nation. A "base" in the context of naval operations is considered to be a facility where ship presence is the norm rather than the exception and where support activities (communications, supply, administration and maintenance) exist and are under the control (at least to some extent) of the visiting vessels' state. Although not formally acknowledged, their high level of access indicates that the Soviets had *de facto* bases in Egypt. During that year, Sadat and Podgorny dedicated the Aswan High Dam, Egypt, Syria and Libya formed the Federation of Arab Republics, the USSR and Egypt signed a 15-year Treaty of Friendship, and the two countries issued a joint communique declaring that the Suez Canal would open only when Israel withdrew all its forces from Arab territory. Soviet influence in Egypt was probably never higher than at that point. The year also marks the high-water mark of Soviet presence in Port Said.

In 1972, however, Arab solidarity began to fray, and Soviet influence in Egypt began to wane. Presence Factors for Alexandria, Port Said, and Mersa Matruh are substantially lower for that year than the year preceding (16.1, 38.0, and 4.3). Midway in the year, President Sadat publicly evicted Soviet forces from the country and took control of military installations formerly held by the Soviets. The data indicates that, although the Soviet

presence decreased, the eviction declaration was not wholly enforced. Presence Factors in 1973 for Alexandria, Port Said and Mersa Matruh levelled at 15.9, 12.9 and 19.7. The latter parameter is significant in that it indicates an increase in Soviet presence at a location removed from the population centers of Egypt. The average Presence Factor for the three ports dropped from 19.4 to 16.1 between 1972 and 1973, but individually it increased four-fold at Matruh.

Nineteen seventy-three was a pivotal year for Soviet naval diplomacy in Egypt. The Yom Kippur War in October (which Sadat instigated without, evidently, much Soviet support) offered the Soviets an opportunity to "redeem" themselves in Egyptian eyes, particularly after early Arab successes were reversed. The Presence Factors for that year strongly indicate that Sadat allowed a major influx of Soviet naval units into Alexandria and Mersa Matruh (Presence Factors of 90.6 and 91.2). In direct contrast to the days following the 1967 War, the Soviets were conspicuously absent from Port Said. Their presence at that port had been very slight in the days preceding the outbreak of hostilities in October, but once the war began, the Soviets made only one more visit at Port Said, a single, one-day stop by a minesweeper and amphibious ship.

The Soviet Union never recovered the level of influence in Egypt it had once enjoyed. Although Soviet presence was still evident in 1975 (100 at Alexandria and 43.1 in Mersa

Matruh), by 1976 it had dropped to 28.4 in Alexandria and port visits to Mersa Matruh, as well as Port Said and the few to Ras al Kanais, had ceased entirely. From 1977 through the balance of the period covered by this research, no Soviet naval unit visited any Egyptian port.

Analysis reveals three additional points of significance. The Soviet Union proved extraordinarily cautious about the presence of their large fleet of intelligence collection ships (AGIs). Under normal circumstances, such ships rarely, if ever, made diplomatic port visits and thus kept their existence and identity low-key. As a consequence, the pattern of port calls of AGIs indicates that their ports of call are more properly considered bases than "visited" ports. The history of AGI visits to Egypt supports that premise. From September 1, 1971, through January 12, 1976, Soviet intelligence collection vessels made a total of 28 visits to four Egyptian ports. Initially, the majority of visits were made to Alexandria and Port Said (25 percent and 21 percent of the total). Beginning in 1972, however, there was a discernible shift to Mersa Matruh. By the time of the final Soviet exodus from Egypt, 50 percent of AGI visits had been made to the more isolated base at Mersa Matruh and only one to Ras al Kanais. The predominance of visits to Mersa Matruh underscores earlier contentions that the facility there was, in fact, a Soviet base.

The Soviet naval presence in Egypt was highlighted from the outset by amphibious warfare vessels (Alligator- and Polnocny-class vessels). These ships served the dual purpose of providing a naval presence and implying the presence of naval infantry. In July 1967 four of the first nine vessels to arrive after the June war were amphibious warfare vessels, and their presence in Port Said probably diverted the Israelis attention to other targets.

Throughout the period of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship, Soviet amphibious ships were common visitors at three of the four major Egyptian ports. Twenty-nine of 62 visits were to Port Said, primarily from 1967 through early 1972. As relations between Moscow and Cairo soured, however, the amphibious warfare ships made far fewer visits including none between February, 1972 and October, 1973. When visits resumed after the Yom Kippur War, virtually all were either to Alexandria or Mersa Matruh. Eight visits were made to Alexandria and 25 to the facility at Mersa Matruh. In comparison to the presence in Port Said in the early days, the Soviet Union was distancing itself from Egyptian activities near the Sinai while taking advantage of the opportunity to bring ships into port.

The third factor of significance in Soviet-Egyptian naval relations was the pattern of submarine visits. Soviet doctrine identified its attack and ballistic missile submarine force as a major component of the navy and

evidently considered attack submarines to have a politico-diplomatic mission. In fact, attack submarines were in the first group to visit Egyptian ports and the last to leave in 1976. In the interim, a variety of submarines called at the ports of Alexandria, Port Said and Mersa Matruh. The latter two, however, accounted for only one visit apiece. A number of factors suggest that a Soviet submarine base or major facility existed in Alexandria.

Between July 1967 and April 1974 submarines made at least 42 visits to Egyptian ports. Early visits were widely spaced (two in 1967, two in 1968), but for a brief period in 1969 the frequency of visits increased. In that year there were eight calls followed by an unexplained hiatus which lasted until the last days of 1971. At that point a nuclear-powered submarine made a unique visit to Port Said. There was another gap until May 1972 when a similar submarine (possibly the same one) made a one-day stop in Alexandria. After that, there was another brief flurry of visits in the first months of 1973 which ended with the lone visit to Mersa Matruh (February 20 through March 20).

For nearly a year afterward, Soviet submarines were absent from Egyptian ports. When they returned the pattern of their visits was vastly different. The first port call of the period began on February 1, 1974, and lasted for 28 days (a period associated more with repairs than with diplomacy). From that date until April 14, 1976, when the

last Soviet unit--a submarine--left Egyptian waters, there was an uninterrupted presence of Soviet submarines in Alexandria. At times, as many as five submarines remained for periods in excess of thirty days. Those durations are a convincing argument that a *de facto* Soviet submarine base existed. When compared with the visits of submarine support vessels (Don- and Ugra-class), it becomes evident that support for those submarines was provided from facilities ashore rather than afloat. Submarine tenders made a total of 21 visits to Alexandria in the 27 months from February 1974 through April 1976. Aside from one visit of 30 days, the remaining 20 averaged 6.45 days per visit, insufficient time to conduct substantial repairs or maintenance for the number of submarines in port. In short, although the Soviets had been "evicted" in July 1972, after the October 1973 war it can be argued that they remained, that they remained in numbers, and that they enjoyed major concessions from the Egyptian government.

VISIT DURATION

Port visits may be made for one or more of a number of reasons. Generally speaking, several purposes may be served by one visit, although only one is usually the primary purpose. Unlike the navies of the Western world, the Soviet Navy replenished its ships from Soviet-flag auxiliaries more often than in a foreign port. That saved the costs in the local currency of provisions, water, and fuel. It is

therefore less likely that Soviet port visits were primarily intended for replenishment.

Analysis of Soviet port visits supports the conclusions mentioned above. The study considers 1785 ship visits. They ranged in duration from a single day to 360 days, not including four visits in progress as of December 31, 1986. An effort to determine if a point existed that clearly distinguished a diplomatic from a logistic port visit, but no conclusion can be supported. A listing of port visits by duration is found in Appendix B.

Visits greater than 37 days duration can, in most cases, be identified as made for maintenance or repair. Of 128 visits lasting 38 days or more, 56 percent were made to the Egyptian or Syrian ports of Port Said, Alexandria, Mersa Yugoslavia, and were all made by either submarines or submarine support vessels. Five percent were made to Menzel Bourguiba, Tunisia. Of the extended visits of 142 days or longer, 85.7 percent were made to Tivat.

Lengthy port visits, particularly to those ports in Tunisia and Yugoslavia with whom the Soviet Union had commercial agreements or relations based on treaty, i.e. Syria, and Egypt until 1972, were conducted primarily for maintenance or upkeep of vessels, particularly the submarine force. Three visits to Bizerte, Tunisia in 1985 and 1986 were probably repair-related. Two visits that do not meet the criteria addressed above remain. Two Foxtrot-class




Figure 4

submarines visited Algiers from November 11 through December 30, 1968, and a *Don*-class submarine tender which may have had a major commander embarked lingered in Tripoli, Libya from January 1 through March 6, 1986. The significance of such an extended visit to Libya by two submarines is important but cannot be traced to a specific event at that time. Given the state of tension that existed between Libya and the United States in early 1986 the *Don's* presence may have been an effort to demonstrate support for Qaddafi. Whether it left prior to the April raid because it had advance warning of impending hostilities, or if those hostilities were delayed awaiting the tender's departure cannot be determined.

PORT VISITS BY SPECIFIC SHIP

The Soviet Navy, like navies of other countries, has a broad spectrum of ships to deploy. Unlike other navies, however, the Soviets appear to be much more selective in determining which units conduct port calls, particularly of a politico-military nature.

Writers like Petersen, Watson, and Kelly suggest that the Soviets select the type of ship based on the stature of the port to be visited. Major warships are more often selected for visits to developed ports, particularly western European, and minor combatants or auxiliaries for lesser developed countries. Specialized vessels such as intelligence collection ships rarely make politico-

diplomatic visits. A review of the visits made to Mediterranean ports during the two decades of this study reinforces that premise. Capital ships were featured far more prominently in visits to French, Italian, Yugoslav, and Algerian ports and in the sole visit to Istanbul than in visits to Syrian, Egyptian and Libyan ports before the establishment of Soviet bases. Appendices D, E and F list in order of visit frequency units of the Soviet Navy which conducted port visits during the period studied. Modifying each succeeding Appendix to discount visits to ports with high Presence Factors in an effort to exclude units whose visits were more in the line of "returning to base" or for an extended overhaul than for any specific purpose and finally excluding those calling in Syrian and Egyptian ports when a call there was tantamount to a return to homeport yields a more accurate reflection of those specific units which made more port calls than others. To analyze those numbers in their proper context, Table 9 lists units in descending order by the average annual number of visits. The resulting list suggests those ships designated as "port visit" units.

From a total of 67 ships 29 averaged one or more port calls per year. Of those 29 ships, 10 were of the Krivak I- or Krivak II-class, a rakish combatant designated by NATO as a "frigate" but categorized by the Soviets as a *Bolshoi Protivolodochny Korabl'* (BPK)--large anti-submarine warfare

TABLE 9

SOVIET NAVAL UNITS CONDUCTING PORT VISITS IN
THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA, 1967-1986

| Unit (Class) | Average number of visits per year | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Zadornyy (Krivak I) | 6 | (3 in .5 years) |
| Gromkiyy (Krivak II) | 4 | (2 in .5 years) |
| Marshall Vasilevskiy (Udaloy) | 2 | |
| Pylkiy (Krivak I) | 2 | |
| Admiral Isakov (Kresta II) | 2 | |
| Svetlyy (Kotlin) | 2 | (Oct-Nov, 1967) |
| Zhguchiy (Kanin) | 2 | (1970 - 1971) |
| Gremyaschiy (Kanin) | 2 | (1971) |
| Bezukoriznenny (Krivak I) | 1.75 | |
| Druzhnyy (Krivak I) | 1.5 | |
| Mikhail Kutuzov (Sverdlov) | 1.5 | |
| Razitelnyy (Krivak I) | 1.4 | |
| Borodino (Ugra AXT) | 1.33 | |
| Boykiy (Kanin) | 1.3 | |
| Ochakov (Kara) | 1.25 | |
| Bezzavetnyy (Krivak I) | 1.25 | |
| Komsomolets Ukrainyy (Kashin) | 1 | |
| Smolnyy (Smolnyy) | 1 | |
| Deyatelnyy (Krivak I) | 1 | |
| Khasan (Smolnyy) | 1 | |
| Murmansk (Sverdlov) | 1 | |
| Admiral Zozulya (Kresta I) | 1 | |
| Marshal Timoshenko (Kresta II) | 1 | |
| Admiral Yumashev (Kresta II) | 1 | |
| Udaloy (Udaloy) | 1 | |
| Kiev (Kiev) | 1 | |
| Rezvyi (Krivak II) | 1 | |
| Otlichnyy (Sovremenyy) | 1 | |
| Pytlivyy (Krivak I) | 1 | |

ship. Former US Chief Of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt once called the *Krivak* "pound for pound, the most heavily armed ship in the world." The Soviet hierarchy evidently felt that other nations saw their sleek warship in a similar light, for it far outnumbered other classes as a

choice for politico-diplomatic port visits.

Ranking second as favored units were the Kresta II cruisers and Smolnyy-class midshipman training ships. The former, a guided-missile cruiser of unquestioned capability and appeal, was an obvious choice, particularly in those instances where the Soviets were implying greater stature on the nation being visited. By western standards, the latter choice is somewhat unique. While it is not uncommon for sail training ships to make visits, the Smolnyy-class units had little of the aesthetic appeal of a "tall ship" under sail. Nevertheless, the Soviet Navy used such vessels relatively extensively in the Mediterranean for diplomatic missions. Other classes of vessels frequently seen included Sverdlov and Kynda-class cruisers, Udaloy-class destroyers, and Kashin-class destroyers. Aircraft-capable units such as the two Moskva-class CHG and the Kiev-class aircraft carrier were used much more sparingly. It was not uncommon for the Soviets to "shield" newer units during their operational infancy, although those units, representing the pinnacle of Soviet naval capability, were carefully reserved for unusually important visits, e.g., to Yugoslavia and Algeria.

Chapter 4

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This research was conducted to determine some of the characteristics of Soviet naval ship visits in the Mediterranean from 1967 through 1986 and to ascertain if those characteristics had any significance.

HYPOTHESIS 1: The port visited by a Soviet naval combatant has a special significance.

The data was examined to determine what, if any, significance could be associated with a particular port visited by a Soviet naval unit. In assessing the results of this analysis, it is important to consider that a port visit by a foreign naval vessel is based on mutual agreement by the nation visiting and that nation hosting the visit. Naval port visits, in particular, are coordinated well in advance of the fact and all aspects of the visit are agreed upon prior to its commencement. Therefore, any analysis of a port visit program must consider that the visit involves not only what the visiting nation wishes to do but also what the host nation agrees to let them do.

This research supports the premise that Soviet port visits are associated with a specific goal or objective. These objectives may be broken down into two major

categories:

A. Long term or short term

A short term objective is essentially one that can be fulfilled as a direct result of the port visit, i.e., reinforce a diplomatic stance, underscore a stated position, etc. Long-term objectives are normally associated with programs or goals of extensive intent, and which are not likely to be satisfied by a particular port visit.

B. Intent of the specific visit identified as:

Group 1. Protocol visits

Group 2. Visits with commercial goals primary

Group 3. Visits with diplomatic-political goals
primary

Using the above criteria, France, Italy, Spain, Turkey and Greece are nations in which the Soviet Union had short-term interests. The infrequency of visits to ports in those countries, the association of those visits with the comparable navy and the stated purpose of the visit indicate that such port calls were likely to be intended to make a brief, short-term impact rather than be component parts of a larger overall program.

In contrast, countries in which the Soviet Union perceived a long term interest were far more frequently visited. Keeping in mind the caveat that the visited country must agree to all the parameters of the visit, it is apparent that Egypt (until 1976), Syria, Libya, Tunisia,

Algeria and Yugoslavia are countries in which the Soviet Union perceived a much longer term interest and likelihood of success.

The intent of the visit is specifically associated with the port visited. The three types of visit identified above represented specific Soviet interests and therefore the port associated with that visit. Protocol visits were paid to France, Italy, Turkey, Spain and to a lesser degree Greece. Those visits intended to fulfill a protocol requirement were usually short-term visits. The visit to Messina falls into that category as do the visits to Toulon, Marseille, and Istanbul. Not surprisingly, those ports are in countries which belong to or are associated with NATO, and the Soviets apparently perceived little likelihood that a naval visit is apt to achieve any significant political goal. Nevertheless, they conducted periodic courtesy calls if for no other reason than to remind the political-military hierarchy in the host and other interested nations that they had an operative fleet in the theater.

Those nations in which the Soviet Union had commercial interests can be distinguished by an identifiable pattern of naval port visits. Port calls to Piraeus, the primary commercial port of Greece, were an important part of the Soviet's campaign to gain influence in that country, notably during the period of Andreas Papandreu's government, when Moscow was seeking to obtain and renew contracts to have

ships serviced in the Neorion shipyards. The composition of the task groups sent to Piraeus substantiate Petersen's theory that major warships were used to carry the Soviet message that the recipient of such calls is considered a major international actor. Similarly, the almost standard task group configuration of cruiser, destroyer, and submarine that called on Yugoslav ports was intended to carry the same message at a time when the Soviets were seeking expanded use of Yugoslav ports for military and for military-commercial purposes. They enjoyed a degree of continued success, as measured by the program of submarine tender visits which was in progress as the period of this study ended. As in the case of Yugoslavia, Soviet attention to Tunisia was enhanced by Soviet use of the Menzel Bourguiba yards.

The last group of ports belong to states in which the Soviet Union perceived a military-political interest. That included Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Algeria. Consecutive years of unusually high Presence Factors in Alexandria, Port Said and Mersa Matruh clearly reflected the Soviet interest in Egypt when that country was seen in the Arab world as leading the fight against Israel. Even after President Sadat "expelled" the Soviets from Egypt, Russian use of Egyptian ports continued for several years. Although confirmation is lacking, it is reasonable to suspect that the Egyptians were receiving a *quid pro quo* from Moscow for

their extensive use of Egyptian ports. It further suggests that Soviet interest in Egyptian ports was sufficiently high if they accepted the public rebuke with so little response. Only after the consummation of the Camp David agreements, when the United States had supplanted the Soviet Union as the foreign power of greatest influence in Egypt, did Soviet public commentary become overtly acrimonious and their naval units finally left Egyptian waters.

Syria, evidently less attractive to the Soviets in the latter 1960s, assumed greater significance when use of Egyptian ports was revoked. Like Egypt, it needed Soviet military assistance to such a degree that Syria was willing to sacrifice a measure of territorial integrity to get it. The rapid increase in Soviet use of Lattakia and Tartus followed the Soviet exodus from Egypt and rather neatly complemented Syria's bolder stance in the Middle East, not only against Israel, but in Lebanon, Jordan, and its relations with the PLO.

Algeria was long a focus of Soviet military and political interests in the western Mediterranean. Although Soviet use of Algerian facilities never reached the level of Egypt or Syria, the Kremlin enjoyed a quietly significant measure of access to Algerian ports, particularly Annaba. That port was probably offered to the Soviets as an alternative to Algiers and the closely-monitored facility at Mers el-Kebir. Annaba gave the USSR a port in proximity to

the western Mediterranean chokepoint while allowing the Soviets to remain less obvious than they would have been in the capital.

Thus, hypothesis 1 is substantiated.

HYPOTHESIS 2: The length of a specific port visit by a Soviet naval combatant is significant.

The length of time Soviet units spent in foreign ports varied from as little as one day to over a year. The following delineations have been developed:

1. Less than one day. Visits of one day or less present little opportunity for politico-diplomatic activities, and were almost certainly intended for limited replenishment of fuel or stores.

2. Greater than one day and less than ten days. This duration was most common and thus primarily represents those port calls made for politico-diplomatic purposes. Exceptions occurred when extraordinary circumstances led the Russians to leave units in a port to signal support for the host state. In most instances, however, visits were limited to less than ten days, averaging between three and eight days.

3. Visits in excess of ten days. Port calls of over ten days, in the absence of other considerations, frequently involved repair or maintenance services. In Yugoslavia, for example, those services were obvious when submarines remained in port for visits of six months or more in the

company of vessel specifically configured to provide repair or maintenance services. In other instances, the availability of such services was not so apparent, but could be inferred. Extended visits, particularly by submarines that historically required regular maintenance or that were not traditionally used for diplomatic purposes were an indication of a special relationship between the Soviet Union and the host. The relationship might have allowed Soviet support personnel and equipment ashore, as in Syria, or required the use of local labor as in the case of Tunisia and Yugoslavia.

Use of the Presence Factor parameter helped to differentiate ports to which periodic naval visits were made and those in which a more permanent presence could be found. In the former, identified by relatively low Presence Factors, port visits may have had a more immediate impact. Such port calls, generally intended for politico-military purposes, could be arranged to incorporate a variety of vessels, include a variety of events, and generate an element of freshness. Similarly, visits could be shortened or cancelled should the visiting nation wish to indicate some negative signal. Conversely, larger Presence Factors might be an indication that extra-territorial bases have been developed.

Hypothesis 2 is substantiated.

HYPOTHESIS 3. The particular Soviet naval combatant

conducting a port visit is significant.

The data clearly shows that particular Soviet naval units were selected for politico-diplomatic port visits. Those units appeared in foreign ports far more frequently than other units of the same class. Similarly, the Soviets evidently felt that certain classes of ships were better suited than others to fulfil politico-diplomatic missions. Considering the entire naval order of battle nominally deployed to the Mediterranean, certain classes of ships appeared more frequently than others: Krivak more than Kashin, Smolnyy more than Don, and Sverdlov more than Kynda. Within classes, specific units were evidently selected with much greater frequency than their peers: *Zadornyy*, *Gromkiyy*, *Marshall Vasilevskiy*, *Pylkiy*, *Admiral Isakov*, *Svetlyy*, *Zhguchiy*, and *Gremyaschiy* were the most favored units within their respective classes.

Comparing the Soviet naval order of battle in the Mediterranean (Appendix C) with those units repeatedly selected for port visits (Table 9), supports the premise that the unit selected for a port call is significant. Thus, hypothesis 3 is substantiated.

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APPENDIX A

PORT VISIT SCHEDULES OF SELECTED U.S. NAVY UNITS

USS Donald B. Beary (FF-1085)
Mediterranean Deployment August-December 1981

Ports Visited

Rota, Spain (Two visits)

Gaeta, Italy

Genoa, Italy

Naples, Italy

Augusta Bay, Sicily

Izmir, Turkey

Toulon, France

Palma, Majorca

Barcelona, Spain

USS Donald B. Beary (FF-1085)
Mediterranean Deployment March-September 1983

Ports Visited

Monaco

Villefranche, France

Djibouti, Djibouti

Diego Garcia, BIOT

Naples, Italy

Palma, Majorca

USS Iowa (BB-61)
North Atlantic/Baltic Sea Deployment August-November 1985

Ports Visited

Le Havre, France
Oslo, Norway
Copenhagen, Denmark
Aarhus, Denmark
Kiel, Germany

USS La Salle (AGF 3)
Persian Gulf Deployment, March 1987-March 1988

Ports Visited

Manama, Bahrain*
Muscat, Oman
Abu Dhabi, UAE
Dubai, UAE
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
Doha, Qatar

* Homeport for LASALLE. Ship returns to Manama frequently,
and spends up to two weeks in port.

APPENDIX B

DURATION OF SOVIET NAVAL VISITS TO SELECTED MEDITERRANEAN PORTS, 1967 - 1986

| Length of Visit (days) | Number of visits | Length of Visit (days) | Number of Visits |
|---------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|
| 1 | 115 | 41 | 4 |
| 2 | 81 | 42 | 2 |
| 3 | 85 | 45 | 1 |
| 4 | 157 | 46 | 3 |
| 5 | 214 | 48 | 5 |
| 6 | 197 | 50 | 3 |
| 7 | 117 | 51 | 1 |
| 8 | 124 | 52 | 2 |
| 9 | 55 | 54 | 2 |
| 10 | 100 | 55 | 2 |
| 11 | 45 | 58 | 1 |
| 12 | 24 | 60 | 2 |
| 13 | 20 | 61 | 2 |
| 14 | 14 | 62 | 6 |
| 15 | 13 | 63 | 3 |
| 16 | 18 | 65 | 1 |
| 17 | 9 | 67 | 1 |
| 18 | 13 | 68 | 3 |
| 19 | 16 | 70 | 1 |
| 20 | 10 | 71 | 1 |
| 21 | 16 | 72 | 1 |
| 22 | 12 | 74 | 3 |
| 23 | 6 | 75 | 2 |
| 24 | 9 | 76 | 1 |
| 25 | 12 | 77 | 1 |
| 26 | 6 | 80 | 1 |
| 27 | 9 | 90 | 1 |
| 28 | 14 | 91 | 1 |
| 29 | 11 | 95 | 1 |
| 30 | 29 | 97 | 1 |
| 31 | 31 | 100 | 1 |
| 32 | 14 | 110 | 1 |
| 33 | 8 | 111 | 1 |
| 34 | 14 | 122 | 2 |
| 35 | 14 | 135 | 1 |
| 36 | 12 | 137 | 1 |
| 37 | 11 | 141 | 1 |
| 38 | 6 | 142 | 1 |

| <u>Length of Visit (days)</u> | <u>Number of visits</u> | <u>Length of Visit (days)</u> | <u>Number of Visits</u> |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 149 | 2 | 178 | 1 |
| 153 | 2 | 182 | 1 |
| 154 | 1 | 183 | 2 |
| 155 | 2 | 184 | 1 |
| 158 | 1 | 185 | 2 |
| 159 | 1 | 189 | 1 |
| 160 | 1 | 191 | 1 |
| 162 | 3 | 195 | 2 |
| 163 | 1 | 201 | 1 |
| 164 | 4 | 204 | 1 |
| 168 | 1 | 212 | 4 |
| 169 | 1 | 219 | 1 |
| 171 | 2 | 242 | 1 |
| 174 | 2 | 301 | 1 |
| 175 | 1 | 335 | 1 |
| | | 360 | 1 |

APPENDIX C

SOVIET NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE
MEDITERRANEAN FLEET
1967 - 1986*

| <u>Class</u> | <u>Type</u> |
|-------------------------|-------------|
| <u>Major Combatants</u> | |
| Kiev | CVHG |
| Moskva | CHG |
| Kara | CG |
| Kresta II | CG |
| Kresta I | CG |
| Kynda | CG |
| Sverdlov | CL |
| Udaloy | DDG |
| Sovremenyy | DDG |
| Kashin | DDG |
| Modified Kashin | DDG |
| Krupnyy | DDG |
| Modified Kildin | DDG |
| SAM Kotlin | DDG |
| Skoryy | DD |
| Kildin | DD |
| Modified Kotlin | DD |
| Kanin | DDG |
| Krivak I | FFG |
| Krivak II | FFG |
| Riga | FF |
| Petya I | FFL |
| Petya II | FFL |
| Mirka I | FFL |
| Mirka II | FFL |

*Does not include all auxiliary vessels, intelligence collectors, or merchant vessels subordinate to Naval command.

Submarines

| | |
|----------|------|
| Charlie | SSGN |
| Echo II | SSGN |
| November | SSN |
| Juliett | SSG |
| Tango | SS |
| Foxtrot | SS |
| Whiskey | SS |
| Zulu | SS |
| Romeo | SS |

Minor Combatants

| | |
|------------|-----|
| Poti | PCE |
| Grisha III | FFL |
| Nanuchka | PGG |

Intelligence Collectors

| | |
|---------------|-----|
| Primorye | AGI |
| Mayak | AGI |
| Lentra | AGI |
| Okean | AGI |
| Mirnyy | AGI |
| Moma | AGI |
| Nikolai Zubov | AGI |

Amphibious Warfare Ships

| | |
|-----------|-----|
| Alligator | LST |
| Polnocny | LSM |

Mine Warfare Ships

| | |
|-------|-----|
| T-58 | MSF |
| T-43 | MSF |
| Natya | MSF |
| Yurka | MSF |
| Vanya | MHC |

Auxiliaries, Support and Training Ships

| | |
|---------|-----|
| Ugra | AXT |
| Smolnyy | AXT |
| Don | AS |
| Ugra | AS |
| Lama | AEM |

APPENDIX D

NUMBER OF PORT CALLS BY SHIP SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN FLEET 1967-1986

| <u>Unit/Class</u> | <u>Inclusive Dates</u> | <u>Number of Port Calls</u> |
|---|----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Dmitriy Galkin/DON AS | 10/67-7/86 | 35 |
| Fedor Vidyaev/DON AS | 4/68-3/86 | 33 |
| Viktor Kotelnikov/DON AS | 9/68-1/85 | 26 |
| Magomet Gadzhiev/DON AS | 8/67-5/83 | 20 |
| Naporisty/MOD KOTLIN DD | 11/67-8/74 | 17 |
| Krasny Krym/KASHIN DDG | 5/71-8/85 | 16 |
| Ozhivlennyy/SKORYY DD | 4/68-1/74 | 15 |
| Nakhodchivyy/SAM KOTLIN DDG | 8/69-6/86 | 14 |
| Zhdanov/SVERDLOV CG | 8/74-7/85 | 14 |
| Groznyy/KYNDA CG | 1/68-12/85 | 13 |
| Voronezhskiy Komsomolets/ALLIGATOR LST | 10/67-2/84 | 13 |
| Plamenyy/MOD KOTLIN DD | 3/67-9/73 | 12 |
| Krasny Kavkaz/KASHIN DDG | 6/68-8/85 | 12 |
| Smetlivyy/KASHIN DDG | 5/70-1/84 | 12 |
| Komsomolets Buzis/RIGA FF | 10/73-1/76 | 11 |
| Gangut/UGRA AS | 9/74-9/85 | 11 |
| Smolnyy/SMOLNYY AXT | 9/77-6/86 | 11 |
| Razitelnyy/KRIVAK II FFG | 3/79-10/83 | 11 |
| Bezukoriznenny/KRIVAK I FFG | 9/80-6/84 | 11 |
| Dzerzhinskiy/SVERDLOV CG | 3/67-10/78 | 10 |
| Krimskiy Komsomolets/ALLIGATOR LST | 2/68-7/81 | 10 |
| Blagorodnyy/MOD KOTLIN DD | 7/69-6/82 | 10 |
| Reshitelnyy/KASHIN DDG | 10/69-10/80 | 10 |
| Smelyy/MOD KASHIN DDG | 10/70-12/81 | 10 |
| Volga/DON AS | 8/73-5/82 | 10 |
| Admiral Golovko/KYNDA CG | 2/68-9/78 | 10 |
| Otvazhnyy/KASHIN DDG | 3/67-10/73 | 9 |
| Kunitsa/RIGA FF | 3/68-10/75 | 9 |
| Voron/RIGA FF | 4/68-5/84 | 9 |
| Mikhail Kutuzov/SVERDLOV CL | 4/68-4/70 | 9 |
| Leningrad/MOSKVA CHG | 1/74-2/82 | 9 |
| Vertikal/MIRNYY AGI | 8/72-1/86 | 9 |
| Kurs/MAYAK AGI | 10/72-2/85 | 9 |
| Admiral Ushakov/SVERDLOV CL | 1/73-10/82 | 9 |
| Bedovyy/MOD KILDIN DDG | 2/75-7/86 | 9 |

| | | |
|---|-------------|---|
| Sderzhannyi/MOD KASHIN DDG | 3/75-4/84 | 9 |
| Deyatelnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 6/77-8/82 | 9 |
| Pylkiy/KRIVAK I FFG | 7/82-12/84 | 9 |
| GS-239/MAYAK AGI | 7/71-5/86 | 9 |
| Soobrazitelnyy/KASHIN DDG | 12/67-10/83 | 8 |
| Yaguar/RIGA FF | 4/68-8/80 | 8 |
| Otzyvchivyy/SKORYY DD | 1/69-9/72 | 8 |
| Provornyy/KASHIN DDG | 7/69-7/73 | 8 |
| Soznatelnyy/SAM KOTLIN DDG | 11/73-1/85 | 8 |
| Druzhnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 6/80-7/84 | 7 |
| Oktyabrskaya Revolyutsiya/ SVERDLOV CL | 4/67-11/72 | 7 |
| Pantera/RIGA FF | 10/67-7/75 | 7 |
| Moskva/MOSKVA CHG | 4/70-4/82 | 7 |
| Lotsman/MIRNYY AGI | 2/72-9/82 | 7 |
| Silnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 7/78-2/86 | 7 |
| Bezzavetnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 11/80-12/84 | 7 |
| Komsomolets Gruzii/RIGA FF | 11/67-7/79 | 6 |
| Sereznyy/SKORYY/DD | 2/68-7/69 | 6 |
| Donetskiy Shakhter/ALLIGATOR LST | 10/71-11/71 | 6 |
| Alidada/OKEAN AGI | 3/72-8/76 | 6 |
| Val/MIRNYY AGI | 5/72-4/82 | 6 |
| Ivan Kolyshkin/UGRA AS | 5/73-3/82 | 6 |
| Skoryy/KASHIN DDG | 9/73-10/78 | 6 |
| Yupiter/MOMA AGI | 6/74-4/80 | 6 |
| Ochakov/KARA CG | 4/75-6/79 | 6 |
| Komsomolets Ukrainyy/KASHIN DDG | 12/81-3/84 | 6 |
| Bravyy/SAM KOTLIN DDG | 10/69-6/75 | 5 |
| Neulovimyy/MOD KILDIN DDG | 1/70-7/85 | 5 |
| Kavkaz/PRIMORY AGI | 5/72-9/75 | 5 |
| Nikolayev/KARA CG | 5/73-12/79 | 5 |
| Borodino/UGRA AXT | 7/75-3/78 | 5 |
| Kildin/MOMA AGI | 1/79-3/86 | 5 |
| Perekop/SMOLNYY AXT | 6/79-7/86 | 5 |
| Radist/NATYA MSF | 1/83-5/84 | 5 |
| Obraztsovyy/KASHIN DDG | 10/67-7/70 | 4 |
| Stroynyy/MOD KASHIN DDG | 4/69-3/85 | 4 |
| Sovershenyy/SKORYY DD | 7/70-9/78 | 4 |
| Ognenny/SKORYY DD | 10/71-12/71 | 4 |
| Vitse Admiral Drozd/KRESTA I CG | 2/76-3/86 | 4 |
| Kerch/KARA CG | 2/76-7/79 | 4 |
| Khasan/SMOLNYY AXT | 8/80-11/83 | 4 |
| Grom/NANUCHKA PGG | 8/81-12/83 | 4 |
| Zenitchik/NATYA MSF | 6/84-7/85 | 4 |
| Prozorlivyy/KILDIN DD | 8/67-4/71 | 3 |
| Svirepyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 10/67-12/85 | 3 |
| Solidnyy/SKORYY DD | 7/68-10/79 | 3 |
| Smyshlenyy/MOD KASHIN DDG | 3/76-3/86 | 3 |
| Admiral Isakov/KRESTA II CG | 2/72-10/73 | 3 |
| Bditelnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 10/72-6/82 | 3 |
| Slavnyy/MOD KASHIN DDG | 9/78-2/86 | 3 |
| Nikolay Filchenkov/ALLIGATOR LST | 12/79-5/85 | 3 |

| | | |
|---|-------------|---|
| Zyb/NANUCHKA PGG | 7/83-1/84 | 3 |
| Kharkovskiy Komsomolets/ALLIGATOR | 7/83-8/83 | 3 |
| Ognevoy/MOD KASHIN DDG | 11/83-3/86 | 3 |
| Gnevnyy/KRUPNYY DD | 7/67-4/68 | 2 |
| Svetlivyy/KOTLIN DD | 10/67-11/67 | 2 |
| Zorkiy/KRUPNYY DD | 11/67-12/67 | 2 |
| Boykiy/KANIN DDG | 5/68-9/69 | 2 |
| Murmansk/SVERDLOV CL | 4/69-3/71 | 2 |
| Nastoichivyy/SAM KOTLIN DDG | 5/70-4/71 | 2 |
| Speshnyy/KOTLIN DD | 7/70-5/71 | 2 |
| Zhguchiy/KANIN DDG | 10/70-12/71 | 2 |
| Gremyachiyy/KANIN DDG | 2/71-3/71 | 2 |
| Tobol/UGRA AS | 8/72-9/72 | 2 |
| Krasnaya Presnaya/ALLIGATOR LST | 12/73-1/74 | 2 |
| Admiral Zozulya/KRESTA I CG | 7/75-10/77 | 2 |
| Marshal Timoshenko/KRESTA II CG | 3/81-5/85 | 2 |
| Zarnitsa/NANUCHKA PGG | 8/81-7/83 | 2 |
| Gromkiy/KRIVAK II FFG | 10/81-2/82 | 2 |
| Zadornyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 10/81-2/82 | 2 |
| Admiral Pershin/NATYA MSF | 8/74-9/74 | 2 |
| Sevastopol/KRESTA I CG | 10/70 | 1 |
| Zakarpatskye/PRIMORYE AGI | 10/71 | 1 |
| Admiral Isachenkov/KRESTA II CG | 9/81 | 1 |
| Admiral Yumashev/KRESTA II CG | 2/82 | 1 |
| Magadanskiy Komsomolets/DON AS | 5/82-11/82 | 1 |
| Leningradskiy Komsomolets/ KRIVAK II FFG | 9/83-1/84 | 1 |
| Ivan Vakharmeev/UGRA AS | 10/83-6/84 | 1 |
| Udaloy/UDALOY DDG | 3/84 | 1 |
| Ivan Kucherenko/UGRA AS | 12/84-12/85 | 1 |
| Kiev/KIEV CVHG | 5/85 | 1 |
| Kurskiy Komsomolets/NATYA MSF | 5/85-6/85 | 1 |
| Kamchatskiy Komsomolets/ALLIGATOR LST | 11/85 | 1 |
| Rezvyi/KRIVAK II FFG | 4/86 | 1 |
| Otlichnyy/SOVREMENYY DDG | 4/86 | 1 |
| Pytlivyy/KRIVAK II FFG | 8/86-9/86 | 1 |
| Admiral Isachenkov/KRESTA II CG | 9/81 | 1 |
| Admiral Yumashev/KRESTA II CG | 2/82 | 1 |

APPENDIX E

NUMBER OF PORT CALLS BY SHIP SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN FLEET 1967-1986

(Modified to exclude port calls for extended overhaul or those in ports with a Presence Factor [PF] >66 during the period of the call)

| <u>Unit/Class</u> | <u>Inclusive Dates</u> | <u>Number of Port Calls</u> |
|--|------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Fedor Vidyaev/DON AS | 4/68-3/86 | 19 |
| Dmitriy Galkin/DON AS | 10/67-7/86 | 15 |
| Ozhivlennyy/SKORYY DD | 4/68-1/74 | 13 |
| Nporistyy/MODIFIED KOTLIN DD | 11/67-8/74 | 12 |
| Plamennyy/MODIFIED KOTLIN DD | 3/67-9/73 | 10 |
| Groznyy/KYNDA CG | 1/68-12/85 | 10 |
| Krasny Kavkaz/KASHIN DDG | 6/68-8/85 | 10 |
| Mikhail Kutuzov/SVERDLOV CL | 4/68-4/70 | 9 |
| Reshitelnyy/KASHIN DDG | 10/69-10/80 | 9 |
| Smelyy/MODIFIED KASHIN DDG | 10/70-12/81 | 9 |
| Krasny Krym/KASHIN DDG | 5/71-8/85 | 9 |
| Zhdanov/SVERDLOV CG | 8/74-7/85 | 9 |
| Smolnyy/SMOLNYY AXT | 9/77-6/86 | 9 |
| Magomet Gadzhiev/DON AS | 8/67-5/83 | 8 |
| Otvazhnyy/KASHIN DDG | 3/67-10/73 | 8 |
| Dzerzhinskiy/SVERDLOV CG | 3/67-10/78 | 8 |
| Krimskiy Komsomolets/ALLIGATOR LST | 2/68-7/81 | 8 |
| Kunitsa/RIGA FF | 3/68-10/75 | 8 |
| Viktor Kotelnikov/DON AS | 9/68-1/85 | 8 |
| Nakhodchivyy/SAM KOTLIN DDG | 8/69-6/86 | 8 |
| Admiral Ushakov/KRESTA II CG | 1/73-10/82 | 8 |
| Bezukoriznenny/KRIVAK I FFG | 9/80-6/84 | 8 |
| Voronezhskiy Komsomolets/ALLIGATOR LST | 10/67-2/84 | 7 |
| Soobrazitelnyy/KASHIN DDG | 12/67-10/83 | 7 |
| Blagorodnyy/MODIFIED KOTLIN DD | 7/69-6/82 | 7 |
| Moskva/MOSKVA CHG | 4/70-4/82 | 7 |
| Komsomolets Buzis/RIGA FF | 10/73-1/76 | 7 |
| Gangut/UGRA AXT | 9/74-9/85 | 7 |
| Razitelnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 3/79-10/83 | 7 |
| Oktybrskaya Revolutsiya/SVERDLOV CL | 4/67-11/72 | 6 |
| Pantera/RIGA FF | 10/67-7/75 | 6 |

| | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------|---|
| Admiral Golovko/KYNDA CG | 2/68-9/78 | 6 |
| Sereznyy/SKORYY DD | 2/68-7/79 | 6 |
| Voron/RIGA FF | 4/68-5/84 | 6 |
| Provornyy/KASHIN DDG | 7/69-7/73 | 6 |
| Smetlivyy/KASHIN DDG | 5/70-1/84 | 6 |
| Leningrad/MOSKVA CHG | 1/71-2/82 | 6 |
| Sderzhanny/MODIFIED KASHIN DDG | 3/75-4/84 | 6 |
| Druzhnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 6/80-7/84 | 6 |
| Yaguar/RIGA FF | 4/68-8/80 | 5 |
| Otzyvchivyy/SKORYY DD | 1/69-9/72 | 5 |
| Lotsman/MIRNY AGI | 2/72-9/82 | 5 |
| Nikolayev/KARA CG | 5/73-12/79 | 5 |
| Ochakov/KARA CG | 4/75-6/79 | 5 |
| Deyatelnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 6/77-8/82 | 5 |
| Silnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 7/78-2/86 | 5 |
| Bezzavetnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 11/80-12/84 | 5 |
| Komsomolets Gruzii/RIGA FF | 11/67-7/79 | 4 |
| Stroynyy/KASHIN DDG | 4/69-3/85 | 4 |
| GS-239/MAYAK AGI | 7/71-5/68 | 4 |
| Val/MIRNY AGI | 5/72-4/82 | 4 |
| Skoryy/KASHIN DDG | 9/72-10/78 | 4 |
| Soznatelnyy/SAM KOTLIN DDG | 11/73-1/85 | 4 |
| Yupiter/MOMA AGI | 6/74-4/80 | 4 |
| Borodino/UGRA AXT | 7/75-3/78 | 4 |
| Vitse Admiral Drozd/KRESTA I CG | 1/76-3/86 | 4 |
| perekop/SMOLNY AGI | 6/79-7/86 | 4 |
| Khasan/SMOLNY AGI | 8/80-11/83 | 4 |
| Pylkiy/KRIVAK II FFG | 7/82-12/84 | 4 |
| Obraztsovyy/KASHIN DDG | 10/67-7/70 | 3 |
| Svirepyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 10/67-12/85 | 3 |
| Bravyy/SAM KOTLIN DDG | 10/69-6/75 | 3 |
| Admiral Isakov/KRESTA II CG | 2/73-10/73 | 3 |
| Kavkaz/PRIMORYE AGI | 5/72-9/75 | 3 |
| Vertikal/MIRNY AGI | 8/72-1/86 | 3 |
| Bditelnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 10/72-6/82 | 3 |
| Ivan Kolyshkin/DON AS | 5/73-3/82 | 3 |
| Volga/UGRA AS | 8/73-5/82 | 3 |
| Bedovyy/MODIFIED KILDIN DDG | 2/75-7/86 | 3 |
| Kerch/KARA CG | 2/76-7/79 | 3 |
| Zadornyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 10/81-2/82 | 3 |
| Komsomolets Ukrainyy/KASHIN DDG | 12/81-3/84 | 3 |
| Gnevnyy/KANIN DDG | 7/67-4/68 | 2 |
| Prozorlivyy/KASHIN DDG | 8/67-4/71 | 2 |
| Svetlyy/KOTLIN DD | 10/67-11/67 | 2 |
| Zorkiy/KANIN DDG | 11/67-12/67 | 2 |
| Boykiy/KANIN DDG | 5/68-9/69 | 2 |
| Solidnyy/SKORYY DD | 7/68-10/79 | 2 |
| Murmansk/SVERDLOV CL | 4/69-3/71 | 2 |
| Speshnyy/KOTLIN DD | 7/70-5/71 | 2 |
| Zhguchiy/KANIN DDG | 10/70-12/71 | 2 |
| Gremyaschiy/KANIN DDG | 2/71-3/71 | 2 |
| Ognenny/SKORYY DD | 10/71-12/71 | 2 |

| | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------|---|
| Admiral Golovko/KYNDA CG | 2/68-9/78 | 6 |
| Sereznyy/SKORYY DD | 2/68-7/79 | 6 |
| Voron/RIGA FF | 4/68-5/84 | 6 |
| Provornyy/KASHIN DDG | 7/69-7/73 | 6 |
| Smetlivyy/KASHIN DDG | 5/70-1/84 | 6 |
| Leningrad/MOSKVA CHG | 1/71-2/82 | 6 |
| Sderzhanny/MODIFIED KASHIN DDG | 3/75-4/84 | 6 |
| Druzhnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 6/80-7/84 | 6 |
| Yaguar/RIGA FF | 4/68-8/80 | 5 |
| Otzyvchivyy/SKORYY DD | 1/69-9/72 | 5 |
| Lotsman/MIRNYY AGI | 2/72-9/82 | 5 |
| Nikolayev/KARA CG | 5/73-12/79 | 5 |
| Ochakov/KARA CG | 4/75-6/79 | 5 |
| Deyatelnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 6/77-8/82 | 5 |
| Silnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 7/78-2/86 | 5 |
| Bezzavetnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 11/80-12/84 | 5 |
| Komsomolets Gruzii/RIGA FF | 11/67-7/79 | 4 |
| Stroynyy/KASHIN DDG | 4/69-3/85 | 4 |
| GS-239/MAYAK AGI | 7/71-5/68 | 4 |
| Val/MIRNYY AGI | 5/72-4/82 | 4 |
| Skoryy/KASHIN DDG | 9/72-10/78 | 4 |
| Soznatelnyy/SAM KOTLIN DDG | 11/73-1/85 | 4 |
| Yupiter/MOMA AGI | 6/74-4/80 | 4 |
| Borodino/UGRA AXT | 7/75-3/78 | 4 |
| Vitse Admiral Drozd/KRESTA I CG | 1/76-3/86 | 4 |
| perekop/SMOLNYY AXT | 6/79-7/86 | 4 |
| Khasan/SMOLNYY AXT | 8/80-11/83 | 4 |
| Pylkiy/KRIVAK II FFG | 7/82-12/84 | 4 |
| Obraztsovy/KASHIN DDG | 10/67-7/70 | 3 |
| Svirepyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 10/67-12/85 | 3 |
| Bravyy/SAM KOTLIN DDG | 10/69-6/75 | 3 |
| Admiral Isakov/KRESTA II CG | 2/73-10/73 | 3 |
| Kavkaz/PRIMORYE AGI | 5/72-9/75 | 3 |
| Vertikal/MIRNYY AGI | 8/72-1/86 | 3 |
| Bditelnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 10/72-6/82 | 3 |
| Ivan Kolyshkin/DON AS | 5/73-3/82 | 3 |
| Volga/UGRA AS | 8/73-5/82 | 3 |
| Bedovyy/MODIFIED KILDIN DDG | 2/75-7/86 | 3 |
| Kerch/KARA CG | 2/76-7/79 | 3 |
| Zadornyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 10/81-2/82 | 3 |
| Komsomolets Ukrainyy/KASHIN DDG | 12/81-3/84 | 3 |
| Gnevnyy/KANIN DDG | 7/67-4/68 | 2 |
| Prozorlivyy/KASHIN DDG | 8/67-4/71 | 2 |
| Svetlyy/KOTLIN DD | 10/67-11/67 | 2 |
| Zorkiy/KANIN DDG | 11/67-12/67 | 2 |
| Boykiy/KANIN DDG | 5/68-9/69 | 2 |
| Solidnyy/SKORYY DD | 7/68-10/79 | 2 |
| Murmansk/SVERDLOV CL | 4/69-3/71 | 2 |
| Speshnyy/KOTLIN DD | 7/70-5/71 | 2 |
| Zhguchiy/KANIN DDG | 10/70-12/71 | 2 |
| Gremyaschiy/KANIN DDG | 2/71-3/71 | 2 |
| Ognenny/SKORYY DD | 10/71-12/71 | 2 |

| | | |
|----------------------------------|-------------|---|
| Tobol/UGRA AS | 8/72-9/72 | 2 |
| Kurs/MAYAK AGI | 10/72-2/85 | 2 |
| Krasnaya Presnaya/ALLIGATOR LST | 12/73-1/74 | 2 |
| Radist/NATYA MSF | 1/83-5/84 | 2 |
| Admiral Pershin/NATYA MSF | 8/74-9/74 | 2 |
| Admiral Zozulya/KRESTA I CG | 7/75-10/77 | 2 |
| Smyshlenyy/MODIFIED KASHIN DDG | 3/76-3/86 | 2 |
| Slavnyy/KASHIN DDG | 9/78-2/86 | 2 |
| Marshal Timoshenko/KRESTA II CG | 3/81-5/85 | 2 |
| Gromkiy/KRIVAK II FFG | 10/81-2/82 | 2 |
| Ognevoy/MOD KASHIN DDG | 11/83-3/86 | 2 |
| Marshal Vasilevsky/UDALOY DDG | 4/86-4/86 | 2 |
| Neulovimyy/MODIFIED KILDIN DD | 1/70-7/85 | 1 |
| Nastoichivyy/SAM KOTLIN DDG | 5/70-4/71 | 1 |
| Sovershenyy/SKORYY DD | 7/70-9/78 | 1 |
| Sevastopol/SVERDLOV CL | 10/70 | 1 |
| Donetskiy Shakhter/ALLIGATOR LST | 10/71-11/71 | 1 |
| Admiral Isachenkov/KRESTA II CG | 9/81 | 1 |
| Admiral Yumashev/KRESTA II CG | 2/82 | 1 |
| Udaloy/UDALOY DDG | 3/84 | 1 |
| Zenitchik/NATYA MSF | 6/84-7/85 | 1 |
| Kiev/KIEV CVHG | 5/85 | 1 |
| Kurskiy Komsomolets/NATYA MSF | 5/85-6/85 | 1 |
| Rezvyi/KRIVAK I FFG | 4/86 | 1 |
| Otlichnyy/SOVREMENYY DDG | 4/86 | 1 |
| Pytlivyy/KRIVAK II FFG | 8/86-9/86 | 1 |

APPENDIX F

NUMBER OF PORT CALLS BY SHIP SOVIET MEDITERRANEAN FLEET 1967-1986

(Modified to exclude port calls for extended overhaul, those in ports with a Presence Factor [PF] >66 during the period of the call, or those calls in Syrian or Egyptian ports)

| <u>Unit/Class</u> | <u>Inclusive Dates</u> | <u>Number of Port Calls</u> |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Smolnyy/SMOLNYY AXT | 9/77-6/86 | 9 |
| Smelyy/MODIFIED KASHIN DDG | 10/70-12/81 | 8 |
| Nakhodchivyy/SAM KOTLIN DDG | 8/69-6/86 | 7 |
| Zhdanov/SVERDLOV CG | 8/74-7/85 | 7 |
| Razitelnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 3/79-10/83 | 7 |
| Bezukoriznenny/KRIVAK I FFG | 9/80-6/84 | 7 |
| Magomet Gadzhiev/DON AS | 8/67-5/83 | 6 |
| Dmitriy Galkin/DON AS | 10/67-7/86 | 6 |
| Soobrazitelnyy/KASHIN DDG | 12/67-10/83 | 6 |
| Groznyy/KYNDA CG | 1/68-12/85 | 6 |
| Admiral Golovko/KYNDA CG | 2/68-9/78 | 6 |
| Fedor Vidyaev/DON AS | 4/68-3/86 | 6 |
| Blagorodnyy/MODIFIED KOTLIN DD | 7/69-6/82 | 6 |
| Krasny Krym/KASHIN DDG | 5/71-8/85 | 6 |
| Sderzhanny/MODIFIED KASHIN DDG | 3/75-4/84 | 6 |
| Druzhnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 6/80-7/84 | 6 |
| Dzerzhinskiy/SVERDLOV CG | 3/67-10/78 | 5 |
| Naporisty/MODIFIED KOTLIN DD | 11/67-8/74 | 5 |
| Reshitelnyy/KASHIN DDG | 10/69-10/80 | 5 |
| Moskva/MOSKVA CHG | 4/70-4/82 | 5 |
| Smetlivyy/KASHIN DDG | 5/70-1/84 | 5 |
| Gangut/UGRA AXT | 9/74-9/85 | 5 |
| Ochakov/KARA CG | 4/75-6/79 | 5 |
| Deyatelnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 6/77-8/82 | 5 |
| Silnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 7/78-2/86 | 5 |
| Bezzavetnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 11/80-12/84 | 5 |
| Otvazhnyy/KASHIN DDG | 3/67-10/73 | 4 |
| Krasny Kavkaz/KASHIN DDG | 6/68-8/85 | 4 |
| Stroyny/KASHIN DDG | 4/69-3/85 | 4 |
| Leningrad/MOSKVA CHG | 1/71-2/82 | 4 |
| Admiral Ushakov/KRESTA II CG | 1/73-10/82 | 4 |
| Nikolayev/KARA CG | 5/73-12/79 | 4 |
| Skoryy/KASHIN DDG | 9/73-10/78 | 4 |

| | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|---|
| Borodino/UGRA AXT | 7/75-3/78 | 4 |
| Vitse Admiral Drozd/KRESTA I CG | 1/76-3/86 | 4 |
| Perekop/SMOLNYY AXT | 6/79-7/86 | 4 |
| Khasan/SMOLNYY AXT | 8/80-11/83 | 4 |
| Pylkiy/KRIVAK II FFG | 7/82-12/84 | 4 |
| Pantera/RIGA FF | 10/67-7/75 | 3 |
| Svirepyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 10/67-12/85 | 3 |
| Mikhail Kutuzov/SVERDLOV CL | 4/68-4/70 | 3 |
| Bravyy/SAM KOTLIN DDG | 10/69-6/75 | 3 |
| GS-239/MAYAK AGI | 7/71-5/86 | 3 |
| Lotsman/MIRNYY AGI | 2/72-9/82 | 3 |
| Admiral Isakov/KRESTA II CG | 2/72-10/73 | 3 |
| Bditelnyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 10/72-6/82 | 3 |
| Ivan Kolyshkin/DON AS | 5/73-3/82 | 3 |
| Yupiter/MOMA AGI | 6/74-4/80 | 3 |
| Zadornyy/KRIVAK I FFG | 10/81-2/82 | 3 |
| Komsomolets Ukrainyy/KASHIN DDG | 12/81-3/84 | 3 |
| Prozorlivyy/KASHIN DDG | 8/67-4/71 | 2 |
| Obraztsovyy/KASHIN DDG | 10/67-7/70 | 2 |
| Svetlyy/KOTLIN DD | 10/67-11/67 | 2 |
| Voron/RIGA FF | 4/68-5/84 | 2 |
| Yaguar/RIGA FF | 4/68-8/80 | 2 |
| Boykiy/KANIN DDG | 5/68-9/69 | 2 |
| Murmansk/SVERDLOV CL | 4/69-3/71 | 2 |
| Provornyy/KASHIN DDG | 7/69-7/73 | 2 |
| Zhguchiy/KANIN DDG | 10/70-12/71 | 2 |
| Gremyaschiy/KANIN DDG | 2/71-3/71 | 2 |
| Val/MIRNYY AGI | 5/72-4/82 | 2 |
| Soznatelnyy/SAM KOTLIN DDG | 11/73-1/85 | 2 |
| Bedovyy/MODIFIED KILDIN DDG | 2/75-7/86 | 2 |
| Admiral Zozulya/KRESTA I CG | 7/75-10/77 | 2 |
| Slavnyy/KASHIN DDG | 9/78-2/86 | 2 |
| Marshal Timoshenko/KRESTA II CG | 3/81-5/85 | 2 |
| Gromkiy/KRIVAK II FFG | 10/81-2/82 | 2 |
| Ognevoy/MODIFIED KASHIN DDG | 11/83-3/86 | 2 |
| Marshal Vasilevskiy/UDALOY DDG | 4/86-4/86 | 2 |
| Plamenyy/MODIFIED KOTLIN DD | 3/67-9/73 | 1 |
| Oktybraskaya Revolutsiya/SVERDLOV CL | 4/67-11/72 | 1 |
| Komsomolets Gruzii/RIGA FF | 11/67-7/79 | 1 |
| Zorkiy/KRUPNYY DD | 11/67-12/67 | 1 |
| Kunitsa/RIGA FF | 3/68-10/75 | 1 |
| Viktor Kotelnikov/DON AS | 9/68-1/85 | 1 |
| Neulovimyy/MODIFIED KILDIN DD | 1/70-7/85 | 1 |
| Nastoichivyy/SAM KOTLIN DDG | 5/70-4/71 | 1 |
| Speshnyy/KOTLIN DD | 7/70-5/71 | 1 |
| Sevastopol/SVERDLOV CL | 10/70 | 1 |
| Vertikal/MIRNYY AGI | 8/72-1/86 | 1 |
| Volga/UGRA AS | 8/73-5/82 | 1 |
| Komsomolets Buzis/RIGA FF | 10/73-1/76 | 1 |
| Kerch/KARA CG | 2/76-7/79 | 1 |
| Smyshlenyy/MODIFIED KASHIN DDG | 3/76-3/86 | 1 |

| | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------|---|
| Admiral Isachenkov/KRESTA II CG | 9/81 | 1 |
| Admiral Yumashev/KRESTA II CG | 2/82 | 1 |
| Radist/NATYA MSF | 1/83-5/84 | 1 |
| Udaloy/UDALOY DDG | 3/84 | 1 |
| Zenitchik/NATYA MSF | 6/84-7/85 | 1 |
| Kiev/KIEV CVHG | 5/85 | 1 |
| Kurskiy Komsomolets/NATYA MSF | 5/85-6/85 | 1 |
| Rezvyi/KRIVAK I FFG | 4/86 | 1 |
| Otlichnyy/SOVREMENYY DDG | 4/86 | 1 |
| Pytlivyy/KRIVAK II FFG | 8/86-9/86 | 1 |