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Political Violence and Conflict Resolution: The Struggle for Peace in Northern Ireland

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POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION:

THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

by

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ABSTRACT

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND

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Old Dominion University, 2004
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Political violence, especially in ethnoreligious conflicts, continues to threaten the

stability and security of the international environment. Motivations for using violence

are complex and can evolve over time. As long as one or more of the motivations

continue to exist, parties to a conflict will feel that violence is a legitimate course of

action and, thus, the conflict will persist.

Theories about the causes of conflict and the approaches that should be taken to

terminate it mostly propose a single approach. A single approach, however, will address

certain issues while leaving others unresolved, allowing some motivations to continue

stimulating conflict. To bring violence to an end, it is necessary to utilize multiple

conflict resolution approaches, addressing the conflict from different perspectives and

leading to the elimination of violence. Systematic combination of four essential elements

drawn from several approaches provides a more comprehensive model of conflict

resolution that can succeed in overcoming the motivations for violence and allow peace

to endure. These four elements are *a response to the underlying issues, track-two*

diplomacy, inclusiveness, and *third-party assistance.*

The case of Northern Ireland demonstrates the efficacy of this comprehensive

model. Until all four elements of the model were used during the peace process, attempts

to produce peace in this region repeatedly failed. Failed attempts, such as the

Sunningdale negotiations, demonstrate the deficiencies of an incomplete peace process.

The successful Good Friday negotiations, on the other hand, highlight the benefits of

incorporating the four necessary elements into the conflict resolution process.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

As we move into the twenty-first century, the international environment continues

to be plagued by conflict and violence. When the Cold War ended, many people thought

that the world was headed for better times and that a new world order could be

established that would allow states to work together in a peaceful, coexistent manner.

Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Although the great powers have avoided

military conflicts with each other for many years, there are still numerous violent

conflicts that threaten international peace and security. As this violence continues to

grow and spread, the future begins to look more dangerous and unpredictable. If these

conflicts are to be stopped and peace is to be achieved, the world must look into the realm

of conflict resolution to find better ways of overcoming the numerous problems that

motivate political violence.

The conflicts appearing in the world today can be found in many forms. They are

no longer just between states; they are within states and even between states and non-

state actors. The threats to peace and security may come from ethnic or religious

factions, rogue states, and/or terrorists. It is no longer enough for the international

community to prevent and end interstate wars. Now, it must work to prevent and resolve

intrastate and transnational conflicts as well in order to achieve the goal of peace.

International and domestic terrorism are two of the most prevalent forms of

political violence. Terrorists are non-state actors who can be ethnically, religiously, or

otherwise linked and who are partly motivated to use violence due to the absence of other

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This paper follows the format requirements of *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th edition, 2003.

mechanisms to achieve their goals. They may also be motivated by hate and the desire to destroy their adversaries. Terrorist tactics are often destructive and deadly, causing fear and devastation. As long as terrorists continue to see violence as a legitimate tool, security will be threatened and peace will be out of reach. If the violence is to be thwarted, conflict resolution must aim at addressing their motivations for violence.

Many terrorist groups are engaged in ethnoreligious conflict within their own states. Ethnoreligious conflict occurs when two or more ethnically and/or religiously differentiated communities that coexist within a single state become pitted against one another or against the state itself as they compete for greater access to societal institutions and a more equitable distribution of status and resources and attempt to reinforce group boundaries and distinctions in order to protect and maintain their group's identity and interests. Although this competition could remain in the realm of legitimate political activity and legally sanctioned cultural expression, there is a greater likelihood that it will turn violent when the group's ties are widespread and affective and when the group is mobilized by a perceived serious threat to the group's vital interests, political position, cultural rights, or livelihood.

This type of violent conflict has been growing throughout the world for many years. A few well known examples include Bosnia, Chechnya, Rwanda, and Northern Ireland. Ethnoreligious conflicts have especially grown in number since the end of the Cold War, a point when many groups began to desire their independence and were willing to use violence to secure it. Some of these conflicts, however, have existed for centuries. As the situations persist, it becomes increasingly urgent to improve the conflict resolution process and to find solutions to intrastate conflict so that the violence does not continue.

The international community has condemned violent conflicts and has taken many measures to prevent and suppress them. Finding ways to end the violence, however, is not a simple task. According to the United Nations, experience has shown that establishing a secure and lasting peace requires much more than avoiding conflict or establishing a cease-fire; it requires assistance in the form of economic and social development, human rights protection, good governance, and the democratic process.[1] In other words, for peace to last, conflict resolution requires a multi-faceted approach.

Although intrastate conflict resolution has become the focus of many theorists within the field, these conflicts have proven difficult to resolve because of their often protracted and identity-based nature. The groups involved typically have a long history of animosity and have been engaged in conflict at some level for an extended period of time. The opposing groups are defined by their ethnoreligious affiliations and each is considered a threat to the other by merely being different. In such circumstances, it is difficult to find a solution to the conflict. Since the threat is often defined in terms of identity and these groups tend to cling to those identities, the potential for conflict will continue to exist. Identity cannot be bargained away in the conflict resolution process. If these conflicts are to be resolved, they must be transformed and the protagonists must learn to redefine their relationships in peaceful, non-threatening terms.

It is not just the identity-based character of ethnoreligious conflicts that makes resolution difficult. Problems are also created by the fact that most of these conflicts involve non-state actors. Bringing these actors to the negotiation table validates their existence and, therefore, fulfills one of their goals. For this reason, states will often avoid

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[1] United Nations. 2002. *Assisting Nations to Cultivate Peace after Conflict: The Work of the United Nations Peace-Building Support Offices.* <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/conflict/text.html#civil> [8 May 2004].

negotiating with non-state actors in an effort to keep them from gaining legitimacy. If they refuse to negotiate, however, the groups will continue to use violence to obtain their goals.

Several other challenges to the conflict resolution process exist as well. For instance, the motivations for violence within these conflicts can be complex and evolve over time. For conflict resolution to succeed, it would need to address all of the motivating factors rather than just one. Further complicating the picture is the fact that these groups are often not formal or organized with unitary goals; they have a tendency to splinter. This means that resolving the conflict with some portion of a group will not necessarily convince the others to follow. These challenges make ethnoreligious conflicts especially difficult to resolve.

Theorists have developed various approaches to the conflict resolution process that aim at ending violence and establishing peace. Some merely seek to establish a viable settlement to the conflict while others actually try to uncover and resolve the problems that have caused it. The chosen approach reflects the theorist's beliefs about the cause of conflict by proposing a response to that cause in order to bring about peace.

The various approaches to the conflict resolution process highlight a number of factors that should be taken into consideration when trying to end a conflict. For example, some theories suggest the dynamics of a conflict can create a cycle of violence that is difficult to escape. In such circumstances, it would be necessary to alter the dynamics of the conflict to ultimately achieve peace. There could also be a clash of identities involved in the conflict, which would require reconciliation efforts in order to reshape and rebuild relationships on peaceful terms. Other theories may emphasize certain needs that must be fulfilled in order to halt the violence. Each type of theory

views the conflict in different terms and approaches the conflict resolution process from different perspectives, but all shed light on the true nature of conflict and how to bring it to an end.

Although the various approaches to conflict resolution have much to offer, each one remains inadequate to produce the desired results alone. Many attempts have been made to resolve ethnoreligious conflicts using these individual approaches and most have failed because they did not address all of the factors that had legitimized the use of violence in those situations. Instead, they only responded to some of the factors and allowed others to continue motivating groups to use violence to achieve their goals. As long as one or more of the motivating factors was left to provoke and legitimize the use of violence, the conflicts continued.

Theorists who offer an approach to conflict resolution from a single perspective fail to recognize the multi-dimensional nature of ethnoreligious conflict. Violence erupts and is sustained in these conflicts for many reasons. The motivations are based on various factors that provide the opposing groups with the rationale they need to legitimize the use of violence against each other and to obtain their goals. To overcome the violence, each of these motivations must be addressed. As long as one or more factors remain in place, a motivation to use violence will continue to exist. For this reason, a more comprehensive approach to conflict resolution is needed to produce successful results and help end the violence that plagues our world.

In the following chapters, I argue that the approaches within the conflict resolution literature offer constructive elements. Each provides necessary information about the causes and/or solutions to ethnoreligious conflict, but is insufficient to bring about peace by itself. Instead, a combination of approaches is needed that will bring

together all of the necessary elements of the peace process so that the various motivations for violence can be eliminated and prevented from justifying violent action in the future.

The conflict resolution process will only be able to delegitimize the use of violence if it is designed to eliminate each of the motivations for violence within the conflict. If the motivations are removed, then the opposing groups will no longer have the desire to use violence or be able to justify its continued use. A systematic and comprehensive intrastate conflict resolution model built on a combination of approaches will make this possible by countering the motivations from several perspectives. The four necessary *and* sufficient elements of this model are *a response to the underlying issues of the conflict, track-two diplomacy, inclusive negotiations,* and *third-party assistance.* Together, these elements combine to create a path to peace by removing the factors that legitimize the use of violence in ethnoreligious conflicts.

The necessity of each of these elements will be evaluated by examining a case of ethnoreligious conflict and the attempts to bring that conflict to an end. By exploring a case of this type, it is possible to understand the complex motivations for violence and how difficult it is to overcome them. Once this complexity is understood, it will become apparent that a multi-dimensional approach to conflict resolution is necessary to secure a lasting peace. Afterwards, a review of the history of attempts to resolve the conflict will demonstrate that success in the peace process is not attainable until the four elements, *response to the underlying issues of the conflict, track-two diplomacy, inclusive negotiations,* and *third-party assistance,* are present to delegitimize the use of violence by removing the motivations.

CASE SELECTION

An examination of the ethnoreligious conflict within Northern Ireland provides an opportunity to explore both the successes and failures of the peace process. This conflict involves a clash of identities, the oppression of minorities, and battles over territory. It has existed for centuries with numerous attempts to bring about a settlement. As the conflict progressed, the opposing communities increasingly turned to violence to solve their problems and the settlement attempts repeatedly failed. Recently, however, a settlement was reached and the violence has halted. As a case study, the Northern Ireland conflict provides the occasion to understand the factors that stimulate ethnic conflicts. It also demonstrates how difficult it is to resolve such conflicts. This case therefore allows us to study both instances of success and failure in order to understand what elements are necessary *and* sufficient to bring about peace.

The two peace processes chosen for examination provide evidence of how and why a conflict resolution process can fail or succeed. By comparing two peace processes connected to the same conflict, the roots of the conflict can be held constant, while assessing the circumstances that changed and allowed peace to be secured. This comparison demonstrates that peace will not be secured until *all* of the motivations for violence are addressed. It also demonstrates what factors are necessary and sufficient during the negotiation process to reduce the level of violence.

The first peace process that is examined took place in the 1970s. This process produced the Sunningdale Agreement, but eventually ended in failure. The agreement lasted only a few months and had very little impact on the high level of violence.

The second peace process that is examined took place in the 1990s. This peace process, which proved to be much more constructive, generated the Good Friday

Agreement. This agreement was able to greatly reduce the level of violence and produce a stable peace. Though we do not know the ultimate fate of Northern Ireland's struggle for peace at this time, the Good Friday peace process has made significant progress towards the delegitimization of violence and it continues to be an example of how to conduct a successful peace process. The lessons learned from this conflict resolution process therefore will continue to be relevant in the future.

ORGANIZATION

Before examining the case of Northern Ireland, it will first be necessary in Chapter Two to review the conflict resolution literature and critically examine the potential of the various conflict resolution theories that have been put forth. The literature in this field is extensive and a number of theories have been advanced. Evaluating the various approaches to the conflict resolution process will help identify the flaws of each approach and explain what will be necessary to create a more systematic and comprehensive model of conflict resolution.

Following these evaluations, in Chapter Three, I create a methodology based on the need for a combination of approaches. This chapter begins with a discussion of the complex and evolving motivations to use violence in ethnoreligious conflicts. Examining these motivations will illustrate the multi-dimensional character of conflict and show how the legitimization of violence can be sustained. Subsequently, it will be possible to understand how combining the four key elements of the conflict resolution process creates the best chance for peace. If the conflict resolution process *responds to the underlying issues*, uses *track-two diplomacy* to reshape and rebuild relationships, *includes* all necessary parties in the negotiation process so that it is able to alter their perceptions

and decisions, and brings in *third-parties* to help alter the dynamics of the conflict even further, it will solve the problems that led the parties to continue the cycle of violence. Once this has occurred, violence will become delegitimized and peace will be able to endure.

After the motivations for violence have been explained and the conflict resolution model has been built, it will be possible to turn to the case study to evaluate the necessity of the four elements of the peace process. In order to do this, it will first be necessary to discuss the roots of the Northern Ireland conflict. This discussion will illustrate the underlying issues between the opposing communities and how the motivations for violence have evolved over time. This chapter will also look at the history of attempts to resolve the conflict and how each affected the level of violence. It will underscore how ingrained violence had become within the region and how difficult it was to resolve Northern Ireland's issues.

Once the background to the conflict has been presented, it will be possible to evaluate the two peace processes in order to understand how and why one failed while the other succeeded. An analysis of the Sunningdale talks will demonstrate that when all four elements of the peace process are not present, the process will fail. Then, an analysis of the Good Friday talks will demonstrate that when the four elements are in place, the peace process will succeed.

After these analyses have been completed, it will be possible to conclude that a combination of conflict resolution approaches offers the best chance for peace. By combining four crucial elements from various approaches, the issues can be resolved and the motivations for violence can be overcome. When the conflict resolution process *responds to the underlying issues of a conflict, engages in track-two diplomacy efforts,*

pursues inclusive negotiations, and *provides third-party assistance,* violence will be delegitimized and peace will be secured.

CHAPTER II

THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION LITERATURE

In the field of international relations, many theorists have attempted to uncover

the key to establishing a lasting peace. They have attempted to explain the causes of war

and have contributed greatly towards overcoming interstate conflicts. Unfortunately, the

world has seen a rise in intrastate civil wars and ethnic conflicts, which continue to

plague many nations and threaten the stability of the international environment. With this

surge of violence in the post-Cold War era, improving intrastate conflict resolution has

become increasingly important.

Many attempts have been made to develop strategies for terminating intrastate

wars. The theorists working in the field of conflict resolution have produced an extensive

literature on the various approaches that could be taken to resolve these violent conflicts.

Even theories developed with interstate conflicts in mind suggest approaches that are

transferable to the realm of intrastate conflict resolution. Some of the theories approach

the resolution process by looking for a solution to the initial cause of the conflict. Others

simply look for a way to alter the dynamics of a situation in order to produce a

settlement. Many of these conflicts persist, however, even after so-called settlements

have been made. It is therefore necessary to reevaluate the methods used in these cases

in order to understand what elements are necessary and sufficient to bring about an end to

violence and produce a lasting peace.

The different approaches to the conflict resolution process often reflect theorists'

beliefs about the true causes of the conflict. Some may see the problem as a battle over

political power or resources. Others may see the conflict as a manifestation of a clash of identities or value systems. Whatever the cause may be, the goal of conflict resolution is to help the opposing parties find a solution to their problems that will allow them to coexist without resorting to violence to solve their disputes.

A basic dichotomy between the theoretical approaches places them in two main categories which John Burton has called settlement and resolution.[1] In other words, some approaches attempt to create the circumstances for a settlement and others attempt to resolve the underlying issues that have led to the conflict in the first place. One factor most theorists in the literature agree on is the desirability of using third-party mediators, but each theory emphasizes different elements that are considered vital to terminating conflicts. Within the settlement category, there are those who emphasize the importance of altering the dynamics of the situation and who take interests into account in order to produce a settlement. Others emphasize the importance of timing and rational calculation. Those in the resolution category often take a needs-based approach to conflict resolution by seeking to respond to the needs of the parties to the conflict whether they are identity, social, political, territorial, or economic needs. Many recent theorists suggest the need to combine these two basic modes of conflict termination by using both settlement and resolution techniques. Each of these approaches offers tremendous insight into the critical elements of conflict termination and will be useful for developing a more effective method of ending the violent conflicts that continue to plague the international environment.

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[1] John W. Burton, "The Procedures of Conflict Resolution," in *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, ed. Edward E. Azar and John W. Burton (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986).

In the following sections, a discussion of the most prominent approaches will help highlight the important elements of conflict resolution. These approaches include the dynamic and rational calculation approaches, which employ settlement techniques, and two variations of the needs-based approach, interest-based and identity-based, which employ resolution techniques. In each section, an examination of the foundations and variations of each approach will illustrate the logic behind each argument and how it has developed over time in an attempt to produce better results. Each approach will be followed by case studies that will demonstrate that each individual approach has been unsuccessful in achieving its goals. Finally, a discussion of the theorists who suggest combining approaches will help us understand that tackling the conflict resolution process from multiple perspectives will ultimately provide the best path to peace. Using this idea of a multi-faceted approach, I will then be able to present a methodology which will offer a more systematic and comprehensive approach to the conflict resolution process.

THE DYNAMIC APPROACH

One of the approaches to conflict resolution within the settlement category is the dynamic approach. This approach sees the process of action and reaction as the underlying causal mechanism of conflict. Actors get caught up in a sequence of events that take on a life of their own and trap the actors in a cycle of reaction which produces increasing violence.[2] The conflict is seen as a product of the situation in which the actors

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[2] Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System* (London: SAGE Publications, 2002), 34.

find themselves and the solution is believed to lie in altering the dynamics of the situation thereby transforming violent behavior and creating a settlement.

Those who follow this approach have derived most of their assumptions and recommendations from game theory and suggest that the stances and actions of parties to a conflict are predictable based on the rules of the game. Building on this concept, theorists offer solutions based on what moves will produce certain results or how changing the dynamic of the game could reduce the level of threat. This dynamic approach stems from a behavior-based understanding of the nature of conflict management and therefore its basic objective is to alter the behavior of the opposing parties in order to produce a settlement and bring the violence to a halt. [3]

One theorist who has developed this type of approach is Johan Galtung.[4] He presents a triangle model of conflict in which the three corners represent attitude, behavior, and the conflict situation itself. A conflict can start at any corner, either with opposing attitudes, behavior, or conflict. The objective of his approach is to find the appropriate stance for the parties to take in order to transform the conflict. His theory focuses on conflict dynamics in which the goal is to transform them through transcendence, compromise, or withdrawal. His ultimate goal would be transcendence in which both parties would get what they want, thereby transcending the deadlocked dispute and transforming the conflict.

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[3] David Bloomfield, *Peacemaking Strategies in Northern Ireland: Building Complementarity in Conflict Management Theory* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1997), 75-76.
[4] Johan Galtung, "Institutionalized Conflict Resolution," *Journal of Peace Research* 2, no. 4 (1965): 348-397; Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* (London: Sage Publications, 1996); Johan Galtung, Carl G. Jacobson, and Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobson, *Searching for Peace: The Road to Transcend* (London: Pluto Press, 2002).

Galtung does not believe, however, that the conflict will be totally terminated. He believes that conflict resolution is a never-ending process. He also does not focus on trying to resolve the actual issues under dispute. He instead looks for a way in which the parties can move beyond the circumstances that have created a dynamic of opposition and get to a place where the substance of the issues could be discussed without conflict. He suggests that procedures and processes could be the key to altering the conflict dynamics. He therefore emphasizes the importance of establishing a dialogue between the parties, setting up a negotiation process, providing confidence building measures, bringing in third-parties, and the role of actors who can offer an alternative, non-violent mechanism for change. All of these elements offer strategies for altering the dynamics of the conflict in the hope of bringing about de-escalation and a potential path to peace.

Many theorists have built their approaches on the dynamic perspective of conflict resolution. Some examples include Louis Kriesberg, Christopher Mitchell, and Dean Pruitt and Jeffrey Ruben.[5] Another theorist who approaches conflict management by attempting to create the circumstances for a settlement is Jacob Bercovitch.[6] He focuses on the process of negotiation while emphasizing each party's power resources and self-interest. This focus on resources and interests also applies to the third-party mediators for Bercovitch. He says, "A third party is not, and cannot be, neutral. By its very

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[5] Louis Kriesberg, De-*escalation and Transformation of International Conflict* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Christopher Mitchell, *The Structure of International Conflict* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1981); Dean G. Pruitt and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement* (New York: Random House, 1986).

[6] Jacob Bercovitch, *Social Conflicts and Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution* (Boulder: West View Press, 1984); Jacob Bercovitch, "International Mediation: a Study of the Incidence, Strategies, and Conditions of Successful Outcomes," *Co-operation and Conflict* 21 (1986): 155-68; Jacob Bercovitch, *Resolving International Conflicts: the Theory and Practice of Mediation* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996).

presence, it affects the process or some of the conditions of conflict management interaction."[7]

Bercovitch argues that settlements can be achieved through negotiation and bargaining and this will often include the use of coercion, manipulation, power-bargaining, and compromise by both the parties and the mediator. The goal is to alter the behavior of the opposing parties by negotiating a path to peace using whatever means necessary. He builds on Galtung's triangle model on this point, focusing on the behavior corner of the triangle and stresses that altering the behavior of the parties is critical to conflict management, not attitude. Bercovitch's theory emphasizes how the mediator can do this.

> The mediator's task is primarily one of persuasion, and persuasion is best achieved . . . not when a mediator is unbiased or impartial, but when he possesses resources which either or both parties value . . . The most successful method of mediation was that of manipulation . . . Clearly, if a mediator can bring to bear resources such as power, influence and persuasion, he can move the parties in the desired direction and achieve some success.[8]

For Bercovitch, third-party mediators are crucial to conflict management. Their ability to manipulate the circumstances of a conflict and thereby alter the behavior of the parties makes a settlement possible.

Another theorist, Nathalie Frensley, puts a different spin on this type of approach by looking at the dynamics within parties to a conflict instead of just those between parties. She calls this the dynamic group approach. She argues that the ratification process of a potential settlement agreement is "a key and contingent turning point in

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[7] Bercovitch, *Social Conflicts and Third Parties*, 16.
[8] Bercovitch, *International Mediation*, 164-5.

determining whether conflicts terminate or become protracted."[9] The leaders and

constituents within a party to a conflict have a dynamic relationship which directly

affects the outcome of the conflict. In her theory, leader and constituent harmony of

interests makes up the independent variable which accounts for the success or failure of

the resolution process. She says that elite initiated settlements will be successful when

leaders persuade constituents to ratify the settlement agreement and that constituent

initiated settlements will be successful when leaders ratify them by modifying their

interests to favor settlement.

Frensley's approach stresses the importance of leader accountability to constituent

groups during the conflict resolution process. This dynamic relationship between leaders

and their constituents is crucial to the negotiation process and must be considered. If

constituents begin to doubt the methods of their leaders and their leaders are accountable

to them, they can put pressure on the leaders to change their tactics. If constituents

continue to support the use of violence, there will be less motivation to seek compromise.

In Frensley's view therefore, changing the dynamics between the opposing parties may

not be enough to transform the conflict. It may continue because the dynamics within the

group may not be conducive to settlement. Consequently, she suggests taking the

dynamic approach to another level by looking inside the group as well as between groups

to identify the necessary conditions of settlement.

Each of these theorists, Galtung, Bercovitch, and Frensley, has offered compelling

arguments regarding the methods of bringing violent conflict to an end. They all focus

on the dynamics of a conflict situation and how to alter them in order to produce peace.

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[9] Nathalie J. Frensley, "Ratification Processes and Conflict Termination," *Journal of Peace Research* 35, no. 2 (1998): 175.

Galtung starts off with a triangle model and argues that through procedures and processes, conflict situations can be altered enough to allow parties to transcend the dispute and find a workable agreement. Bercovitch builds on this triangle model, but stresses how important third-party mediators are in altering the behavior of the opposing parties through manipulation and coercion. Frensley takes the approach to another level by underlining the importance of intra-group dynamics which greatly influence the outcome of the ratification process and whether or not a settlement will stick. Each of these theories, however, lacks elements critical to the peace process.

Although the dynamic approach contributes to understanding the path to peace, it fails to produce the circumstances that are both necessary and sufficient for a lasting peace. Producing a settlement should not be equated with producing a durable peace. Frensley recognizes this and examines the potential problems that arise once a settlement has been reached by those involved in the peace process. Leaders must respond to their constituents or else lose support and therefore their ability to negotiate and speak for the party. If constituents are left unsatisfied by the settlement terms, the agreement will not last. Even if the settlement receives approval and becomes ratified, it may not last if the dynamics change again, for instance, if new leaders or parties come to power.

Another problem arises with too much reliance on third-party manipulation. If the dynamics were altered by third-parties either offering incentives or punishment or placing peacekeepers in the region, those third-parties may be forever tied to the conflict and unable to leave without it resuming. Settlements that hinge on the continued presence of third-party coercion will not necessarily even maintain the peace process

itself because the opposing parties are often aware that measures that require the presence

of outside actors are out of their control and subject to failure.[10]

One more problem with the dynamic approach is the lack of attention to the

underlying issues of the conflict. Galtung rightly suggests that changing the dynamics of

a conflict is a never-ending process. The underlying issues will continuously resurface

and cause the same problems over and over again until they have been truly dealt with

and resolved. Conflict resolution that fails to address the underlying issues is doomed to

failure because those issues will continuously be able to mobilize groups to take action on

their behalf and even justify violent means for this purpose. The resolution process

therefore cannot ignore the problems that instigated the conflict.

Case Studies

Continuing problems of intrastate violence have offered tremendous opportunities

for negotiators to utilize conflict resolution techniques. Many of them have engaged the

process with a dynamic approach mindset, trying to formulate settlements by attempting

to alter the situational dynamics. A look at the cases of Cyprus, Chechnya, and Bosnia,

however, will demonstrate the insufficiencies of this approach.

Cyprus

Various attempts at resolving intrastate conflicts have used the logic of the

dynamic approach to conflict resolution without achieving complete success. One of

these cases is the conflict over Cyprus which has yet to reach a workable peace solution.

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[10] Caroline A. Hartzell, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 1 (February 1999): 7.

The island has been partitioned since 1974, dividing the Cypriots according to their Greek or Turkish ethnic identities. The many negotiation processes which have taken place over the years have become deadlocked and have consistently failed to produce a resolution because, unfortunately, the underlying issues have been neglected. Instead, the negotiations have focused on procedural matters and attempted to alter each party's position. "A primary cause for the stalemate in the Cyprus conflict is that the parties involved have so far seen the conflict through an adversarial lens, focusing on the *position* that would maximize their piece of a perceived fixed pie, regardless of the impact on others (a zero-sum, win-lose problem)."[11] The parties are focusing on their relative position and getting caught up in trying to advance their respective interests rather than seeking a resolution. Political expediencies and shifting political realities are driving their decisions, not the search for peace. The dynamic approach suggests that the conflict could be overcome by altering each party's position or changing the circumstances of the conflict. It seems in this case, however, that the focus on positions is holding the resolution process back.

Third parties have been involved in the Cyprus peace process as well, but they still seem to be unable to bring an end to the conflict for good. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, for instance, has led the peace talks over Cyprus without success. This attempt to produce an agreement ended because the parties failed to look for a compromise on the issues under dispute such as territory and refugees. Instead, they stuck to their self-interested positions and let the talks collapse.

> A potential agreement may eventually fail because the current adversarial focus on positions does not truly address the underlying needs, fears, concerns, and

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[11] Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Lenos Trigeorgis, "Cyprus: An Evolutionary Approach to Conflict Resolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37, no. 2 (June 1993): 347.

> long-term interests of the affected people of each community in a cooperative fashion. For example, the issues of insecurity, mistrust, identity, fundamental rights . . . must be confronted as the primary causes of the conflict rather than as peripheral issues that would "fall through the cracks" once certain legalistic details have been agreed on. If insecurity and fear of domination by a more powerful adversary are the fundamental concerns that have led to certain positions, it is necessary to find creative ways to alleviate these fears rather than seek a median position that would create a sense of loss for each side rather than address their underlying concerns.[12]

If the parties continue to focus on their relative positions instead of trying to address the underlying issues, an agreement may never be reached.

Recently, the Turkish-Cypriot desire to join the European Union (EU) has had an impact on the Cyprus conflict.[13] The international community had chosen not to recognize the Turkish-Cypriots because they were blamed for derailing the negotiations in the past. Without this recognition, the EU would not consider Turkish-Cypriot membership. It would only be considered if Cyprus reunited, therefore their incentive to find a compromise increased. In contrast, the Greek-Cypriots, who were recognized by the international community, would be able to join the EU regardless of unification. At this time, therefore only the Greek-Cypriots would benefit from EU membership. If the Turkish-Cypriots wanted to benefit as well, they would have to work towards reunification.

This desire for EU membership instigated a new set of negotiations in 2004. Greece and Turkey both took steps to push through a settlement and participated in the negotiations led by the UN. American and European officials were also involved and encouraged the Cypriots to find a solution to their problems. This time it was the Greek-

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[12] Ibid., 349.
[13] Susan Sachs, "Greek Cypriots Reject a U.N. Peace Plan," *New York Times*, 25 April 2004, sec. 1, col. 1, p. 8; Colum Lynch, "U.N. Plan for Cyprus Reunification Advances," *Washington Post*, 14 February 2004, p. A01; Colum Lynch, "Annan Presents Cyprus Plan," *Washington Post*, 1 April 2004, p. A26.

Cypriots that rejected the agreement. It appeared that they did not have the same incentives as the Turkish-Cypriots to find an agreement since it was not necessary for them to gain EU membership.

As the negotiations ended without a settlement, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan announced that there would be a referendum on the UN's plan so that the Cypriots could choose for themselves if they were ready for peace. This plan called for a federal government with highly autonomous Greek and Turkish states, but did not offer a solution to the refugee or Turkish troop issues that both sides could accept.

On April 24, 2004, the hopes for peace were dashed once again as the Greek Cypriots voted against the plan, while the Turkish Cypriots voted in favor of it. The Greek-Cypriots were dissatisfied with the continued presence of Turkish troops and the refugee plan and felt that more guarantees would need to be offered. As long as these issues remain unresolved, the Cyprus conflict will not be settled. The Turkish-Cypriots' yes vote demonstrated that they were ready to settle, but until the Greek-Cypriots can be brought on board as well, the unresolved issues will keep the conflict going.

Chechnya

The continuing conflict in Chechnya also sheds some light on the possible failures of a peace process. The recent struggle in this region erupted after the fall of the Soviet Union. Like other Soviet republics at this time, Chechnya began to desire and pursue secession, but Russia has adamantly fought against its efforts. One of the problems in the beginning was the lack of third-party intervention to help negotiate a settlement. This was a major stumbling block for negotiating peace. Chechnya made many appeals for

outside help, but there were two basic problems. First, the Russian government refused to support outside involvement. In December 1994, the Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev demonstrated this attitude when stating that "'settlement of the Chechen crisis is an internal affair of the Russian Federation. We need no foreign mediators for that.'"[14] Without Russia's approval, such mediators as the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) would not take action. The second problem was the lack of desire or interest of potential mediators to get involved. The West was more concerned with building its relationship with Russia than intruding into the Chechen crisis. There were also no strategic interests at stake or any real incentive to become involved.[15] Without a third-party, the Chechen conflict dragged on without progress.

As reports began to circulate regarding Russian atrocities and deceptive policies, pressure built up for the West to take a more vocal stance and get involved in resolving the conflict. Finally in 1995, the chairman in office of the OSCE sent his personal representative to Moscow to persuade the Russians to allow them to participate in resolving the matter. The OSCE first secured the agreement of both sides to allow the International Red Cross to visit prisoners. The next success was the result of skillful negotiations and pressure from the West to allow the OSCE to become actively involved. The Russian government agreed to allow the OSCE to establish the Assistance Group in Grozny (although not without strict guidelines).

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[14] Gail W. Lapidus, "Contested Sovereignty: the Tragedy of Chechnya," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 27.
[15] Ibid., 28-9.

Once the OSCE became involved, progress began to occur in seeking a resolution to the crisis. The Assistance Group gained the trust of moderates on both sides and eventually set up direct negotiations between them.

> Although it was not in a position to influence directly the political and military choices that drove the escalation of the conflict, it played a highly constructive role in facilitating the delivery of relief supplies and exchanges of prisoners, in focusing international attention on violations of human rights, in promoting dialogue between the two sides and providing an element of transparency, and in facilitating later cease-fire agreements and presidential elections in Chechnya. By offering unwavering support to the principle that a peaceful resolution of the conflict was both essential and possible, the OSCE presence strengthened the position of moderates on both sides and paved the way for the direct negotiations that ultimately produced the peace agreement.[16]

The OSCE presence proved critical to making progress in the negotiation process and an agreement was finally reached and signed in May 1997.

The Treaty of Peace and the Principles of Mutual Relations, which was agreed to by the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, demonstrated that progress had been made, but unfortunately, this progress was not sustainable. The agreement

> acknowledged the 'centuries-long antagonism' between the two sides, and committed both to the renunciation of force 'forever' in resolving disputed issues and to building relations in accordance with 'generally recognized principles and norms of international law . . . The document was intended to serve as the basis for additional treaties and agreements on the whole complex of mutual relations . . . however no significant progress has been made on resolving the underlying conflict, and continuing intra-elite struggles in both capitals make the prospects dim.[17]

Progress made with the entry of a third-party altered the dynamics and an agreement was reached on process, but the crisis continues to disrupt the region. According to Galtung, the answer to conflict management may lie in procedures and processes. The treaty

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[16] Ibid., 39.
[17] Ibid., 45-6.

produced for Chechnya, however, failed even though it included an agreement on process. The agreement to renounce the use of force forever did not hold. Until the underlying issues of this conflict are addressed and solutions found, it is unlikely that the Chechen crisis will find its end.

Bosnia

One more conflict that made use of the dynamic approach to conflict resolution was the one in Bosnia. There are three main ethnic identities within this region, Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbians, and Bosnian Muslims, which have been at odds over many issues for some time. The underlying issues of this conflict had been present for centuries and the various ethnic groups had been consumed by violence several times in the past. After the end of the Cold War, hostilities began to surface once again. Third-parties entered this conflict with the hopes of producing a settlement, but the opposing parties continued to pursue a violent course rather than seek a compromise.

It was not until the Americans became directly involved and NATO forces began their heavy bombing campaign that the negotiation process began to make progress. Once NATO changed the dynamics of the situation by preventing the Bosnian Serbs from being able to achieve a military victory, they were forced to consider compromise. Also, by helping to advance the Croatian and Bosnian offensive, NATO helped increase their positions so that they could negotiate from a better stance. The intervention of outside forces altered the dynamics of the situation and therefore changed the behavior of the opposing parties. By November 1995, the parties had agreed to a settlement and the

Dayton Peace Agreement was signed. To date, the peace agreement stands, but its long-term success still remains questionable.

The Dayton Agreement has been enforced by international peace keepers since its inception, and the region continues to be supported by the international community. If they left, it is highly questionable whether or not the peace would last. The major problem is the continuing nature of the issues that have plagued the region for centuries. The ethnic and nationalist rivalries that have torn this region apart time and time again have not been adequately addressed. "Nationalist politics and ethnic differences continue to dominate every aspect of daily life."[18] It is not just the clash of ethnic identities, however, that hurts this region. There are many problems that continue to be harmful. For instance, many of the war criminals have not been arrested; Bosnian leaders are demonstrating a lack of commitment to necessary reforms to create a sustainable economy; there is a major problem with corruption in the region; and the political system remains unstable.[19] Without the continued presence of the peacekeepers, what would prevent violence from erupting just as it has in the past? For now, Bosnians remain dependent on outside assistance, but the international community will not want to keep troops in place forever. Before they leave, the underlying issues will need to be addressed or else violence will most likely return.

Each of these cases, Cyprus, Chechnya, and Bosnia, demonstrates how the conflict resolution process can fail when the underlying issues are neglected. In each case, third-parties intervened and altered the dynamics of the situation. They made progress possible, but each situation remains unstable with an uncertain future. If

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[18] Ivo H. Daalder and Michael B. G. Froman, "Dayton's Incomplete Peace," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 6 (November/December 1999): 106.
[19] Ibid., 108-9.

resolution is to be sought and the use of violence is to be overcome, simply altering the dynamics of a conflict will not be enough. Changing the dynamics of the conflict may be a necessary part of the conflict resolution process, but more is needed to establish a lasting peace.

THE RATIONAL CALCULATION APPROACH

Although the dynamic approach to conflict resolution falls short, many theorists continue to build upon it and try to supplement it in order to overcome its failures. The next approach discussed seems to do just that. It has much in common with the dynamic approach, but brings in other elements to explain why some negotiations fail and why others succeed. This approach would be included in the settlement category of conflict management as well since it focuses on creating the circumstances for settlement. This so-called rational calculation approach builds heavily on rational calculation theory,[20] which has much in common with the game theory used in the dynamic approach.

Theorists who utilize this approach view conflict as the outcome of the decision-making process of actors who are rational, form judgments, pursue strategies, and initiate the events of the conflict. This theory argues that violent methods are used because the actors calculate that the potential benefits will outweigh the losses. As the conflict progresses, the actors will continue to make this calculation and continue to use violence until it shifts and produces a situation in which the losses may outweigh the benefits. The goal of this conflict resolution technique therefore is either to wait until the costs outweigh the benefits or to change the circumstances so that the costs do outweigh the

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[20] Wallensteen, 44-9.

benefits. Then, the opposing parties will decide that negotiation is the best course of action.

Although similar to the dynamic approach, the rational calculation approach has additional elements. The most prominent feature of this approach is timing, which is considered crucial to the success of a negotiation process. The theory argues that the negotiation process will not succeed until the time is right and that time will mostly likely occur when the parties to a conflict both calculate that they will no longer make gains through violent methods. The other important element of this approach, like others, is the role of third-parties. Third-parties are able to alter the cost-benefit ratio by offering incentives and sanctions in order to bring about agreement. They are also often able to manipulate the circumstances of a conflict so that the timing is right because the involvement of the third-party makes the continuation of a military battle too costly. According to the rational calculation approach to conflict resolution, the involvement of third-parties and the right timing can make all the difference in whether or not peace is achieved.

I. William Zartman has approached conflict resolution in this manner. He argues that conflict will continue until there is a ripe moment for resolution which occurs when a mutually hurting stalemate arises. Zartman says that a mutually hurting stalemate is when "both sides are locked in a situation from which they cannot escalate the conflict with their available means and at an acceptable cost."[21] This is the point when both sides believe they cannot achieve victory on the battlefield and therefore begin to consider alternatives. It forces the actors to reevaluate the cost-benefit ratio of further conflict. He

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[21] I. William Zartman, *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1995), 8.

finds that "parties tend to negotiate in a dynamic situation of equality, when the underdog starts rising and the upper hand starts slipping . . . both sides must have legitimacy and strength to come to an agreement."[22] In other words, when the opposing parties realize that they are on equal ground militarily and politically and that they will most likely not be able to defeat each other, that is when conditions are most ripe for settlement. In order to turn a stalemate into a resolution, however, both sides will need to recognize each other as legitimate actors and engage in dialogue.[23]

Zartman also emphasizes the role of the mediator. He says that "progress in negotiation often depends on the presence of an external mediator" and that "mediators must be important ('powerful'), multiple, and coordinated to succeed."[24] They will be needed to keep the parties at the negotiation table and to ensure that the stalemate continues. This means they must be able to "change the mode of conflict and move it from violence to politics."[25] They also provide reassurances that any agreement made will be kept. Third-parties therefore are considered critical to the negotiation process.

Zartman makes clear, however, that any third-party mediator alone is not enough. As he points out, many conflict negotiations have failed with mediators at the helm. He offers two explanations for this. First, he returns to the importance of the ripe moment. Even if third-parties are present, they will not succeed if the moment is not ripe. Second, he says that the third-parties must be the right mediators or they can fail. If they "lacked importance, prestige, weight, and a relationship with the parties,"[26] then this would explain the failure. Zartman stresses that "mediators must have an official ongoing

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[22] Ibid., 335.
[23] Ibid., 335-6.
[24] Ibid., 341.
[25] Ibid., 343.
[26] Ibid., 344.

relationship with the parties that is both material and ideological"[27] in order to succeed. If they have these qualities and the moment is ripe, the negotiation process has its best chance for success.

Zartman has been one of the most influential theorists in the conflict resolution literature. Many have followed his path, agreeing that ripe moments are decisive. Richard Haass, for instance, states that "it is ripeness more than anything else that plays a decisive role in negotiating regional disputes."[28]

Another theorist who has been influenced by Zartman as well as Bercovitch is Saadia Touval. Like Bercovitch and Zartman, Touval focuses heavily on the role of third-parties. Like Bercovitch, he recognizes that mediators are seldom impartial and typically attempt to secure their own interests while participating in the negotiation process.[29] Seeking to protect their own interests, mediators will attempt to influence the outcome of the negotiation process by establishing the parameters they would prefer for the agreement. Like Zartman, Touval emphasizes the importance of the mutually hurting stalemate.[30] He says, "The timing of mediation efforts is often considered to be of critical importance. It has been observed that interventions that take place in situations of a 'mutually hurting stalemate,' where the disputants recognize that their existing policies will not achieve their goals and that alternative policies may be very risky, are particularly conducive to a settlement."[31] If a stalemate does not already exist, Touval

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[27] Ibid., 344-5.
[28] Richard N. Haass, *Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 8.
[29] Saadia Touval, *Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years, 1990-95* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 4.
[30] Ibid., 7.
[31] Ibid.

agrees that the mediator may alter the cost-benefit ratio so that one does exist or so that the continued use of violence is no longer an option.

Touval also agrees with Zartman, insisting that the mediator must have certain characteristics in order to be successful. For instance, he finds that collective mediation efforts are more likely to fail because of internal disagreements about how to proceed. If the mediator is appropriate, however, then it should be able to persuade and influence the opposing parties to alter their violent behavior and reach an agreement.

> As in all negotiations, mediators pursue their persuasive efforts through clarification of the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action. In trying to persuade the parties to change their policies, mediators often need to bargain with the parties, communicating to them conditional promises and threats, and actually employing rewards and punishments. A mediator's ability to confer or withhold benefits, or to shift benefits to the adversary, is often vital to its ability to influence the disputants to change their policies and accept the mediator's proposals. Moreover, powerful mediators need not wait for a hurting stalemate to occur, but can use their resources to create it.[32]

Just like Zartman, therefore, Touval finds that the proper timing and a proper third party offer the best chance of reaching a settlement in international conflicts.

T. David Mason and Patrick J. Fett also developed an argument based on rational calculation theory and were heavily influenced by Zartman's work. They designed a model for calculating how intrastate wars can end based on D. Wittman's model of how to terminate interstate wars.[33] Their theory presents a rational choice model of the decision-making process that leads opposing parties to choose the negotiation process over continued violence.

From their model, Mason and Fett conclude that "the likelihood that both the government and the rebels will agree to a settlement rather than continue to fight will

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[32] Ibid.

[33] D. Wittman, "How a War Ends: A Rational Model Approach," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23 (1979): 743-63.

vary depending on each party's estimate of its probability of victory, its expected payoffs

from victory versus those from a settlement, the rate at which it absorbs costs of conflict,

and its estimate of how long it will take to achieve victory."[34] The logic of this

conclusion then allows them to argue that

> any factors that (1) reduce both parties' estimate of their chances of victory, (2)
> increase the rate at which both are absorbing costs, (3) extend both parties'
> estimate of the amount of time required to achieve victory, or (4) increase the
> utility from a settlement relative to the utility from victory will make both more
> willing to agree to a negotiated settlement rather than continue to fight in the hope
> of achieving victory.[35]

Again, just like Touval and Zartman, Mason and Fett suggest that by altering the cost-

benefit ratio so that the costs of continued violence are too high, the parties will reach a

mutually hurting stalemate that will make the conflict ripe and the parties ready to

negotiate.

Although the rational calculation approach to conflict resolution brings in new

elements for examination, it really contains the same basic flaw as the dynamic approach.

It does not go far enough to bring about a lasting peace. Like the dynamic approach, the

rational calculation approach provides temporary fixes by altering the cost-benefit

calculation long enough to elicit a settlement, but the underlying issues continue to be

overlooked in this approach. Once the cost-benefit ratio changes again, the conflict

reemerges. As Zartman himself points out, the position of extremists who want to

mobilize support for their violent tactics "is attractive in the long run only to the extent

that the government is unresponsive to the underlying grievances and needs of the

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[34] David T. Mason and Patrick J. Fett, "How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, no. 4 (December 1996): 549.
[35] Ibid.

rebellion."[36] If this is so, then it would seem obvious that responding to the underlying grievances would be the best way to terminate support for the violent tactics of the opposition. Overlooking the underlying issues provides justification for the tactics used by those who fight in the name of those issues.

Another problem with this approach is its emphasis on ripe moments. This element greatly restricts the possibilities for resolution to only those times when the parties reach a stalemate. What if this does not occur or what if the ripe moment goes by unrecognized? It may be difficult for third-parties to recognize the optimal time for mediation. Is the ripe moment evident when parties agree to negotiate? Just because a party agrees to take part in the negotiation process does not mean it is really ready to compromise. Often, negotiations collapse or accomplish little because spoilers join the process only to get concessions or stall for time.[37]

The bigger issue for ethnic conflicts is that there may never be a mutually hurting stalemate. Zartman recognizes this problem and suggests that it is a major obstacle to ethnic conflict resolution.

> Normally, [the parties] need to find themselves in a mutually hurting stalemate, in which each side's hopes of victory are stymied and the continuing blockage hurts. But in internal conflicts, such a stalemate is a harbinger of victory for the ethnic rebellion, since its separateness and equality are implicitly recognized . . . In the absence of a mutually hurting stalemate to push the parties to negotiate, a mutually enticing opportunity can theoretically serve to pull them in the same direction. But, again, in internal and particularly ethnic conflicts, such an opportunity is almost always unobtainable, since procedural grievances and preferential justice leave little room for mutual enticements.[38]

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[36] Zartman, *Elusive Peace*, 341.

[37] Stephan John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 5-53.

[38] I. William Zartman, "Mediating Conflicts of Need, Greed, and Creed," *Orbis* 44, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 259.

If ripe moments never exist, does this mean the conflict will never end? Although Zartman's concept of ripe moments helps us understand that some groups will continue to resist taking part in negotiations until they no longer have other attractive alternatives, it does not offer the best model for ending intrastate conflicts. Since there may never be a mutually hurting stalemate in ethnic conflicts, and yet ethnic conflicts do end, then there must be other variables that can create the circumstances for peace.

Case Studies

Many negotiators have attempted to use the rational calculation approach. Two cases, Bosnia and Chechnya, have been discussed previously. A third example is that of Mozambique. In each of these cases, attempts were made by third-parties to create ripe moments and formulate lasting settlements. Unfortunately, none of these cases had successful results after achieving the ripe moments.

Bosnia

The opposing groups within Bosnia were seen as having reached a stalemate which was produced by third-party intervention. In this case, the third-party, NATO, actually used force to bring the parties to a stalemate. Touval refers to this tactic as coercive mediation.[39] NATO used force to alter the cost-benefit calculations of the Bosnian Serbs who had the upper hand at the time and saw victory on the battlefield as a distinct possibility. By bombing the Serbs, NATO weakened their position and simultaneously raised the position of the opposition, placing the sides on more equal ground and creating the ripeness needed to begin the negotiation process. As Touval

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[39] Touval, 136.

points out, "the ability of the mediators to persuade the Croats and Muslims to conclude the 1994 federation agreement can in large measure be attributed to ripe circumstances" and in the 1995 Dayton Agreement, "it was the mediator who 'ripened' the conditions, making the parties willing to compromise."[40]

As stated before, however, it is still unclear whether the Dayton Agreement will hold once the peacekeepers finally leave. The major reason for this uncertainty is that the underlying issues were not adequately addressed during the negotiation process. The US delegation led by Richard Holbrooke, unfortunately chose to neglect the underlying issues at stake while attempting to manage the conflict. The US failure to acknowledge the intense nature of the ethnoreligious divisions hindered its ability to find a solution that was reasonable to all sides. Whenever the underlying factors of the conflict came up, Holbrooke and his team dismissed them as inconsequential. When reminded "never to forget that the Serbs felt that history had victimized them" and "not to put them in a corner . . . or they will lash back," Holbrooke responded that "the Serb view of history was their problem . . . ours was to end the war."[41] When speaking of General Mladic's reference to a Serb rebellion against the Ottomans which took place in 1804, Holbrooke said that "Mladic's identification of modern-day Bosnian Muslims with the Turks of 191 years earlier was revealing of his dangerously warped mind-set."[42] This criticism demonstrates Holbrooke's inability to truly understand the roots of the conflict in this region. Before agreeing to meet with Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic, Holbrooke established several guidelines which included that he "must not give us a lot of historical bullshit" and when Karadzic made several references to the "humiliation the Serbs are

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[40] Ibid., 167.
[41] Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), 110.
[42] Ibid., 69.

suffering," Holbrooke threatened to walk out immediately.[43] Each of these statements demonstrates the lack of regard the US diplomatic team had for the underlying issues within the Bosnian conflict. They were unwilling to listen to the historical issues at stake and therefore limited their efforts to manage the conflict, suppressing the issues that would need to be resolved for true reconciliation.

Another reason the parties involved in the Bosnian conflict may not be committed to the settlement agreement is that some were not included in the negotiation process itself. There were many actors involved in the Bosnian conflict, but once Holbrooke and his team took control of the negotiation process, they chose to exclude certain parties.[44] The Croatian and Serbian leaders within Bosnia did not represent themselves in the negotiation process and therefore had no real voice in the matter. This meant that the Croatian and Serbian communities within Bosnia were unable to ensure that their interests were met and may have left unresolved issues that could resurface. In regards to the Bosnian Serbs, Holbrooke pointed out that "While we did not want to elevate Milosevic to statesman status, we planned to negotiate only with him and, at the same time, hold him strictly accountable for the behavior of the Bosnian Serbs."[45] When Milosevic suggested that they would be needed to negotiate any peace agreement, Holbrooke responded that "You have just shown us a piece of paper giving you the power to negotiate for them. It's your problem."[46]

Although Milosevic continued to object to their exclusion from the peace process, the Americans repeatedly refused. They would generally only negotiate with Alija

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[43] Ibid., 148-9.

[44] Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 127-9.

[45] Holbrooke, 98.

[46] Ibid., 107.

Izetbegovic, Franjo Tudjman, and Slobodon Milosevic. Izetbegovic was a leader within

Bosnia, but the other two were not. Tudjman was the President of Croatia and Milosevic

was the President of Serbia. Although these two leaders exerted extensive influence on

the Croatian and Serbian communities within Bosnia, they were not the parties that would

actually be living within the newly constructed Bosnian state once the war was over. The

Croatian and Serbian leaders within Bosnia, who would be the most affected by the

outcome of the peace accords, were effectively excluded from the majority of the

negotiation process. The Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats were only allowed to play a

minor role in resolving the issues that would govern their own lives.

The lack of sensitivity to the underlying causes of the Bosnian conflict combined

with the exclusion of important parties and coercive measures greatly limited the ability

of the US to produce a resolution to this conflict. By neglecting the underlying causes of

the conflict, the peace agreement has only temporarily suppressed the issues and has left

the potential for them to resurface once the NATO peacekeepers leave.

> The combination of [Bosnia's] problems creates a cycle from which it is difficult
> to escape. For Bosnia ever to become a functioning multiethnic society, refugees
> in large numbers need to return to their homes. Yet for refugees to go back home,
> jobs need to be created in these areas; to create jobs, economic reforms favoring
> private-sector activity and investment must be adopted; to institute these reforms,
> corruption and the leadership's commitment to communism and control must be
> eliminated; to defeat the culture of corruption, communism, and control, the
> nationalist dynamics of Bosnia politics must give way to a politics of reform; yet
> to denationalize politics, a multiethnic society must first exist.[47]

By leaving important groups out of the negotiation process, this increased the likelihood

that the tensions will remain because those who must live within the Bosnian framework

did not have someone to speak for their specific interests. If violence is to be prevented

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[47] Daalder and Froman, 110.

from erupting once again, Bosnians must find a way to overcome the trap in which they find themselves.

Finally, the coercive measures used may have created ripe conditions and helped bring the war to an end, but at what price? By allowing the Bosnian-Croatian offensive to take more land, the US encouraged the use of force to resolve their problems. The US also forced an agreement that may not have been truly acceptable, but was agreed to because the Serbs could no longer sustain their efforts under continued NATO bombings. What the international community needs to realize is that "we should not be naïve enough to think that by bombing a country into submission or placing an international military force on the ground, we can settle intractable ethnoreligious conflicts. Trying to fix distant conflicts by force before learning how those involved see themselves and their adversaries often compounds the problem."[48]

Chechnya

Another case that has been previously mentioned is Chechnya. A lasting agreement has failed to be reached in this conflict, and there are certainly no peacekeepers there to suppress the violence as in Bosnia. When the negotiations, led by the OSCE, began, however, there was a deadlocked military situation which contributed to the ripeness of the moment and made the signing of the 1997 peace agreement possible.[49] Unfortunately, this agreement did not last and violence has once again erupted in the region. Zartman and his followers may suggest that the third-party was not the proper mediator for the job, but it seems more likely that the failure to resolve the

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[48] Paul Mojzes, "Religious Wars?: A Short History of the Balkans," in *Religion in Politics and Society*, *The Reference Shelf* 74, no. 3, eds. Michael Kelly and Lynn M. Messina (H. W. Wilson Company, 2002), 93.
[49] Lapidus, 23-4.

underlying issues kept this conflict going. Although certain mediators may be more suitable to certain conflicts and therefore will have more influence, the mediator's identity should not be the factor that holds the agreement together. If the agreement is completely contingent on the third-party, then it will ultimately fail when that third-party leaves the situation. The role of the third-party is to get the parties to a conflict to reach an agreement and offer some guarantees until the parties can learn to rebuild a workable relationship. The third-party is not meant to remain involved indefinitely.

If an agreement is to succeed, it must account for the underlying issues to ensure that once the mediator leaves, those issues will not lead to a resumption of violence. In Chechnya, this did not occur. Chechnya wants independence, but Russia continues to insist that it is part of the Federation even though it remains unable to exercise true control in the region. Proposals were suggested for a loose 'associated status' which would have given Chechens considerable control over their internal affairs, but as time passes, the moderates who would have accepted such terms lose the ability to rally support. There are also issues remaining in Chechnya, as well as the entire North Caucasian region, involving the devastated economy, employment, violent crime, weapons proliferation, refugee flows, drug trafficking, oil pipeline control, and human rights abuses which keep the conflict alive. Until these issues are addressed, Chechnya will be a source of instability within the region.

Mozambique

A third conflict that demonstrates the insufficiency of the rational calculation approach is Mozambique. The conflict in Mozambique was long and extremely deadly.

The ethnically opposed factions, the northern Makonde and the southern Shangana, fought until an estimated 900,000 people had been killed, over three million had been driven from their homes, and about eight million were suffering from starvation. By 1992, however, the two sides had reached an agreement (the Rome Accord) that ended this horrific conflict.

There have been several explanations offered for the success of Mozambique's peace process. Theorists have concentrated on four main arguments. One is that the Cold War had ended, removing support for the battle between the ideologically opposed parties. Another is that outside assistance to the parties had been greatly reduced. It has also been suggested that the pressure placed on the parties by outside mediators created the necessary conditions for settlement. One more popular argument is that a military stalemate had made each side realize that they could not win on the battlefield which "effectively moved the conflict from a stalemate to a hurting stalemate" according to one UN election observer in Mozambique.[50]

The problem with these explanations is that those factors had existed for quite some time but had failed to lead to a resolution of the conflict.

> Each of these variables . . . had been present at different intervals throughout the war, and all were present years before [the parties] signed a treaty in 1992. As one observer points out, 'a mutually hurting stalemate produced an impetus for negotiations at several points in the seventeen year history of the conflict.' Only the final negotiations, however, succeeded. Another observer notes that 'the Government had known for many years that even with substantial assistance, a military solution was not possible.' It seemed unlikely therefore that the reduction of outside aid suddenly convinced the two sides to settle. And the drought, which many believed pushed both sides to the table, was not a new condition in 1992. In 1983, nine years before the signing of the Rome accord, a severe drought resulted in the deaths of approximately 100,000 people, yet it did not encourage a settlement. Even mediation was not unique to this last round of peace talks, for a

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[50] Barbara F. Walter, "Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 145.

number of countries had been trying to arbitrate and end to the conflict since 1985.[51]

The presence of a ripe moment as well as outside mediators was not enough to bring Mozambique's conflict to an end. Something more was needed to make the negotiation process a success. As we will see later, however, it was even more than the underlying issues that remained to be addressed in this case before the crisis could be brought to an end.

Each of these cases highlights the insufficiency of attempting to resolve conflicts with the mere presence of ripe moments and third-party mediators. The deadlocked military situation in Chechnya may have made circumstances conducive to initiating the peace process and signing a limited agreement, but the agreement did not hold and the conflict continues. The creation of a ripe moment in the Bosnia crisis also made the parties willing to negotiate, but the peace existing there remains highly dependent upon aid from the international community and the presence of peacekeepers. Unless the underlying issues are addressed before the peacekeepers leave, the chance of a resumption of violence remains high. Finally, the case of Mozambique shows that even in the presence of third-parties and ripe moments, it may not be possible to arrive at an agreement. Something more was needed in the Mozambique case to convince the parties to reach an agreement.

THE NEEDS-BASED APPROACH

After examining the previous approaches to conflict resolution, it has become apparent that the dynamic approach and the rational calculation approach fail to provide

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[51] Ibid., 145-6.

the variables that are both necessary and sufficient to bring an end to intrastate conflicts that will last. So far, one of the most prominent flaws has been the failure to adequately address the underlying issues of the conflict. The approach to conflict resolution that does address these issues is called the needs-based approach. This approach falls under the resolution category of conflict management because it seeks to do more than just produce a settlement agreement; it also seeks to resolve the issues that have led to the violent dispute in the first place. Also, whereas the previous approaches aimed at altering the behavior of the opposing parties, this approach aims at altering their attitudes first. This could occur by either addressing their concerns in order to alleviate their fears or by getting them to see past their differences in order to establish a connection between the parties based on their shared needs. Theorists in this group believe that by addressing the attitudes first, a better foundation will be established for reaching a settlement that can last.

The needs-based approach to conflict resolution could be divided further into two variations called the interest-based approach and the identity-based approach. Both of these variations, however, take the same basic stance. They look to the origin of the conflict or the substance of the issues under dispute and seek to solve the problem by directly responding to those issues. As these theories argue, "If the basis of a conflict is the denial of particular needs, then the resolution process must identify those needs and include ways of answering them."[52]

The Interest-Based Approach

The interest-based approach generally blames conflict on differentially distributed

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[52] Wallensteen, 39.

needs.[53] It suggests that parties are engaged in conflict because they believe themselves

to be unjustly disadvantaged economically, socially, politically, or even territorially.

Some theorists argue that the equalization of economic development will end the

conflict.[54] Some look to the division of territory to settle disputes.[55] For others, access to

political channels is crucial. Ted Gurr, for example, looks at the effects of relative

deprivation on groups and argues that it is a source of violence.[56] He suggests that the

removal of autonomy from a group can provoke a violent response. If a group lacks

influence on the political process and therefore control over its own destiny, it may seek

violent methods to achieve its goals.

Gurr's argument has much in common with the ideas of Lewis Coser who, before

him, argued that political access was crucial to understanding conflict termination. Coser

makes this point when he argues that "only where there exist open channels of political

communication through which all groups can articulate their demands, are the chances

high that the political exercise of violence can be successfully minimized."[57] From his

perspective, the key to conflict resolution is the satisfaction of the need for political

access. This may mean altering the political formation of the state which is in crisis.

Since the groups feel that the current political system excludes them, it will be necessary

to create a new system that not only brings them into the political process, but guarantees

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[53] I. William Zartman, "Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts" (paper presented at the conference Facing Ethnic Conflicts for the Center for Development Research (ZEF), Bonn, Germany, December 14-16, 2000), 2.
[54] James K. Boyce and Manuel Pastor, Jr., "Macroeconomic Policy and Peace Building in El Salvador," in *Rebuilding Societies after Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance,* ed. Krishna Kumar (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997).
[55] Michael Chisholm and David M. Smith, eds., *Shared Space Divided Space: Essays on Conflict and Territorial Organization* (London: Unwin Hyman, Ltd., 1990); John Coakley, *The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict* (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Monica Duffy Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
[56] Ted R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Ted R. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).
[57] Lewis A. Coser, *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1967), 106.

that they will have continued access. "The solution, in other words, is likely to be found in building new institutions, whether formal or informal."[58]

Other theorists have picked up on Coser's suggestion that proper institution building could produce the path to peace. Recently, for instance, Caroline Hartzell has argued that institutions play a central role in conflict management by ensuring that the opposing parties will both have access to political power and be protected from the potential abuse of the centralized power of the state.[59] She says, "In the long run, a civil war settlement must be constructed on the basis of institutions that address the security fears of groups in divided societies. Only by constructing institutionalized settlements can civil war opponents act to neutralize the security dilemma they face and facilitate the move by groups in society toward more cooperative relations."[60]

Hartzell sees the problem in these conflicts as an internal security dilemma. The problem is how to go from the condition of anarchy which exists during the war to the centralization of power at the end of the conflict in which one group could take complete control and use its power against the other group. Hartzell's solution is to build institutions that offer guarantees to both groups so that their interests will be protected. Third-parties also play a role in this process of confidence-building because they can help guarantee the commitment of each group to whatever agreement is made and also provide protection to each group from the other.[61] Third-parties, however, are not the critical element for Hartzell. They can only do so much. For Hartzell, institutions that help each

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[58] Wallensteen, 39.
[59] Hartzell, 9.
[60] Ibid., 20.
[61] Ibid., 16.

side overcome their respective fears and provide security are the answer to ending conflicts.

The Identity-Based Approach

The other variation of the needs-based approach to conflict resolution is the identity-based approach, which looks to opposing beliefs, values, or worldviews as the origin of conflict and seeks to resolve the problem by overcoming the identity issues. This approach is viewed as a variation of the needs-based approach because group solidarity and the maintenance of identity are seen as needs. John Burton, for instance, has used needs theory to explain identity conflict.

> [His] theory proposes that identical psychological needs are shared by all human beings, that these needs are inalienable, and that their pursuit takes priority over every other motivation or goal. The individual seeks the satisfaction of such social needs through identity groups . . . which are formed around such elements as religion, race, culture, etc. . . . All humans share the same human needs: in this sense we are identically motivated. But the different cultures of our different identity groups define different means of satisfying them: in this sense we are in competition with other identity groups for the means to satisfy our needs. Hence, human needs are at the basis of conflict.[62]

Theorists who utilize the identity-based approach to conflict resolution look to the satisfaction of these social needs in order to bring conflicts to an end.

There are several explanations offered by theorists as to why different identity groups clash. One explanation is that these clashes stem from ancient hatreds. These theorists explain conflict as coming from the desire to maintain linguistic, cultural, racial, and religious connections within a group which are passed down through generations, by celebrating the importance of the group identity while demonizing that of others. This group mentality creates a perception of "us" and "them," dividing people into categories

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[62] Bloomfield, *Peacemaking Strategies*, 72.

of like and different. Conflict then erupts when the group feels as though it is being threatened by what is different.[63]

There are other factors that can have an impact on these clashes as well. For instance, history can play a role in identity clashes since parties to a conflict often cling to past events as defining elements of the group as well as providing justification for the hatred of the opposition.[64] Another manner in which identity comes into play is when groups feel discriminated against. "People may feel targeted because of their political beliefs or their social position or their ascriptive membership, or variations on these themes, but whatever the cause of the discrimination, it in itself provides the coin of identity for the conflicting party and becomes a source of solidarity among the revolters."[65] In other words, regardless of the real reason why certain people may be disadvantaged, they often feel as though it is because of their identity. This sense of discrimination then begins to define the group, helps solidify it, and motivates its actions. In any case, whether they are influenced by ancient hatreds, historical events, or discrimination, different identity groups often feel threatened by outsiders and may turn to violence in order to protect their interests and secure their position within the state.

John Burton is one of the leading theorists that have examined identity conflicts and the best methods for resolving them. In fact, he is commonly credited with having developed the needs-based approach to conflict resolution. He is also the theorist who designated the settlement/resolution dichotomy and argued in favor of an approach that

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[63] Toft, 7.
[64] Sean Byrne and Cynthia L. Irvin, eds., *Reconcilable Differences: Turning Points in Ethnopolitical Conflict* (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 2000), 45.
[65] Zartman, "Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts," 3.

would address the attitudes and relationships of opposing parties.[66] Burton's theory calls for a problem-solving approach to conflict resolution. He says, "Problem solving is a useful term because a problem in relationships remains even after there is a final settlement. It is not until an option is discovered that satisfies the interests and needs of all parties that the problem is solved. Problem solving implies exploration and not merely the simple process of bargaining."[67]

Like most other approaches, Burton also addresses the role of third-parties. Instead of calling them mediators, however, Burton refers to them as facilitators who are meant to keep the problem-solving process going. The facilitator is expected to be a group of professionally qualified and experienced persons who are in touch with a community of political and social scientists of all kinds.[68] During the resolution process, the goal of the facilitator is to get the opposing parties to see past their surface level demands, such as wages, territory, or roles which cannot be divided up easily, and get down to the real issues related to security, recognition, and identity which are part of the human developmental process and can be shared by all. Burton's argument is that "it is in the interest of all parties to ensure that the opposing parties achieve these social needs" because each "can achieve their basic goals of security by ensuring their opponents have their identity, recognition, and security."[69] If the third-party can help facilitate this process, then each party will be more likely to remain committed to any settlement agreement reached.

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[66] Bloomfield, *Peacemaking Strategies*, 71.
[67] Burton, 95.
[68] Ibid., 105.
[69] Ibid., 99.

Many theorists, such as Joseph Montville, Ronald Fisher, Herbert Kelman, and Stephen Cohen, have supported the problem-solving approach to conflict resolution.[70] Edward Azar has also worked extensively on developing the problem-solving workshop initiated by Burton and focuses on the importance of identity for this purpose as well. He says that "While domestic, regional and international conflicts in the world today are framed as conflicts over material interests, such as commercial advantages or resource acquisition, empirical evidence suggests that they are not just that. More fundamentally, most contemporary conflicts are about developmental needs expressed in terms of cultural values, human rights and security."[71] In other words, although groups appear to be fighting over material interests, they are really fighting for the ability to secure their identity needs.

Although these identity needs are the source of the conflict, Azar also sees them as the solution. For Azar, "Identical, shared needs are the transcendent, common elements of the parties in conflict: it is by grasping a sense of shared needs that they can transform their relationship into one of cooperation over the task of jointly satisfying their needs."[72] By attempting to find commonalities among the parties to a conflict, Azar hopes to help them overcome their differences and construct the foundations of a lasting peace.

[70] Joseph V. Montville, *Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990); Ronald J. Fisher, "The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution," in *Communication in International Politics*, ed. R. L. Merritt (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972); Ronald J. Fisher, "Third Party Consultation as a Method of Intergroup Conflict Resolution: A Review of Studies," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, no. 2 (June 1983): 301-34; Herbert C. Kelman, "Interactive Problem Solving: the Uses and Limits of a Therapeutic Model for the Resolution of International Conflicts," in *The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Vol. 2: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work*, eds. Vamik Volkan, et al. (Lexington: Lexington Press, 1991); Herbert C. Kelman and Stephen P. Cohen, "The Problem-Solving Workshop: A Social-Psychological Contribution to the Resolution of International Conflicts," *Journal of Peace Research* 13, no. 2 (1976): 79-90.
[71] Edward E. Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases* (Hampshire: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1990), 2.
[72] Bloomfield, *Peacemaking Strategies*, 72.

Conflict resolution theorists, like Azar, who use the problem-solving approach look to promoting group empathy for the "other" and communication between groups in order to alter negative perceptions and overcome conflict. Azar takes this stance in his refinement of Burton's problem-solving approach to conflict resolution. "The problem-solving approach is predicated on the belief that violent and prejudicial, or peaceful and cooperative, thinking and behavior are learned phenomena, and that what is learned therefore can also be modified."[73] This approach is an attempt to stimulate conversation and interaction in the hopes of altering perceived differences between groups and modifying the learned hatred of the "other." This, of course, is only suggested as a supplement to official diplomacy. The problem-solving portion of the process, also known as track-two diplomacy,[74] is meant to prepare the way for an official settlement agreement which comes in track-one. It is not meant to replace it.[75] Once the track-two diplomacy has been completed, the hope is that an agreement can be reached that will last because a proper foundation has been laid first.

This is where the third-party becomes important in the problem-solving approach. As with Burton, the third-party is seen as a facilitator, not a manipulator as suggested in the settlement approaches. The facilitator is meant to fill the "role of providing opportunity for communication and discussion and of providing information . . . the third party has no effective power to bring to bear on the conflict, beyond the provision of a needs-based understanding of the situation in the hope that cooperative attitudes will thus

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[73] Azar, *Protracted Social Conflict*, 21.
[74] The concept of track-two diplomacy was first developed by Joseph Montville. For more, see Montville, 535.
[75] Azar, *Protracted Social Conflict*, 19.

be fostered."[76] In this approach, the facilitator helps stimulate dialogue and offers a sense of transparency and trust to the process. This environment allows the parties to maintain progress and get to a place where a settlement can be made that will be able to last because the underlying issues have been dealt with effectively and resolved.

The needs-based approach to conflict resolution offers tremendous insight into the possible origins of intrastate conflicts and provides essential methods of progress in the peace process by seeking to address those underlying issues which instigated the problems. The failure to address the underlying issues is what made the previous approaches insufficient. The needs-based approach takes these issues into account and provides a better chance of establishing a lasting peace. This does not mean, however, that the dynamic and rational calculation approaches had nothing to offer. Understanding how the dynamics of a situation can create the conditions for violence or peace as well as how parties may calculate their options is important for making progress in the peace process. Addressing the underlying issues to a conflict will not be possible until the parties have agreed to sit down at the negotiation table or attend a workshop. It may be necessary to utilize the methods of the previous approaches just to get the process started.

Once the parties agree to meet and the peace process has begun, however, there is still the chance that finding a settlement and addressing the underlying issues may not be enough to produce a lasting peace. If the parties still fear a lack of commitment by the other side, they may hesitate to finalize an agreement. Another problem could be the persistence of spoilers. Even those who appear to be taking part in the peace process may be trying to sabotage it because they are committed to prolonging the violence. For this

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[76] Bloomfield, *Peacemaking Strategies*, 73.

reason, adequate measures must be taken to deal with spoilers and to provide guarantees to those who want the peace process to succeed.

Case Studies

In order to see the circumstances under which the peace process can fail even once the underlying issues have been addressed, it will be helpful to look at a couple of cases. The case of Mozambique has been previously discussed. Another example will be Rwanda. In each of these cases, simply addressing the underlying issues was not enough to formulate a lasting peace.

Mozambique

The conflict in Mozambique had lasted for quite some time and persisted even though mediators had become involved and a mutually hurting stalemate had existed at several points. The problem, however, was not a failure to address the underlying issues. "As was the case in Zimbabwe, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Sudan, the central issues in Mozambique's war were resolved long before a settlement was signed."[77]

Barbara Walter suggests that the elements that were missing were internal and external guarantees.[78] She argues that it was not until both parties agreed to allow outside enforcement by the UN (external guarantee) and the establishment of a dual administration within the state (internal guarantee) that both parties believed that each other's commitments would be kept and therefore formalized an agreement. Addressing the underlying issues was not enough in this case. Commitment problems prevented the

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[77] Walter, 146.
[78] Ibid., 153-5.

negotiations from progressing. Once they were adequately addressed, however, the agreement was signed and peace endured.

Rwanda

Another case that presents problems for the needs-based approach is Rwanda. The ethnic battle between the Hutu and Tutsi populations had been going on for years. The peace process that took place ended with the signing of the Arusha Peace Accords in 1993. Unfortunately, this agreement did not produce an end to the violence and the conflict continued. It was not a failure to account for the underlying issues, however, that made this agreement fail. The major issues of the conflict revolved around the lack of political access for the Tutsi minority within the state, which the accords attempted to accommodate. "The accords contained elaborate provisions for power-sharing in government; integration of the two armies; a detailed plan for the return of some soldiers to civilian life; procedures for democratization of Rwandan politics; and the establishment of a coalition transition government, the Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG)."[79] Even with these issues addressed, however, resolution was not achieved.

The conflict also had a mediator overseeing the peace process and deploying peacekeepers to help guard against extremist violence. Unfortunately, this mediator was not significantly devoted to the peace process. The UN "had no intention of robust peacekeeping" and therefore sent an inadequate number of troops.[80] Also, other international actors failed to assert any credible renunciation of the violence that was

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[79] Stedman, 21.
[80] Ibid., 22.

consuming the state. These factors encouraged the extremists to continue the use of violence. Finally, in 1994, the UN threatened to withdraw unless the parties fulfilled their commitment to peace. The Rwandan president responded by finally agreeing to implement the accords, only to be assassinated the same night by those who wished to prevent the accords from proceeding. The peace process fell apart completely after that and violence took over once again.

The major failure of this process was the third-party's lack of commitment to the peace process that would have been necessary to protect it from collapsing under the pressure of spoilers. If adequate protection had been offered to those who sought peace and measures had been taken to stop the spoilers from attacking the peace process, then the Arusha Peace Accords may have had a chance. When spoilers are handled improperly and allowed to infiltrate the peace process, peace may never be achieved.

The two cases, Mozambique and Rwanda, show that there are other elements to the peace process that must be considered before a lasting peace can be achieved. Addressing the underlying issues may not be enough if guarantees are not offered or if spoilers are allowed to take control of the situation. If commitment problems are adequately handled and spoilers are marginalized, however, then the peace process will have a substantially better chance of success.

COMBINING APPROACHES

Although the different approaches to conflict resolution discussed here all have their inadequacies for terminating conflict, the prospects for finding a successful approach are not hopeless. The different methods suggested by these various approaches

offer insightful hints as to which variables are necessary to successfully bring about the resolution of violent situations. Instead of narrowly defining the cause or dynamics of a conflict and attempting to resolve the situation by responding to those dynamics or causes, it would be better to view conflict resolution as a process involving various steps and requiring a mixture of strategies.

Many theorists have taken this multi-faceted approach by suggesting a combination of strategies to conflict resolution in order to achieve maximum success. This philosophy seems to offer the best chance at resolving intrastate conflicts and bringing an end to the violence. Peter Wallensteen, for instance, states that, "For actors and analysts concerned with conflict resolution it is an advantage to be accustomed to many approaches rather than one. These considerations suggest that they can be integrated into one scheme for conflict analysis."[81] He suggests an approach that attempts to alter behavior first so that the parties to a conflict may then search for compatible positions on shared needs and even attempt to create new institutions that will allow the parties to coexist peacefully.[82]

Ronald Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly also attempt to combine approaches by offering a contingency model of third-party intervention.[83] Their attempt is to combine mediation and consultation (problem-solving) in order to work towards the resolution of a conflict by matching the type of third-party intervention with the characteristics of the conflict.[84] Dean Pruitt suggests something similar. He says, "third parties need to use

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[81] Wallensteen, 50.

[82] Ibid., 59.

[83] Ronald J. Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly, "The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention," *Journal of Peace Research* 28, no. 1 (1991): 29-42.

[84] Ibid., 32.

heavier tactics with more intransigent disputants."[85] David Bloomfield builds upon the

Fisher and Keashly model as well.[86] He suggests that the settlement and resolution

dichotomized debate fails to produce the best approach to conflict resolution. Instead, he

argues that these approaches are complementary. Unlike Fisher and Keashly, who

suggest using the various techniques in different situations, Bloomfield argues that the

complementary approaches should be utilized simultaneously. By combing approaches

as each of these theorists do, mediators will have the best possible tools available for

conflict resolution and their chances of success will be greatly increased. Building on

these theorists' notions of complementarity, I will also offer a theory that synthesizes the

approaches already mentioned, emphasizing four key elements of the conflict resolution

process.

SUMMARY

As we have seen, each of the aforementioned approaches to conflict resolution

has been inadequate to resolve the discussed cases. Each approach was helpful in

addressing some of the circumstances involved in the conflicts, but none were capable of

responding to all of the circumstances. The result in each case was that one or more of

the factors that had provoked the conflict was left unaltered and provided a motivation for

continuing violence.

These cases demonstrated the necessity of addressing the underlying issues of a

conflict. In the case of Cyprus, attempting to alter the dynamics of the conflict was not

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[85] Dean G. Pruitt, "The Tactics of Third-Party Intervention," *Orbis* 44, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 7.
[86] Bloomfield, *Peacemaking Strategies*; David Bloomfield, "Toward Complementarity in Conflict Management: Resolution and Settlement in Northern Ireland," *Journal of Peace Research* 32, no. 2 (1995): 151-64.

enough to produce a lasting peace as long as the underlying issues continued to threaten each group's livelihood. Chechnya initially suffered from a lack of third-party assistance but even after this element was added and a mutually hurting stalemate existed, peace was not obtained because the underlying issues remained unresolved. Bosnia suffered from the same problem. Although third-party involvement created a ripe moment, and therefore the circumstances conducive to reaching a settlement, and peacekeepers have enforced a cessation of violence since then, the underlying issues of the conflict remain unresolved and threaten to stimulate violence once again if the peacekeepers leave.

The cases of Mozambique and Rwanda also proved to be problematic. For them, addressing the underlying issues was not the missing element. The Mozambique conflict had been stalemated and the central issues had been resolved for some time before a settlement was signed. In this case, the dynamics were not adequately altered to bring about peace until guarantees were offered in the form of third-party assistance and a dual administration to include both parties in the governmental process. For Rwanda, addressing the underlying issues and third-party assistance was not enough either. The third-parties involved were uncommitted to the peace process and failed to sufficiently alter the dynamics of the conflict or prevent spoilers from derailing the peace process. The conflict therefore continued. In each of these cases, violence continued to be a legitimate form of action as long as one or more of the motivations for violence was left unaltered.

This does not mean, however, that the approaches used in these cases and discussed in this chapter are not useful. In fact, each of them adds to the potential for success in the peace process. The dynamic, rational calculation, interest-based, and

identity-based approaches all highlight important factors, such as altering the conflict dynamics, third-parties, addressing the underlying issues, and track-two diplomacy, that are necessary to produce a lasting peace. The theorists who suggest combining approaches recognize the importance of each of these techniques and seek to combine them in ways that will be most advantageous to the conflict resolution process.

The dynamic approach argues that conflict is a product of the opposing parties' environment. They get trapped in a cycle of action-reaction which is characterized by conflict and violence and which is difficult to escape. The theorists in this school therefore argue that the solution to the problem lies in altering the dynamics of the situation so that the parties are able to escape the cycle in which they have been trapped. To do this, they suggest such techniques as establishing procedures and dialogue which can help guide parties away from the need to use violence and offer them other methods of resolving their disputes so that a settlement can be reached.

The rational calculation approach follows a similar path. It argues that conflict stems from the choices of rational actors who weigh the costs and benefits of violence and calculate that they will achieve more through its use. The solution for these theorists is to alter the cost/benefit calculation of the parties so that violence no longer produces more benefits, but instead exacts more costs. Third-parties are considered crucial to this process. Once the parties calculate that violence is no longer beneficial, these theorists argue a settlement can be reached.

The interest-based needs approach argues that parties engage in conflict because they are fighting over scarce resources, such as money, jobs, territory, or even access to the political system. In order to resolve the conflict, these resources must be equalized.

This could mean giving certain groups a role in the government, designing new institutions, or simply putting programs into place that will help equalize the distribution of jobs or housing. By equalizing the communities' resources, these theorists argue that the conflict will be resolved.

The identity-based needs approach suggests that opposing beliefs, values, or worldviews are the motivating factors behind conflict. These theorists argue that all humans have psychological needs that are fulfilled through their identification with different cultural groups. These groups often feel the need to protect and maintain their identities to such a degree that outsiders begin to look like enemies. This can create a mentality of 'us' versus 'them' and teach groups to hate one another.

In order to resolve the conflict, these theorists suggest using a problem-solving approach, also known as track-two diplomacy. They believe that bringing members of the opposing groups together to stimulate dialogue can help teach the people to stop hating each other. Then, they will be able to find a common ground from which to begin building a new relationship not centered on violence and hatred. Once this occurs, these theorists believe the conflict will be resolved.

Each of these approaches addresses the conflict resolution process by attempting to respond to the elements that the theorists believe are responsible for the violence in the first place. The problem, however, is that all of the elements may be partially responsible for the continuing violence. There may be several motivations for using violence and these may also evolve over time. Unless they are each addressed, they will continue to exist and the opposing groups will continue to believe that violence is a justified method of achieving their goals.

Realizing that the motivations for using violence are complex and can evolve over time helps explain why these approaches, by themselves, have failed. Failure comes when violence can still be legitimized by one or more of the opposing parties. This is why combining approaches offers the best hope for peace. Combining approaches means that all of the factors that have led to the conflict will be addressed and that the opposing parties will lose their ability to justify violence in the name of those factors. If the pertinent elements from each approach are combined to formulate a more systematic and comprehensive model for conflict resolution, intrastate conflicts will have a much better chance of being resolved.

CHAPTER III

OVERCOMING THE MOTIVATIONS FOR VIOLENCE

There can be many motivations for using violence and approaching the conflict resolution process by only addressing some of them will leave the conflict unresolved and the region involved prone to continued violence. One of the many reasons why ethnic conflicts last for so long is that these motivations for violence are numerous, complex, and tend to change over time. They can include a need to protect one's identity; a method of exacting social, economic, political, or territorial concessions; a desire to demonstrate the severity of one's feelings; hatred and revenge; a tool for influencing the peace process; or a method of everyday survival. These motivations can combine to create complex situations that are difficult to overcome. The peace process becomes more difficult because finding a solution to the conflict is not as simple as discovering its origin. The origin will remain an issue, but as the conflict progresses, the violent tactics used can be legitimized for various overlapping reasons.

In such circumstances, conflict resolution will have the best chance at success if those involved realize that the motivations for using violence can evolve over time and seek to address them from several perspectives. This can be accomplished by combining approaches to the conflict resolution process by responding to needs of the communities, providing an atmosphere for reconciliation, and altering the dynamics and cost/benefit ratios that have led the groups to choose violence. If the peace process can achieve these goals, violence will eventually become delegitimized and peace will be able to endure.

Before addressing what is necessary and sufficient to produce a systematic and comprehensive model of conflict resolution, it will first be necessary to examine the many motivations for the use of violence. Only if the motivations are recognized and understood, can negotiations make real progress in the peace process. Once these motivations have been examined, the conflict resolution model can be adequately designed to address them and move towards a lasting peace.

THE USE OF VIOLENCE

Normally, violence is related to politics through a state's right to use force, on which it supposedly has a monopoly. Individuals, on the other hand, are usually prohibited from using force and are expected to use other methods to achieve their goals, but nevertheless have repeatedly turned to violence in order to alter their life circumstances.[1] When individuals are unhappy with the existing order of authority and have a general distaste for the social conditions in which they live, they have been known to join forces in the quest for a better life and often unite to bring about a change, revolution, or liberation of their people. Under certain circumstances, this liberation may involve the use of violence and result in a prolonged war that is difficult to end. When communities within a state turn against each other or against the state itself, the state

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[1] For more on violence, see R. Scott Appleby, *The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000); David E. Apter, *The Legitimization of Violence* (Washington Square: New York University Press, 1996); Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (London: Penguin Books, 1965); Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1969); Christopher Dandeker, *Nationalism and Violence* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998); Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence," *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 3 (1990): 291-305; Mark Juergensmeyer, *Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1992); Rudolph J. Rummel, "Is Collective Violence Correlated with Social Pluralism?" *Journal of Peace Research* 34, no. 2 (1997): 163-75; Elizabeth A. Stanko, *The Meanings of Violence* (London: Routledge, 2003); Toft; Vamik Volkan, *Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997); Kenton Worcester, Sally Avery Bermanzohn, and Mark Ungar, *Violence and Politics: Globalization's Paradox* (New York: Routledge, 2002); Stephen Worth, *Written in Blood: Ethnic Identity and the Struggle for Human Harmony* (New York: Worth Publishers, Inc., 1999).

loses its monopoly on the use of force and order breaks down. The violence then continues until those involved are either permanently defeated or achieve their goals. The problem with intrastate conflicts, however, is that neither of these events may happen and the conflict may continue.

When a state is divided and the different communities are unable to defeat each other or achieve their ends, there is a continuing motivation for the use of violence. As long as the opposing groups are capable, they will continue to fight to secure their respective communities. They will not consider a voluntary cessation of violence until they feel that their security is intact. In ethnoreligious conflicts, where the opposing groups are fighting to secure their identity, security may be especially difficult to achieve.

In ethnoreligious conflicts, violence is often justified by the need to protect the group's identity. When ethnicity and religion form the fundamental core of a group's identity, they become the tools for mobilizing community support behind each group's goals as well as their tactics. When groups feel their identities and beliefs are under attack, they are more likely to see violence as a necessary and legitimate method of self-preservation. "The more moral the goal the easier it is to justify violence as a means of replacing the 'is' with the 'ought.'"[2] Leaders within the opposing groups realize this and will often characterize the conflict in ethnic or religious terms in order to justify their violent tactics and keep the conflict going until they achieve their own ends.

The violence, however, often does not stop after the attainment of the initial goals. As the conflict continues, violence has a way of sustaining itself.

> It is when events are incorporated into interpretive discourses embodied in discourse communities, that political violence not only builds on itself, but becomes both self-validating and self-sustaining. For those involved all one's

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[2] Apter, 16.

activities are redefined in terms of the needs and obligations of the movement itself. So a movement depends on violence to sustain its organization and the means of satisfying its needs.[3]

The longer the conflict exists, the more violence becomes imbedded in each community's way of life. The motivations evolve as the conflict proceeds. Violence may become a vehicle for exacting concessions, expressing one's emotions, a manner of exacting punishment or revenge, a tool for those who wish to influence a peace process, or just simply a way of fitting in and feeling a sense of belonging to the community itself. Each of these motivations gives individuals within the opposing groups a reason to use violence to obtain their goals and therefore prolongs the conflict. As the violence continues to dominate each group's way of life, they feel justified in its use and it becomes the legitimate mode of communication within the society. A look at these evolving motivations for violence will help explain the difficulties that lie ahead for any peace process which seeks to resolve the situation and bring the violence to an end.

IDENTITY NEEDS AS A MOTIVATION FOR VIOLENCE

In ethnoreligious conflicts, each community's fundamental goal is to secure the group's identity. This goal is viewed as essential to the group's continued existence. It therefore calls for extreme measures and justifies the use of violence as well. In order to understand how the protection of a group's identity can justify violence, it is necessary to understand the role identity plays within different societies and how it can become threatened by others.[4]

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[3] Ibid., 11.

[4] For more on the importance of identity, see Richard D. Ashmore, Lee Jussim, and David Wilder, *Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Resolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Byrne and Irvin; Kjell Goldmann, Ulf Hannerz, and Charles Westin, *Nationalism and Internationalism in the Post-*

Psychological Security

One of the most basic instincts of human life is the quest for survival which creates certain needs for individuals throughout their lives. For most people, this includes "the need for psychological security in the form of a predictable world, and the need for love (or belonging), self-esteem, and self-actualization."[5] This search for psychological security encourages individuals to seek out others with whom they can share common beliefs, goals, and values, thereby providing a stable order to their lives. The continuity of these elements between individuals produces a group identity which provides security for each individual within that group. This identity includes a "shared conception of its enduring characteristics and basic values, its strengths and weaknesses, its hopes and fears, its reputation and conditions of existence, its institutions and traditions, its past history, current purposes, and future prospects."[6] Over time, these shared elements become imbedded in and form the foundation of each individual's life. When this happens, things such as "language, religion, race, and territory provide the basic organizing principles of the human existence . . . and [divide] the species into culture-communities."[7] In these circumstances, the maintenance of the group identity becomes important to the individual because the group identity is linked to its own existence.

The development of various group identities can lead to conflict between groups as they struggle to preserve their respective ways of life.

Cold War Era (London: Routledge, 2000); Cathal McCall, *Identity in Northern Ireland: Communities, Politics and Change* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1999); Jeffrey R. Seul, "'Ours is the Way of God': Religion, Identity, and Intergroup Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 5 (1999): 553-69; Volkan; Worth.

[5] Seul, 554.

[6] Ibid., 556.

[7] Edward E. Azar and John W. Burton, *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice* (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), 68.

Contact, especially direct competition and conflict for scarce resources, facilitates in-group/out-group polarization. Through contact, interaction, and negotiation, groups identify perceived differences between "us" and "them." The cultural trait or value that acts as the basis for group differentiation becomes more salient because it is the marker used to maintain the group boundary and circumscribe any advantages associated with group membership. Ready available boundary markers include religion, ethnicity, and class.[8]

The dynamic that develops is one of "us" versus "them" as each group begins to see "the other" as a competitor and seeks to enhance and strengthen its own group cohesion in response. Although this dynamic may remain merely competitive, it may also turn into conflict. "When ethnic groups define and differentiate themselves, they almost invariably develop some prejudices for their own group and against the others' groups."[9] This prejudice can evoke intense feelings over time and create a hostile environment. In such circumstances, violence between groups can erupt as each seeks to defend its way of life against perceived threats from outsiders.

Different Forms of Identity

In the realm of international relations, group conflict has manifested itself in various forms, often depending on the manner in which the world has been ordered.[10] Historically, the world has seen a variety of ordering systems ranging from groups as small as tribes to those as large as empires. These groupings have been formed around numerous elements, including ethnicity and religion.[11] Ethnicity and religion have both played important roles in the political realm throughout history. They have provided

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[8] Robert M. Kunovich and Randy Hodson, "Conflict, Religious Identity, and Ethnic Intolerance in Croatia," *Social Forces* 78, no. 2 (December 1999): 647.
[9] Volkan, 22.
[10] For more on the relationship between world order and conflict, see Goldmann, Hannerz, and Westin.
[11] Michael E. Brown, *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 129.

order defining cultural frameworks for many civilizations around the world. These

cultural elements have been the basis for many group identities and have served as

mechanisms for both unification and mobilization for political purposes. Since the

advent of the nation-state within the Westphalian system, however, state divisions have

become the more prominent ordering framework in the world. Within this framework,

state nationalism, the commitment to promoting and defending the state's collective

culture and interests based on its territory, citizenship, and political principles, has

become the more common mode of unification and mobilization. This does not mean,

however, that nationalism has completely replaced ethnicity or religion. Instead, it seems

as if these elements have become intertwined with nationalism in many regions and

continue to form the foundations of our social consciousness alongside nationalism.

Civic Nationalism

Whether or not a state builds its identity on ethnicity and/or religion may depend

on the type of nationalism that develops and the criteria for membership.[12] Although

ethnicity and religion form the fundamental core identity of many societies around the

world, all nations do not attach significance to these elements in this manner. Nations

that do not build upon an ethnic or religious identity may develop a civic nationalism in

order to unify and mobilize their people. Civic nationalism differs from ethnic

nationalism in many ways.

> Civic nationalism is group identity that is composed of commitments to the
> nation's political creed. Race, religion, gender, language, or ethnicity are not
> relevant in defining a citizen's rights and inclusion within the polity. Shared
> beliefs in the country's principles and values embedded in the rule of law is the
> organizing basis for political order, and citizens are understood to be equal and

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[12] Goldmann, Hannerz, and Westin, 32.

rights-bearing individuals. Ethnic nationalism, in contrast, maintains that individual rights and participation within the polity are inherited - based on ethnic or racial ties.[13]

States that develop civic identities tend to see the individual as the primary unit within the state. This creates an individualistic notion of nationalism wherein individuals are seen as free and equal with rights, based on their humanity. In these states, ethnic identity loses its significance because it is an objective label which "denies the individual the freedom of choice and the right to self-determination, and makes an accident of birth, if not a census category, destiny."[14] Under individualistic nationalism, the nation is defined as the protector of the individual and puts the individual's interests first.

The criteria for membership in these types of nations is based on the acceptance of certain values such as equal opportunities, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.[15] Identification with a certain ethnicity, religion, or other cultural group will not prevent anyone from exercising their individual social, political, or constitutional rights. This means that, ethnic diversity is not a source of conflict because everyone is seen as equal by their mere humanity. Ethnicity has no political significance in these nations; it is relegated to the level of social interaction.

Ethnic Nationalism

Although many nations in the world today have created a civic identity, there are many who cling to their ethnic or religious identities for group cohesion and still others who are returning to their ethnic and religious roots in an attempt to ensure their survival.

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[13] John G. Ikenberry, *America Unrivaled* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 297.

[14] Goldmann, Hannerz, and Westin, 26.

[15] For more on civic nationalism, see Amitai Etzioni, *The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1996); Amitai Etzioni, *The Monochrome Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

Ethnic nationalism, for instance, "has been interpreted as a defense against the forces of modernization . . . that tend to create a sense of 'anomie' and a 'loss of identity.' Under these conditions, people may rediscover their ethnicity as a way of establishing the emotional security that comes from communal association."[16] These groups tend to maintain a collective sense of nationalism in which the "interests of the nation, in case of discrepancy, always take priority over the interests of the individuals, whose rights, in so far as they are acknowledged at all, can always be legitimately sacrificed to the good of the nation."[17] Under these circumstances, individual freedom can become suppressed and rejected as unrealistic and immoral.

In ethnically defined groups, the criteria for membership is not always easy to define. Fredrik Barth's depiction of ethnicity suggests that it is best understood as

> [a term to describe] groups and group identities that are in fact recognized in social life on the basis of a mixture of perceived cultural and social inheritance. On the one hand, that is to say, an ethnic identity is 'passed down': you have the identity of your parents and ancestors, and this tends to make ethnicity a matter of lay understandings of kinship and biology. On the other hand, one tends to recognize ethnic membership in terms of particular behavioral markers, which are interpreted to signify a shared and more or less enduring group culture (including, at different times and in different places, religion, language, customs, and so forth).[18]

Collectivist nationalism tends to coincide with the use of ethnic or religious criteria for membership because this type of criteria can easily lock members into a group for life. Individuals are designated to their respective ethnic or religious groups from birth and are expected to serve the interests of that community until they die. This leaves ethnicity as an inescapable defining label for those who live in societies that determine their

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[16] David Carment and Patrick James, *Peace in the Midst of Wars: Preventing and Managing International Ethnic Conflicts* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 4.
[17] Goldmann, Hannerz, and Westin, 32.
[18] Ibid., 7-8.

membership in this manner. An individual cannot be other than what he is and as long as he lives in such a society, his future will be determined by his past.

Groups that define their identities and structure their lives on the basis of their ethnicity or religion will most likely be in contact with other groups whose identities and ordering principles may or may not be at odds with their own. In fact, many of these groups can exist within a single state, making a clash of identities or ordering principles highly politicized and potentially confrontational.[19] Ethnic conflicts "'generally involve a clashing of interests in the struggle over rights: rights to land, education, the use of language, political representation, freedom of religion, the preservation of ethnic identity, autonomy, or self-determination, etc.'"[20] Groups who feel that their way of life could be threatened by other groups within their state or by the increasing interconnectedness of the world may become defensive and react by separating themselves from others both symbolically and literally. This can be seen at increasing levels around the world in the forms of cultural protectionism, fundamentalism, and intolerance. They may also take more violent actions which could result in genocide, war, or even terrorist activities in order to defeat those who threaten their group's livelihood. When ethnic differences are considered "culturally significant, they are magnified - often to the point of being turned into a cultural rift that cannot be bridged, which among other things, makes ethnic violence a possibility at any given moment and peace always unstable and precarious."[21]

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[19] For more on multiethnic states, see Brown; Chisholm and Smith; Montville; Rummel; Rodolfo Stavenhagen, *Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-State* (Houndmills: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996).

[20] Carment and James, *Peace in the Midst of Wars*, 3.

[21] Goldmann, Hannerz, and Westin, 26.

The Importance of Religion

Even more than ethnicity, religious differences have the potential to provoke

conflict and justify the use of violence because religion has such an important role in

identity formation.[22] One reason religion plays such an important role in identity is that it

provides the widest sense of psychological security that a person can experience.

> In all their multifarious expressions and dimensions, the world's religions answer
> the individual's need for a sense of locatedness - socially, sometimes
> geographically, cosmologically, temporally, and metaphysically. Religious
> meaning systems define the contours of the broadest possible range of
> relationships - to self; to others near and distant, friendly and unfriendly; to the
> nonhuman world; to the universe; and to God, or that which one considers
> ultimately real or true. No other repositories of cultural meaning have historically
> offered so much in response to the human need to develop a secure identity.
> Consequently, religion often is at the core of individual and group identity.[23]

Although there are many other characteristics of an individual or group that could define

its identity, no other element would play as expansive a role as that of religion. When

religion is part of the core identity, it is much more likely to dominate that identity than

other elements.

Religion can have such an important impact on identity because it makes claims

about the most fundamental elements of the human existence such as origin, truth, life,

and death. It deals with sacred spaces, rituals, and the supernatural.[24] By addressing the

answers to many of life's questions, religion attempts to provide a higher degree of

security to the individual or group by offering "a sense of seamless continuity between

[22] For more on the importance of religion, see Donald Harman Akenson, *God's Peoples: Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel, and Ulster* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Appleby; Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, *Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Jurgensmeyer; Mojzes; Pedro Ramet, *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989); Seul; Worth.
[23] Seul, 558.
[24] Appleby, 60-1.

past, present, and future."[25] This eternal linkage makes religion much more salient in identity formation than other elements.

Religion is also a significant element of identity because it requires loyalty. "When we say, then, that religious claims are absolute, we perceive that religion has always played a powerful role in cementing the loyalty of citizens . . ."[26] This loyalty is required because religion makes claims about truth and to disagree with certain aspects of a religion is to deny its truth. A person cannot believe part of one religion and part of another without being disloyal. "Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people."[27] A person can identify with multiple ethnic identities at one time, but to believe two opposing truths is to contradict oneself. In religion, a person must commit to "the" absolute truth or suffer the consequences. "You must give [the church] your undivided loyalty unless you want to end up in hell, purgatory, limbo, or some other similarly pleasant place."[28]

Since religion can play such an important role in identity formation, it can also become a source of conflict and justify the use of violence when a group's beliefs need to be protected. "One of the causes of conflict is inherent to religion's provision of 'the' ultimate meaning of life and a founding truth. For believers it is often difficult to tolerate other faiths that offer contrasting claims to truth; from symbolic confrontation this sometimes leads to violence, especially when the 'others' are regarded as apostates from the 'true' religion."[29] Opposing claims to truth can create an antagonistic relationship

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[25] Seul, 561.
[26] Ramet, 4.
[27] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 27.
[28] Ramet, 44.
[29] Anneke Galama and Paul van Tongeren, *Towards Better Peacebuilding Practice: On Lessons Learned, Evaluation Practices and Aid & Conflict* (Utrecht: European Center for Conflict Prevention, 2002), 244.

between various religious groups as each one denies the other's validity. The potential for violence is increased when religion is used for political purposes. "The politicization of religion and its extension into economic, political, and social institutions involve a struggle for resources and power. Taken together, unquestioned religious faith and the politicization of religion might lead to value conflict and intolerance between believers and nonbelievers."[30]

The level of importance religion plays in identity formation also explains the level of violence used when conflicts occur. The more important the subject matter, the more intense the feelings will be surrounding a conflict and the higher the level of violence will likely be. "The intensity of feelings which religions may arouse militates against the easy reconciliation of religious quarrels and invites violent solutions. Because religion can engender such intense feelings, a religious justification offered for a cause which might otherwise be justified on political or economic terms seriously influences the intensity of the violence used."[31]

As opposing parties in a conflict seek to protect their interests and achieve their goals, they often realize the necessity of maintaining community support. They would not be able to continue their efforts without the backing of their constituents. For this reason, leaders of these groups often utilize important elements of their group's identity in order to gain support. When religion forms part of the core of the identity, it can be used in this manner. "Decreasingly able to mobilize support and form coalitions on the basis of ideology, governments and groups will increasingly attempt to mobilize support by

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[30] Kunovich and Hodson, 645.
[31] Juergensmeyer, 121.

appealing to common religion and civilizational identity."[32] It is the expansiveness of religion, its importance, its ability to invoke intense feelings, and the requirement of loyalty that makes community leaders recognize the value it has for mobilizing support and even justifying violent tactics. "The interpretations and explanations need not be convincing to outsiders but to insiders, followers and supporting clienteles."[33] Leaders can use religious symbolism and dialogue to increase the importance of the issues they want to address while securing the loyalty of the group just as religious allegiance requires.[34] The use of religion to rally support in this manner is usually very effective for the leaders in these communities, but it also raises the likelihood of violence because the stakes are raised as issues become colored with religious symbolism.

Summary

As we have seen, identity is a crucial factor to the human existence. It provides the psychological security that people seek during their quest for survival. In those societies where ethnic nationalism defines a group's identity, the elements of ethnicity, religion, and culture divide people into groups of like and different and create an oppositional dynamic where those that are different become threats. The divisions within the society can then lead to conflict as each community seeks to secure its identity and protect its interests. In these circumstances, violence can become legitimized because the group feels its very existence is at stake. Each group will be motivated to use violence to protect themselves and the people will feel justified in their actions because they believe that their identities and therefore psychological security are under attack. In

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[32] Huntington, 29.
[33] Apter, 16.
[34] Juergensmeyer, 121-2.

ethnoreligious conflicts, therefore, identity needs must be addressed in order to resolve the conflict.

OTHER MOTIVATIONS FOR VIOLENCE

Social, Economic, Political, or Territorial Concessions

Although identity needs will play a significant role in ethnoreligious conflicts, groups will often be fighting for their needs in the form of social, economic, political, and/or territorial concessions as well.[35] It may not be simple enough to address the relationships between opposing identity systems. These groups will continue to feel the motivation to use violence as long as their interests are not being met. They will fight for their civil rights and may feel that violence is the best tactic to achieve concessions. In some cases, groups will simply be fighting over the possession of certain finite resources, such as territory, which the group may deem sacred or necessary to their existence. The groups that often feel suppressed within a multi-ethnic society are the minorities whose interests are sometimes overpowered by those of the majority.[36] Whatever the case may be, equalization of civil rights and resources will often be critical to the peace process.

Demonstration of Feelings

Although securing the group's identity and achieving certain concessions may be the initial and primary motivations for political violence, other motivations arise as the conflict progresses. For many, violence can become a method of making their feelings

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[35] For more on this discussion, see Brown; Byrne and Irvin; Worcester; Worth; Gurr.
[36] For more on this discussion, see Brown; Chisholm and Smith; Stavenhagen; Gurr.

known.[37] Whether or not violence changes the situation, some may use it to demonstrate outrage or disapproval of a certain event or situation. They may take part in violent demonstrations or protests or just cause destruction within the opposition's territory in order to show distaste for their poor living conditions or disapproval of certain policies. It may be simply an outlet to relieve frustration. In any case, these issues will need to be addressed in order to prevent such acts from reoccurring in the future.

Hatred and Tit-for-Tat Revenge

Violence can also spread within a conflict due to hatred or tit-for-tat revenge.[38] When one community suffers at the hands of its adversary, anger and hostility can build up and create the desire for retribution. This type of feeling can spiral out of control and stimulate a vicious cycle of violence which is difficult to escape. As long as hatred consumes the opposing groups, it will be difficult to end the violence. These groups will continue to feel their use of violence is acceptable, because they will not value the lives of those within the other group. As each group commits an act of violence, it will be met with another from the other side. Only if the cycle can be broken and new relationships built will the conflict end.

A Tool for Influencing the Peace Process

Violence can also be used as a tool or obstacle for influencing the peace process.

The most serious danger to intergroup mediation is escalating political violence.
Debilitating violence can be perpetrated by the parties to the talks - either as a

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[37] For more on this discussion, see Apter; Stanko; Worcester; Worth.

[38] For more on this discussion, see Hermann Giliomee and Jannie Gagiano, eds., *The Elusive Search for Peace: South Africa, Israel, Northern Ireland* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1990), 150; Volkan; Worth.

means of exit or as a beyond- the-table tactic to affect the pace, agenda, or balance of power - or by rejectionists who oppose the very idea of negotiation and seek victory through revolution or the exhaustion and withdrawal of their adversaries. Whatever its source, violence usually results in at least one party withdrawing from the talks and asserting that negotiation in such a climate is intolerable.[39]

Parties to a negotiation may attempt to use violence as leverage or to exert power, threatening to use it if their demands are not met. Even if an agreement is reached by the parties, dissenting groups may resort to violence to show their disapproval or to prevent the agreement from being implemented. In such circumstances, violence has become leverage or the means to influence the negotiation process.

Some dissenting groups, or spoilers, oppose any sort of negotiation at all.[40] "While people are being killed, entering into political negotiations with associates of those responsible for the deaths of one's own allies can easily be seen as betrayal rather than as a search for an honorable compromise."[41] Spoilers may use violence to ruin the negotiation process altogether because they do not agree with it, but this should not be allowed to happen. They must be defeated or marginalized so that their influence is no longer significant enough to derail the negotiations. Only then can progress be made.

Violence as a Way of Life

One final way in which the motivations for political violence can be transformed is when violence loses its political aim and instead becomes an end in itself, a source of empowerment, or a way of becoming part of the community.[42] Many who get caught up

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[39] I. William Zartman, *Preventative Negotiation: Avoiding Conflict Escalation* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), 81.

[40] For more on spoilers, see Stedman.

[41] Arthur Aughey and Duncan Morrow, *Northern Ireland Politics* (New York: Longman Publishing, 1996), 59.

[42] For more on this discussion, see Apter; Stanko; Worth.

in violence have learned to depend on it for their livelihoods. It may provide their only source of income. As violence becomes a 'normal' part of life, these groups begin to define their roles in society by it and it becomes a part of their identities. Only if these communities are rebuilt and identities are redefined on peaceful terms will the violence be able to end.

Summary

This section has examined the numerous and complex motivations for violence that often exist in ethnoreligious conflicts. Groups in these conflicts often feel that their identities and therefore existences are threatened and believe that violence is required to protect themselves and exterminate their enemies. They will also fight to secure their interests and use violence to extract concessions from their opponents. Even if these issues are addressed, however, violence can continue because it is a method of demonstrating feelings, a tactic of hate or revenge, a tool for influencing the peace process, or part of everyday life. All of these motivations will continue to justify the use of violence unless the peace process is designed to address them all.

FOUR STEPS TO PEACE: A MODEL FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The peace process will have a better chance of success if a combination of conflict resolution strategies is used. Each of the aforementioned approaches offers necessary elements for this combination. For instance, the interest-based approach demonstrates the necessity of addressing the underlying issues including social, economic, and political reforms to insure an equitable distribution of resources to the

various communities. The identity-based approach recognizes the problems of learned hatred, distorted perceptions, and opposing identity systems. It offers track-two diplomacy to help overcome these factors.

The dynamic approach underscores the importance of procedures, process, dialogue, and negotiation. It emphasizes how these factors can help parties transcend the existing conflict. If those involved in the conflict are excluded from experiencing these factors during the peace process, their behavior will not be altered and they will most likely continue to use violent tactics to achieve their goals. Inclusiveness in the peace process, therefore, is essential.

Finally, from most of these theories, but especially from the dynamic and rational calculation approaches, we learn the importance of third-party mediators who are necessary to alter the dynamics or cost-benefit ratio of a conflict situation. The rational calculation approach helps us understand that actors are rational and base their decisions on a cost-benefit calculation. One of the critical aspects of conflict resolution, therefore, is to alter the situation so that the use of violence no longer produces more benefits than costs. This can be accomplished by third-party mediators who are able to alter the dynamics of the conflict. They can use threats or offer benefits and guarantees to the opposing parties in order to bring them to the negotiation table and help them reach a compromise.

By combining the elements from the dynamic, rational calculation, interest-based and identity-based approaches, a more systematic and comprehensive conflict resolution strategy can be developed which will offer the best chance for peace. Four key elements can be drawn from these theories to develop a model for overcoming violent conflict.

The four key elements of the conflict resolution process that will be necessary in order to delegitimize the use of violence are *the response to the underlying issues, track-two diplomacy, inclusiveness in the peace process,* and *the use of third-party mediators* who are able to alter the dynamics of the conflict enough to bring the parties to a settlement.

Response to the Underlying Issues

In order to resolve the conflict and produce a lasting peace, the underlying issues must be acknowledged and adequately addressed. This element of the conflict resolution process will respond to the desire for social, economic, territorial, and political concessions that motivate the opposing groups to use violence. It will also help rebuild the society so that these groups will not be reliant on violence to survive. The underlying issues cannot be neglected because they will continue to justify the use of violence if they are allowed to persist. "Attempts at settlement or control of a crisis that do not tackle the deeper dynamics underlying the crisis will be temporarily successful at best. Moreover, the intractable and entangled nature of issues in protracted social conflicts involving the struggle over communal needs and demands reduces the efficacy of third-party assistance. Indeed, there are no 'quick fix' solutions to these problems."[43]

Addressing the underlying causes of a conflict will include tackling issues in the social, economic, and political realms. In ethnic conflicts, the parties will want to feel as though their respective identities are secure. This may include addressing issues of language, culture, and religion. There should also be an equitable distribution of resources (including land, employment, education, etc.) and confidence building measures to reassure the parties that the changes will last.

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[43] Azar, *Protracted Social Conflicts*, 18.

Most importantly, the parties will require political access. Without a voice in the political system of the state, the parties will continue to feel excluded and unrepresented in the affairs which govern their livelihoods. They will make demands for political access "since redress at the hands of others is no longer trusted."[44] This may be the most important element of the resolution process because it provides a non-violent mode of change that was previously absent and partially responsible for creating the circumstances which justified the use of violence in the first place. This part of the peace process may involve setting up institutions that allow each group to participate in the political system, such as a power-sharing government. Once a group is able to realize their political influence, they will be more likely to turn away from violence. If the political matters, along with the social and economic ones, are adequately addressed during the peace process and sincere efforts are made to find equitable solutions, the parties will have made significant progress towards establishing a lasting peace.

Track-Two Diplomacy

The next important element of the peace process will be track-two diplomacy, which will respond to the identity conflict and hatred between the opposing groups and help redefine their relationships in non-violent ways. These initiatives are not connected to formal government agencies, but are organized by non-profit organizations, academics, or other such agencies interested in facilitating cross-community dialogue and relationship-building. Azar's problem-solving workshops would be important to this phase of the conflict resolution process in order to alter the negative perceptions and learned fear and hatred of the other community.

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[44] Zartman, "Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts," 5.

As the motivations for violence evolve over time, it becomes harder to overcome the conflict. The two communities have learned to hate each other. They feel as though their identities are at stake and have learned to see the 'other' as an enemy. They have been taught to use violence to express their emotions and have gotten caught up in a cycle of tit-for-tat revenge. Violence has become their way of life. If these obstacles are to be surmounted, the peace process must do more than just respond to the underlying issues or establish a settlement. It must also help facilitate dialogue, alter negative perceptions, help establish common interests and goals, and help establish new relationships between the communities built on respect and civility rather than hatred and violence. Only then will the parties be able to move past their history of violence and into a more peaceful existence.

Inclusiveness

The next crucial element of the conflict resolution process is inclusiveness, which will alter the dynamics of the conflict so that the parties do not use violence to make their feelings known, exact concessions, or influence negotiations. When the peace process is taking place, repeatedly refusing to include certain parties will only prolong the use of violence. Although exclusion from the negotiations can be used as leverage to get the parties to agree to certain terms, it should be recognized that the exclusion of important parties will leave the matter unresolved. "Ethnic conflicts cannot be resolved without the consent and cooperation of the adversaries. While it is difficult to identify all the parties to conflicts within states (and often impossible for states to agree on their status), the

failure to acknowledge movements with popular support may undermine moderates, accelerate militancy, and lead to escalating violence."[45]

Another element to consider is that if parties are excluded from the negotiation process, it will be much more difficult to have an influence on their perspectives and decisions. Part of the goal of the talks is to modify violent behavior by helping the parties overcome their negative perceptions of each other as well as misunderstandings and miscommunications. The parties need to experience the procedures, process, negotiations, and dialogue involved in the peace process in order to embrace the value of non-violent tactics. Once they see their ability to effect change without resorting to violent means, progress will begin to be made. To be effective therefore, the conflict resolution process must involve a high level of participation.[46] If certain parties are consistently excluded, they will not make progress. It is often this sort of exclusion that legitimized the use of violence in the first place.

Inclusion in the peace process is also a tactic for handling spoilers. Stephan Stedman offers three strategies for handling spoilers. He says that custodians of the peace process can use inducement (giving the spoiler what it wants), socialization (changing the behavior of the spoiler to adhere to a set of established norms), or coercion (punishing spoiler behavior or at least reducing the capacity of the spoiler to destroy the peace process) in order to manage spoilers.[47]

Total spoilers (those who want all of their demands met or else will not consider peace) cannot be accommodated; therefore they must be defeated or so marginalized that they cannot mobilize enough support to wreck the peace process. Most likely these

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[45] Carment and James, *Peace in the Midst of Wars*, 7.
[46] Burton, 98.
[47] Stedman, 12.

spoilers will resist any efforts to negotiate a peace and even seek to destroy the peace process all together. Inclusion of these spoilers in the peace process therefore will be unproductive and only harm the process.

Limited spoilers (those with limited goals) and greedy spoilers (those whose goals expand or contract based on their cost-benefit calculation), on the other hand, can be accommodated by using inducement and socialization tactics in order to bring them in to the peace process. Inducement and socialization allow the spoiler to be included in the peace process where they will be able to take part in establishing a peace that they will have a stake in and want to see succeed. The main concern is preventing spoilers from derailing the peace process and the less they participate, the more justification they will have for continuing the disruption of negotiations.

Third-Party Assistance

Finally third-party mediators will play an important role in getting the peace process started, keeping it going, and providing guarantees. Their presence will help alter the dynamics of the conflict so that the cycle of violence is broken and progress can be made. Third-parties who have a pre-existing good relationship with those involved in the conflict will be especially beneficial to the peace process because they will be respected and trusted to establish fair and equitable solutions. When third-parties enter the negotiation process, they bring in a new perspective that can help alter the opposing parties' views. They may also change the calculation of costs and benefits by promising to impose punishments or provide rewards for the parties' actions. They can stimulate

communication, develop possible solutions, or use manipulation and persuasion to entice agreement.[48]

Third-parties can also alter the dynamics of the situation by turning an internal matter into an international issue.[49] Once third-parties have entered the scene, international attention on the issue can have repercussions for those who appear to be prolonging the conflict. Third-parties may exert pressure through various channels such as their economic ties or they may simply condemn the actions and turn international opinion against the responsible parties. The parties may be more willing to find an agreement once they know their actions are being judged and scrutinized by others. Lastly, third-parties can offer various guarantees to the opposing parties by promising to oversee the transition to the new political system or send peacekeeping troops in order to provide protection from extremists who may wish to sabotage the process. The agreement must not be completely dependant on third-party participation; however, it must be able to withstand the third-party's absence when it is time to leave.

Applicability

This conflict resolution model is designed specifically with intrastate ethnoreligious conflict in mind, where identity, distribution of status and resources, and intergroup dynamics typically play a role. Each conflict situation, however, will have a

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[48] For more on the role of third-parties, see David Carment and Dane Rowlands, "Three's Company: Evaluating Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 5 (October 1998): 572-99; Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson, and Pamela Aall, *Managing Global Chaos* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 445-61; Tom Princen, "Camp David: Problem-Solving or Power Politics as Usual?" *Journal of Peace Research* 28, no. 1 (1991): 57-69.
[49] For more on the impact of the international community, see Michael Cox, "Bringing in the 'International': the IRA ceasefire and the end of the Cold War," *International Affairs* 73, no. 4 (1997): 671-93; Gerard Delanty, "Negotiating the Peace in Northern Ireland," *Journal of Peace Research* 32, no. 3 (August 1995): 257-64; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 346.

unique set of circumstances that will make it different than others. The conflict resolution process therefore may need to be customized to fit each situation. For instance, one conflict may center around the identity issues and track-two diplomacy will be crucial. Another conflict may be concerned more with the equitable distribution of political, social, or economic resources and a response to these underlying issues will be the most important dimension of the process.

The model is intended to counter all of the relevant factors of a conflict so that the motivations for violence can be removed. Each element of the model therefore should be weighted according to its relevancy and utilized as needed. The point is to realize that conflicts are not one-dimensional situations. The causes of conflict and the motivations for violence are complex. A multi-dimensional conflict resolution process is necessary to end the violence and resolve the conflict. If all of the dimensions are not incorporated, the conflict will continue.

Summary

The four elements, *response to the underlying issues, track-two diplomacy, inclusiveness in the peace process,* and *third-party assistance,* make up the model for addressing conflict resolution in such a manner that will respond to and delegitimize the complex and evolving motivations for violence involved in ethnoreligious conflicts. Drawing from the interest-based approach to conflict resolution, I suggest that responding to the underlying issues of a conflict will remove the grievances surrounding social, economic, territorial, and political issues. Once these issues are addressed, however, the conflict could continue unless the other elements of the peace process are utilized as well.

To help overcome the learned hatred and fear of the opposing communities, track-two diplomacy should be pursued by neutral mediators who can help facilitate dialogue and transform the existing relationships. This element of the peace process is an ongoing one and will need to continue for some time into the future. Reforming an ingrained, hostile relationship will not be an easy task, but it is essential to a lasting peace.

Inclusiveness of the negotiation process will alter the dynamics of the conflict and also alter the cost/benefit ratio of the opposing parties. By including the parties in the peace process, they are given a stake its outcome. This makes them more likely to seek an agreement's implementation and ensure its success. Excluded parties will feel their interests have been disregarded and will continue to seek their goals through the only methods they believe will work, i.e. violent methods. Inclusiveness in the peace process will influence the perceptions of the parties and help alleviate the problems of miscommunication and lack of trust. It will also show the opposing groups that non-violent methods can produce change even more effectively than violent ones.

The participation of third-parties is also critical to the conflict resolution process and will help alter the dynamics of the conflict as well as alter the cost/benefit ratio of the opposing parties. When third-parties enter the scene, they may be able to foster communication, provide workable solutions, offer incentives, or threaten sanctions. Their presence will help break a deadlock that the parties have been unable to move past. They can also provide commitments and guarantees that will help establish trust in the settlement terms. Third-parties therefore create an important element of the peace process.

Individual conflict resolution approaches failed because they allowed violence to remain a justified and legitimate tactic for the opposing parties. Combining key elements from each approach will thwart violence and ensure a lasting peace. Success in the resolution of conflicts, in other words, will be possible when there is a *response to the underlying issues*, *track-two diplomatic* initiatives take place, *inclusiveness* in the peace process is pursued, and *third-parties* are brought in to help formulate and guarantee an agreement. Under these circumstances, the level of violence will decline as violence itself becomes delegitimized.

CHAPTER IV

NORTHERN IRELAND: BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT

Now that the important elements of the conflict resolution process have been identified, they can be examined in the case of Northern Ireland. Before comparing the failure and success of two of the peace processes, however, it is first necessary to explore the roots of the conflict. Only by recognizing and understanding the people's motivations for violence will the failures and successes of the peace processes be apparent.

The Northern Ireland conflict has existed for centuries and over the years, numerous factors have played a role in stimulating the use of violence. When Great Britain colonized the island, conflict set in and divided the society into opposing ethnic and religious groups. From there, oppressive majority politics took over and divided the communities socially, economically, politically and territorially. Throughout the years, reoccurring battles erupted over the island as each community fought to protect its interests. As the oppressed became more and more discouraged, they decided that violence would be necessary to achieve their goals. As violence became ingrained in their everyday lives, peace seemed like an unobtainable objective.

Finally, in the 1970s, a long succession of attempts began in order to resolve the Northern Ireland conflict. As each attempt failed, those who sought peace tried to learn from their mistakes and search for various alternatives and tactics that could lead them to it. It was not until the Good Friday Agreement, however, that significant progress was made and the potential for peace appeared to exist.

A look at the roots of the conflict and the string of attempts that took place to resolve them will provide background information that will be necessary to assess the failure and success of two of the peace processes. The roots of the conflict will outline the relevant factors that would need to be addressed by the conflict resolution process such as the underlying issues, the hostile relationships, and the conflict oriented dynamics. Then a look at the many attempts to resolve the conflict over the years will demonstrate why the violence continued despite many concerted efforts to bring it to an end. After this section, a more in-depth look at two of the negotiations processes will demonstrate how peace was brought to the region.

THE ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT

Colonization

The initial motivation for violence within Northern Ireland stemmed from the desire of each community within the region to prevent or overcome their own oppression. The fear of this oppression developed from the interactions of a segregated society which was set in motion by British colonization. For centuries, Northern Ireland has been a segregated region divided by religion, class, ethnicity, and political allegiance.[1] In the early 1600's, the British began a more widespread colonization effort in Ireland and encouraged many English and Scottish settlers to move there. These settlers, however, did not integrate with the Irish natives once they made their home on the island. This was

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[1] For more on this discussion, see Fionnuala Ni Aolain, "Where Hope and History Rhyme - Prospects for Peace in Northern Ireland?" *Journal of International Affairs* 50, no. 1 (Summer 1996): 63-89; John Darby, *Northern Ireland: The Background to the Conflict* (Syracuse: Appletree Press, 1983); Mari Fitzduff, *Beyond Violence: Conflict Resolution Process in Northern Ireland* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2002); Thomas Hennessey, *A History of Northern Ireland 1920-1996* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); Peter Rose, *How the Troubles Came to Northern Ireland* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 2000); Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, *The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict, and Emancipation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

partially due to the deliberate British colonial strategy of segregation meant to maintain their control over the colony.[2] This created a divided society and conflict between the occupiers and the occupied. The British came in and set up new systems of law and governance, enacting codes which deprived the Irish of equal rights. The Irish were removed from their land, replaced by British settlers, and forced to live as tenants on the poorest lands of Ireland. The oppression that was enacted on the Irish community reflected the British desire to maintain control of the land.

Religion

Religion was another factor that segregated the people of Northern Ireland.[3] From the time the British colonized the island, the differences between the two versions of Christianity, Protestantism and Catholicism, divided the people. The British settlers who colonized Northern Ireland mostly came from two different backgrounds. They tended to be either English Anglicans or Scottish Presbyterians. The native Irish, on the other hand, were Roman Catholic. The fundamental ideological split between these forms of religion played a tremendous role in keeping the population segregated. This segregation, in turn, would play a considerable role in the use of violence. "Within Northern Ireland, on a 'local level it is often religious segregation, especially in towns, which converts distrust and dislike into violence.'"[4]

Religion was so ingrained in each community's identity that it defined their political motivations and goals and placed each community on opposing teams viewing

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[2] Fitzduff, 1.
[3] For more on this discussion, see Akenson; Appleby; Apter, 234-91; Ashmore, 133-58; Giliomee.
[4] Darby, 151.

each other as the enemy.[5] Although the Protestants were originally a minority on the

entire island, they felt secure because they were under British rule and had been given

control over the region. Once Ireland won its freedom, the Protestants in the north feared

they would lose their civil and religious liberties if they were forced to live within a

Catholic state. This fear prompted them to seek the partition that created Northern

Ireland. "Ultimately, Ulster became the small state called 'Northern Ireland' because the

Protestants of the north refused to live within the borders of a Catholic state and were

willing to go to war to prevent such an occurrence."[6]

Once Northern Ireland came into existence, the Protestant community became the

majority and they sought to maintain complete control over the community by structuring

it in such as manner as to suppress any potential for Catholic influence.

> Given the dualistic nature of the Ulster society and the character of the covenantal
> cultural grid of the dominant group in Ulster's Protestant culture, the
> Presbyterians, it was inevitable that the state of Northern Ireland would
> institutionalize strong patterns of discrimination by Protestants against Roman
> Catholics. How could it have been otherwise? Had the leaders of the new state
> been nonjudgmental and nondiscriminatory, they would have been untrue to the
> culture that supported the state . . . Anyone who has made a covenant with God
> and with fellow believers can be nonjudgmental only by breaking those vows. To
> be true to its God, a covenantal society is constrained to act in ways that appear,
> to outsiders, to be unjust to others. The covenantal commitment to tilting the state
> in favor of their own tribe was reinforced by the Protestant's perpetual anxiety
> about "the enemy".[7]

The religious division within the Northern Ireland population created a dynamic which

turned the two communities against each other and into enemies.

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[5] For an alternative view arguing that the conflict was not really a religious one, see Saul Newman, *Ethnoregional Conflict in Democracies: Mostly Ballots, Rarely Bullets* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996), 150.
[6] Akenson, 149-50.
[7] Ibid., 193.

Economics

The two communities within Northern Ireland were segregated by more than just religion. They were divided economically as well.[8] When the British colonized the island and placed the power in the hands of the Protestants, they were in fact giving them the power to build a community on the foundations of inequality and injustice. The British Protestants who settled in Ireland viewed the Irish Catholics as backward. They were seen as a backward and rural people who could not achieve success in the economic realm. The Protestants continued reinforcing this stereotype by hindering Catholic economic progress through inequalities in land ownership and job discrimination.

Another element that increased the split between the two communities was the industrial revolution.

> Industrialization . . . actually reinforced traditional social structures . . . the north of Ireland . . . was the only part of Ireland to join the world of the British industrial revolution . . . The rest of Ireland remained precapitalist in parts and overwhelmingly agricultural throughout. Thus, there arose an obvious distinction between what Ulster Scots perceived as the backward and lazy south, the land of the Irish Catholic natives, and their own hard-working, risk-taking, entrepreneurial north.[9]

This economic segregation between the Protestants and the Catholics created an inequality which generally allowed the Protestants to become wealthy while the Catholics remained poor.

Culture

Segregation within Northern Ireland goes beyond religion and economics and can

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[8] For more on the economic issues of Northern Ireland, see Henry Patterson, *Ireland Since 1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 139-47 and 187-92; Sabine Wichert, *Northern Ireland since 1945* (New York: Longman, Inc., 1999), 19-35; Ruane and Todd, *Conflict in Northern Ireland*, 150-77; Aughey and Morrow, 121-8; Giliomee, 136-48; Darby, 79-109; Fitzduff, 19-29.

[9] Akenson, 144.

be found in almost every aspect of everyday life. There is a basic division in culture

between the two communities.[10] It is more than just a Protestant/Catholic dynamic; it is

also a British/Irish one. The Protestants who settled in Northern Ireland came with a

British identity which continued to define their existence just as the Catholics continued

to cling to their Irish heritage. The two communities claimed different ancestral ties,

cultural traditions, and even languages. They lived in separate neighborhoods, educated

their children in different schools, and participated in separate activities.[11] For example

in sports, the Catholics tended to stick to Gaelic football, camogie, and hurling; whereas

Protestants played rugby, hockey, and cricket. They socialized in different pubs,

belonged to different unions, and attended different churches. Each also had its own

cultural celebrations, music, and dancing. Symbols such as flags typically demarcated

their respective territories and allegiances, making 'ownership' easily identifiable. In such

circumstances, the two communities remained heavily isolated from each other and each

learned to view the other as different, creating a dynamic of us and them.[12]

Politics

The religious, economic, and cultural differences between the two communities

within Northern Ireland have also created a split within the political realm.[13] When

Ireland won its freedom, the Protestants became worried about their economic, cultural,

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[10] For more on the division of cultures, see Paul Dixon, *Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), 19-23; Ruane and Todd, *Conflict in Northern Ireland*, 178-203; Aughey and Morrow, 157-210; Darby, 110-50; Fitzduff, 59-71.

[11] Fitzduff, 4-6.

[12] Ibid., 31.

[13] For more on the politics of Northern Ireland, see John McGarry, *Northern Ireland and the Divided World: The Northern Ireland Conflict and the Good Friday Agreement in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Ruane and Todd, *Conflict in Northern Ireland*, 116-49; Hennessey, 1997; Wichert; Darby; Rose; Aughey and Morrow.

and religious future and immediately moved for partition in order to maintain ties with Great Britain. "Ulster Protestant fears of living in a nationalist Ireland were threefold: they expected the new nation to be industrially backward and, in all probability, economically isolationist; they feared an onslaught upon their own culture; and they believed that in a nationalist dominated Ireland, the Roman Catholic Church would directly reduce Protestant civil liberties."[14]

The Protestants were successful in obtaining the 1921 partition, and Northern Ireland was established under Protestant control. They became the majority who controlled the political reality of the state, which would be defined in Protestant terms. "The chief way in which the . . . Ulster state bore down on the northern Catholics was in reminding them, day after day, that the state was not theirs. What the Protestants communicated so well was that for 'us,' the Protestants, Ulster is ours, the land, the state, and what-we-have-we-hold."[15] The Catholics, who had once been a majority on the island, were now the minority within the separate state and they feared and resented the discrimination that would follow.[16]

Each side's political stances were influenced by the fear of oppression. The Protestants became unionists because they wanted to maintain ties with Great Britain and prevent losing control due to their minority status. The Catholics became nationalist because they wanted to break ties with Great Britain and attain self-determination by joining the rest of Ireland in its freedom. Unfortunately for the nationalists, Protestant control over the region meant that unionist politics would prevail.

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[14] Akenson, 184.
[15] Ibid., 201.
[16] Darby, 151-80.

Voting and Policing

The Protestant dominated territory left Catholics alienated as they were discriminated against and either prevented or deterred from participating in politics and the justice system.[17] "The festering situation in Northern Ireland refused to go away, due to systematic discrimination and official injustice aimed at the minority Catholic Nationalist population by the Protestant Unionists who continued to hold absolute political and economic power through a system of apartheid, gerrymandering and vote-rigging."[18] The gerrymandering and vote-rigging indirectly prohibited Catholics from receiving representation in politics and therefore prevented them from utilizing political methods to overcome their oppression.

The police force within Northern Ireland also lacked Catholic representation. When the new Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) was created in 1922, it was meant to employ proportional amounts of both Catholics and Protestants; however, Catholic distrust of the state and the exchange of political pressures and threats from both sides deterred Catholics from joining the police force. "The innate suspicion of the power systems of the Northern Ireland state shared by most Catholics inevitably led them to remain suspicious of what they saw as the biased power of the police."[19] Catholic distrust of the police force and therefore the justice system in general, as well as their inability to fully participate in the political realm, heightened their feelings of vulnerability within the state and left them looking for alternative measures of protection.

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[17] For more on the problems of voting and policing, see John Hume, *A New Ireland: Politics, Peace and Reconciliation* (Boulder: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1996); Darby, 32-60; Fitzduff, 73-87; Aughey and Morrow, 103-10.

[18] Hume, 15.

[19] Fitzduff, 7.

Summary

All of these factors played a role in the Northern Ireland conflict. With colonization, the communities became segregated and the Irish Catholic people were oppressed. They were economically, culturally, and politically disadvantaged and felt that their Irish Catholic identity was threatened. The British Protestants, who were originally a minority on the island, were not oppressed but also feared for their identities unless the Catholics were continuously suppressed. As each group felt more and more threatened and helpless to bring about change through political means, many turned to violence in order to protect themselves and gain concessions that would improve their lives.

A VIOLENT HISTORY

Republican Paramilitaries

As the Catholic community felt more and more helpless to change its living conditions and looked for alternative measures of protection, republican paramilitary groups and their violent tactics began to gain legitimacy within Northern Ireland.[20] These paramilitary groups believed that they were justified in using violence to achieve a united Ireland as called for in the constitution of the Irish Republic, whose statehood had been obtained through the use of violence as well.[21] The republican paramilitaries felt violence was justified because they were involved in a war of liberation to free the Irish people and restore their civil liberties. They also legitimized their actions as defense for Catholics who were being targeted by the Protestant community.

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[20] For more on the republican traditions of violence, see Fitzduff, 89-117; Darby, 181-96; Giliomee, 149-74; Aughey and Morrow, 159-72; Apter, 234-91; Stanko, 184-202 and 224-42; Montville, 151-9.

[21] Aughey and Morrow, 161.

The support they received from the community in response to their actions

heightened their sense of justification as well as enabled their continued use of violence.

> Neither side had substantial electoral constituency, but each had what might be
> called a 'passive constituency' that was very broad - that is, communities that
> would not affirmatively or openly support paramilitary violence but would accept
> whatever advantages terrorists attacks offered to their larger political objective.
> At ground level, these groups therefore were inclined to acquiesce rather than
> oppose. Tolerance at the community level was essential to allow the conflict to
> continue in Belfast and Derry, where terrorism was heaviest. These cities are
> segregated on an atomized level- neighborhood by neighborhood - which
> necessitated conflict in very close quarters. Without at least some local support,
> the paramilitaries could not have staged attacks with the frequency that they did,
> and they could not have evaded the security forces as successfully.[22]

Without community support, these organizations would have had a much more difficult

time continuing their efforts. Many supporters assisted paramilitary activities by

providing safe houses, hiding weapons, and providing financial support. Community

support also encouraged the paramilitary groups to have a negative attitude towards

politics because "their continued capacity to pursue the armed struggle suggested that

they already enjoyed adequate real support, rendering a broader political mandate

unnecessary."[23] This attitude would evolve over time, however, as paramilitary groups

increasingly found value in the political system.

Loyalist Paramilitaries

The Protestants also developed paramilitary organizations within Northern

Ireland, but their justification for violence stemmed from defense of Protestants and the

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[22] Jonathan Stevenson, *"We Wrecked the Place": Contemplating an End to the Northern Irish Troubles* (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 23.
[23] Aughey and Morrow, 163.

state.[24] The loyalist paramilitaries believed that it was necessary and legitimate for them to use violence to defend the state in support of the constitutional authorities since, in their view, the state agencies were incapable of counteracting republican violence on their own.

> Like their republican counterparts, the loyalist paramilitaries constantly tried to legitimize their violent activities and once again the parasitical relationship between the paramilitary adversaries was apparent, with the need for defence being an important weapon in the loyalist theoretical armoury just as it was for republicans. Loyalist paramilitaries also reserved the right to punish criminals operating in their areas. Finally, in broader political terms, the loyalist paramilitaries sought to legitimate their violence by arguing that their objectives were the same as those of the British security forces, or would be if the British government could be trusted as a true defender of the Union. Because the police and army were subject to constraints in their battle with republican terrorists, the 'pro-state' violence of loyalists was held to be justified. Above all, however, they felt justified in doing whatever was necessary to defend the Union even if this meant opposing the security forces and the policies of the British government.[25]

As long as the loyalists felt the union with Britain was insecure and that the livelihood of the Protestant community was at stake, they would use the necessary means to protect their interests.

Although they believed their actions to be legitimate, the loyalists did not attain a strong level of community support as the republicans did. The Protestant community was increasingly disturbed by the violent methods of the loyalist paramilitaries and their targeting of Catholic civilians. In addition, most unionists viewed the legitimate defense of Northern Ireland as the responsibility of the security forces and not paramilitary organizations. Nevertheless, loyalist paramilitaries continued to use violence in order to further their cause just like the republicans did as each organization fed off the others' actions in order to justify their own use of violence.

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[24] For more on the loyalist traditions of violence, see Fitzduff, 89-117; Darby, 181-96; Giliomee, 149-74; Aughey and Morrow, 159-72; Apter, 234-91; Stanko, 184-202 and 224-42; Montville, 151-9.

[25] Aughey and Morrow, 164.

As each community felt increasingly insecure, both paramilitary groups stepped up their efforts to defend their people. The use of violence may not have been a welcomed tactic at first, but as time went on, many saw it as necessary. Each community was so frustrated and angry that violence would soon become common practice and consume Northern Ireland in every aspect of life. As the hatred and fear grew, it would become increasingly difficult to stop the cycle of violence and establish any sort of peace.

The Troubles Begin

Although paramilitary groups had been in existence for quite some time, there was a surge of violent activity in 1969 which led to the beginning of the era known as the Troubles.[26] The tremendous sense of injustice and inequality felt by the Catholic community motivated their actions throughout the civil rights campaign. They wanted to redress the imbalances within the community including housing, voting, employment, education, and policing. The Catholic civil rights campaign, however, was met with hostile reactions by the Protestant community who viewed civil rights reform as a potential threat to Protestant hegemony in Northern Ireland. "These very reforms increased fear among protestants and certainly gave extremist politicians . . . renewed support."[27]

It was not only the acknowledgment of Catholic civil liberties, however, that upset the Protestant community. The civil rights campaign had increasingly become defined in terms of the border issue which created fear among Protestants and caused

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[26] For more on the Troubles, see Jack Holland, *Hope Against History: The Course of Conflict in Northern Ireland* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1999); Rose; Hennessey, 1997; Darby; Dixon; Ruane and Todd, *Conflict in Northern Ireland*; Fitzduff; Montville, 133-50.
[27] Wichert, 111.

their violent reaction. "It was the threat to the border posed by Catholic radicals, not the recognition of Catholic civil rights per se, that panicked the Protestant community into sectarian agitation."[28]

Even though the Catholics had attained many advances in their civil rights, including their principle demand of one man - one vote, they continued their civil rights marches, grew impatient with the reform process, and began to transform their goals. Instead of civil rights, they were increasingly concerned with the more unrealistic aim of erasing the border. As they lost hope of achieving total equality within the existing state structure, their methods became more violent and their primary goal became a united Ireland. "Republicanism had now artificially raised the stakes of the Catholic civil rights movement from local conditions to national sovereignty."[29] The violent reactions encountered by the Catholics justified the nationalist armed struggle even further. The civil rights campaign soon lost its focus as violence took center stage and civil rights issues were pushed into the background. "[The republicans'] aim had become secondary to the methods they were using to achieve it."[30] Violence escalated out of control throughout the region. This situation prompted the British to send troops for assistance, but instead of reducing the violence, they provoked further action.

The British were welcomed by both sides in the beginning. The Catholics believed they were there to protect them from the hostile Protestants, and the Protestants believed they were there to secure the Protestant position within the state. Both sides, however, soon became disillusioned with British efforts. The Catholics quickly discovered that they were the ones viewed as the main threat in Northern Ireland as the

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[28] Stevenson, *We Wrecked the Place*, 40-1.
[29] Ibid., 43.
[30] Holland, 37.

British came in and directed their efforts against them. The British forces arrived in Northern Ireland and began a campaign of harsh treatment, approaching martial law. Many Catholics were forced from their homes, many republicans were arrested, and beatings and torture became routine. The British army and security forces also frequently used blackmail, harassment, and death threats to intimidate the Catholic community. The Catholics were unjustly treated and this gave them even more reason to join and/or support the paramilitary organizations.

The British decision to begin internment in 1971 also helped increase Catholic support for the IRA and led to an explosion of violence that put the Protestant and Catholic communities on what seemed to be a path of no return.

> Far from quashing an emergent IRA, internment contributed to rapid recruitment and the escalation of political violence to a scale unknown in civil conflict in Britain or Ireland this century. In the course of 1972, the worst ever year for political violence, 467 people were killed, including 323 civilians. The atrocities of that year - Bloody Sunday, Bloody Friday, McGurk's Bar, Kelly's Bar, Callender Street, Abercorn - further deepened the spiraling crisis. Not only was the Provisional IRA now operating a full-scale terror campaign, but hardline, mass-membership Protestant paramilitary groups, such as the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) and Ulster Vanguard, made public shows of strength. Others tried to terrorize the Catholic community through a campaign of sectarian assassination.[31]

Internment created extreme and intense resentment within the Catholic community and confirmed their fears that securing their rights through the current state structure would be impossible. Their cause was now "a united Ireland or nothing"[32] and the British were an obstacle that they wanted removed.

The struggle would now include getting rid of the British and seeking justice in the name of those who had been brutally mistreated. "The strategy was two-pronged,

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[31] Aughey and Morrow, 20.
[32] Fitzduff, 91.

consisting of attacks against soldiers and policemen in tandem with a bombing campaign

aimed at 'economic' targets. The aim was to make Britain's link to Northern Ireland so

expensive that it would be forced to withdraw."[33]

The Protestants were also responsible for the violence during this time. They

believed the British were incapable of thwarting the republican paramilitaries and that it

was therefore their duty to take action.

> [Loyalists] believed that the security forces were not up top the task of containing
> the IRA, and therefore that they, as loyalist paramilitaries, had to step in.
> American right-wing vigilantes often take action over some essentially personal
> loss . . . that convinces them of the inadequacy of U.S. law enforcement.   The
> same goes for loyalist paramilitaries. 'The violence emanating from the loyalist
> paramilitary organizations was a defensive tactic . . . It was to try and instill in the
> Roman Catholic community in general that the IRA were responsible for the
> death and destruction, so the Catholics in those communities would put pressure
> on the IRA to desist from what they were doing, and the loyalists would stop
> immediately.' While loyalist violence was 'reactive' insofar as it was prompted by
> IRA violence, it was also strategic insofar as it was intended to reward the IRA
> for restraint.[34]

The loyalists would not sit back and allow their state to fall into the hands of the

republican paramilitary. Instead, they would take whatever means necessary to secure

their community.[35]

The level of violence that erupted from both communities caused the British to

take further action by suspending the Northern Ireland government, Stormont, and

invoking direct rule. Even after the British took control, the situation in Northern Ireland

continued to decline as violence intensified. The republicans and loyalists both saw the

suspension of the government as a reason to continue the use of violence.

> There were two main reasons why violence rose sharply. Both were linked to
> Stormont's suspension. The first was that the Provisional IRA took credit for

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[33] Holland, 37.

[34] Stevenson, *We Wrecked the Place*, 61-2.

[35] Fitzduff, 4.

bringing down the Unionist government and assumed that suspending Stormont
was a sign that Britain was weakening in its commitment to Northern Ireland. As
a result, the Provisionals' leaders were encouraged to launch an all-out offensive
while at the same time opening up contacts with the government in the hope of
negotiating a British withdrawal. Meanwhile, loyalist paramilitaries viewed the
end of Stormont as an appalling betrayal, the inevitable consequence of the
perfidious policies of successive British governments that had abolished the B-
Specials, disarmed the RUC, cosseted the civil rights movement, and failed to
deal successfully with the IRA menace. They were confronting the end of Ulster
as they knew it. Loyalists would respond to the crisis with the most vicious
sectarian campaign that Northern Ireland had yet experienced. It would last for
almost twenty-five years.[36]

The republicans saw the suspension of Stormont as a victory and were encouraged in

their violent campaign. The loyalists were angered by the suspension of Stormont and

reacted violently in hopes of reversing the situation.

Summary

During the 1970s, Northern Ireland experienced overwhelming levels of violence.

As the Troubles began, both communities went to such lengths to protect their people that

a tremendous number of lives were lost. The Catholics sought social, economic, and

political concessions and demanded equal civil rights. Even when reforms were made,

however, the violence continued. Protecting their interests evolved into more than just

civil rights. They soon wanted to govern their own lives on their own territory. These

goals were unacceptable to the Protestant community, and the Protestants felt the need to

fight for their community's interests as well. Zero-sum positions emerged that left no

room for compromise and prolonged the violent conflict.

The British, who came in to put an end to the violence, accomplished little and, in

fact, made the violence worse. The extremist tactics used by the British provoked

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[36] Holland, 52.

violence in return. The level of hatred and fear rose and tit-for-tat revenge ensued. As long as these factors continued to provoke a violent response, Northern Ireland would continue to be torn apart by the opposing communities.

THE EVOLVING MOTIVATIONS FOR VIOLENCE

As the previous section demonstrates, the Northern Ireland conflict had many underlying causes. In the beginning, the opposing communities fought to secure their identities and sought social, economic, and political reforms. They wanted to preserve their respective ways of life and were willing to use violence for this purpose. Leaders within each group knew the importance of identity and used it to mobilize their people to take whatever steps were necessary to secure their community's existence. In their eyes, therefore, violence was justified and legitimate because their group's security was at stake.

Over time, these motivations to use violence continued but were supplemented by other factors as well. Violence became the tactic of choice for many to demonstrate their feelings, exact revenge, become part of the community, or even make a living. These motivations kept the cycle of violence going and would make peace harder to achieve in the future.

Identity Security and Self-preservation

Each group's desire to secure its ethnic and religious identities played a tremendous role in the justification of violence for Northern Ireland.[37] The polarization of the state into British Protestants and Irish Catholics made their religious and ethnic

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[37] Ashmore, 133-58.

identities the boundary lines of the conflict. The initial motivations of the Irish Catholics for the use of violence were the protection of the group's identity and the liberation and self-preservation of their people. The Irish Catholic community had suffered for centuries at the hands of the British Protestants and now sought freedom and the ability to build a better life.

Since religious and ethnic affiliations differentiated the people, the conflict was characterized by those same terms and the protection of the Irish Catholic identity served as the legitimate justification for their actions. "The moral basis for its vision was a semimystical incantation of sacrifice and martyrdom where absolutes reigned: the absolute right of a vague entity, the 'Irish people,' to an independent united Ireland, and the IRA's absolute right to use violence to achieve it."[38] This challenge was met with violence in return by the Protestant community who felt that their livelihoods were being threatened. As each community felt threatened by the other based on their ethnic backgrounds and religious beliefs, a clash of identities took hold of the region and motivated each group to fight for its continued existence and livelihood.

Influential Leaders

Influential leaders mobilized the communities within Northern Ireland to use violence as well. Many leaders used religious discourse and symbolism to unify and mobilize their people to fight against their so-called enemies. The Protestant community, for instance, was heavily influenced by Reverend Ian Paisley, a Christian fundamentalist known for encouraging violent behavior. He was adamant about the necessity of forceful resistance. "'Christ was not a man of peace,' he bellowed from his pulpit. 'Be violent for

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[38] Holland, 37.

Christ's sake, to defend the faith which he himself defended with his fists."[39] He also

frequently demonized the Catholic community as a way of inciting violence. "'Catholics

not only threaten your way of life,' he thundered, 'they will destroy your Protestant values

and your identity as Ulster Scots."'[40]

The Catholic community was also influenced by their leaders' use of religious

symbolism. For example, during a 1981 Hunger Strike, the Irish political prisoners

utilized the Catholic religion to rally their supporters when they were deprived of their

status as political prisoners. Many supporters thought that backing the nationalist cause

was equivalent to supporting the poor and oppressed, just as Jesus had done.[41]

> The prisons' campaign made the distinction between a *sacrificial* ideology and
> the *revolutionary* ideology of the military campaign. . . . they had gone there not
> to win but to die. And it was seeped in martyrology and religious symbolism:
> Sinn Fien's plea for a vote to save Sands' life; the grafitto in West Belfast of a
> dying hunger striker being comforted by the Virgin Mary with the message,
> 'Blessed are those who hunger for justice'; the prisoners using their bodies as
> social texts 'in the act of refusal, i.e. refusing to eat, wash, smearing body and cell
> with human excrement, acts which not only violate conventional notions of
> cleanliness and dirt, but are shockingly redolent of the purification by putrefaction
> of the flesh, as with the early Christian anchorites . . . their supporters sense of
> theatre with the hunger strikers portrayed in crucified postures with the barbed
> wire of the prisons being transferred into the crown of thorns and the H-Block
> blanket (their only piece of 'clothing') into a burial shroud; Sands' prison
> testimony as an inversionary text 'as a 'tale of faith' and 'triumph of endurance'
> which became a 'morale booster' for a cause that depended 'more on integrity and
> courage than on what politicians and lawyers term reason and common sense' . . .
> and, above all, the place of religion with the Mass as a 'real sacrifice' and source
> of comfort and strength to the prisoners.[42]

Even the timing of the hunger strikes was significant. The first strike was set to

occur at Christmas and the second during Easter, both important Christian holidays

signifying the birth and resurrection of their Savior. Bobby Sands was one of the most

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[39] Stevenson, *We Wrecked the Place*, 73.
[40] Ibid., 73.
[41] Appleby, 185.
[42] Apter, 272.

memorable prisoners to die during this hunger strike. His actions evoked a Christ-like sense of sacrifice and martyrdom among the Irish people.

> He could expect to be dead by Easter - both a secular celebration of destruction and renewal, as well as of a Holy Beginning - if his demands were not met. His inspiration extended back to Christ: 'No greater love hath a man than to lay down his life for his friends.' The imagery and the symbolism were politico-religious in character . . . 'He saw himself as the Messiah, Christlike, and he was determined to go ahead' . . . It is not those who inflict the most but those who suffer the most who will conquer.'[43]

The use of religious symbolism during this hunger strike raised the political issues to the realm of the sacred and invoked intense feelings from the Irish community. The hunger strike remains one of the most influential incidents of the Northern Ireland conflict.

Social, Economic, Territorial, and Political Concessions

It was not just identity conflict that stimulated the use of violence between these groups. They were fighting for social, economic, territorial, and political concessions as well. The Catholics had been considered second-class citizens since the days of colonization. Any advance in their living conditions would not come without a concentrated effort. Since the time of the partition, the Catholics had become a minority in the region and held relatively few civil rights. Equality was not considered obtainable and the Protestants did little to disprove this Catholic belief.

As the disadvantaged Catholics started voicing their grievances through their civil rights campaign, the Protestants began to fear for their livelihoods in a Catholic state. They worried that their rights would be taken away and that they would be treated as second-class citizens. Although the Protestants were not a disadvantaged group, the fear that they could be prompted them to fight for their interests.

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[43] Ibid., 276.

Each community, therefore, turned to violence to obtain or protect its rights. Each wanted its people to be able to speak their respective languages, practice their respective religions, have equal job opportunities, and have a say in the affairs that governed their lives. Each group increasingly saw these concessions in terms of territory as well. Whether or not the island remained partitioned would determine who was a minority and therefore who would rule. Since their stances were directly opposed to one another, compromise was not deemed possible and violence became justified as the necessary means of protecting their communities' interests.

Demonstration of Feelings

As the conflict progressed, other motivations for violence developed. Violence became a method of making feelings known. Paramilitary violence, for instance, typically escalated every summer in correlation with the marching season which played an important role in Northern Ireland culture. Marching was an outlet for expressing communal support and political stances as well as commemorating key historical events in each community's struggle. These marches, however, often stimulated violence, especially if one community entered the 'territory' of the other during its march.

> The issue . . . was territorial. To march in Ulster is to stake a claim on a territory. It is to say, 'I have a right to march here because this is mine.' For this reason traditional parades such as those taking place around July 12 each year are basic expressions of the underlying conflict and over the years have provoked so much violence.[44]

The violent reaction from both communities during marching season was a display of their feelings. In general the violence did not occur for any specific purpose. It was

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[44] Holland, 12.

merely an expression of their communal support or their condemnation of the opposing community.

Hatred and Tit-for-Tat Revenge

Hatred and revenge also motivated the opposing groups. As each group hurt the other, a cycle of violence began that quickly spiraled out of control. The hatred between the various communities had existed for centuries. As one loyalist has confessed, "I was a sectarian bigot . . . it was my background and the society that programmed me in a sense, but I was responsible for what I done. I was a bigot and I hated Catholics."[45]

The need for revenge was another dominant factor in the prolonged Northern Ireland conflict. "The larger public began to justify violence not on the basis of any political objective, like keeping the union with Britain or reuniting Ireland, but instead *because they did it to us* . . . the self-perpetuating motive of revenge gave the Troubles an extrapolitical vitality."[46] With hatred and revenge driving their actions, the people of Northern Ireland remained trapped in a violent struggle.

Violence as a Way of Life

The violence in Northern Ireland had lasted for so long that it slowly became the definition of normalcy within the region. It was an end in itself, a source of empowerment for many, and a source of income for others.

> As a result of personal as well as socio-political factors . . . they became involved in violent acts which were for some an end in themselves and for most the means to certain ends, only some of which were actually political. Violence itself became a way of life . . . The money which could be made through criminal

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[45] Stevenson, *We Wrecked the Place*, 65.
[46] Ibid., 74.

rackets planned and organized by paramilitary groups was welcomed by those for whom unemployment and life on the poverty line were often the likeliest alternatives.[47]

The people had become accustomed to the violence and it was now the normal existence

of things instead of being a temporary means to an end.

Violence also became a part of their identity formation and community

development. A member of the Ulster Volunteer Force admitted:

> As a teenager, you know, I felt supreme power. I felt good that I was doing something which I thought was positive, something which was dangerous, exciting, romantic. I was carrying a gun. There's something else about being able to carry a gun, and also the fear of being shot dead. There was an adrenaline buzz to it. It actually was a consensus thing too - you felt you were part of a larger community . . . one of the main motives for a lot of people was that you were doing something for your community in that we perceived an attack on our community or our identity. So therefore, being young, rough, and tough, we could defend all of the people - our parents, our friends - by actually going out and engaging in this violent behavior.[48]

The more violence became imbedded in their everyday lives, the harder it was to move

beyond it. For many, violence was no longer about defending one's identity or achieving

political goals, it was just what they did for fun, as a job, or to become one of the gang.

A Tool for Influencing the Peace Process

Violence became a tool in the peace process as well. The negotiations that would

produce the Good Friday Agreement, for example, would be threatened by violence from

dissident groups. "The talks became a race against the gunmen as the politicians strove

for a settlement before some awful act of violence could set off a chain reaction of

killings and draw in the Provisionals and the major loyalist paramilitary organizations."[49]

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[47] Aughey and Morrow, 167.
[48] Stevenson, *We Wrecked the Place*, 22.
[49] Holland, 216.

Violence was already a part of everyday existence, and it would soon be used to maintain

that existence. Opposition to the peace process or its outcome was expressed through

violence. These spoiler groups did not want to compromise their goals. They wanted to

achieve all or nothing. Violence, they hoped, would allow them to break down the peace

process and prevent a compromise.

Conclusion

The peace process that was about to begin would not be simple. The underlying

issues of identity conflict and social, economic, and political equality would have to be

addressed. Reforms would have to be made and relationships rebuilt. The dynamics

would have to be altered as well. The people would need to find new ways of expressing

their feelings without resorting to violence. They would need to learn the effectiveness

of dialogue and be convinced that change was possible through non-violent means. The

learned hatred would have to be reversed and the cycle of violence broken. Violence

would need to be seen as unlawful and illegitimate and no longer as normal. Only if the

peace process could respond to these issues would violence lose its justification and

allow Northern Ireland to reach a durable peace.

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE BEGINS

Sunningdale

In 1972, the British government began negotiations with a few of the Northern

Ireland political parties to set up a power-sharing assembly for Northern Ireland. Both

unionists and nationalists were in attendance as well as the British and Irish, but the talks were far from inclusive and did not benefit from the presence of third-parties.

The agreement reached at Sunningdale in 1974 addressed many of the underlying issues of the conflict. It set up a devolved parliamentary body that would rule Northern Ireland and a Council of Ireland that would act as a cross-border body between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. The Irish and the British agreed to allow Northern Ireland to choose their own constitutional status by majority consent. The British also agreed to review internment, release prisoners, to make the RUC more acceptable to Catholics, and to take a tougher stance against the paramilitaries.[50]

The unionists who had taken part in the negotiations hoped the agreement would be acceptable to the Protestant community. However, the community remained suspicious and after only five months, Protestant workers in conjunction with the loyalist paramilitaries called a strike against the Agreement. They succeeded in overthrowing the executive, which then returned Northern Ireland to direct British rule.[51] "For over twenty years the Sunningdale Agreement would stand more as a gloomy reminder of the dangers of ambitious reform than as a beacon showing the way forward."[52]

Although the parties to the negotiation had reached an agreement, they were unable to convince their constituencies that the agreement was a positive step. Tensions were most evident among the unionists, whose disapproval turned into violence. The loyalists began rioting and were involved in gun battles with the British army. The Ulster

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[50] For more on the Sunningdale Agreement, see Thomas Hennessey, *The Northern Ireland Peace Process: Ending the Troubles?* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Stefan Wolff, "The Road to Peace?: The Good Friday Agreement and the Conflict in Northern Ireland," *World Affairs* 163, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 163-70; Bloomfield, *Peacemaking Strategies*; Fitzduff; Dixon; Wichert; McGarry.
[51] Fitzduff, 122.
[52] Holland, 68.

Volunteer Force (UVF), that had been dormant for some time, resumed its campaign of sectarian violence. Within the first few months of 1974, its members murdered sixteen people and threatened further turmoil if the British tried to enforce the Sunningdale Agreement.

On May 17, 1974, the UVF stole and hijacked four cars to drive to Dublin where they detonated bombs that exploded killing a total of thirty-three people. Meanwhile, other loyalists groups were placing pressure on the Northern Ireland people by cutting off fuel, food, water, and electricity supplies. By the end of May, the new executive had collapsed, allowing the loyalists to claim victory in the form of "saving" Ulster from the Sunningdale power-sharing experiment.

> Unfortunately, this political cowardice of the government was a disaster because extreme unionism or loyalism was encouraged in its belief that it could henceforth resist and jettison any British policy for Northern Ireland which involved conceding power to the minority. By so vindicating the Unionist approach of exclusivity, the British served to underwrite the maintenance of sectarian solidarity and negativism as the basic method of Unionist politics. They also served to convince sections of the Nationalist community that violence was the best approach to take against the British; political approaches would only be frustrated by what we call the "Orange Card."[53]

Northern Ireland was right back where it had started, with the republican and loyalist paramilitaries using violence to achieve their goals.

The Sunningdale negotiations attempted to address the underlying issues, but they were unable to resolve the Northern Ireland conflict. The talks were not inclusive and no third-parties were involved to help alter the dynamics of the situation. The result was that the two communities remained dissatisfied with the agreement's provisions and continued to see violence as the best hope for achieving their goals.

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[53] Hume, 60-1.

Informal Negotiations Continue

As the Irish Republican Army (IRA) continued its campaign of violence, the British decided to resume negotiations with the nationalists in hopes of halting the violence. The negotiations were successful in getting the Provisional Army Council to call for a ceasefire in 1975.[54] In exchange, the British agreed to the release of one-hundred prisoners within two weeks with the goal of ending internment all together. They also agreed to the withdrawal of three to four thousand troops and to the reduction of a British presence in Catholic areas. IRA men would be allowed to carry weapons and return to Northern Ireland without arrest. Lastly, they agreed to allow Sinn Fein, the nationalist party connected to the IRA, to establish truce monitoring centers throughout the region.

The public acknowledgment of these back-door negotiations with the paramilitaries worried the nationalist politicians.[55] They feared it would cause a backlash within the Protestant community and they were right. The ceasefire did not last very long as the loyalist and republican paramilitaries stepped up their use of violence once again. "Whatever the aim of the meetings, one thing was plain: They did not end the violence. On the contrary, it grew worse. Loyalists, anxious about the government- IRA contacts, launched another round of sectarian killings, and the Provisionals responded in kind."[56]

Holding informal negotiations out of the public eye altered the dynamics of the negotiation process enough to allow progress to be made with the nationalists. Of course, once the negotiations were made public, they fell apart. Failing to include the unionists

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[54] Dixon, 165-71.
[55] Gerard Murray, *John Hume and the SDLP: Impact and Survival in Northern Ireland* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1998), 31.
[56] Holland, 76.

meant true progress could not be made. Once the unionists began to fear the British-nationalist connection, negotiations were viewed as too costly and violence appeared more expedient.

Violence Begins to Decrease

Although the paramilitaries continued to see violence as preferable to compromise, the level of violence began to decline toward the end of the 1970s and into the 1980s.[57] Internment had ended at the end of 1975, security forces were beginning to move away from many of their illegal tactics, and the civil rights protests were gone. The security forces were also becoming increasingly successful at 'turning' paramilitary members, intercepting terror operations, and making numerous arrests. "There is little doubt that the success of such security personnel through policing, surveillance activities, and intelligence gathering has succeeded in preventing and containing paramilitary violence. The successful conviction of paramilitaries was a significant factor in ensuring that the IRA eventually realized by the late 1980s that its political struggle could never be won solely by the use of force."[58] The IRA even reduced its level of violence by becoming more selective in its targets, focusing mainly on combating security forces.[59] These occurrences led to reduction in street disturbances and open confrontation between paramilitary groups as well as a drastic reduction in the yearly death rate.

Another important change during this time was the realization by republican paramilitaries that they could make advancements through the political process.[60] This

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[57] Ibid., 83-114.
[58] Fitzduff, 73.
[59] Darby, 191.
[60] Byrne and Irvin, 202.

began in the late 1970s with prisoners protesting the removal of their special category

status as 'prisoners of war.' The protest tactics that they used, such as hunger strikes,

were remarkably useful in attracting sympathy from the Catholic community and could

possibly be transformed into political support.[61] "[A]s public sympathy grew, the leaders

of the PIRA and its political wing, Sinn Fein, came to recognize that electoral politics

might be a useful accomplishment."[62]

Although the republicans were warming up to the utility of non-violent tactics, the

1981 hunger strike, which left ten prisoners dead, had two effects on the level of

violence. The outrage felt by the Catholic community over the prisoners' deaths brought

many to the streets, "hijacking, burning, and hurling rocks and gasoline bombs at the

soldiers and police sent to contain them."[63] At the same time, Catholic sentiment for the

prisoners also sent them to the voting booth where numerous nationalists were elected to

government including Sinn Fein members.

As political support increased for Sinn Fein, it began to recognize the potentially

detrimental effects of violence on their political campaign.[64] "Republican leaders were

beginning to accept that as long as the Provisionals were engaged in a violent campaign,

there was going to be a limit to the amount of political support that their party could

expect. For the first time, Sinn Fein leaders began to criticize, at least obliquely, IRA

actions, calling for a 'controlled' and 'disciplined' use of force."[65] This reorientation

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[61] Apter, 270-85.
[62] Aughey and Morrow, 163.
[63] Holland, 112.
[64] Brian Feeney, *Sinn Fein: A Hundred Turbulent Years* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 292-333.
[65] Holland, 139.

towards the political process would have an increasingly important impact on the reduction of violence by certain groups.

The level of violence began to decrease during this time because the dynamics of the conflict were being altered. Violence was becoming more costly. The security forces were performing their jobs well, and it was becoming more and more apparent that the republican paramilitaries would not be able to defeat the British. The republicans were also realizing the benefits of non-violent tactics. As their ability to influence the political process grew, violence was no longer seen as the only method of change. They could now seek change through political dialogue as well. As these dynamics shifted, violence became increasingly costly while non-violent tactics became increasingly beneficial.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement

The next attempt at a political solution came in 1985 with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement.[66] Unfortunately, the negotiations were held between Britain and the Republic without including the Northern Ireland unionists or nationalists. The agreement recognized that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would have to come from the consent of the majority within Northern Ireland so it established an intergovernmental conference where both governments could discuss and resolve their differences regarding Northern Ireland.

Although the Agreement was widely supported within the United Kingdom and the Republic, it failed to gain much support from the unionists and nationalists. Unionists rejected it because they believed it diluted the union with Great Britain. Although some

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[66] For more on the Anglo-Irish Agreement, see Giliomee, 175-90; Dixon; Fitzduff, 123-4; Hennessey, *Ending the Troubles*; Bloomfield, *Peacemaking Strategies*; Murray; Holland.

nationalists supported it, Sinn Fein rejected the Agreement because its members believed it confirmed the island's partition.[67] This Agreement set up an important foundation for future negotiations and provided a useful forum for deliberating on the conflict, but remained yet another failed attempt to find a political solution to ending the violence.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement attempted to address the underlying issues of the conflict and developed a good foundation for resolving these issues in the future. Unfortunately, without the participation of the Northern Ireland people, the negotiations were doomed to failure. The Northern Ireland people would not accept an agreement that they viewed as imposed upon them from the outside. They would need to be included in the negotiations if real progress was to be made.

An Influx of Weapons

Regrettably for the Northern Ireland people, the potential for violence increased in the late 1980s due to an influx of weapons from Libyan dictator Colonel Mohammer Qaddafi and his regime. Between August 1985 and September 1986, the IRA received about one-hundred fifty tons of weapons and explosives. An estimated total of "more than a thousand AK-47 rifles, a million rounds of ammunition, a dozen surface-to-air missiles, large quantities of handguns, Russian-made heavy machine guns, and four tons of Semtex plastic explosives"[68] were received. The republicans also developed their own hand-made technology during this time which increased their effectiveness. This influx of weapons increased the potential level of victims and boosted the IRA's belief that they could score a significant military victory that would place them ahead in the struggle.

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[67] Hume, 64-9.
[68] Holland, 141.

As the stakes got higher, all groups stepped up their efforts in order to the gain the advantage. The loyalists maintained their tit-for-tat ambitions and continued their violent campaign.

> The rise in loyalist violence thereafter occurred principally for three reasons. First, paranoia increased due to the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, which the unionist community generally perceived as an abrupt step towards a united Ireland . . . Loyalists thus began to feel as though not even the law supported their constitutional position, and were less inclined even to pay lip service to the law-abiding tradition of the Protestant community. Second . . . politics no longer interested the UDA, which accounted for the lion's share - 76 percent - of the increase in loyalist hits. Finally, the loyalist paramilitaries inferred that the IRA had shot and bombed their way to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and decided to copy their proactive strategy to keep them from getting any farther.[69]

Fortunately, for the Northern Ireland people in general, the security forces increased their efforts as well and maintained their success at suppressing paramilitary violence. "The reality was that after twenty years the Provisionals were being contained, and their support base was wearying of the endless violence."[70] Although the potential level of violence had greatly increased along with weapons technology, the security forces were continuing to be a major roadblock for its success.

The Brooke Talks

The next set of negotiations began in the 1990s with the Brooke talks. Peter Brooke, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, began meeting with several political parties to make another attempt at an agreement.[71] These talks, however, excluded Sinn Fein who was still refusing to completely condemn the use of violence for political leverage. The main achievement of these talks was the establishment of the three-strand

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[69] Stevenson, *We Wrecked the Place*, 88-9.
[70] Holland, 162.
[71] For more on the Brooke talks, see David Bloomfield, *Political Dialogue in Northern Ireland* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Dixon; Holland; Fitzduff; Murray; Hennessey, *Ending the Troubles*.

approach which structured the negotiations to focus on the internal structure of Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland-Irish relationship, and the Irish-British relationship.[72] Although these talks ended in 1992 without agreement, they were viewed by many as useful and constructive in establishing a framework for future dialogue.

Again, the talks made productive advances towards the peace process. The underlying issues were being addressed and the dynamics of the negotiation process were even improved by establishing a three-strand process for future negotiations. This helped divide up and focus the negotiations on the most relevant issues. Without one of the most prominent groups in attendance, however, the violence would not end. Sinn Fein's exclusion meant that the republican paramilitaries and those who shared their views were not being represented in the talks. Their views would have to be included in order to establish a durable peace.

The Hume-Adams Talks

Following the breakdown of the Brooke talks, John Hume, the head of the nationalist Social and Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), and Gerry Adams, the head of Sinn Fein, got together in an attempt to resolve their differences in order to present a united nationalist front.[73] They had met unsuccessfully in 1988. This time the talks would prove far more productive. It had become increasingly apparent to Sinn Fein members that the campaign of violence could only take them so far and that a joint political effort with other nationalist parties might increase their ability to achieve their

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[72] Fitzduff, 124.
[73] For more on the Hume-Adams talks, see Hume; Murray; Holland; Fitzduff; Hennessey, *Ending the Troubles*; Dixon.

goals. This realization allowed Sinn Fein to soften its demands and compromise more willingly.

> [The transformation of Sinn Fein's position] represented not only the beginning of the reconciliation of the two wings of Irish nationalism, constitutional and physical force, but effectively marked the ideological defeat of Provisional republicanism - the last significant exponents of the physical force tradition - and the beginnings of its absorption into the wider spectrum of constitutional nationalist tradition, which had marginalized the IRA and Sinn Fein in the southern Irish sate in the 1920s and 1930s.[74]

Sinn Fein also began to see Britain as less of a threat as they accepted that Britain no longer had any self-interest in remaining in Northern Ireland but was basically staying to prevent the escalation of violence into civil war. The talks between Hume and Adams resulted in agreement on a series of principles that they would jointly support.[75]

The Downing Street Declaration

Around the same time as the Hume-Adams talks, the British were engaged in secret talks with Sinn Fein and the IRA, which had been successful in establishing the foundation to an agreement. The culmination of the Hume-Adams talks and the British-Sinn Fein talks resulted in the Downing Street Declaration of 1993.[76] This Declaration again emphasized majority consent to decide the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. It also set up a Forum for Reconciliation to provide dialogue amongst the various political groups, provided for North-South cooperation on certain issues, and called for a devolved government for Northern Ireland.[77] The mainstream unionists cautiously accepted the Declaration although some saw it as a defeat. The nationalists were unsure

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[74] Holland, 184.

[75] Hume, 115-7.

[76] For more on the Downing Street Declaration, see Kevin Boyle and Tom Hadden, "The Peace Process in Northern Ireland," *InternationalAffairs* 71, no. 2 (April 1995): 269-83; Hume; Murray; Fitzduff; Hennessey, *Ending the Troubles*; Dixon; Holland.

[77] Fitzduff, 126.

at first as well, but the Declaration was the first to include Sinn Fein in its consideration and this increased the likelihood of support.

The loyalists and republicans both decided to support the Declaration and each asserted that it furthered their respective causes. The loyalists claimed that the union with Great Britain was safe while the IRA claimed they were on the path to a united Ireland. Although these positions conflicted, the two groups agreed on other matters. "The paramilitaries would present a united front on the release of their prisoners, disarmament, and the need for 'inclusive talks.' They vowed to oppose any attempt to make disarmament . . . a precondition for the entry of their political representatives into negotiations."[78] Although there were still many issues to be resolved, the Declaration made significant political progress in the conflict.

The Downing Street Declaration enticed both the IRA and the Combined Military Loyalist Command to announce cease-fires in 1994. Before that time, the level of violence had been on the rise again. In the beginning of the 1990s, the republicans had succeeded in overcoming the security forces' containment and had launched a dramatic series of bombing campaigns which contributed to an increase in the death count. The loyalists were even more responsible for the climb in the death rate due to an upsurge in their paramilitary activities.[79] Both sides were unwilling to bring an end to the violence until the parties were able to reach an agreement that made each side feel secure enough to call for a cease-fire.

The IRA hesitated at first. It still felt as though the Declaration did not go far enough, but its ability to wage an effective military campaign remained limited. Sinn

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[78] Holland, 199.
[79] Hennessey, *History of Northern Ireland*, 290.

Fein's increasing participation in the political process furthered the community expectation that they were moving away from violence.[80] In addition, although the republicans had been able to circumvent the security forces' containment for some time, they remained constrained by the ability of the forces to infiltrate their organizations and prevent their campaign from succeeding. In general, the IRA was running out of steam. These factors along with the Declaration prompted the IRA to call for a cease-fire and in turn, the loyalists followed suit.

The Downing Street Declaration made significant progress in the peace process. It addressed the underlying issues and included the views of both nationalists and unionists. Sinn Fein even had some indirect input through the Hume-Adams talks, which increased the potential of the Declaration's success. The cease-fire that followed demonstrated the growing potential for peace. Many issues, however, were left to be resolved. Inclusive talks would have to follow, guarantees would have to be made, violent tendencies would have to be altered, and relationships would need to be rebuilt before a settlement could be produced that could satisfy both communities and endure.

The Framework Document

The next agreement put forward by the British and Irish governments came in February 1995. The parties produced a Framework Document which outlined their positions on the framework of the internal government of Northern Ireland, the British-Irish relationship, and the North-South relationship on the Irish island.[81] The Framework Document proposed solutions similar to previous ones and brought back to the table

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[80] Holland, 189.

[81] For more on the Framework Document, see Wolff; Dixon; Holland; Hennessey, *Ending the Troubles*; Fitzduff.

some of the guidelines recommended by the Sunningdale Agreement. It called for a North-South body to oversee North-South relations, for a devolved Northern Ireland assembly, and for the fate of the union to remain in the hands of the majority.[82] This document, however, was not welcomed by the unionist or nationalist communities. The unionists felt it represented a wrong step towards a united Ireland. The nationalists were unconvinced because it did not contain a plan for British withdrawal or the ability to increase support for a united Ireland.[83] Although both sides rejected the proposal, it was not met with violence. Both the loyalists and the IRA maintained their commitment to the cease-fire agreement. The Framework Document was the first agreement to develop during a time of peace, and the communities were able to voice their disapproval without resorting to force.

The fact that this document was produced in the midst of a cease-fire altered the dynamics so that the groups did not feel the need to use violence to demonstrate their disapproval. Many of the groups had been engaged in dialogue and found that words were effective enough at the time to denounce an undesirable agreement. Force was not needed to reject the terms. The opposing groups were willing to use non-violent tactics to advance their goals.

Decommissioning

A new issue would soon break down the cease-fire agreement as the British began

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[82] Fitzduff, 126-7.
[83] Holland, 201.

to push for decommissioning.[84] The issue of disarmament had not played an important

role during the secret talks between the British and the IRA or in the months preceding

the 1994 cease-fires, but now that the talks were being held in the public sphere, the issue

became increasingly important. In March 1995, three steps were announced that the IRA

had to adhere to before Sinn Fein would be allowed to continue in the peace process. The

IRA would have to agree in principle to disarm, how to go about it, and to put forth some

form of confidence-building measures to show its good faith to begin the process.[85]

The IRA was outraged by the decommissioning requirement. It believed that its

cease-fire had been sufficient evidence of its commitment to the peace process and that

the decommissioning issue should be a part of the talks, not a prerequisite to them. In

order to resolve the disarmament issue, the United States was asked to head an

International Body on Decommissioning and put together a report proposing principles to

the peace process. The report advised that decommissioning should not be a precondition

but that it should occur along with the political dialogue. The British rejected this

suggestion and continued to delay the talks.[86]

The IRA was finally fed up with British stalling tactics and decided to resume

hostilities. In February 1996, the IRA officially called an end to its cease-fire and began

its campaign of violence once again by exploding a bomb in London's Canary Wharf,

killing two men, injuring one hundred, and causing extensive damage.[87]

> There are differing interpretations as to why the cease-fire was broken, although
> most observers say that the IRA military hawks were convinced that the armed

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[84] For more on the issue of decommissioning, see Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, *After the Good Friday Agreement: Analysing Political Change in Northern Ireland* (St. Stephen's Green: University College Dublin Press, 1999); Hennessey, *Ending the Troubles*; Holland; Dixon; Feeney; Patterson.
[85] Hennessey, *Ending the Troubles*, 87.
[86] Holland, 205.
[87] Hennessey, *Ending the Troubles*, 101.

struggle was a 'use-it-or-lose-it' option. Delayed progress in the talks weakened their commitment to negotiation. Many believed that the precious months of peace in 1994 and 1995 were squandered. The IRA said British stalling and betrayal scuttled the talks; British decried the IRA's bloodlust and demanded a reinstatement of the cease-fire.[88]

Unlike 1994, the loyalists did not follow the IRA path and decided to maintain their cease-fire. The resumption of IRA violence, however, ended up confirming the fears of the British and unionists who remained convinced more than ever that decommissioning was crucial and that in spite of the so-called cease-fire, the IRA had never really abandoned its campaign of violence.

The dynamics of the conflict had shifted once again. As the negotiations continued, the republican paramilitaries had been pushed too far. They were being forced to give up their arms, which would take away their method of self-preservation. Although they had been growing increasingly fond of non-violent tactics, the republican paramilitaries were not ready to give up their arms. The fact that they were being pressured to do so made them doubt the negotiation process once again because they did not trust that their interests would be protected or that the peace process would be fair. Since they were unwilling to give up their arms, Sinn Fein would be excluded from the peace process and their views would not be included. Once again, violence appeared to offer more benefits while negotiations appeared too costly and the republican cease-fire came to an end.

The Good Friday Agreement

In May 1997, a new Labour government led by Tony Blair gained the political majority in Great Britain and presented a new opportunity for the Northern Ireland peace

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[88] Zartman, *Preventative Negotiation*, 78.

process to resume with the help of the United States. The British knew that Sinn Fein

must be included in the peace process if there was any chance of achieving real

progress.[89] The new government immediately began working on bringing Sinn Fein back

into the peace process.[90]

After some negotiation, the IRA was convinced to call for another cease-fire.

They had begun to realize that violence might not get them what they wanted.

> Neither republican nor loyalist terrorism has worked in Northern Ireland.
> Although Britain might not have been so aggressive about redressing Catholics'
> civil rights had the IRA not bombed the mainland and targeted British political
> leaders, neither might the Brits have been so intent on disempowering the Provos
> and everybody they claimed to speak for. Rather than advance either cause,
> terrorism made Northern Ireland unappealing to both sovereign powers regardless
> of which side perpetrated it. Consequently, the paramilitaries decided they'd best
> declare for peace lest events and attitudes render them politically obsolete . . .
> stepping up the IRA's military campaign would only produce greater political
> intransigence in the unionists and stiffer marital resolve in the Brits . . . The IRA
> could not hope to come out on top in a military escalation . . . a renunciation of
> violence by the IRA would enlist Washington's power . . . to soften the Brits and
> thereby involve Dublin in a nascent peace process. [91]

On July 20, 1997, the IRA resumed its cease-fire and the scene was set for Sinn Fein to

be included in the peace process. Violence did not completely end, however, as several

splinter groups continued their campaigns viewing "the IRA and Sinn Fein involvement

in the peace process as a sellout and [making] increasingly bellicose statements that they,

at least, would continue what they termed 'the fight for Irish freedom.'"[92]

The negotiations now continued with Sinn Fein taking part. It was the first time

that all-party talks had been a priority and would therefore be able to represent the

interests of the most people. A couple of the unionist parties chose to leave the

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[89] Hennessey, *Ending the Troubles*, 108.
[90] George J. Mitchell, *Making Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopp, Inc., 1999), 101.
[91] Stevenson, *We Wrecked the Place*, 28-9.
[92] Holland, 211.

negotiations because they refused to negotiate with Sinn Fein. Their absence, however, did not halt the peace process. The communities debated the issues and strove for a settlement. It would be difficult at times, but the parties pushed on and finally reached an agreement on Good Friday, April 10, 1998.[93]

The Good Friday Agreement won wide support among the parties to the conflict. It received a ninety-four percent endorsement from voters in the Republic and seventy-one percent in Northern Ireland.[94] Sinn Fein, which had gained political support and increased its seats within the government, showed remarkable progress in its move away from violent tactics. "The party now believed that [its goals] could be better achieved by working within new institutions of government, especially the cross-border bodies, than attempting to destroy them from the outside through violence."[95] The unionists also made progress. Those who advocated violence lost support as the people moved forward, desiring peaceful means to accomplish their goals. Dissident groups that chose to use violence could now be accused of going against the will of the people who had voiced their own opinions through the voting process.

The Good Friday peace process achieved success because it responded to the factors that the other negotiations had neglected and that had continued to motivate the use of violence. As the others had done, it addressed the underlying issues, but it also focused on creating an inclusive negotiation process which allowed all relevant parties to participate. It also brought in third-party assistance from the US which helped alter the

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[93] For more on the Good Friday Agreement negotiations, see Conor O'Clery, *Daring Diplomacy: Clinton's Secret Search for Peace in Ireland* (Boulder: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 1997); George Mitchell; Ruane and Todd, *Good Friday Agreement*; Dixon; Holland; Hennessey, *Ending the Troubles*; Fitzduff; Wolff; Feeney.
[94] Fitzduff, 131.
[95] Holland, 220.

dynamics of the negotiation process and brought the parties closer to an agreement. Unlike the negotiations that preceded it, the Good Friday talks combined all the right elements to produce an agreement and offer the best chance for peace.

CONCLUSION

As the many attempts for peace demonstrate, resolving the Northern Ireland conflict was not an easy task. Since the Troubles began in 1969, there have been many attempts to design a settlement that could end the violence. These negotiations, however, were continuously flawed and unable to bring about a durable peace until the Good Friday Agreement was produced.

Most talks sufficiently addressed the underlying issues of the conflict. Social, economic, and political reforms were initiated and the people of Northern Ireland came a long way towards equality. Efforts were also made to settle the constitutional status and establish ties between the Catholics in the North and the South. New institutions were designed and police reforms were made. The issue of prisoners was even examined and legal reforms instituted. Real attempts were made to respond to each community's grievances and to improve the lives of the Northern Ireland people.

The identities of each community, however, remained insecure. The Catholics feared remaining in a Protestant dominated state and the Protestants feared what would happen if the border was erased and they were forced to live in a Catholic dominated state. So much anger and hatred had developed over the years that neither community felt that their identities would be secure as long as the other was allowed to continue

threatening it. Trust would need to be developed and this would only occur if the communities could redefine their oppositional relationship.

The dynamics of the conflict also needed to be changed so that the paramilitaries would lose their ability to conduct campaigns of violence and so that non-violent tactics would gain prominence. This was slowly occurring throughout the various attempts at peace. As the dynamics shifted, the opposing communities were more willing to engage in talks rather than violence. The more the opposing parties were included in the negotiation process, the more acceptable the agreements were to the communities. The ability to participate in the political process also encouraged the paramilitaries to recoil from their violent tactics. As the dynamics of the conflict and negotiation process improved, Northern Ireland came closer and closer to achieving a lasting settlement.

It was not until the underlying issues were addressed, identity concerns were tackled, and the dynamics of the conflict were changed through inclusiveness in the negotiations and third-party assistance that success was achieved in the peace process. All of these factors were necessary in order to establish an agreement that could last and allow the opposing communities to overcome the violence. As each set of talks took place and failed to produce a settlement, those who sought peace attempted to alter the circumstances so that success could be achieved. For this reason, each set of talks made more progress than the last until the Good Friday negotiations took place and achieved their goals.

In order to understand how these factors came together to produce a successful agreement, it will be constructive to examine the details of one of the peace processes that failed and compare it to the Good Friday talks which succeeded. The Sunningdale

peace process was the first that took place since the Troubles began and the first to fail. It will be a useful case to compare to the Good Friday negotiations and will demonstrate how and why a peace process can fail when all the necessary factors are not in place. An examination of the Good Friday talks will then demonstrate how and why a negotiation process can succeed when the necessary factors are present.

CHAPTER V

THE SUNNINGDALE PEACE PROCESS

The Sunningdale peace process provides a clear-cut example of a failed peace process. The agreement lasted only a few months and did not lower the level of violence. Although attempts were made to resolve the underlying issues of the Northern Ireland conflict by creating social, economic, and political reforms and placing the most relevant concerns of the people on the agenda, these efforts were not enough to establish a peace.

Each group continued to fear their identities were at stake. The British Protestant and Irish Catholic identities clashed and neither could see past their anger and hatred long enough to stop the violence. Each community viewed the other as an enemy and could not find a way to trust each other or construct an agreement for peace.

Track-two diplomacy efforts began during this time, but they were minimal and new. Because of this, the efforts would be unable to produce significant results within the communities and each community would maintain their hatred of the other. They would continue to see their differences instead of their similarities and would continue to use violence to achieve their goals.

Another reason the Sunningdale talks failed is that they were not inclusive. The talks excluded parties from the negotiation process and those who were excluded had no stake in seeing the agreement succeed. They also would not be influenced by the ability to engage in dialogue with the other community and their misperceptions and miscommunication would not be overcome. Violence remained their only voice.

Finally, the Sunningdale Agreement failed because no third-parties were involved to help alter the dynamics of the conflict and change the cost-benefit calculation of the

opposing communities. The parties involved in the negotiations were too close to the

conflict to act as third-parties. The British and Irish were part of the problem and could

not effectively negotiate on their own.

An examination of each of these factors will demonstrate how and why the

Sunningdale talks failed. The necessary and sufficient elements of the peace process

were not in place and therefore the conflict could not be transformed. Violence

continued to be a justified and legitimate tool for achieving each community's goals and

peace remained unobtainable.

THE PEACE PROCESS

The Atmosphere

The negotiation process that began in the 1970s took place in the aftermath of

Northern Ireland's most violent years. Although the British had high hopes that the social

and economic reforms they were beginning to enact during this time would lead to a

reduction of violence, the violence persisted and created a need for a new approach to

resolving the Northern Ireland conflict.

> Violence in Northern Ireland persisted is spite of the implementation of the
> reform programme. British definitions of the conflict began to shift; less and less
> was the conflict seen in optimistic 'liberal' terms of rational social, economic, and
> security problems which were amenable to British reform. A more 'conservative'
> approach became apparent which increasingly identified 'sinister' and 'irrational
> forces' to explain the continuing conflict and justify a more hardline security
> stance. [1]

The new hardline security stance sent the British Army into nationalist areas, attempting

to establish order and eliminate the violent factions within the Catholic community. This

only alienated and provoked the community even further, which increased the level of

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[1] Dixon, 113.

violence instead of reducing it. "Repressive responses by the state had two significant effects: they awoke and legitimized a previously dormant republican movement; and they served to further alienate and radicalize the Catholic community."[2]

At the same time, the loyalist community increased their level of violence, creating an even more volatile environment. "A vicious loyalist murder campaign got under way, which was probably partly a response to increasing republican violence and directed towards pushing the state to adopt a more repressive security policy."[3] The tit-for-tat escalation of violence occurring during this time made living conditions unbearable and the British even more desperate to find a solution.

By 1971, the British had introduced internment, which was directed at nationalists and meant to counteract their escalation of violence, but instead intensified the violence. "In the two years prior to internment 66 people were killed, including 11 soldiers. In the first seventeen months after internment 610 were killed, including 146 soldiers."[4] The next major event that provoked the nationalists was Bloody Sunday, which left fourteen dead and many wounded. This horrific event in combination with internment stimulated a rise in the number of Catholics who wanted to join the republican paramilitary forces and also increased support for Sinn Fein.[5] From here, violence continuously increased and by March of 1972, the British were forced to dissolve the Stormont government and resume direct rule over Northern Ireland.

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[2] Byrne and Irvin, 73.
[3] Dixon, 121.
[4] Ibid., 118.
[5] Feeney, 270-1.

The Peace Initiative Begins

After the resumption of direct rule in 1972, the British set out to formulate a plan that could bring peace back to the region. They wanted to find a compromise that would allow the opposing factions within Northern Ireland to settle their disputes and work together in a power-sharing government. To do this, the British sought to build up the power of the moderates, believing that they would be more likely to find a compromise and would be able to draw support away from violent extremists. Opinion polls during this time supported their beliefs that the moderates held the majority of support from the people and that they would win the necessary votes during an election. "The violence had allowed the people to look into the abyss of communal violence and, it was argued, they would surely not vote for these 'extremists' who had generated that violence and stood in the way of fair compromise."[6] Unfortunately, the British push for moderate support would not end up producing the desired results.

In September 1972, the moderate parties of Northern Ireland met at the Darlington Conference to begin working towards a settlement. Those attending included the Ulster Unionist Part (UUP), the Northern Ireland Labor Party (NILP), and the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI). The Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP), which was less moderate than desired but was still invited to attend, boycotted the conference in protest to the British policy of internment.[7]

This conference ended up producing the Green Paper, titled *The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper for Discussion*, which was published in October 1972. It stipulated the proposed guidelines for a settlement and introduced the concept of a

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[6] Dixon, 134.
[7] Murray, 17.

power-sharing government. The document also stressed that it would be the people of Northern Ireland that would decide their constitutional position within the United Kingdom and laid out the goals for an Irish dimension to the settlement. This dimension meant the establishment of a Council of Ireland that "would operate at an intergovernmental and interparliamentary level between Northern Ireland and the Republic. Any Northern Ireland executive might '(a) consult on any matter with any authority of the Republic of Ireland' and (b) 'enter into any arrangements with any authority of the Republic' in respect of any matters transferred to it by Westminster."[8] The paper attempted to balance the needs of unionists and nationalists by giving each some of what they wanted. The unionists got a guarantee that their place in the United Kingdom was secure, and the nationalists would gain a place in the Northern Ireland government as well as a connection to the Republic through a North-South institution.

Around the same time, the British were warming up to the idea of working closely with the Irish government in order to resolve the Northern Ireland problem. In November 1972, British Prime Minister Edward Heath met with Irish Taoiseach Jack Lynch to discuss the issue. Their meetings demonstrated that the Republic had a legitimate interest in the future of Northern Ireland. This would help convince nationalists that the British were serious about responding to nationalist needs. The Irish government would also be an important ally in the negotiation process because it would be able to influence the SDLP and encourage them to take part in future talks.[9] "The advantages to the British of a closer relationship with the Irish Government were that it increased the likelihood of achieving a settlement with nationalist support; it held out the prospect of more effective

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[8] Hennessey, *Ending the Troubles*, 11.
[9] Murray, 19.

cross-border security co-operation against the IRA (which for some, was the key to defeating the IRA); and it also helped reduce any international pressure."[10]

After more meetings, another paper was published in March 1973. The White Paper, titled *The Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals*, established many of the same guidelines as the Green Paper and reflected the strategy that the British government was taking at the time to resolve the conflict. They were creating a larger role for Catholics within the government and creating an Irish dimension in order to overcome the nationalist alienation from the state.[11] They had to accommodate the unionists as well, however, or risk alienating them instead.

The White Paper proposed setting up a power-sharing assembly to be elected through proportional representation for both unionists and nationalists. The ability to participate, however, only applied to parties who were non-violent in their tactics. "The White Paper . . . looked to the 'law-abiding' majority 'to stand together against those small but dangerous minorities which would seek to impose their views by violence and coercion, and which cannot, therefore, be allowed to participate in working institutions they wish to destroy.'"[12] This assembly would be responsible for many of the communities' needs such as education, agriculture, and industry, but security would stay in the hands of the British for some time. The paper also supported the establishment of the Council of Ireland just as the Green Paper had. This Council would oversee areas of common interest such as tourism, regional development, and transport. The White Paper outlined a more detailed depiction of how the proposed institutions would work and laid the groundwork for a settlement to Northern Ireland's problems.

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[10] Dixon, 137-8.

[11] Hennessey, *Ending the Troubles*, 10.

[12] Dixon, 138.

In May 1973, the Northern Ireland Constitution Act was introduced in Parliament and became law by July of 1973. This Act was based on the proposals within the White Paper that provided for a power-sharing government and a Council of Ireland. It also sought to accommodate unionists by transferring the principle of consent in terms of constitutional status to the Northern Ireland electorate. The British stressed that Northern Ireland would remain a part of the United Kingdom as long as the majority wanted. "This reassured the unionists that there could be no change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland without the consent of a majority of the people there. For Unionists this was the 'constitutional guarantee,' but for Nationalists it was the 'Unionist Veto' - a mechanism to block political progress."[13] As long as the unionists maintained a majority in the region, they would have the power to maintain the union with Great Britain.

Unfortunately, the constitutional guarantee was not enough for many unionists. The prospect of the Irish dimension was too threatening for them because it was seen as moving towards a united Ireland, the nationalist goal. When the United Ulster Unionist Council (UUUC) voted not to reject the White Paper, a faction broke away from the UUP and formed the Vanguard Unionist Progressive Party (VUPP) who, along with Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and others, decided to oppose the White Paper proposals. This coalition of unionists who opposed the White Paper "agreed on four points: the defeat of the IRA; the utter rejection of the Council of Ireland; full parliamentary representation (at Westminster); and control of the RUC by Northern Ireland's elected representatives."[14] This opposition would prove detrimental to the upcoming peace agreement at Sunningdale.

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[13] Hennessey, *Ending the Troubles*, 11.
[14] Dixon, 138.

In June 1973, elections to the proposed Assembly produced less than desirable results for the British who had hoped to see the success of moderates that would support the White Paper proposals. "The Assembly elections had produced the very outcome the British had tried to prevent, namely a dramatic upsurge for loyalist and anti-White Paper unionists resulting in a 'tribal confrontation.'"[15] The result was that the Assembly would have to include the UUP and SDLP, two parties that had opposite goals and would find it difficult to find common ground. The unionist camp at this point was highly divided and it would be hard for UUP leader Brian Faulkner to make concessions for which he did not have a mandate. Some SDLP members were reluctant to move away from their goal of Irish unity and therefore were not motivated to participate in negotiations with unionists at this point. The British wanted the negotiations to succeed, however, and hoped that their threats of returning to direct rule or withdrawal would push both parties toward a compromise.

In October 1973, the APNI, UUP, and SDLP representatives met at Stormont to discuss the power-sharing arrangements. They were able to reach agreements on several issues including economic and social programs, the principle of having an Irish dimension, and the composition of a power-sharing executive. The UUP leader, Faulkner, would be Chief Executive with the SDLP leader, Gerry Fitt, as Deputy Chief Executive. The rest of the executive would consist of a combination of different party members from the UUP, SDLP, and APNI, but giving the UUP a majority. The agreements made here paved the way for the Sunningdale Conference that would follow.

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[15] Ibid., 139.

The Sunningdale Agreement

The Sunningdale Conference was finally held on December 6-9, 1973 in England to make the final arrangements for a settlement of the Northern Ireland conflict. Both the British and Irish governments were present as well as the UUP, SDLP, and APNI. All parties within Northern Ireland, however, were not represented. For instance, "the loyalist parties were excluded from participation in spite of their substantial representation for fear that they would disrupt negotiations."[16] Nationalist groups, other than the SDLP, were also left out, leaving the process less than representative of a large majority of nationalist and unionist sentiments.

The conference set out to define the nature of the proposed elements of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act, including the power-sharing government and the Council of Ireland. "The unionists were looking for: recognition of Northern Ireland's constitutional position within the United Kingdom; improved security co-operation with the Republic against terrorism, including moves on extradition; and a weak cross-border body. The nationalists by contrast wanted a strong all-Ireland body with executive and harmonizing functions; reform of the RUC; and movement on the release of detainees."[17] Each side sought to protect their interests and advance their positions, but in the end, compromises would have to be made in order to reach an agreement.

One of the main issues addressed at this conference was the question of constitutional status. The unionists needed guarantees that their place in the union was secure, but this aim was in conflict with the Irish Constitution's Articles 2 and 3, which made claims to the territory of Northern Ireland and sought to reunite all of Ireland.

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[16] Ibid., 142.
[17] Ibid.

Faulkner therefore pushed for Articles 2 and 3 to be altered or deleted from the Irish Constitution. The Irish Government responded that this would be unacceptable to the Republic and therefore was impossible. The final agreement tried to give both sides what they wanted by having the British *and* Irish Governments declare that the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would be decided by the consent of the majority. The British still told the unionists that if the majority desired, they would continue to be part of the United Kingdom, but they also told the nationalists that if the majority desired to be part of a united Ireland in the future, the British Government would support that as well.

Faulkner was satisfied with these declarations which he saw in favor of the unionists because they recognized Northern Ireland's right to self-determination. He was also persuaded that things had gone in his favor because "they had also received an *informal* commitment that the constitutional claim [within the Irish Constitution] would be removed at the earliest opportunity."[18] Other unionists saw the Irish declaration as worthless. Only the British declaration recognized Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. Irish law saw it as part of the Republic therefore unionists saw their declaration as meaningless.

From the nationalist perspective, these declarations were progress. The British Government had declared that it was willing to support a united Ireland if the majority so wished. SDLP leaders saw this as a boost for their party because it demonstrated that the British were primarily interested in peace, not trying to hold on the Northern Ireland for its own purposes. This meant that violence used by extremists was unnecessary and this would help the more moderate SDLP gain support. "'If it could be established that the British interest was to ensure that there was peace and stability, it would mean that the

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[18] Hennessey, *Ending the Troubles*, 15.

solution relied totally on a process of persuasion, undermining the argument for violence.'"[19]

Another major issue was the reform of security forces in Northern Ireland. The nationalists had been alienated from the RUC in the past.[20] If the law enforcement system was going to have legitimacy in the future, it would need to make significant changes and be able to attract nationalists to the ranks. The Irish Government proposed having the Council of Ireland handle policing in a joint effort between the North and the South in order to help the nationalists feel as though they belonged. The British wanted the responsibility for policing to remain separate but was also reluctant to give control of security to the Northern Ireland Assembly. The unionists, Faulkner believed, would not accept an agreement that did not include control over the police force. The nationalists liked the Irish idea of sharing a police force with the South. After some debate and compromise, the parties agreed that the British would maintain control over security for now, but once the security problems were taken care of and new institutions were in place, they would begin to return responsibility for policing over to the Northern Ireland Assembly and that the Assembly would at least cooperate on policing with the Irish Government through the Council of Ireland.

The issue of extradition was also discussed. It had been a point of contention for some time because the Irish Government had refused to extradite people to Northern Ireland that were wanted for political and terrorist offenses. It was agreed that offenders would be tried wherever they were arrested, meaning that they would not need to be returned to the place where the crime was committed, but could be tried in the South for

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[19] Dixon, 143.
[20] Fitzduff, 83.

their crimes in the North or vice versa. A Joint Law Commission was also established to

consider legal issues and recommend the best way to approach them in the future.

One more issue that dominated the Sunningdale Conference was the

establishment of the Council of Ireland.[21] This institution had been discussed in previous

meetings and papers, but now it was time to lay out the details of how this Council would

work.

> The executive functions of the Council of Ireland were not defined; instead 'studies would at once be set in hand to identify and, prior to the formal stage of the conference, report on areas of common interest in relation to which a Council of Ireland would take executive decisions and, in appropriate cases, be responsible for carrying those decisions into effect.' The studies would investigate areas of policy suitable for executive action by the Council of Ireland in fields of: exploitation, conservation and development of natural resources and the environment; agricultural matters; co-operative ventures in the fields of trade and industry; electricity generation; tourism; roads and transport; advisory services connected with public health; sport; culture and the arts. There was no limit to the array of functions which could be devolved to the Council of Ireland with the agreement of the NI Assembly and the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament).[22]

They agreed that there would be a Council of Ministers with executive, harmonizing, and

consultative functions made up of seven members from the Northern Ireland Assembly

and seven members from the Irish Government. They also agreed that decisions in the

Council of Ministers would have to be made unanimously, which gave unionists the

power to veto proposals they did not like. There would also be a Constitutive Assembly

with thirty members from each government that would have advisory and review

functions and a secretariat to supervise and service the institutions of the Council.

Implementation

After the Agreement was finalized on December 9, 1973, each community had the

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[21] Wolff, 165.
[22] Dixon, 143.

challenge of implementing it and convincing their constituents that their community would benefit. The SDLP "was generally happy with the Sunningdale Agreement"[23] and appeared to have the easier task because the nationalists had gained the most during the negotiations. The Irish Government had taken their side on the issues and together, they had achieved many concessions. The nationalists had gained a position in the Northern Ireland Assembly, the security forces were being altered to entice nationalist participation, and a North-South body was being created to cooperate on all-Ireland issues. This, however, was not enough for many of the hardliners who still believed a united Ireland was possible. Sinn Fein and the IRA, who had not taken part in the negotiations, thought that the British could be convinced to leave the island and refused to settle for less. They "consistently opposed such compromises . . . [and] waged an intensifying campaign of violence throughout [Sunningdale's] brief history."[24] They did not care for the compromises that had taken place at Sunningdale and would not support the Agreement.

The unionists had an even more difficult time selling the Sunningdale Agreement. One of the first signs of trouble came immediately after the Agreement was finalized. One of Faulkner's gains had been the declaration that both the Irish and British Governments would allow majority consent to determine the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and informally he had also been promised that the Irish Government would remove Articles 2 and 3 at the first opportunity. This promise, however, did not go over well in the Republic and Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave was soon forced to renounce his promises. In an interview he stated, "'there is no question of changing our

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[23] Murray, 22.
[24] McGarry, 112.

Constitution with regard to our claim of sovereignty over all of Ireland.'"[25] The official Irish position would not acknowledge that Northern Ireland was part of the United Kingdom and this set the unionist position back severely.

The Council of Ireland was a stumbling block as well. It remained highly controversial to many unionists and continued to be seen as a threat. Faulkner believed that the constitutional status of Northern Ireland was secure because of the majority consent declaration and therefore the Council would not pose a great threat. He thought that if the Irish Government treated the Northern Ireland representatives as equals within the Council, it would demonstrate that they accepted partition. As long as the Northern Ireland Assembly maintained control over their affairs and unanimity was required within the Council, he did not see a problem.

Other unionists, however, saw the Council as an "embryonic all-Ireland government."[26] Originally, the Council had been conceived of as a consultative council, but this had shifted over time and it was now being given executive functions. Those unionists who opposed the Council saw that its functions were already evolving and many feared that it was only a matter of time before it turned into an all-Ireland Parliament. They did not trust nationalist intentions. The Council was suspiciously viewed as an SDLP strategy to get all-Ireland institutions imbedded within the community in hopes of creating a momentum towards unification that could not be stopped. They thought the Council had too much power and too much potential. It was seen as a step too far towards nationalist goals.

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[25] Hennessey, *Ending the Troubles*, 16.
[26] Ibid., 12.

It did not help matters either that the Irish Government and SDLP were confirming the unionists' fears. Taoiseach Cosgrave argued that "Sunningdale meant that a united Ireland was on the way" while Hugh Logue of the SDLP stated that "the Council of Ireland was 'the vehicle which will trundle unionists into a United Ireland.'"[27] With the Council of Ireland threatening Northern Ireland's constitutional status within the United Kingdom along with the Irish Government turning its back on their promises about Articles 2 and 3, the Sunningdale Agreement was becoming increasingly difficult to sell.

The Beginning and the End

The Northern Ireland Assembly began acting on January 1, 1974, but it would not last for long. The UUC voted, shortly after, against the Sunningdale Agreement and Faulkner resigned as leader of the UUP. Now that he was no longer head of the UUP, his place as Chief Executive of the Northern Ireland Assembly was in question and made the Executive less credible. The British General Election was then held in February 1974, which effectively acted as a referendum on the issues agreed to at Sunningdale. Faulkner and his supporters were heavily defeated while unionist opponents of the Agreement achieved victory by winning 51% of the vote and eleven of the twelve seats, with the twelfth going to SDLP.[28]

Around the same time, Britain announced its move toward a security strategy of normalization, intended to make security concerns more of an internal problem with crime rather than political violence. The goal was to give the RUC more responsibility and decrease that of the British Army. This way, the conflict would appear to be more of

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[27] Dixon, 147.
[28] Wolff, 165.

a domestic issue of law and order rather than an international problem of terrorist violence. This new strategy, however, made the IRA believe they were succeeding in pushing the British out and made the unionists fear a complete British withdrawal. These feelings were magnified by British statements such as that made by Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees, saying that "'we have not the faintest interest to stay in Ireland and the quicker we are out the better.'"[29] Under these circumstances, neither community saw much incentive to cooperate.

After seeing the moderates fail at the polls, the British sought to bring more groups into the political process. They decided to legalize Sinn Fein in May of 1974 and opened up contacts with the IRA.[30] They also legalized the UVF and realized that the loyalist masses would have to be appeased if power-sharing was going to work. These groups, however, were still unrepresented in the established power-sharing government, had little stake in seeing it succeed, and continued to escalate their campaign of violence to undermine the Assembly's position. "Republicans saw [the Agreement] as copperfastening partition at a time when internment without trial was in full swing, and loyalists saw it as a pact with the devil. The IRA reduced the center of Armagh and Bangor to rubble during the Sunningdale period, and the Ulster Defense Association and Ulster Freedom Fighters stepped up a sectarian killing campaign."[31]

On May 14, 1974, the Assembly, where Faulkner unionists, SDLP, and APNI had a majority, held a vote on the Sunningdale Agreement and voted 44 to 28 to ratify it. This provoked the recently formed Ulster Workers' Council (UWC) to call for a general

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[29] Ibid., 166.
[30] Feeney, 274.
[31] Conor O'Clery, "Sunningdale Failed Partly because Mainstream Republicans and Unionists Were Not on Board," *Irish Times*, 6 April 1998, Home News section, City edition, 5.

strike. The UWC consisted of paramilitary leaders and factory workers who did not trust

unionist politicians and who believed that the Sunningdale provisions were being

imposed on them by the British against their will. The strike soon gained momentum as

anti-Sunningdale loyalists realized they could possibly succeed in having the government

removed. The strike basically paralyzed Northern Ireland over the following two weeks.

The Northern Ireland Assembly was still relying on Britain for security, but the British

failed to act. "There were real concerns that deploying the British Army . . . to break the

UWC strike would have precipitated a violent confrontation with loyalists and a 'war on

two fronts'" which they were unwilling to tackle.[32] Without the necessary support or the

ability to bring the strike to an end, Faulkner was forced to resign the executive and the

Sunningdale experiment collapsed, returning Northern Ireland to Britain's direct rule.

WHY THE PEACE PROCESS FAILED

Response to the Underlying Issues

The failure of the Sunningdale Agreement can be explained by assessing the

extent to which the four key elements of the conflict resolution process were present.

The first question to ask is whether or not the underlying issues of the conflict were being

adequately addressed. The answer to this question is yes. Although many issues were yet

to be resolved, the participants in this peace process made sincere efforts and developed

practical solutions to deal with the issues that divided the two communities. Economic,

social, and political reforms were all on the agenda and new institutions were being

planned to help modernize Northern Ireland and promote the well-being of its people.

Human rights and fundamental freedoms were also emphasized and legislation was

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[32] Dixon, 152.

introduced to provide protection for all individuals in Northern Ireland. Although true

agreement failed to be reached on the constitutional status of the region, the issue was

addressed and efforts were made to compromise on the issue. Lastly, a new government

was being established that would allow both communities to participate in governing

their own lives. The participants in this peace process understood the importance of

responding to the conflict's underlying issues and made significant progress in

developing solutions to these issues. Unfortunately, responding to the grievances of the

two communities was not enough for the Sunningdale Agreement to survive. Other

aspects must be examined to understand its failure.

Track-Two Diplomacy

Another factor to assess during this peace process is the level of reconciliation

efforts aimed at overcoming the conflict through track-two diplomacy. During the

Sunningdale peace process, efforts were already being made towards reconciliation and

relationship-building between the two communities. These initiatives sprung up largely

in response to the horrific violence occurring during this time. The British recognized the

need to address the problem of relationships and therefore established a new Ministry of

Community Relations along with the Northern Ireland Community Relations

Commission (NICRC) in 1969.

The fact that the NICRC was linked to the government, however, damaged its

credibility and restrained its ability to act as a facilitator of dialogue. "'Only a body

which is seen to be independent of government can perform this role. Government itself

cannot do it when it is a party to the conflict."[33] It acted more as a public relations council meant to improve relations between the government and the people, instead of relations between the two communities.[34] Its policies were flawed as well, such as giving money to areas overcome by political conflict rather than areas of social need. This gave the appearance of trying to buy off those using violent tactics rather than really trying to resolve the problems. "More fundamentally, as a government agency it was caught in a trap where its policies were aimed at protecting the political system which was largely the cause of the unrest it was attempting to quell. So it was a government department engaged in a hopeless attempt to 'purchase respect' from Catholics who were rapidly losing any respect for the entire government system."[35]

By 1970, the NICRC realized it was failing to accomplish its goals and came up with a new strategy designed around community development. The development strategy would be the core of the NICRC's policy and help foster good community relations. The goal was to increase each community's own self-esteem and confidence through development so that it would then be able to "look outside itself to find areas of common interest with other communities on which they could then unite across sectarian boundaries."[36]

In addition to this core, however, was the support for other groups who could also contribute to reconciliation initiatives. Groups such as the Corrymeela Community (1965), Women Together (1970), Protestant And Catholic Encounter (1968), All Children Together (1972), and Churches Central Committee for Community Work

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[33] Bloomfield, *Peacemaking Strategies*, 54.
[34] Ibid., 52-3.
[35] Ibid., 53.
[36] Ibid., 55.

(1971) as well as others came into existence during this time in order to facilitate community contact and dialogue and to help build cross-community relations.[37] The NICRC supported these groups both publicly and financially, but continued to focus on their community development project.

Unfortunately, the NICRC would not last for long and its efforts would have little effect at this point. The Stormont government did not like its policy of encouraging self-confidence in disruptive areas. In its opinion, this threatened the government's control in those areas and did nothing to facilitate government-community relations. At the same time, violence was on the rise which hurt the NICRC's credibility in terms of having a beneficial effect on resolving community conflict. By April 1972, the NICRC's chair and director had both resigned because of the growing difficulties from the government's lack of support and escalating violence. In 1974 the decision was made to close the NICRC.

The informal groups continued their efforts during and after this time, but their success remained fairly minimal because their numbers were small and momentum was low. They were mostly inexperienced groups who were committed to peace, but lacked the expertise and organization to produce significant results. They encountered difficulties in collaborating, coordinating strategies and goals, obtaining resources, and even finding volunteers who had the time to help. These groups were in the beginning stages of their efforts and it would take some time before they were polished enough to be effective facilitators of the reconciliation process. "Surveys have shown that where there has been an active local council community relations programme in place for one or

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[37] Craig Seaton, *Northern Ireland: The Context for Conflict and for Reconciliation* (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1998), 237-56.

two years, relationships between communities are seen to be more positive than in areas where such programmes have just started."[38] These groups therefore would be much more effective in the future and eventually play a tremendous role in resolving the Northern Ireland conflict.

Inclusiveness

The Sunningdale peace process failed in more areas than just track-two diplomacy. One of the fatal flaws of the Sunningdale peace process was its failure to be inclusive. "[The Agreement] failed partly because it did not have mainstream republican and unionist players on board."[39] In order for the Agreement to succeed, it would need substantial support from both communities. Unfortunately, those who participated in the talks and endorsed the Agreement were lacking majority support from their community. "That this support for pro-agreement politicians was not forthcoming was one of the major reasons for the failure of this early attempt to resolve the Northern Ireland conflict."[40] Many groups who had significant community support were excluded from the talks and not given an opportunity to voice their positions or even take part in the power-sharing government. These groups had no incentive to stop the violence and continued to fight against what they saw as an imposed settlement.

The moderate SDLP was the only nationalist party included in the process. This was insufficient representation for nationalists because it did not represent the hardline nationalist positions and was not significantly linked to any of the republican paramilitary groups who were responsible for the violence. The SDLP's acceptance of the

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[38] Fitzduff, 159.
[39] O'Clery, "Sunningdale Failed," 5.
[40] Wolff, 166.

Sunningdale Agreement would not convince the IRA or other republican paramilitaries to stop the violence because they did not have any control over them and their goals were not completely in line with one another.

The unionists were partially represented at the talks, but the divisions within the UUP soon demonstrated that much of the group did not support what their representatives were doing at Sunningdale. The UUP split and the group that was left participating in the talks proved to be unrepresentative of the majority of unionist opinion. Beyond the UUP, other groups such as the DUP, UDA, and UVF were also excluded, leaving many who disagreed with the Agreement being made and many who were still willing to use force to protect their interests. Their exclusion would not stop them from using violence and also meant that the Agreement would not survive.

Third-Party Assistance

It was not just the lack of inclusiveness that caused the Sunningdale Agreement to fail; it was also the third-party dynamics that created an environment resistant to settlement. First of all, there was no real third-party involved in the peace process. Some look at the conflict as merely between the Protestants and Catholics of Northern Ireland and view the involvement of the British and Irish Governments as third-party involvement. These two governments, however, were part of the problem and cannot be considered third-parties. The British attempted to take a neutral stance during the talks, but since two of the major points of dispute revolved around whether or not the British would stay involved in the affairs of Northern Ireland and whether or not Northern Ireland would remain a part of the United Kingdom, it was impossible for the British to

act as a third-party mediator. Third-parties may not always be neutral, but they surely should not be a part of what the opposing sides are fighting over. The Irish, unlike the British, did not even attempt to be neutral. They supported the nationalist goals and tilted the balance towards the nationalist position. Both of these so-called third-parties, therefore, were ineffective as true mediators and failed to produce a durable settlement on their own.

Secondly, the British used poor judgment in making threats to get the parties to reach and implement an agreement. When trying to push the nationalists into talks, Britain threatened a return to direct rule if a settlement could not be reached. The problem was that many unionists preferred direct rule to power-sharing with an Irish dimension therefore the threat seemed more beneficial to them than a compromise would have been. This threat helped undermined the pro-agreement unionists and helped bring the power-sharing government to an end.

The British also threatened withdrawal at several points in order to persuade the unionists to cooperate. "Faulkner and the British Government heightened unionist insecurities by using the threat of British withdrawal in an attempt to scare unionists into supporting the executive as a least worst alternative."[41] This undermined the position of pro-agreement nationalists because it made paramilitaries believe they could succeed in making the British leave for good without compromising in a settlement.

If threats are going to succeed in altering the dynamics so that opposing groups are willing to compromise, they must not offer more benefits than a settlement would bring. This takes away the incentive to compromise. The threats are supposed to

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[41] Dixon, 149.

increase the costs of continued conflict so that both sides will find their way to an agreement, not encourage the opposition to keep fighting.

SUMMARY

The Sunningdale negotiations addressed several important issues of the Northern Ireland conflict and introduced some new concepts that would appear in later negotiations. Unfortunately, these successes would not be enough to produce a viable settlement. All of the necessary elements of the peace process were not in place therefore it failed, allowing violence to spread throughout the region once again.

The Agreement succeeded in addressing the underlying issues of the conflict and offered many practical solutions to Northern Ireland's problems. Advances were made towards providing better living conditions for all of Northern Ireland, human rights and freedoms were becoming a priority, and social, economic, and political reforms were in place. These efforts, however, were not enough to sustain an agreement.

There were many problems that kept the Sunningdale Agreement from succeeding. First of all, although efforts were being made towards reconciliation, the track-two diplomacy initiatives were inadequate and failed to make much progress in altering the hostile relations between the two communities. The government was linked to many of the first initiatives which prevented them from succeeding because they were not able to be neutral facilitators of problem-solving. The organizations that were neutral were just beginning to take off and would need some time before their efforts could have the desired impact. Without effective track-two diplomacy, the opposing communities

were unable to move past their identity concerns and continued to fear and hate one another.

Another problem that prevented the Sunningdale talks from succeeding was that not everyone was included in the peace process. Those who were excluded remained uncommitted to seeing the settlement succeed and committed to using violence. Without being included in the negotiations, their thoughts and strategies could not be altered and geared towards non-violence. They continued to distrust the opposition and wanted no part in a compromise.

Finally, these talks also failed because there were no real third-parties involved to help broker an agreement or create the circumstances that would lead to an agreement. The parties that were involved were unable to alter the dynamics so that the costs of continued conflict outweighed the benefits. The paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland continued to see victory at the end of their struggle and therefore continued to use violence to achieve their goals.

If a future settlement were to succeed, these problems would have to be fixed. The *underlying issues* would need to be addressed; *track-two diplomacy* would need to be pursued by knowledgeable, experienced, and neutral parties; the talks would have to be *inclusive*; and *third-parties* would need to be involved that could raise the benefits of peace while raising the costs of violence. If all of these elements were pursued during the peace process, the Northern Ireland people would have a better chance for peace.

CHAPTER VI

THE GOOD FRIDAY PEACE PROCESS

After the Sunningdale negotiations ended in disaster, each negotiation process that followed attempted to overcome its failures. It was not until the Good Friday talks occurred, however, that all of the necessary elements would fall into place. Over the years, the same underlying issues kept resurfacing and adjustments were made here and there to improve the responses to them. They would be addressed in these talks as well, just as they had in the past.

Reconciliation efforts would be much greater this time. By the 1990s, the number of groups working on track-two diplomacy had exploded and the level of their expertise had grown significantly. These groups would now be in a position to help the opposing communities overcome their hatred and fear of each other and find a way to rebuild and redefine their relationships.

Those in search of peace had also learned over the years that inclusive negotiations were critical to achieving peace. By the time of the Good Friday talks, efforts were being made to bring Sinn Fein as well as others into the peace process. These efforts to include all of the significant parties would have a tremendous impact on the negotiations. They would allow more parties to be influenced by the process and procedures of negotiation and would give the parties a stake in seeing an agreement succeed.

Lastly, a third-party was finally brought in to oversee the talks and help guide the opposing groups toward peace. The participation of the United States in this negotiation

process would alter the dynamics of the conflict significantly and would help urge the groups to turn away from violence. The attention that the conflict would receive from outside its borders would make the groups rethink their positions and work harder towards a compromise. In the end, the Americans would prove to be very helpful at enticing an agreement.

An examination of each of these factors during the Good Friday talks will demonstrate how and why they were able to succeed where the Sunningdale talks had failed. All four necessary aspects of the peace process were in place, allowing the motivations for violence to be overcome. Once these aspects were present, the stage was set for progress to occur and peace to be achieved.

THE PEACE PROCESS

The Atmosphere

The talks that took place in the 1990s occurred in a very different atmosphere than those of the 1970s. The level of violence, although still unacceptable, was tremendously lower than it had been during the talks leading up to Sunningdale. Since then, there had also been several attempts to resolve the conflict and although none produced a viable agreement, progress had been made. Contact had increased between Sinn Fein and the British Government; Sinn Fein had become more politically conscious as nonviolence became more popular; the SDLP and Sinn Fein had attempted to formulate a common stance for negotiations; and cease-fires were becoming increasingly common. Hardline unionism also became increasingly marginalized as the British and nationalists grew closer to compromise. As it became more obvious that a solution could be found that

would satisfy the nationalists, the violent tactics of the unionists would no longer preserve the link with Britain. They would need to compromise as well if the link was to be kept. A framework for an agreement had also been established which would help focus future negotiations towards the key elements that needed to be resolved. This different environment would prove much more conducive to producing a workable agreement.

Bringing America In

Another critical element of the new environment was the involvement of the United States.[1] The United States has had a limited role in the Northern Ireland peace process throughout the years. Most US administrations have kept a distance from the conflict due to the special relationship between the US and Great Britain. Britain has viewed the Northern Ireland conflict as an internal matter and has not wanted outside interference. "Indeed as early as August 1969 the British and Northern Ireland prime ministers issued a statement in which they asserted that Northern Ireland was purely a matter of domestic jurisdiction with no role for the international community."[2] The US recognized the British jurisdiction and stayed out of the matter because the special relationship was critical to the balance of the Cold War international system. "A Cold

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[1] For more on the US involvement in the Northern Ireland conflict, see Dominic Beggan, "The Conflict in Northern Ireland and the Clinton Administration's Role," *International Journal on World Peace* 16, no. 4 (December 1999): 3-26; R. J. Briand, "Bush, Clinton, Irish America and the Irish Peace Process," *Political Quarterly* 73, no. 2 (April-June 2002): 172-80; Adrian Guelke, "The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process," *International Affairs* 72, no. 3 (July 1996): 521-36; Roger MacGinty, "American Influences on the Northern Ireland Peace Process," *The Journal of Conflict Studies* (Fall 1997): 31-50; Roger MacGinty, "Bill Clinton and the Northern Ireland Peace Process," *Aussenpolitik* 48, no. 3 (1997): 237-44; Joseph O'Grady, "An Irish Policy Born in the U.S.A.: Clinton's Break with the Past," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 3 (May/June 1996): 2-7; Jonathan Stevenson, "Irreversible Peace in Northern Ireland?" *Survival* 42, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 5-26; Cox; George Mitchell; O'Clery, *Daring Diplomacy*; Holland. For a different perspective that argues that the US involvement was not significant, see Dixon.
[2] Ruane and Todd, *Good Friday Agreement*, 74.

War driven 'special relationship' with Britain meant that successive US administrations were happy to regard Northern Ireland as an internal affair for the United Kingdom."[3] The US continuously respected the British position and limited its involvement mainly to rhetoric about the concern for human rights and support for a peaceful settlement.

Although the US government kept its distance from the Northern Ireland conflict, the large Irish-American population within the US continued to pursue an active role through various other means. "Irish Americans were frequently to be disappointed by the stance of the United States government on matters connected to the Irish question. That did not deter them from seeking to influence American foreign policy on Ireland, but it meant that they also sought other means of advancing their cause, in particular, raising large sums of money for the nationalist campaign."[4] Over the course of the conflict, Irish Americans have aggressively pursued the nationalist cause by establishing various organizations for fundraising and lobbying purposes. Some of the most influential organizations were Irish Northern Aid (NORAID), the Irish National Caucus (INC), the Congressional Friends of Ireland, and Americans for a New Irish Agenda (ANIA). Many of those involved in these organizations were supporters of the nationalist parties in Northern Ireland and even the IRA paramilitary. Some of these groups provided more than financial support by smuggling arms shipments to the IRA to help their cause. Others focused on raising awareness of human rights issues involved in the conflict. Some proved to be very influential on US policy such as the Friends of Ireland, which included "twenty-four of the most influential senators, congressmen, and governors . . . [and] Senator Chris Dodd, a future Chairman of the Democratic Party who would,

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[3] MacGinty, "American Influences," 31.
[4] Guelke, 522.

alongside Ted Kennedy, exert considerable influence on Bill Clinton in the US

contribution to the Irish peace process."[5]

As Bill Clinton campaigned for the presidency in 1992, he committed himself to

taking a much more active role in the Northern Ireland conflict. At a forum sponsored by

Irish Americans, just after losing the Connecticut primary to Jerry Brown and two days

before the New York primary would take place (both areas that contained high levels of

Catholic constituents), Clinton announced he "would appoint a special envoy to Northern

Ireland, pressure the British on human rights violations there . . . issue a visa to Gerry

Adams . . . grant political asylum hearings in extradition cases that involved suspected

IRA members living in the United States, support a more open immigration policy, and

endorse the MacBride Principles against employment discrimination in Northern

Ireland."[6] The importance of the Catholic Irish-American constituency in winning the

presidential election raised the level of interest in the Northern Ireland conflict and

helped put the issue on the foreign policy agenda. Clinton's commitment to his campaign

promises would lead the US to take a proactive stance on the matter and commit itself to

participating in the peace process.

It was more than just an Irish-American lobby for US involvement in the conflict,

however, that drove the Clinton administration to take an active role. Clinton had first

been exposed to the conflict in 1968 when he went to Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar. He

was very interested in civil rights during this time and was heavily influenced by what he

saw in England.

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[5] Briand, 176.
[6] O'Grady, 3.

On television there were dramatic pictures of police batoning defenseless demonstrators and of student marchers being stoned by members of the Protestant reserve police force, the "B Specials."

These vivid images deeply affected the boy from Hope, where he had learned respect for people of a different kind from the courteous way his grandfather treated black customers in his shop. He was outraged by what he saw on television at Oxford.

'I was there when the Troubles began, you know,' ... [Clinton said in an interview] ... 'I was living in Oxford. It occupied the attention of the country obviously. And as someone who was there who had Irish roots, also Scottish roots, and on my father's side, English roots, I was fascinated by it at the time.' Reflecting on the violence which followed he remarked, 'Well, of course, we went through the whole thing at home. I could see it coming, that religious differences were likely to lead to the same kind of problems that racial difference had in my childhood' ... Having been a child living in a majority of whites in his state with a passionate sense of the need for integration and equal opportunity for people, he said he had always been curious about the nature of conflict.

'It's not a strict analogy. There are lots of complexities here which are different. But I never dreamed when it all started and I was a young man living in England and just fascinated by it and heartbroken by it, that I'd ever have a chance to do anything to help it. I hope I have. I hope I'll have more. You know, I've been fascinated by it for twenty-five years ... from the day the Troubles began.'[7]

Clinton's background and experience in England during this time greatly influenced his

perspective on the Irish conflict and made him even more passionate about the cause.

The changing nature of the international environment during the 1990s also

allowed the Clinton administration to take a stronger position on the Northern Ireland

conflict by opening up US foreign policy choices. Now that the Cold War was over, US

foreign policy was no longer confined to the policies of a bipolar world. It had the choice

to become more active in the world or retreat and focus more on domestic concerns.

Becoming isolationist, however, was something the Clinton administration wanted to

avoid so its foreign policy was one of selective intervention.[8] The reduced salience of the

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[7] O'Clery, *Daring Diplomacy*, 23.
[8] Briand, 172.

British-American special relationship as the Cold War ended meant that this selective

interventionism could now take the US into Northern Ireland. As Clinton stated,

> I think sometimes we are too reluctant to engage ourselves in a positive way
> because of our long-standing special relationship with Great Britain and also
> because [Northern Ireland] seemed such a thorny problem. In the aftermath of the
> Cold War we need a governing rationale for our engagement in the whole world,
> not just in Northern Ireland, with our European allies, but around the world. I
> think the United States is now in a position to think about positive change.[9]

The changing philosophy of American foreign policy during this time allowed the US to

play an influential role in the Irish peace process.

Although the Clinton administration chose to take action in the Northern Ireland

situation, US involvement was not merely an American idea. The nationalist movement

within Northern Ireland recognized the value of US participation in the peace process and

sought to bring the Americans in.

> The republican movement was explicit about the need to capitalize on links with
> North America. It noted in an internal discussion document that 'there is
> potentially a very powerful Irish-American lobby not in hock to any particular
> party in Ireland or Britain.' The discussion document went on to note that,
> 'Clinton is perhaps the first US President in decades to be substantially influenced
> by such a [Irish American] lobby.' By the early 1990s the republican movement
> had already forged a number of links with this lobby. The emerging Irish-
> American lobby was different in character to previously influential Irish-
> American lobbies. It included a number of entrepreneurs who had become
> significant players in corporate America, and were also active in Bill Clinton's
> first Presidential election campaign.[10]

Although US involvement initially angered the British government and Irish

Unionists, the British eventually backed down and accepted US involvement as well.

British officials were now ready to make use of American assistance.

> The Irish government had long sought to involve outsiders, to 'internationalize'
> the problem of Northern Ireland. The Irish especially wanted to get the
> Americans involved. The British had resisted, on the grounds that Northern

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[9] MacGinty, "American Influences," 42.
[10] MacGinty, "Bill Clinton," 238.

> Ireland was part of the United Kingdom so the conflict there was an internal issue; to internationalize it could undermine British sovereignty. Now . . . the British government . . . was prepared to join the Irish government in creating an international group to study and make recommendations on the thorny issue of disarmament. They were even prepared to accept an American as chairman of the group: [George Mitchell].[11]

With an American desire to become involved and the British and Irish nationalists now requesting US involvement, the stage was set for the US to help the opposing parties within Northern Ireland reach an agreement for peace.

America Takes Action

One of Clinton's first decisions that would greatly influence the peace process was the decision to grant Gerry Adams, leader of the nationalist Sinn Fein party, a visa to enter the US. This was one of the first steps the US took to demonstrate its commitment to advancing the peace process. While the British condemned the visa, which in their view allowed a terrorist to enter the US, the White House defended its position as one that would help convince the IRA leadership to declare a cease-fire.

> The Adams visa will advance the peace. Sinn Fein will pay a price for going to Capitol Hill. A lot of powerful people went out on a limb for Adams. If he doesn't deliver, they'll have him back in the house with the steel shutters (Sinn Fein headquarters, Falls Road, Belfast) so fast his feet won't touch the ground. We're slowly putting the squeeze on them, pulling them in, boxing them in, cutting off their lines of retreat.[12]

This was only the first of several visas Clinton would grant for Adams, each granting him further legitimacy within the political realm and encouraging his participation in the peace process.

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[11] George Mitchell, 25-6.
[12] MacGinty, "American Influences," 36.

US involvement in this peace process was a diplomatic mission that strove for peace without the use of force. The US did not intervene militarily in this conflict. It issued visas, made speeches, and sent envoys. "The American role was pragmatic, helping where the opportunity arose, rather than intervening and banging heads together. According to Clinton, ' . . . the United States had no ulterior motive, no particular political design in mind.'"[13] Despite the waning special relationship, it was still impossible to think of US forces intervening on British territory. With the special connection and shared democratic norms, the Americans would never have considered such measures. Instead, American ties to the Irish people made the conflict in Northern Ireland a personal cause and motivated many to help pursue the goals of peace. The nationalist movement in Northern Ireland welcomed American friends into the peace process and hoped they would help support the nationalist position. Once the British realized the potential influence the US could have on achieving peace, they too requested US assistance in resolving the conflict.

The Peace Process Begins

In November 1995, the British and Irish Governments announced their intentions to begin the process towards all-party negotiations. "The governments would 'invite the parties to intensive preparatory talks to reach widespread agreement on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to bring all parties together for substantive negotiations.'"[14] At the same time, US Senator George Mitchell was asked to lead in

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[13] MacGinty, "Bill Clinton," 240.
[14] Dixon, 259.

international body on the discussion and assessment of the decommissioning issue in order to provide advice and recommendations on how to proceed.

Mitchell's report, released in January of 1996, stated that the paramilitaries would not have to decommission before entering the talks, but should commit to achieving decommissioning as part of the negotiation process. The parties would also have to commit to the principles of democracy and non-violence. The principles that this report produced became known as the Mitchell Principles and were considered mandatory for participation in the talks. These principles included:

> total and absolute commitment: a) to democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues; b) to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations; c) to agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission; d) to renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations; e) to agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and, f) to urge that 'punishment' killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.[15]

Although some disagreed with Mitchell's recommendations to allow parties into the talks without prior disarmament, his recommendations and principles were eventually accepted and laid the groundwork for all-party talks to begin.

In May of 1996, Forum elections were held to choose who would represent the people of Northern Ireland in the all-party talks. These elections were designed to accommodate both unionist and nationalist demands. Unionists were pushing for an election to choose delegates for negotiations while nationalists wanted inclusive negotiations. They would both get what they wanted, but it would take some maneuvering to have certain groups included in the talks.

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[15] George Mitchell, 35-6.

> Both [British and Irish] governments wanted the political parties associated with paramilitary organizations to be included in the negotiations. Sinn Fein would clearly get enough votes in any system to be eligible once the IRA reinstated its cease-fire; it was already the fourth largest party in Northern Ireland. But its unionist counterparts, the Progressive Unionist Party and the Ulster Democratic Party – known collectively as the loyalist parties – were new and small, not large enough to win a place at the talks in the election systems customarily used in Northern Ireland. So the British created a new system to get them in, by providing, in a society where there were five well-established parties, that the top *ten* parties would be eligible. The plan was ingenious.[16]

Sinn Fein and the DUP did remarkably well despite their connections to paramilitary organizations and typically hardline stances. The more moderate and conciliatory UUP received the most seats, but did not obtain its desired support and therefore would be less able to compromise or risk appearing too soft during the negotiation process. The SDLP also did well, but was only barely ahead of Sinn Fein. The remaining parties received significantly fewer votes but were able to participate nonetheless. This time around, the negotiations would be open to all parties, but their stances would be at times less compromising than desired and would make the negotiation process tense and difficult.

Unfortunately when the talks began on June 10, 1996, Sinn Fein was prevented from taking its place in the negotiations because the IRA had broken its cease-fire in February, and therefore Sinn Fein was not in conformity with the Mitchell Principles. Gerry Adams and his group arrived, ready to take part, but were denied access to the proceedings. "The legislation enacted by the British Parliament to authorize these negotiations was clear: until there was a renewal of the IRA cease-fire, Sinn Fein would not participate in the talks."[17]

As the negotiations began, one of the first issues to be resolved was who would chair the peace talks. The British and Irish Governments had agreed to ask George

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[16] Ibid., 43.
[17] Ibid., 48.

Mitchell to chair the negotiations, but this proved to be a point of contention for the unionists. Although Mitchell insisted that he would be fair and impartial, some unionists thought otherwise and fought against Mitchell's appointment. When Mitchell arrived to take his seat as Chairman, the DUP and UKUP voiced their disapproval and walked out. At this point, it appeared the negotiations would proceed without three of the ten elected parties. Fortunately, however, the DUP and UKUP returned the following day and eventually the majority of unionists would grow to appreciate and respect Mitchell's abilities as a negotiator. Now it was just a matter of the IRA renewing its cease-fire in order to make the talks fully inclusive.

Negotiations proceeded throughout the year, although making little headway as the violence persisted, and many issues remained unresolved. The IRA continued its campaign of violence and as the marching season began, tensions rose between the two communities. The most disruptive march took place at the Drumcree Church. The parade route traditionally took Protestants through Catholics neighborhoods and caused conflict. This time was no different. As the march took place, confrontation increased and violent clashes disrupted the momentum of the talks.

Phase Two

The peace process was soon to be revived, however, as a new government came into office in Britain. On May 1, 1997, the Labour Government was elected to office and Prime Minister Tony Blair set out to move the peace process forward. He began by reassuring the unionists that Britain supported Northern Ireland's place within the UK. He argued that the principle of majority consent continued to guide their position and that

the unionists had nothing to fear.[18] Next, Blair turned his attention to pulling Sinn Fein

into the talks. All Sinn Fein had to do was renounce the use of violence and have the

IRA announce and maintain a cease-fire. As Blair stated to Sinn Fein leaders, "the

settlement train is leaving. I want you on that train. But it is leaving anyway and I will

not allow it to wait for you. You cannot hold the process to ransom any longer. So, end

the violence now."[19] Sinn Fein then announced that they would require a date for

entrance into talks, that those talks would also require a deadline, and that the talks must

cover constitutional issues. Blair met their conditions and replied that once the IRA had

renewed its cease-fire, Sinn Fein would be allowed to join the talks within six weeks, the

deadline for the new agreement would be April 9, 1998, and constitutional issues would

be on the agenda.[20] Finally on July 20, 1997, the IRA announced a cease-fire and Sinn

Fein was now in a position to take part in the peace process.

When the new Labour Government was elected, the UUP gained strength as well

by increasing its seats in the Parliament. The increase in support for the UUP gave them

a stronger mandate to continue in their efforts towards settlement. This was important

because Sinn Fein would now be entering the talks and many unionists who had

consistently refused to take part in negotiations with them would find their presence

problematic. When the talks resumed in September 1997, the DUP and the UKUP

refused to participate because of Sinn Fein's presence and the UUP was left with the task

of representing the majority of unionists.

In the face of continued violent resistance from dissident nationalists and loyalists

and the temporary expulsion of both Sinn Fein and the UDP due to their connections with

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[18] Dixon, 267.
[19] George Mitchell, 101.
[20] Holland, 210.

violence, the peace process continued. This set of talks was the first one where almost all parties were represented and able to have a voice in the political process.[21] It proved to be a very strenuous period of debate as each group attempted to have their interests met. "The fiercest battles took place around the number and scope of any cross-border bodies, the powers of the new assembly, the fate of paramilitary prisoners, and the future of the RUC."[22] Agreement began to look impossible as the parties continued to reject each other's proposals and the deadline grew near.

The issues that were up for debate closely resembled those at the Sunningdale Conference. The two communities were attempting to agree on a power-sharing government, the rights and safeguards of groups and individuals, social and economic reform, RUC reform, the release of prisoners, and a North-South body that would involve cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic. This time, however, new issues were also on the agenda. Decommissioning had become a critical issue and another institution, in the form of an East-West body that would allow the British and Irish Governments to coordinate policies and strengthen their relationship, was being planned as well.

The framework of the negotiations basically broke the issues down into three strands. Strand One concerned setting up a power-sharing government between the two communities. The debate over this strand generally focused on the style of the executive and the level of safeguards to protect each community's rights, including the power of veto.[23] Strand Two involved setting up a North-South council and Strand Three involved establishing a British-Irish council. The concerns were generally the same as during the

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[21] Fitzduff, 129.

[22] Holland, 216.

[23] Hennessey, *Ending the Troubles*, 126.

Sunningdale Conference. The unionists were attempting to insure that the North-South council would not be too powerful or potentially lead to a united Ireland. Instead, they wanted to focus on the British-Irish council, which would keep the British involved in the region and hopefully protect their interests.

Constitutional issues remained a key part of the negotiations as well. As before, the unionists sought to secure their constitutional status as part of the UK while the nationalists sought to reunite all of Ireland. The majority consent principle remained critically important to both communities, since each viewed it as allowing self-determination. Of course, the unionist and nationalist visions of self-determination remained in opposition, but at least their constitutional status would not be imposed on them from outside, it would remain an internal decision.

Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution were also important to this issue. Under Irish law, everyone on the island was a member of the Irish nation and this included the people of Northern Ireland.

> Unionists bitterly resented the refusal of the Irish Constitution to recognize the legal existence of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom and their communal right not to be part of the Irish nation. The aim of the UUP was to encourage the Irish Government to draw a distinction between the Irish nation, which would include nationalists throughout the island of Ireland but exclude Ulster unionists in Northern Ireland, and the boundaries of the Irish state. The Irish Government, for its part, wanted to protect the right of Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland to express their membership of the Irish nation. This was a major worry for Northern Nationalists.[24]

This time, the Irish Government was willing to make real concessions. They had concluded that the negotiations would remain deadlocked as long as they insisted on maintaining Articles 2 and 3 as they were. They were now ready to make a change to avoid another stalemate.

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[24] Ibid., 139.

As the deadline drew closer, the parties worked frantically to resolve the remaining issues and come to an agreement. The British and Irish Governments had come to agree on many issues, including the revision of Articles 2 and 3, prisoners, policing, and the British-Irish Council, but differences remained on Strand One and Strand Two. They worked diligently on constructing a settlement and by April 5, the two governments had produced a draft document which they took to Mitchell. The draft, however, did not yet contain a Strand Two agreement. This strand seemed to be the most controversial section and required repeated revisions to make it acceptable to both unionists and nationalists. The incomplete draft was given to the parties to review and negotiate, but nothing would be completely decided until Strand Two was in place.

The deadline finally arrived as the parties continued to negotiate over Strand Two. There was a fear on both sides that the opposition would use the respective institutions in which each had a majority to destroy each other. There would have to be a compromise and additional provisions in order to placate each community's fears.

> The compromise was sealed by the inclusion of what Blair labeled 'a mutual destruction' provision. The unionists wanted an Assembly; the nationalists wanted north-south institutions. The unionists feared that the nationalists would work to make the north-south institutions function and then sabotage the Assembly; that was why the unionists insisted that the north-south institutions be subordinate to the Assembly. The nationalists had the opposite concern: that the unionists would work to make the Assembly function and then undermine the north-south institutions; that was why the nationalists wanted those institutions created directly by the British and Irish Parliaments, independent of the Assembly. To ease the concerns of both sides, the agreement makes the institutions 'mutually inter-dependent' and stipulates 'that one cannot successfully function without the other.'[25]

With the mutually interdependent clause in place, Strand Two could finally be settled and the negotiations could proceed. The renegotiation of this section and compromise by

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[25] George Mitchell, 175-6.

both sides created a much more suitable agreement. All the parties were involved in designing the conditions and this made it more likely to gain support. "It had the benefit of direct input from all of the participants. They modified it and made it more realistic and acceptable – and therefore more likely to endure."[26]

Although Strand Two had been settled, there were more issues left to discuss and obstacles to overcome. Strand One was still up in the air as the parties continued haggling over the details of the power-sharing government. Soon, April 9th came to an end. The deadline had been missed, but they were not giving up yet. The next morning, Clinton telephoned Mitchell to see if he could help. Clinton had stayed abreast of the issues and need little briefing in order to step into the negotiations and help the parties reach a settlement. He telephoned the party leaders and attempted to bring them to a compromise. "The calls were very helpful. The delegates knew the president well from their prior meetings with him. They knew how well he understood the issues. They were impressed that he would stay up all night, to follow the negotiations, to talk with them."[27] After hours of discussion with both unionists and nationalists and promises "that disarmament would not be ignored . . . that the north-south arrangements would be meaningful, that police reforms would be sought, and the prisoners not forgotten,"[28] agreement was finally reached on Good Friday, April 10, one day after the deadline.

Implementation

Unlike the Sunningdale Agreement, the Good Friday Agreement achieved wide support from both communities. After the Agreement was made, copies were sent to the

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[26] Ibid., 176.
[27] Ibid., 178.
[28] Holland, 218.

people so that they could read it for themselves and choose whether or not to support it.

It was then up to them to vote for it through a referendum. The referendum was passed

by 71.1 percent with an 81 percent turnout rate.[29] Although the heaviest support came

from Catholics, the majority of Protestants supported it as well. A settlement finally had

been reached which all parties had a stake in and which the Northern Ireland people

supported as well. The test would now be to get the Agreement up and running and have

it last.

Although the political parties had made significant progress in their negotiations

and had begun to separate themselves from the paramilitaries' use of force, some violence

continued. "There were significant tensions between what came to be known as the

"Yes" camp who were those in favor of the Agreement, and the "No" camp who were

those against the Agreement."[30] Splinter groups such as the "real" IRA, INLA, and LVF

continued their use of violence to show contempt for the agreement and possibly prevent

its implementation. This provoked an outcry for a cessation of hostilities from both

Catholic and Protestant communities which urged the political leaders to take further

steps toward implementation of the Agreement.

Unfortunately for the peace process, many issues, especially disarmament,

continue to obstruct the full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement and prevent

complete resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict. In 1999, US Senator George

Mitchell was again asked to conduct a review of the decommissioning process which led

to the IRA agreeing to send a representative to the Independent Commission on

Decommissioning. This allowed the parties to move forward and set up the power-

[29] Dixon, 273.
[30] Fitzduff, 131.

sharing executive in Northern Ireland in December 1999. Since then, however, the issue has continued to slow down progress and development of the assembly and cross-border bodies.[31] The events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, which created enormous international pressure to bring an end to terrorist organizations, also put pressure on the IRA to disarm. This led to their announcement in October 2001 that they would begin decommissioning, which allowed the Northern Ireland Assembly to proceed in its work.

Regrettably, the Assembly has been unable to maintain this progress and the power-sharing government has broken down once again. The Assembly was suspended on October 14, 2002 and was subsequently dissolved on April 28, 2003. Elections for the new Assembly were held on November 26, 2003 but the Assembly remains suspended. The DUP, who has often displayed anti-Agreement sentiments, gained the majority of seats in the Assembly with the UUP three seats behind. Sinn Fein pulled ahead of SDLP and now has the most nationalist seats. Talks continue between the various parties over the future of the Good Friday Agreement, but they are stuck in a stalemate over how to proceed. Many issues will have to be resolved before peace can endure, but the people of Northern Ireland remain optimistic that stability can be maintained while working towards a settlement.

WHY THE PEACE PROCESS SUCCEEDED

The negotiations leading up to the Good Friday Agreement produced much better results than the Sunningdale negotiations. Although the stipulations of the Good Friday Agreement have yet to be completely fulfilled, its chances of success remain much better

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[31] Ibid., 131-2.

than the Sunningdale Agreement, and it has made significant progress in resolving the conflict. In order to understand why it produced better results, it will be necessary to compare the two peace processes to see what elements were present during the Good Friday peace process which Sunningdale may have lacked.

Response to the Underlying Issues

The underlying issues were addressed in these negotiations just as they were at Sunningdale. The basic difference was that the Good Friday Agreement went into even more detail and produced a more comprehensive agreement. "The Good Friday Agreement . . . addresses the greatest number of issues and goes into detail concerning the operational procedures on their implementation."[32] In fact, the Good Friday Agreement has been called "Sunningdale for slow learners" because of the similarities in the substance of the two agreements.[33] Political, social, and economic reforms were on the agenda including the concerns for human rights, policing, and prisoners. They worked on designing a new power-sharing government that would allow both communities to participate in governing the affairs of Northern Ireland so that majority rule would no longer suppress the will of the minority. They also established a North-South council just as they had discussed at Sunningdale and added a British-Irish dimension to the settlement as well. The constitutional status issue returned once again with the Irish Government more willing to compromise this time. The issues that were discussed and agreements that were made gave the people of Northern Ireland a chance at a more equitable and peaceful future.

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[32] Wolff, 169.
[33] Dixon, 285.

Track-Two Diplomacy

Another important factor was the growth of track-two diplomacy over the years. Although these efforts began in the 1970s, the organizations were too new and inexperienced to have the desired effect. This time would be different. In the early 1990s, the number of community projects to stimulate cross-community dialogue rose as people became exhausted by the continuing conflict and sought to establish a path to peace.[34]

The number of groups that attempted to develop strategies for peace during this time was substantial. They ranged from reconciliation groups such as the Community Relations Council, Families Against Intimidation and Terror, and the Peace People to RUC initiatives, trade union initiatives, the Integrated School Movement, Alternate Dispute Resolution Movement, theological think tanks, and even business community initiatives.[35] These groups held workshops, stimulated dialogue, developed relationships, and encouraged leaders to seek peace.

> While formalized Track One political efforts are and should be pre-eminent, the experience of Northern Ireland has been that such initiatives would never have succeeded without the plethora of Track Two initiatives, which developed the context for more formalized initiatives. It was Track Two initiatives that broke the logjam of non-dialogue between governments and paramilitaries. It was also the creativity and courage of many informal actors such as academics and business and community people which developed contexts in which politicians could meet each other away from the destructive glare of the political spotlight. It was the enormous number of dialogue efforts by hundreds of community groups that enabled many of the politicians to engage in dialogue, in the knowledge that such dialogue would not be political suicide.[36]

It was through these track-two initiatives that negotiation and compromise became possible.

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[34] Fitzduff, 133.
[35] Seaton, 107-23.
[36] Fitzduff, 137.

The tremendous increase in these efforts during this time greatly influenced the potential for success during the Good Friday peace process. They were much more organized and had the expertise and resources necessary to create change. Over the years, they were able to facilitate dialogue, help establish common interests, and build new relationships amongst the people of both communities. These efforts began the process of overcoming the desire to use violence. They taught people to rise above their learned hatred and break the cycle of tit-for-tat revenge. The communities learned to express their feelings in a non-violent manner and began working towards peace. These initiatives should continue, however, if peace is going to be sustained.

Inclusiveness

The next crucial factor of the Good Friday peace process was the focus on achieving inclusive talks. Unlike the Sunningdale talks, which specifically excluded many parties, the negotiators for the Good Friday Agreement worked hard at achieving inclusiveness. The leaders involved in the Northern Ireland situation had realized long ago that any sustainable agreement would have to involve inclusive talks. "The lesson that talks should be inclusive [was] taken seriously by the [British and Irish] governments. Some might say that the slow learners were in fact the participants in Sunningdale who thought they could do it without bringing in the political representatives of the mainstream paramilitary groups."[37] This time the negotiators would not make the same mistake. Groups were not excluded as long as they committed to the Mitchell Principles. When the negotiations began without Sinn Fein, repeated efforts were made to draw them in. Once they arrived, progress actually became possible. There were also

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[37] O'Clery, "Sunningdale Failed," 5.

several occasions during the peace talks when unionist groups chose to leave. This meant the talks would no longer be inclusive so the negotiators worked hard to coax them back in.[38] Although all unionist parties were not present for the final agreement, it was not because they had been excluded, it was by their own choosing. Even when certain groups were expelled for violating the principles of the talks, namely the commitment to non-violence, the negotiators made provisions to allow them back in. The commitment to inclusive talks helped insure that each community's interests were considered and that the solutions would have a better chance of success.

Third-Party Assistance

The final factor that allowed the Good Friday peace process to achieve success was favorable dynamics. The participation of third-party mediators put pressure on the parties to find a solution and altered the cost-benefit calculation so that peace had the most benefits to offer. Neither side believed that continued violence would produce the desired results and both had a real desire for peace.

The US involvement in the peace process altered the dynamics of the conflict and encouraged the parties to find a solution. One of the factors that enhanced the US role in the peace process was Clinton's relationship with the British and Irish political leaders as well as the Irish people. By issuing the visa to Gerry Adams, he had shown his support for the nationalist cause, but he also shared a good relationship with both Prime Minister Tony Blair and Unionist leader David Trimble. In fact some have suggested that Clinton played a vital role in the signing of the Good Friday Agreement when he made the last minute call to Trimble to reassure and help convince him that he should sign the

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[38] George Mitchell, 111.

agreement.[39] Clinton demonstrated his commitment to and personal interest in the conflict by being a part on the process himself. He was not only the first American president to make the peace process a priority in US policy; he was also the first to visit Northern Ireland. His visit to the area was a great success. He was "warmly received in London, cheered in Belfast, and embraced in Dublin."[40] Clinton's special interest in the peace process and his personable relationships with the parties involved made the use of diplomacy an effective method of conflict resolution and helped bring the peace process closer to a settlement.

It was not just the special relationship; however, it was also the way the US team approached the negotiation process. Beyond striving for inclusiveness, the negotiators actually took the time to listen to each community's concerns. They did not overlook or dismiss the underlying issues. They often listened to each side's grievances and respected the need for each side to be heard. As Mitchell admitted, "In private, [other parties] gently criticized me for letting [McCartney] talk so often and so long; they particularly resented it when he strayed off the subject. I rejected their complaints. I believe in letting people have their say. It was important."[41] President Clinton even listened to their stories when he made his personal visit to Northern Ireland. He met with both unionist Reverend Paisley who "immediately launched into a thirty-minute recitation of the history of Northern Ireland from the unionist point of view" and Gerry Adams who told the same story, but from the nationalist point of view.[42] The respect that the US negotiators showed for the historical background of the conflict helped build trust

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[39] McGarry, 20.
[40] George Mitchell, 26.
[41] Ibid., 86.
[42] Ibid., 28.

between them and the parties and reinforced the relationship that was necessary to make true advancements in the peace process.

Finally, the alternatives for the two communities within Northern Ireland, if they did not reach a compromise, were not attractive. During the Sunningdale talks, the communities were threatened with direct rule or withdrawal outcomes that were preferable to some. The alternatives to the Good Friday Agreement, however, would possibly include shared sovereignty between the British and Irish Governments, an outcome neither side would prefer. This gave both communities the incentive to work towards an agreement that would allow them to govern themselves.

SUMMARY

The Good Friday peace process achieved much greater success because the negotiations included the necessary elements. The *underlying issues* were adequately addressed, *track-two diplomacy* made great advances, *inclusiveness* was a priority, and a *third-party* was involved that was able to influence the parties, alter the dynamics of the conflict, and lead the parties to a settlement. As all of the elements fell into place, Northern Ireland moved closer to peace than it had been in the past.

The underlying issues were addressed as they had been before, but this time to a much greater extent. Great efforts were made to create workable and fair solutions to Northern Ireland's problems. New institutions were designed to help equalize participation from both communities and to provide connections to the South; agreements were found on the power-sharing government; and efforts were made to improve the lives

of the Northern Ireland people. These efforts were all crucial to the peace process and helped achieve great success.

The next element that contributed to the success was the advancement of track-two diplomacy efforts. As the number of organizations grew in this area, reconciliation was made possible. They were able to reach much more people and provide better programs. The Northern Ireland people were being taught to see each other as fellow humans rather than Protestant or Catholic enemies. The people were able to start redefining their relationships and start working towards a common ground. These efforts should not stop, however. This is an ongoing process that must continue into the future in order to help the people of Northern Ireland heal and maintain peace.

The inclusiveness of the talks was also critical to the success of the peace process. If Sinn Fein had not been included, the talks would not likely have ended so well. Although all groups did not maintain their presence throughout the talks, the commitment to inclusiveness provided a better atmosphere than the previous negotiations and allowed success to occur. Even when groups broke the rules and had to leave, they were allowed back in after a resumption of their cease-fires. Those that chose to leave had no final say in the agreement, but it was not because they had been excluded. It was because they chose not to participate. These groups may be a problem in the future, but it will not be because they were barred from the negotiation process and prevented from having a voice in the proceedings. It will be because they are spoilers who must be defeated or marginalized in order to maintain the peace.

Finally, US involvement in the Good Friday peace process greatly altered the dynamics of the conflict. The longtime connection between the Irish Americans and

nationalists made the peace process important to many Americans and drove the US to get involved. The personal involvement of President Clinton demonstrated the American commitment to the peace process and urged many to work towards peace. The US presence helped the nationalists trust the peace process more and made them more willing to negotiate. The influence that the US was able to exert helped raise the benefits of peace and enticed the groups to find a compromise.

Once all of the necessary elements were in place, the peace process was able to succeed. The opposing communities felt their interests were being acknowledged and they were also making great advances towards reconciliation. Once inclusiveness became a priority and the US became involved, the dynamics were greatly altered so that compromise could occur. Once all of the motivations for violence were tackled through these necessary elements, violence lost its justification, both communities made it known that they wanted peace, and the Good Friday peace process was deemed a success.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The case of Northern Ireland has provided ample evidence for evaluating the

successes and failures of the peace process. It has demonstrated that unless all four

factors of the conflict resolution model are in place, the motivations to use violence will

linger on and violence will remain a legitimate course of action. Only by combining the

four necessary elements from the various conflict resolution approaches, *response to the*

underlying issues, track-two diplomacy, inclusiveness, and *third-parties,* can the peace

process achieve success. When combined, the four elements tackle the conflict from

various directions and are able to remove the motivations for violence, thereby

delegitimizing its use.

In order to see the insufficiency of approaching the conflict resolution process

without all of the necessary factors in place, it was necessary to assess the circumstances

of a peace process that had failed. The Sunningdale Agreement was considered a failure

by all and had no impact on reducing the level of violence, therefore it provided a good

case for exploring how and why a peace process can fail. Examining this case

demonstrated that the conflict resolution process will not be successful without all four of

the necessary elements, even if one or more is present. Sunningdale also demonstrated

the violent response that could be expected to follow in similar situations.

After exhibiting the problems of a failed peace process, it was necessary to

evaluate the circumstances of a peace process that had succeeded in order to appreciate

the importance of a multi-dimensional approach to conflict resolution including the four

key elements. The Good Friday Agreement was the first peace process in Northern

Ireland to produce widespread support and significant progress towards peace. It was championed as a huge success by much of Northern Ireland and has kept the violence from resurfacing. Analyzing the circumstances of this peace process has demonstrated how and why the four critical elements of the conflict resolution process are able to secure a stable peace.

The failure and success of the two peace processes is explained by the absence or presence of the four essential elements of the conflict resolution process. Both sets of talks had a response to the underlying issues, which gave them the potential for success. Both also had some form of track-two diplomacy, although the Sunningdale track-two diplomacy efforts were just beginning and were inadequate. The other two necessary elements, inclusiveness and third-party assistance, were not present in the Sunningdale peace process and therefore explain its failure. If those elements had been in place, Sunningdale could have succeeded. In contrast, the Good Friday talks included all four elements and achieved success.

RESPONSE TO THE UNDERLYING ISSUES

The Sunningdale and Good Friday negotiations both addressed the underlying issues of the Northern Ireland conflict, which was a necessary condition for establishing a durable peace. If these issues were not addressed, the Northern Ireland people would have continued to suffer socially, economically, and politically. Those who were disadvantaged would have felt that their grievances were not being taken seriously and therefore would have had little respect, if any at all, for any settlement that resulted. Only when the underlying issues have been addressed can progress be made in the peace process.

The fact that efforts were made to address the underlying issues of the Northern Ireland conflict during the Sunningdale talks gave them the potential for success. The reforms being instituted at this time helped improve the lives of the Northern Ireland people and enriched their civil rights as well. A power-sharing government was designed to allow both communities access to the government system and a cross-border institution was planned to allow the Northern Ireland Catholics to increase their ties to the South. This response to the underlying issues allowed the Sunningdale negotiations to take a positive step towards reaching an agreement, but unfortunately it was insufficient to produce a durable peace.

The Good Friday Agreement addressed the underlying issues as well. By the 1990s, advances had been made in response to these issues and the issues were able to be addressed in a more detailed and comprehensive manner. Concessions were made to both communities and satisfactory compromises were found. The Agreement dealt with the underlying social, economic, territorial, and political concerns of the people and helped improve their living conditions as well. Advancements in civil rights were also successful in bringing about reforms that raised the level of equality within the state. By responding to these underlying issues, the Good Friday negotiations were one step closer to peace.

TRACK-TWO DIPLOMACY

Track-two diplomacy is another element that is necessary to achieve a durable peace and that was being pursued during both the Sunningdale and Good Friday peace processes. It approaches conflict resolution from a different perspective than the previous element. The response to underlying issues generally tackles the interest-based

needs whereas track-two diplomacy efforts address the identity-based needs. These efforts should be pursued by academics and non-governmental organizations who can take a neutral position and help facilitate dialogue between the opposing groups. The goal is to help each group overcome its learned fear and hatred of the other and redefine their relationships so that they can let go of the hostility. If those who take part in the reconciliation efforts learn to respect one another, this respect will have the potential to spread throughout each community. This will help end the hatred and fear that have fueled the cycle of violence for so long and bring the people closer to a durable peace.

When the Sunningdale negotiations took place, track-two diplomacy efforts were pursued and were helpful to the communities to a certain degree. Unfortunately, the efforts during this time were too inadequate to have the desired effect. The main efforts being pursued were controlled by the government though the NICRC, which prevented the organization from taking a neutral position. The NICRC would not be able to have a significant impact on the Northern Ireland people as long as it remained connected to the government and had the appearance of being biased.

The other efforts taking place at this time were being led by non-governmental organizations which were neutral, but were also fairly new with little skill or expertise at the time on how to conduct successful reconciliation initiatives. The inexperienced groups had minimal resources and would not be able to reach a significant portion of the Northern Ireland population. Although these efforts were somewhat helpful, they would be much more effective in the future, once the organizations had gained the necessary experience and resources.

The track-two diplomacy efforts that were occurring during the Good Friday negotiations had a much larger impact on the people of Northern Ireland. These efforts

had been steadily growing in significance since the 1970s and their abilities increased

tremendously during the 1990s. As the number of reconciliation groups rose throughout

the region, they were able to reach more and more people. The level of expertise and

resources had also grown and enabled the groups to conduct their initiatives in an

effective manner. These efforts were crucial to the conflict resolution process and

increased the likelihood that the Good Friday Agreement would succeed, but will also

need to be continued into the future in order to sustain peace. Reconciliation is not a

simple, one-time task. It is a complex, ongoing process that will take a lot of time and

effort on the part of both communities.

INCLUSIVENESS

The next crucial element of the conflict resolution process is inclusive

negotiations. The level of inclusiveness during the Sunningdale and Good Friday peace

talks was different and partially responsible for the resulting failure and success of each.

The peace process is more likely to succeed if the level of inclusiveness is higher. The

negotiation process must do more than address the interest and identity needs of parties to

a conflict; it must have a significant impact on the dynamics of the conflict as well. The

strategies used during negotiations may make a group more willing to accept certain

provisions. The procedures and processes established can help make things more

acceptable by clearing up miscommunication and misperception and negotiators will be

available for suggesting compromises and solutions. As each group sees that they can

bring about change through mere dialogue, they will realize that violence is not

necessary. None of these effects of the negotiation process will be possible, however, if

groups are excluded. In order to alter the dynamics of the conflict, the negotiation

process must be inclusive so that non-violent tactics will become attractive to all parties and satisfactory compromises will be found.

The Sunningdale negotiations were not inclusive. They included several parties that were important to the conflict resolution process, but some significant groups, such as Sinn Fein, were excluded. Those who were involved were able to reach a settlement and did make progress towards peace. They were not responsible for the agreement's failure. The Sunningdale Agreement failed because those who were excluded from the peace process had no stake in seeing it succeed, did not feel their views had been represented in the agreement, and continued to see violence as the best manner of voicing their opinion and achieving their goals. The loyalist and republican paramilitaries continued in their campaigns of violence and brought the power-sharing experiment to an end. It was not enough to address the underlying issues during these negotiations. The dynamics of the conflict needed to be altered as well and this could not occur as long as significant groups were excluded from the peace process and driven to believe that violence would produce the most benefits for them.

By the time the Good Friday negotiations took place, the parties involved realized that progress would not be made until inclusive negotiations were held. For this reason, inclusiveness became a priority and was adamantly pursued throughout the negotiations. Guidelines were set up so that all significant parties, and even a few others, would be included. To take part in the talks, all they had to do was abide by the Mitchell Principles. The most important of these principles was the commitment to non-violence. Sinn Fein was not allowed to take part at first because the IRA was continuing to use violence. Once a cease-fire was announced, however, Sinn Fein was allowed in and progress followed. Some groups were asked to leave during the negotiations when their

paramilitary counterparts engaged in violence, but they were allowed to return to the negotiations process once the violence halted and cease-fires resumed.

The only groups that were not present in the end were two unionist parties who refused to negotiate with Sinn Fein present, but their absence was self-imposed, not enforced. They had the opportunity to voice their opinions non-violently and take part in the peace process, but chose not to. Groups such as these are likely to be spoilers and probably would have disrupted the negotiation process if they had remained present. The best way to handle such groups is to defeat them or marginalize them so that they are unable to rally community support and derail the peace process all together.

THIRD-PARTY ASSISTANCE

The fourth element that is necessary to achieve success in the conflict resolution process is third-party assistance. Although the Good Friday negotiations benefited from this element, Sunningdale did not. Third-parties are necessary to alter the dynamics of the conflict so that the costs of violence and benefits of peace rise simultaneously. Third-parties are able to do this by threatening sanctions and/or offering incentives that will persuade the opposing groups to seek a settlement. Third-parties can also suggest compromises and solutions from an objective viewpoint and offer guarantees to reassure the groups that commitments will be kept. Overall, their presence makes violence more costly and peace more attainable.

The Sunningdale negotiations did not have a third-party present. The only parties in attendance were representatives of the opposing communities within Northern Ireland, the British, and the Irish. Although it could be argued that the British and the Irish were trying to help resolve an internal Northern Ireland problem, thereby making them third-

parties, this was not the case. The British and Irish were closely connected to Northern Ireland and in fact, were part of the problem. The Catholics wanted the British out and the Irish in, while the Protestants wanted the British in and the Irish out. As long as these two governments were part of what the Northern Ireland people were fighting over, they would not be able to intercede as third-parties.

The failed efforts of the British to coerce the Northern Ireland parties into a settlement during this time demonstrated their inability to act as a third-party. The threats they made, such as the threat to withdraw if the parties did not cooperate, were ultimately giving at least one of the factions what they wanted and encouraging the continuation of violence. The republicans increased their efforts to force the British out while the loyalists increased their violence to keep the British in. Because the British presence was actually part of the problem, the threat to withdraw failed to push the parties towards an agreement and instead stimulated more violence. Without the benefit of a third-party mediator, violence remained an optimal tool of action and the Northern Ireland conflict continued.

The Good Friday dynamics were much different because a third-party was involved. When the Clinton Administration came into office, the US began to take more interest in the Northern Ireland conflict. Irish Americans had always been concerned over the issue and were now effective at stimulating US involvement. President Clinton issued visas for the leader of Sinn Fein and hoped to influence the decision-making process of the nationalists. The President also personally visited Northern Ireland and sent Senator George Mitchell to help deal with the important issue of decommissioning. By the time the Good Friday negotiations were being planned, the British recognized the

important impact the US could have in bringing the people of Northern Ireland towards peace and therefore asked Mitchell to return and lead the negotiations.

The third-party presence altered the dynamics of the conflict so that peace was attainable. The US was very persuasive, encouraging both communities to agree to the settlement. Mitchell and his team facilitated dialogue and offered solutions that satisfied both sides. The presence of the US also helped reassure the nationalists, who had a longstanding relationship with Irish Americans, that the negotiations would be fair. Without the US presence to help shift the dynamics in favor of peace, the Good Friday negotiations would not have achieved success.

As the two cases have shown, the peace process requires a *response to the underlying issues, track-two diplomacy efforts, inclusive negotiations,* and *third-party assistance* in order to produce a durable peace. Individually, these elements would be insufficient to achieve success. The Sunningdale Agreement had a response to underlying issues and minimal track-two initiatives, but the dynamics remained conducive to violence. Over the years, the parties worked towards attaining inclusive talks, but it was not until the Good Friday negotiations that inclusiveness was achieved in combination with a third-party presence. Once all of these factors were in place, violence became delegitimized and peace became possible.

The ultimate fate of Northern Ireland remains unknown at this time, but its prospects for continued peace remain high. There are still many issues that must be resolved before the Good Friday Agreement can be implemented. The continued disputes over decommissioning, for instance, threaten to prevent the agreement from proceeding. Another threat at this time is the growing support for the DUP, one of the unionist parties that chose to leave the Good Friday negotiations and therefore was not

involved in its final design. Because this party's views were not incorporated into the peace plan, it may not feel committed to seeing it succeed. As the DUP gains popularity, it may negatively impact the agreement's future and could even create an opportunity for conflict to resume.

Even if the Good Friday Agreement collapses in the future, there will not necessarily be a return to violence. Although the agreement has not reached full implementation, it has had a tremendous impact on the people of Northern Ireland for over six years. During this time, the level of violence has remained incredibly low. The major paramilitary organizations have generally stuck to their cease-fires and peace has been able to endure. As the people move further away from the atmosphere of violence, they become less willing to return to its use. Now that they have experienced the benefits of peace, the people of Northern Ireland will be increasingly motivated to find solutions to their problems through the political process. They will not want or condone a resumption of violence. The Good Friday negotiations therefore have had a lasting impact on Northern Ireland whether or not the agreement remains in tact.

SUMMARY

Only when *response to the underlying issues, track-two diplomacy, inclusive negotiations,* and *third-party assistance* combine to approach a conflict from several angles will violence be delegitimized so that peace can endure. As long as a motivation for violence continues to exist, the opposing communities will not be able to escape its reach. These motivations are numerous, complex, and tend to evolve over time. The peace process must recognize the existence of these various motivations and approach them from different perspectives in order to terminate their influence.

One of the most influential motives for violence within ethnoreligious conflicts is identity security. Identity is one of the fundamental elements of the human existence that people cling to for their livelihoods. When it is threatened, a person's existence is threatened as well. Those who define their identities by ethnicity and religion will often view competing ethnic and religious groups as threats to their existence. If the opposing community is able to suppress their identity, they fear their own community will cease to exist or at least will suffer because of their identity differences. For this reason, they may seek to secure their livelihoods through whatever means necessary, including the use of violence. Extreme measures are seen as legitimate because the stakes are so high.

Identity needs may drive many ethnic conflicts, but social, economic, political, and territorial interests are usually at stake as well. The opposing groups will fight to ensure their livelihoods are protected and to have access to the political system that will govern their lives. They will want equality and civil rights and will use the means that are necessary to achieve their goals. For those who are weak and have no voice in the political system, like minority groups, violence will often appear to be the only method of achieving a change in their circumstances. For this reason, they will feel that violence is a justified and legitimate course of action.

As the conflict continues, other motivations for violence will develop. These motivations can include a demonstration of feelings, hatred, tit-for-tat revenge, a tool for influencing the peace process, or just simply a method of everyday survival. It will not be simple enough, therefore, to address the origins of the conflict. The conflict resolution process must also address these evolving motivations by altering the dynamics of the conflict and engaging in track-two diplomacy so that the oppositional relationships can be redefined.

The peace process that recognizes and responds to each of the motivations for violence within a conflict will have the best chance at success. When dealing with a conflict that has lasted for so long, it can be very difficult to resolve the issues that initiated it or those that have developed because of it. By combining approaches, however, such as the dynamic, rational calculation, interest-based, and identity-based ones, a more systematic and comprehensive approach to conflict resolution has been found. When the conflict resolution process *responds to the underlying issues* of a conflict, engages in *track-two diplomacy* efforts, pursues *inclusiveness* in the negotiation process, and provides *third-party assistance*, violence will be delegitimized and peace will be achieved.

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