

Summer 1969

Patrick Hurley and China Policy

Bruce W. Platz
Old Dominion University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/history_etds



Part of the [Asian History Commons](#), [Diplomatic History Commons](#), and the [United States History Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Platz, Bruce W.. "Patrick Hurley and China Policy" (1969). Master of Arts (MA), Thesis, History, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/g2xa-gx33
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/history_etds/208

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the History at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.

Patrick Hurley and China Policy 129

Bruce W. Platz

A thesis presented to the Department of History of
Old Dominion College
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts in History

OLD DOMINION COLLEGE
August 1, 1969

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER I. STILWELL'S DIFFICULTIES WITH CHIANG KAI-SHEK...	6
CHAPTER II. HURLEY INTERVENES.....	25
CHAPTER III. NEGOTIATIONS WITH MAO TSE-TUNG.....	41
CHAPTER IV. LAST PHASES OF WORLD WAR II.....	67
CHAPTER V. THE AFTERMATH.....	85
CONCLUSION.....	100
APPENDIX I.....	107
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	111

INTRODUCTION

The successful Chinese Revolution is widely regarded as one of America's most bitter defeats in the area of world politics. The search for the reason or the cause of this defeat has led to acrimonious witch hunting in the United States and irrationality in the relations between the two countries. The final verdict of the historians is not in yet. This thesis intends to throw some light on the question by describing and analyzing the actions of one of the important participants who shaped United States policy at a crucial stage and gave it the guidance and direction which led to the debacle.

Midway in the decade of the 1940's which began with Japan and America struggling over alleged rights in China and ended with the effective elimination of all outside influence from that unhappy nation, Patrick J. Hurley made an elaborate contribution to the story. Strangely, Hurley's vital part has been largely obscured or omitted especially by those other participants who played dominant and responsible roles.

Patrick J. Hurley's career in America resembled the career of Horatio Alger, Jr.'s hero in the classic From Rags to Riches. In 1894, at the age of eleven, Hurley began to work in a coal mine in the Indian Territory of Oklahoma. At one time Hurley lived with the Indians and

learned the Choctaw language. He made an urgent effort to fight in the Spanish-American war and managed to go as far as Tampa, Florida, where the authorities refused him permission to embark for Cuba because he was under age.

He received an education in law, and assisted in organizing the United States Chamber of Commerce in 1912. He fought as an officer in World War I, becoming a Colonel by the end of that struggle. He devised what he thought was an unbreakable code by putting Indians at both ends of the Signal Corps telephones for the relay of orders in Choctaw.¹

Hurley returned to his law practice after the war and became prominent for his efforts on behalf of Oklahoma Indians. He represented the Indians in their struggle to maintain control of reservation land after oil was discovered in Oklahoma. Though a Republican, Hurley served in public office during the Democratic administrations of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. He became Secretary of War in Herbert C. Hoover's administration after the original appointee, James W. Good, died.²

Hurley happened to be in Shanghai September 18, 1931,

¹U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, The Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, before a Subcommittee to investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act. 82d Cong., 1st Sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 637. (Hereinafter referred to as Hearings: Institute of Pacific Relations).

²Don Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1956), p. 85.

at the time of the Mukden incident which presaged Japanese occupation of Manchuria. On Hurley's return he met with President Hoover and Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson. He argued that Japan was beginning a far-flung plan of imperial expansion which could be blocked only by war. Hurley discounted the idea that notes and diplomatic representation would do any good unless backed by force.³

As Secretary of War, Hurley appointed Douglas MacArthur as Chief of Staff of the Army. He later claimed that he was proudest of that sponsorship. MacArthur followed Hurley's orders in the forceful ejection of the Bonus Expeditionary Force from Washington, D.C., July 28, 1932.⁴

Actually a lawyer, Hurley gained a reputation as an oilman. He played a prominent role in Latin American oil negotiations. Hurley negotiated an agreement between the Republic of Mexico and five American oil corporations regarding Mexican expropriation of American holdings. From the Mexican government Hurley received Mexico's highest military decoration. From the Consolidated Oil Company he received a fee reported to be one million dollars.⁵

After Pearl Harbor, Hurley offered his services to the incumbent Democratic president. Although a Republican who

³Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 243.

⁴Anna Rothe, ed., Current Biography, Who's Who and Why, 1944, (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1945), p. 325.

⁵Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 150.

disagreed violently with Roosevelt on domestic matters, Hurley served Roosevelt in several responsible positions.⁶ He gained the confidence of Roosevelt by his efforts to run supplies through the Japanese blockade of the Philippines, and by his work as United States Minister to New Zealand in 1942.⁷ Hurley's reports from Soviet Russia during the battles at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus during the winter of 1942-43 provided Roosevelt with the first direct information about Russia's capacity to withstand the German onslaught.⁸ Roosevelt entrusted Hurley with a series of diplomatic missions to various countries in the Middle East.

More than six feet in height, erect in bearing and square-shouldered, Hurley had a close-cropped mustache, gray hair, square jaw, and blue eyes. He was handsome, suave and well-groomed, with the bearing of a successful man. An impressive public speaker of charm and ability, Hurley has been described as a man who "struts sitting down!" His properties in 1944 included eight large buildings in Oklahoma, Kansas, and Washington, an estate near Leesburg, Virginia, a house in Santa Fe and another near Washington.⁹ In 1944, Hurley intervened in a complex

⁶William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1950), p. 22.

⁷Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), p. 204.

⁸Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 182.

⁹Rothe, Current Biography, Who's News and Why, 1944, pp. 322-23.

wartime situation which had originated with a confrontation between two complex individuals; Chiang Kai-shek and General Joseph W. Stilwell.

CHAPTER I

STILWELL'S DIFFICULTIES WITH CHIANG KAI-SHEK

President Franklin Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull followed a policy imposed by the sensitivity of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in November, 1941. Hull informed Chinese envoys of a proposed modus vivendi with the Japanese. Chiang expressed his displeasure and instructed T. V. Soong, his brother-in-law in Washington, to convey that displeasure to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. Chiang argued that any relaxation of restrictions against Japan by the United States would lead to a collapse of Chinese morale and resistance. Chiang claimed that the United States was inclined to appease Japan at the expense of China.¹ Thus the question of Chinese morale and resistance prompted a virtual United States ultimatum to Japan rather than a temporizing modus-vivendi.

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the Americans resolved to keep China in the war and help her to exact a constantly growing price from the Japanese.² To

¹Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), II, 1073-81.

²Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, p. 528.

achieve this goal the United States relied almost wholly on advisors. Aid, although authorized by Congress, could not be delivered to China because of Japanese blockade. Secretary Stimson selected General Hugh A. Drum as best available man to direct American efforts in China. Drum complained to Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall that the War Department plan concerning China was nebulous, uncertain and indefinite. Drum attacked the China plan, claiming it to be inconsistent, of limited nature and subject to indignities relative to command.³ The plan was not changed. Instead, Marshall offered the position to his good friend Major General Joseph W. Stilwell. T. V. Soong investigated Stilwell's record and gave approval for his appointment. Stilwell regarded the assignment as a "burnt sacrifice" and accepted with the reluctance of a "sacrificial goat." Before his departure for Chungking February 11, 1942, Stilwell was promoted to Lieutenant General.⁴

Stilwell had served in China during the late 1930's and had great faith in the worth of the Chinese soldier as a fighting man--if properly fed, paid, trained, equipped, and led. Upon arrival in China on March 4, 1942, Stilwell assumed command of two Chinese armies in Burma. His

³Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, (New York: The Viking Press, 1965), pp. 356-57.

⁴Theodore H. White, ed., The Stilwell Papers (New York: McFadden-Bartell Corporation, 1962), p. 36. (Hereinafter cited as Stilwell Papers).

efforts to halt the Japanese offensive failed and by the end of April 1942, the Japanese closed the Burma Road, the only link between China and the outside world. Stilwell decided that his major task would be to open the Burma Road. He considered himself the "stooge who does the dirty work and takes the rap."⁵

Stilwell found his job complicated by variable and informal channels of command and communications. Madame Chiang addressed the American Congress in February, 1942, and pleaded for more aid to China, especially airplanes. This plea, together with that of Brigadier General Claire L. Chennault, had the support of Harry Hopkins, Special Advisor to the President.⁶ Chennault enjoyed the confidence of Chiang and Madame Chiang and also had direct access to the White House.⁷ Dr. Lauchlin Currie, assistant to Hopkins, established a special relationship with T. V. Soong thus supplying Chiang with another link to high officials in the American Government. When Chiang or Madame Chiang made their protests directly to Roosevelt they claimed Stilwell to be at fault.⁸ Stilwell became the American "whipping boy" in China and he recognized himself

⁵Ibid., p. 71.

⁶Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 58-59.

⁷Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, p. 354.

⁸Stilwell Papers, p. 43.

as such. He was vulnerable and served two bosses, sometimes three.⁹ Stilwell accepted responsibility for providing the supply, training, and leadership to go with China's huge pool of peasant muscle and courage, but as Chiang's military chief of staff Stilwell had no authority. An incompatibility resulted from the difference between the strategies of the two men. Chiang wanted vast quantities of military supplies and the participation of strong Allied forces in the war in Asia. Stilwell proposed not only to train and equip the Chinese troops and get them into battle, but to reorganize the National Army. Chiang refused any basic changes. The President considered removal of Stilwell but Marshall dissuaded him from making a change. The Chiang-Stilwell relationship mellowed as the war stagnated.¹⁰

From late spring 1942 to early winter 1944 Allied war policy in China was reduced to contests between wills, staff conferences, desk drudgery, intrigue, ambition, and politics. A "Europe first" strategy coupled with an unconditional surrender edict relegated the war against Japan to the lowest priority. In the war against Japan, China had the lowest priority except for aircraft. Though

⁹Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, United States in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell's Mission to China (Washington: Department of the Army, 1953), pp. 74, 114-15.

¹⁰Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, p. 369.

Chiang had in reality done little fighting against the Japanese, the contributions by Chennault's Flying Tigers somehow added to a myth that China was fighting the Japanese.

In October, 1942, Chennault told Roosevelt that "with 105 fighters, 35 medium bombers, and 12 heavy bombers," he could defeat Japan from the air in six months.¹¹ Chennault's plan required little effort on the part of the Chinese, while Stilwell's plan required "the humdrum work of building a ground force."¹² Stilwell's strategy never developed. Chiang could not agree to the strengthening of any independent military groups, a vital element for Stilwell's plan. The most important point in Chiang's resistance to Stilwell was "that it would be risky to have an efficient trained unit under the command of a possible rival."¹³

Marshall and Stimson supported Stilwell in his contention that "any increased air offensive that stung the Japs would bring a strong reaction that would wreck everything and put China out of the war."¹⁴ Marshall pointed

¹¹Claire L. Chennault, Way of a Fighter (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1949), p. 214.

¹²Stilwell Papers, p. 167.

¹³Ibid., p. 180.

¹⁴Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, United States Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater, Stilwell's Command Problems. (Washington: Department of the Army, 1956), p. 322.

out to Roosevelt that the problem in "air operations is ground protection for the air-dromes . . . as soon as our air effort hurts the Japs, they will move in on us . . . on the ground."¹⁵ Chiang countered this argument by assurances to Roosevelt that any Japanese attempts to interrupt the air offensive by a ground advance would be halted by existing Chinese forces.¹⁶ Chennault argued that his aircraft would repel any Japanese attack.¹⁷ Chiang favored Chennault because such a strategy demanded absolutely nothing of him.

In May, 1943, General Marshall summoned General Stilwell and General Chennault to Washington to meet with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, plus the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to discuss China policy. The President agreed with Chiang and Chennault and gave Chennault the priorities for supplies which he requested.¹⁸ Like Hull in November, 1941, Roosevelt rationalized this decision with references to the need of bolstering Chinese morale.¹⁹ Chennault received twice as much as he asked

¹⁵Memorandum, Marshall to Roosevelt, March 16, 1943, quoted in Feis, The China Tangle, pp. 59-60.

¹⁶Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 320.

¹⁷Chennault, Way of a Fighter, p. 214.

¹⁸Maurice Matloff, United States Army in World War II. The War Department, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944. (Washington: Department of the Army, 1959), p. 4.

¹⁹Feis, The China Tangle, p. 64.

for. Stimson thought the supply service to Chennault over the mountains in Burma would cost an extra winter of war in Europe because it consumed so many planes.²⁰ President Roosevelt rejected Stilwell's suggestion that negotiations with Chiang be conducted in a manner which would require some action on the part of Chiang.²¹ Tact, instead of a stern approach, would be used in handling Chiang.

Stilwell's persistent efforts to fight the Japanese acerbated relations with the British as well as the Chinese. The British were called upon to make an effort in Asia. This they refused to do. At Cairo, December 5, 1943, the invasion of Southern France won out over an amphibious operation previously scheduled against Burma.²² Thus, military considerations negated political objectives. Military objectives in Europe obviated any hope for China to emerge from the war as one of the Big Four, an idea which became American policy at Moscow in October, 1943.²³ China was not to be liberated by opening the Burma Road,

²⁰Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, p. 538.

²¹Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, p. 86.

²²Ibid., pp. 356, 370, 385.

²³Stettinius to Grew, May 23, 1944, U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1944, China, VI, (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 230. (Hereinafter cited as Foreign Relations, 1944, VI.)

and without liberation the Chinese military deterioration accelerated. A later decision in 1944 precluded a landing on the coast of China. There was to be no large scale operation on the Asiatic mainland. Not dramatic decisions, these were decisions by default. The policy makers proved reluctant to impose additional and perhaps unnecessary strain upon the American economy to achieve a liberated China.²⁴ Japan was to be defeated by other means.

One fundamental factor which influenced these American decisions with regard to China was the Chairman of the Council of Commissars of the Soviet Union, Iosif V. Stalin. Stalin gave unsolicited assurances directly to the other two Chiefs of State on November 28, 1943, that he would enter the war against Japan as soon as the European conflict ended.²⁵ After this commitment by Stalin at Teheran, Roosevelt revealed two fundamental policies relating to China. According to Elliott Roosevelt, Chiang agreed to form a democratic government in China. Roosevelt, on his part was to keep the British out of China after the war.²⁶ Roosevelt gave Chiang his personal promise that no British warships would enter Chinese ports. Chiang agreed to

²⁴Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944, p. 326.

²⁵Roosevelt, As He Saw It, pp. 164, 203.

²⁶Summary Notes of Conversations between Vice President Wallace and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, June 21, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 232.

invite the Communists into the National Government of China while the war was still being fought.²⁷ The underlying basis for the agreement was a scheduled Burma offensive.

After Cairo it became Stilwell's task to return to China and tell Chiang that the Allies would renege on their commitment to relieve China. Stilwell asked for and received authority to begin a Burma Campaign with his five Chinese divisions plus 3,000 Americans known as Merrill's Marauders.²⁸ Stilwell spent the first six months of 1944 in Burma with a mission and function of strictly military nature. His maximum goals were to hold the Myitkyina, Burma area as an air base with supply by road, air, and pipeline. The reopening of communications with China would require an American corps and more engineers.²⁹ Marshall refused to provide United States troops. Stilwell actually achieved some victories, but progress was extremely slow. In May, 1944, Marshall ordered Stilwell to stockpile supplies to support Pacific operations. The result was a further curtailment of deliveries to China over the only supply link with China, a five-hundred mile long ferry service over the "Hump" of the Himalayas--the most difficult supply operation of the entire war.³⁰

²⁷Roosevelt, As He Saw It, pp. 164-65.

²⁸Stilwell Papers, p. 272.

²⁹Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 363.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 362, 364.

One element was well supplied in China. The priorities in logistical supplies provided Chennault with more than he originally requested. The effort, however, added to inflation because airfield construction and troop support facilities raised local prices.³¹ The introduction of B-29 bombers into the CBI theater further complicated economic and supply matters during 1944.³² This newly organized XX Bomber Command produced a ritual of violent struggle among Chennault, Chiang and Stilwell over who was to command this new instrument of war. Washington decided to retain control in the Joint Chiefs of Staff much like a fleet at sea. The effort, code named MATTERHORN, was supposed to be fully self-supporting, but it actually received more logistical support than the Chinese Army.³³

The Japanese responded to increased air raids by striking at the Chinese air bases. The Japanese drive to eliminate East China air bases, met small resistance during 1944. In seven months, from May to November, 1944, the Nationalists reportedly lost 700,000 troops, 146 towns, 200,000 square kilometers of territory, 25 airfields and

³¹Arthur N. Young, China's Wartime Finance and Inflation 1937-1945 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 287.

³²Romanus and Sunderland, United States Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater: Time Runs Out in CBI (Washington: Department of the Army, 1959), pp. 114-15.

³³Ibid.

control of more than 60,000,000 people.³⁴ Chennault was seriously compromised by the easy Japanese victories, as was President Roosevelt and Chiang. Stilwell was not sympathetic to their predicament. Not only strategy, but Roosevelt's concept of China as a great power suffered.³⁵

Chiang displayed an unwillingness to assist area commanders of his own army during the last half of 1944. He was willing to see his Army commanders suffer loss of "face" in defeat because he feared that a victory would undermine his position in China. The American Army historians reported:

The Generalissimo refused to give arms to the Chinese commanders in east China, while some of them sought Japanese and American support for a revolt against him. General Chennault threw his every resource into supporting the east China Commanders and later charged Stilwell with ulterior motives when the latter would not ship arms to them; in part because of the Generalissimo's injunction.³⁶

Stilwell asked that Chennault be relieved for insubordination because his aid to Chinese commanders was in violation of directives to Stilwell from Chiang.³⁷

On June 3 the Generalissimo called Stilwell to Chungking.³⁸ Stilwell could not resist the proverbial "I told

³⁴Jerome Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 240.

³⁵Feis, The China Tangle, p. 95.

³⁶Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out in the CBI, p. 4.

³⁷Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 364.

³⁸Ibid., p. 366.

you so," at least in his diary entry.³⁹ Stilwell requested permission from Washington to use B-29 stocks to assist the Chinese armies, but that project was now a favorite of the President, so refusal was forthcoming. Faith in strategic bombardment was at a high pitch. The War Department answered Stilwell's request thus:

It is our view that the early bombing of Japan will have a far more beneficial effect on the situation in China than the . . . transfer of those stocks to Chennault . . . [the B-29's] must not be localized under any circumstances any more than we would so localize the Pacific Fleet. Please keep this in mind.⁴⁰

Stilwell summed it up in his response, "Instructions understood . . . I have few illusions about power of air against ground troops. Pressure from G-MO forced the communication."⁴¹ Stilwell returned to Burma and then to Ceylon to take over South East Asia command duties in the absence of Lord Louis Mountbatten, the senior commander.

The deterioration of the situation in China caused concern in Washington. When Roosevelt became apprehensive about the possibilities for China holding out until the end of the war, he asked Vice President Wallace to go to China. Wallace was to explain to Chiang that China had been recognized as one of the four Great Powers primarily

³⁹Stilwell Papers, p. 240.

⁴⁰Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 369.

⁴¹Ibid.

because of Secretary Hull. The Generalissimo must not let America down after America had pinned such faith and hope on China as a World Power.⁴²

Wallace arrived in China June 20, 1944. Chennault assigned Lieutenant Joseph W. Alsop, public relations man and advisor to Soong, as Wallace's "air aide." The former nationally syndicated columnist who had known Wallace socially and professionally, admitted to drafting a letter to Roosevelt signed by Wallace requesting Stilwell's relief.⁴³ Stilwell knew that Alsop presented the case against him to the Vice President in a biased manner.⁴⁴

Wallace's report to Roosevelt read in part:

I consider vital our need for a more vigorous and better coordinated American representation in China--in Chungking. Our effort in China, and its military and related political aspects, requires more positive direction, and closer cooperation from the Chinese, if this area is to be employed as an effective base of operations against the Japanese.⁴⁵

Wallace recommended that Roosevelt "appoint a personal representative" of the highest caliber in whom political and military authority could be united. Without the appointment of such a representative the situation would

⁴²Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 369.

⁴³Hearings, Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 1461. Alsop went to China on a Lend-Lease mission and stayed on as an aide to Chennault.

⁴⁴Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 375.

⁴⁵Wallace to Roosevelt, June 28, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 235.

drift from bad to worse. Stilwell was not the man.

Wallace recommended General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters of Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia, as persona grata to the Generalissimo.⁴⁶

Wallace's recommendations fell into limbo temporarily. The War Department functioned more efficiently and rapidly. On July 1 Marshall asked Stilwell if he thought there was any way at all the situation in China might be redeemed.⁴⁷ Stilwell responded without enthusiasm and no optimism:

There is still a faint chance to salvage something in China but action must be quick and radical and the G-MO must give one commander full powers. If the President can get this idea across, we can at least try hoping that a weak and disjointed effort, by dint of numbers and determination, might stop the Japs before they finish breaking up all resistance. The chances are definitely not good, but I see no other solution at the moment.⁴⁸

Marshall recommended Stilwell's promotion to General.⁴⁹

The Joint Chiefs of Staff placed Chennault's promises in one column, then pointed out how Chennault had failed on each. Against them they placed Stilwell's predictions and related the fulfillment of each.⁵⁰

⁴⁶Wallace to Roosevelt, message number two, June 28, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 237.

⁴⁷Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 380.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 381.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 384. Stilwell was promoted on 1 August, 1944. He then shared the rank with Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower and Arnold.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 382.

The American attempt to persuade Chiang to accept Stilwell as Commander of Chinese armies in China began with a message, July 6, 1944. Roosevelt, in a message drafted by Marshall, admitted air power could not stop a determined enemy, then, "I recommend . . . you recall him [Stilwell] from Burma and place him directly under you in command of all Chinese and American forces."⁵¹

General Nathan Ferris, Chief of Staff for Air, accompanied by John S. Service, one of four political advisers on Stilwell's staff, delivered the message personally to Chiang in order to avoid intermediaries.⁵² This procedure became necessary after some messages from Roosevelt to Chiang went undelivered or were altered to soften the language.⁵³

Roosevelt's effort to save the situation in China caused Chiang to intensify his own diplomatic manipulations. Chiang responded to Roosevelt's request to place Stilwell in command of all Chinese forces with an agreement

⁵¹Ibid., p. 383.

⁵²U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, Hearings, before a Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, Senate on S. Res. 231, 81st Cong., 2nd sess. (Hereinafter referred to as Hearings: State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation). Service later felt that his presence at this and another later meeting may have incurred Chiang's wrath. See Transcript of proceedings of the Loyalty Security Board meetings in the case of John S. Service May 1950, pp. 1902-2380.

⁵³Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 175.

"in principle" but asked for a preparatory period and included the following:

I very much hope that you will be able to despatch an influential personal representative who enjoys your complete confidence, is given with full power and has a far-sighted political vision and ability, to constantly collaborate with me and General Stilwell so as to enhance the cooperation between China and America.⁵⁴

On July 15, General Ferris, again accompanied by Service, delivered to Chiang a message from Roosevelt which agreed to appoint a political go-between but urged Chiang to appoint Stilwell and "we should not delay."⁵⁵ Roosevelt made at least five specific requests personally and directly to Chiang Kai-shek to appoint Stilwell commander of all forces, Chinese and American, in the China Theatre. Chiang did not do so.

Chiang and Roosevelt arrived at tentative arrangements in another matter. Only a decision as to timing remained. Before Roosevelt departed on a month long tour of the Pacific he sent Chiang a message which summarized the understanding:

I have noted with particular satisfaction your assurance with regard to the negotiations now in progress with the Chinese Communists that only political means will be employed in seeking a solution. I also welcome the indication which Mr. Wallace has given me that you desire better relations between China and the

⁵⁴Chiang Kai-shek to Roosevelt, July 8, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 121.

⁵⁵Hearings: State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, p. 1913; Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, p. 386.

U.S.S.R., and am giving serious thought to your suggestion that I use my good offices to arrange for a conference between Chinese and Soviet representatives. It occurs to me that any such conference would be greatly facilitated if, prior thereto, the Chinese Government had reached a working arrangement with the Chinese Communists for effective prosecution of the war against Japan in north China. In this connection, Mr. Wallace has also informed me of your encouraging remark that a settlement with the Communists would make it possible to carry out your democratic program earlier than expected.⁵⁶

Roosevelt's cryptic references to the Soviet Union were necessary because Stalin forbade any overt connection with China. Stalin could ill afford antagonizing Japan and he never allowed any of the persistent American arguments to sway him. His Far Eastern flank was far too vulnerable to Japanese attack and he held Chiang and the Americans at arm's length until his own purposes could be served.

The vision of a strong, free and united China seemed within reach in the summer of 1944. The character of the leader of China was such that such a vision should have been dim. Service described Chiang's deficiencies and character as well as his goals thus:

Chiang's experience as a young man in Shanghai is important to an understanding of his methods. As a broker he learned to push his luck when things seemed to be going his way. From his contact with the gangster underworld he learned the usefulness of threats and blackmail. To these he adds the traditional Chinese habits of bargaining and of playing off one opponent against another. Chiang shows these traits in everything he does. He has achieved and maintained his position in China by his supreme skill in balancing man against man and group against group,

⁵⁶Roosevelt to Chiang, July 14, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 245.

by his adroitness as a military politician rather than a military commander, and by reliance on a gangster secret police. Chiang expects America to defeat Japan for him. And in the process to strengthen his external position by diplomatic support, and his internal position by financial aid and by improving and supplying his armies. The fundamental consideration today of Chiang and the Kuomintang is not the war against Japan but the continuing struggle for internal power, the desire to liquidate the Communists and the almost certain inevitability of civil war. Chiang believes that by bluff and by taking advantage of our weakness and lack of unity in dealing with him, he can evade American efforts to jolt him out of his course. He believes that we are so committed to him that he can 'have his cake and eat it too.'⁵⁷

At first glance, a diplomatic struggle during the last half of 1944 between China and the United States would seem to have been completely unequal. Chiang wanted lend-lease, credits, and air support, and the United States was the only source. Unfortunately, the milieu around the President in the form of his advisors created serious inconsistencies. Most hoped to see China become strong and democratic and a stabilizing power in the Far East. Hopes, rather than realities determined goals. With the public sympathizing over a mythological past, the Army concerned with a dominant present, and the President visualizing the future, a picture emerged in an astigmatic form. The Headquarters in China, the Embassy and the State Department had the benefit of at least one penetrating analysis and some advice:

⁵⁷Gauss to Hull and enclosures, March 23, 1944, 893.00/15338, State Department File, National Archives. Records from the National Archives will be hereinafter cited as follows: N.A., File number and document number, (N.A., 893.00/173).

Until the President determines our policy, decides our requirements, and makes these clearly and unmistakably known to Chiang, Chiang will continue in his present ways.⁵⁸

Six months later Service observed:

By continued and exclusive support of the Kuomintang, we tend to prevent the reforms and democratic reorganization of the government which are essential for the revitalization of China's war effort. Encouraged by our support the Kuomintang will continue in its present course progressively losing the confidence of the people and becoming more and more impotent. Ignored by us, and excluded from the Government and joint prosecution of the war, the Communists and other groups will be forced to guard their own interests by more direct opposition.⁵⁹

The essential element of every report of this nature was the basic concept that the war against Japan was a pressing problem to United States policy makers and that China was expected to take part in that war. By early winter 1944, this was not the case. Many factors contributed to this change in policy. Into this backwater of the war where there was more intrigue than fighting, Roosevelt introduced another advisor to Chiang. At 10:00 a.m., September 4, 1944, a plane landed in Delhi, India with Major General, Patrick J. Hurley on board.⁶⁰

⁵⁸Service to Colonel Joseph K. Dickey, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, USAF-CBI, March 20, 1944; Copy Gauss to Hull, March 23, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 39.

⁵⁹Memorandum by Service, October 10, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 709.

⁶⁰Stilwell Papers, p. 250.

CHAPTER II

HURLEY INTERVENES

President Roosevelt honored Chiang's request for a Personal Representative to visit China. Chiang's request for an envoy coincided with a visit by Patrick J. Hurley to his old friend Secretary Stimson. Hurley's interest in a military assignment dated from Pearl Harbor and he requested such an assignment in August, 1944. He also inquired about the Ambassadorship to China.¹ Stimson referred Hurley to General Marshall, who concluded that Hurley would like to be the President's special envoy to China.² Under Secretary of State Stettinius considered Hurley in line for the Ambassadorship, but decided to postpone announcement until the appointment was made.³

The President returned to Washington on 17 August, and

¹Stettinius to Hull, August 3, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 247. During a visit to China in 1943 Hurley made an excellent impression on both Chiang and Stilwell. He decided at that time that Chiang devoted his main efforts to the maintenance of internal security and supremacy as against the objective of defeating Japan. Hurley to Roosevelt, October 16, 1943, U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, China, 1943. (Washington, D. C. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 163-66.

²Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 416.

³Stettinius to Hull, August 9, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 248.

found H. H. Kung, another Chiang Kai-shek brother-in-law, ready with the Generalissimo's detailed preconditions for Stilwell's appointment over all forces in China. Marshall and Stimson also presented the Generalissimo's request for an agreement to the Hurley Mission. The President brushed aside Chiang's preconditions:

I do not think the forces to come under General Stilwell's command should be limited except by their availability to defend China and defeat the Japanese . . . I feel sure that General Hurley will facilitate General Stilwell's exercise of command . . . that it will not be necessary to delay matters until each detail is considered and settled.⁴

On August 18, 1944, Roosevelt directed Hurley:

You are hereby designated as my personal representative with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, reporting directly to me. Your principal mission is to promote efficient and harmonious relations between the Generalissimo and General Stilwell, to facilitate General Stilwell's exercise of command over the Chinese armies placed under his direction. You will be charged with additional missions.⁵

Hurley's mission was limited--"to help iron out any problems between you [Chiang Kai-shek] and General Stilwell."⁶

The decision in August, to send Hurley to act as a mediator between Chiang and Stilwell reflected the lack of

⁴Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 416.

⁵Roosevelt to Hurley, August 18, 1944, Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, pp. 233-34. This directive does not exist in Department of State files; Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 250.

⁶Roosevelt to Chiang, August 19, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 250.

clear objectives and a lack of any firm United States policy vis-a-vis Chiang or China. There was no United States policy. The decision also reflected the failure to utilize existing channels of communications. Chiang had access to policy makers in Washington and effectively circumvented all United States representatives in China. An expressed whim by Chiang met acquiescence in Washington while a lack of guidance continued a policy vacuum in China proper. The condition reflected irresponsibility at the highest levels.

In the United States in August a recurring fight flared up between Donald Nelson, Director of the War Production Board and his assistant, Charles E. Wilson. As early as 1943 Stimson and Knox had tried to get Nelson replaced by Bernard M. Baruch so that the military could gain greater control of the United States wartime economy.⁷ With planning in the United States oriented toward post-war developments Roosevelt decided to send Nelson on a four to six month survey of the Chinese economy. His mission was to determine the role of the United States in postwar China and determine whether loans should be underwritten by the United States Government or private American capital.⁸

⁷Letter Roosevelt to Bernard M. Baruch, February 5, 1942. Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R. His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, Vol. II. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), pp. 1396-97; Nelson and Wilson were businessmen known as "dollar-a-year-men."

⁸Roosevelt to Nelson, August 18, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 249.

Nelson accompanied Hurley on a mission designed to help China get on her feet economically and to make Chiang realize that the United States was not an economic exploiter.⁹

Nelson's mission was to establish a War Production Board in China capable of sustained planning both during the war and in the post-war period. Hurley's mission was to act simply as a buffer between Stilwell and Chiang. Nelson accomplished his mission in about two weeks and, though pressured by Chiang to take over the War Production Board in China, Nelson returned to the United States and reported to President Roosevelt in Washington on September 27.¹⁰

Hurley's mission became more complicated than that of Nelson. This complication materialized out of Hurley's own actions and responses. H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, alerted Hull to the fact that Hurley and Nelson intended to stop in Moscow to get useful information regarding the Soviet attitude toward China and suggestions as to the line which should be adopted in dealings with Chiang Kai-shek.¹¹ Hull checked

⁹Roosevelt to Nelson, August 18, 1944. Roosevelt, F.D.R. His Personal Letters, II, 1530.

¹⁰Memorandum of conversation between Chiang and Nelson, September 19, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 274.

¹¹Matthews to Hull, August 24, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 252.

with the President and alerted Ambassador Harriman in Russia. Hurley had no instructions from Hull or the President to go to Moscow.¹² In Moscow Hurley received a promise from V. M. Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to keep hands off China. Molotov also revealed to Hurley that the Moscow Communists did not consider the Yen-an Communists of China real Communists.¹³

The day after Hurley arrived in Chungking he made an optimistic report to Roosevelt. The Generalissimo stated to General Stilwell and to Hurley that he was prepared to give General Stilwell actual command of all forces in the field in China and that with this command he also gave to him his complete confidence.¹⁴ Hurley told Roosevelt and Marshall that there was good prospect for unification of command in China and that the Generalissimo showed a definite tendency to comply with Roosevelt's wishes.¹⁵ Marshall thought the issue settled.¹⁶ Stilwell was pessimistic.¹⁷ Hurley believed Chiang implicitly.

¹²Hull to Harriman, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, August 30, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 253.

¹³Harriman to Hull, September 5, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 255.

¹⁴Hurley to Roosevelt and Marshall, September 7, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 154.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Feis, The China Tangle, p. 173.

¹⁷Stilwell Papers, p. 257; Gauss to Hull, September, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 256-59; Memorandum for the President "Situation in China." September 25, 1944,

Ultimately Hurley became a tool for Chiang to use. It is difficult to imagine that Chiang did not recognize Hurley as a fortuitous instrument to resolve a number of outstanding dilemmas. It can be safely assumed that this was Chiang's intention from the first. Chiang could not have chosen a more appropriate man himself.

The United States was well advised of conditions in China. The Chinese, under Chiang, stagnated for seven years. From 1938 the Japanese controlled China's cities, her industry, and her coastline. Emboldened by the success of Hitler and Mussolini in their victories over England and France, Japanese leaders thought in terms of a huge east Asian empire extending from Manchuria to Australia. The vast hinterlands of China did not attract the Japanese militarists until 1944 and then only for the reasons that Stilwell had mentioned. Japan considered the China mainland as the "inactive Theater of Operations." Meaningful hostilities ceased in China except in the Liberated Areas controlled by the Communists.

Aside from the war against the Japanese, unless Chiang could be induced to make political reforms or accept coalition government, there was going to be civil war, and many observers thought the Communists would win. Even Chennault detected strength, dynamic growth and support for

N. A. File 893.01/9-1644.

the system of government led by Mao Tse-tung.¹⁸ Trained observers detected weakness and loss of support for Chiang. They said the only way Chiang could succeed after the war would be with United States help and support. No "China expert" disagreed with this conclusion no matter how simplified his view of Chinese Communism.¹⁹ The issue was how best to help Chiang to the detriment of the Japanese. The Japanese offensive continued to make progress at will against Kuomintang troops through the spring of 1945, and continued to fail against the Liberated Areas of the Communists.

That the issue was resolved in terms and by methods outlined by Hurley based upon superficial and arbitrary observation and contrary to the consensus formed by all observers on the scene resulted from conditions obtaining around Roosevelt. The various artifices and devices of subterfuge and delay utilized by Chiang, plus the presence of Hurley, unequivocally committed the United States to Chiang. Hurley admitted later that Roosevelt had sent him to find a possible substitute for Chiang. Roosevelt instructed Hurley to consult with Stilwell and determine whether Chiang was a correct "selection of the man to whom we will give our support, both military and materiel, in

¹⁸Chennault to Roosevelt, September 21, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 158-60.

¹⁹Hearings: State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, pp. 1258-1453. The Chinese Communists were evaluated by some as mere tools of Stalin's Russia.

China."²⁰ Stilwell suggested General Li Tsung-jen as a likely substitute for Chiang. Hurley dismissed the suggestion.²¹

After his initial gracious consent to appoint Stilwell the Generalissimo became evasive and began his characteristic dickering and delaying.²² Hurley became discouraged and considered returning home. Stilwell asked him to remain.²³ Clarence E. Gauss, Ambassador to China, claimed it was not a question of good faith, Chiang just could neither make correct decisions nor implement them.²⁴ Some pressure had to be applied. John S. Service claimed that token support for Mao would result in manifold benefits in the war against Japan, as well as, a strong inducement to make Chiang realize that he had to change his government. Hurley at first agreed.²⁵ This issue loomed large during the winter of 1944-45 in Chungking.

²⁰U.S. Congress, Senate, Joint Committee of Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951. (Hereinafter referred to as Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East), p. 2920.

²¹Ibid., p. 2921.

²²Stilwell Papers, p. 260.

²³Memorandum, Vincent to Grew, of conversation with Nelson, October 2, 1944. Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 259-60.

²⁴Gauss to Hull, September 28, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 257.

²⁵Memorandum Service to Mr. W. Walton Butterworth, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, October 19, 1949, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 714.

Gauss approached Chiang on the coalition matter just before Hurley arrived in China. At the initiative of Roosevelt and Hull, Gauss commenced active liason to bring about a fair deal between Chiang and the Communists so that both sides could live together. Chiang was advised that "a spirit of tolerance and good will of give and take [was] essential in achieving unity."²⁶ Roosevelt and Hull instructed Gauss to encourage Chiang to cooperate with "Chinese of every shade of political thinking."²⁷ This view had Chiang's concurrence from the time of the Cairo Conference.²⁸ Of course, the United States was to assure respect by the Soviet Union for the frontier in Manchuria and the British were to stay out of Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Canton.²⁹

Gauss and George Atcheson, Counselor of the Embassy in China, called on Chiang September 15, with directions from the President and Hull to effect some sort of war council as a first step to unification.³⁰ Chiang's response was so

²⁶Hull to Gauss, September 9, 1944, Foreign Realtions, 1944, VI, 568.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p. 164.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Gauss to Hull, September 16, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 574.

vague and qualified that Gauss gave up the effort and left the issue up to Hurley.

On the same day, September 15, at the Octagon Conference in Quebec, Roosevelt made the military decision which removed China completely from consideration in any American military effort against Japan.³¹ MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz held the mandate for victory without reference to Stilwell or Chiang. In a matter of hours after Nimitz made the necessary ships available to MacArthur, the Combined Chiefs of Staff on September 16 moved the date for the landing on Leyte up two months, to October 20.³²

Another decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to commence an extended effort over land, sea and air to open the Burma Road by early 1945 came virtually simultaneous with receipt of a Stilwell message informing them that Chiang was threatening to pull back his forces from the Salween front in Burma.³³ Chiang's threat to withdraw the Yunnan armies across the Salween would ruin the possibility of driving a road through to China. Stilwell acknowledged the crises in quick succession.³⁴ Stilwell told Marshall that the Chiang plan of defense was stupid. Chiang wanted

³¹Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-44, p. 513.

³²Ibid.

³³Feis, The China Tangle, p. 187.

³⁴Stilwell Papers, p. 262.

to hold on until the Americans could get a decision in the Pacific, trading "space for time."³⁵

The President reacted immediately. On September 16 he sent a strongly worded message to Chiang. Apologists later gave tremendous significance to this message. It was a reproving message that called upon Chiang to "reinforce your Salween armies immediately and press their offensive, while at once placing General Stilwell in unrestricted command of all your forces."³⁶ Later, Hurley would claim that delivery of the message upset all his plans.³⁷

On September 23 Stilwell decided to go to Yenan, and he revealed his plan for arming the Communists to Hurley. Hurley showed the plan to Chiang.³⁸ On September 25 Chiang asked that Stilwell be recalled. Hurley helped write the message to Roosevelt for Chiang.³⁹ Although briefed by the War Department, Hurley was apparently unaware that Stilwell had begun his Burma campaign in compliance with orders from Southeast Asia Command, based on directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, approved by the President and

³⁵Ibid., p. 263.

³⁶Roosevelt to Chiang, September 16, 1944. Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 157-58; See also Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-50 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963) pp. 114-15.

³⁷Feis, The China Tangle, p. 190.

³⁸Stilwell to Hurley, September 23, 1944. Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 2872-73.

³⁹Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East, p. 2869.

the Prime Minister.⁴⁰ Chiang requested Stilwell's relief because of his Burma campaign and Hurley supported Chiang's position.⁴¹

The President expressed his surprise at Chiang's reversal of his agreement to appoint Stilwell and said that, since the situation in China had so deteriorated, he no longer felt inclined to assume the responsibility involved in placing an American officer in command of the ground forces in China. Roosevelt agreed to relieve Stilwell of his appointment as Chief of Staff to Chiang and of his responsibility for Lend-Lease matters. Roosevelt proposed that Stilwell should continue to have direct command under the Generalissimo, of Chinese forces in Burma and the Yunnan armies.⁴²

Chiang consulted other sources in Washington. These sources provided interesting information. Soong told Hurley on October 1, 1944, that:

Dr. Kung stated that Harry Hopkins had told him at a dinner party that the President had received the Generalissimo's Aide-Memoire . . . and that since it concerned the sovereign right of China, the President intended to comply with the Generalissimo's request

⁴⁰Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, pp. 418, 468-69. When Hurley called on Mao in November he blamed the East China loss on Stilwell, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 685.

⁴¹Chiang to Roosevelt, September 25, 1944, Chiang to Roosevelt, October 9, 1944, Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 2869-71, 2874-76.

⁴²Roosevelt to Chiang October 5, 1944. Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 165.

for the recall of General Stilwell and his replacement by another American officer.⁴³

The next day Chiang declared publicly that Stilwell "must go."⁴⁴

Chiang's policy became United States policy. Many historians later interpreted Chiang's desires as United States policy. A corollary to this interpretation was the revelation of Russian complicity as the reason for failure of alleged United States policy in China.⁴⁵ The source for the theories was Chiang Kai-shek.

Hurley never deviated in his commitment to Chiang even at the expense of Stilwell. A second Aide-Memoire, which requested Stilwell's unequivocal recall, included Hurley's comments:

In studying the situation here I am convinced that there is no Chinese leader available who offers as good a basis of cooperation with you as Chiang Kai-shek. There is no other Chinese known to me who possesses as many of the elements of leadership as Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell are fundamentally incompatible. Today you are confronted by a choice between Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell. There is no other issue between you and Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek has agreed to every request, every suggestion made by you except the Stilwell appointment.⁴⁶

⁴³ Soong to Hurley, Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 456.

⁴⁴ Memorandum by Gauss, October 3, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 265.

⁴⁵ Feis, The China Tangle.

⁴⁶ Hurley to Roosevelt, October 10, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 170.

Stilwell saw this message.

On October 13 Hurley, unable to sleep, arose at 2: o'clock in the morning and sent the final coup-de-grace to Roosevelt:

The Generalissimo's prestige has suffered because of his reverses in East China. Relying on a cable from Dr. Kung in Washington he believed his action had your approval when he made public his refusal to appoint Stilwell. If you force him publicly to back down his usefulness will be diminished if not destroyed . . . I respectfully recommend that you relieve General Stilwell and appoint another American General to command all the land and air forces in China under the Generalissimo.⁴⁷

Hurley postulated October 10 that there was no other leader except Chiang. On October 13 Stilwell had to go or Chiang would be ineffective. Again Roosevelt decided United States policy in accordance with the concept that Chiang's morale and prestige would suffer if Stilwell were not removed.

Roosevelt recalled Stilwell, but Marshall reorganized the entire Asian Theater. A division between the China

⁴⁷Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, pp. 300-03. There is little question that Stilwell never saw the message of October 13. Admiral Miles himself encoded the message and only two people knew about it. Hurley was angry when the fact that Stilwell was leaving leaked. Hurley himself said only two Navy men knew about the message. Milton E. Miles, Vice Admiral, USN A Different Kind of War: The little-known story of the combined guerrilla forces created in China by the U.S. Navy and the Chinese during World War II. (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967), p. 334. This use of Naval transmission services will create extensive problems for historians. Because of code compromises paraphrases were necessary. Crucial messages sent in October and November, 1944, are entered in the Joint Hearings under date of January 31, 1945, because of code considerations. Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East, p. 3669. Hurley relied heavily upon the fact that these messages could not be made available for security reasons.

Theater and the Burma-India Theater explicitly allowed Stilwell's relief to serve only as Chief of Staff to Chiang. Nothing more was expected of the China Theater.⁴⁸ On October 18 Roosevelt recalled Stilwell. On October 21 Gauss said he was going to resign.⁴⁹

Stilwell abandoned China in haste. By November 2, 1944, he was in Washington, D. C. He was placed under virtual house arrest.⁵⁰ Even after Stilwell emerged from seclusion, he spoke no word about China. His story was not published until 1948, and the publication coincided with two major events; Truman's unexpected victory in the 1948 Presidential election and the complete rout of Chiang's American supported forces in China.

The Japanese offensive in China led to Stilwell's recall. All the effort directed toward the preparation of China as a staging area for the coming assault on the Japanese home islands came to nothing. Indeed, the strategy had failed for now China seemed a huge bastion of Japanese power and an endless land war with Japan seemed inevitable. Stilwell had tried to introduce some sort of order into Chiang's armies. He had watched as the best troops marched off to contain the Communist forces rather

⁴⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff to Wedemeyer and Sultan, October 24, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 178-79.

⁴⁹ Stilwell Papers, pp. 269-70.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 274.

than fight the Japanese. American supplies, flown in at such great expense over the "Hump" were wasted and openly sold to profiteers. Now many of those supplies were being given up without a fight by the Kuomintang forces. to Stilwell it was clear that Chinese resistance depended on cooperation with the Communists. More than that the war effort to be effective must be taken from corrupt Kuomintang officials and generals. His relief meant that victory against Japan would not depend upon China, but it left unresolved the problem of domestic opposition to Chiang.

CHAPTER III

NEGOTIATIONS WITH MAO

Having failed utterly in his primary mission, Hurley directed his talents toward the resolution of China's most pressing problem; the Chinese Communists. Before Stilwell left China he confided to his diary the following:

Hurley convinced that he has failed and accepts defeat on the command question. Then he gets excited about the Communists, seeing a chance to¹ make a noise by 'unifying' the Chinese war effort.

One of the conditions which the Generalissimo agreed to in connection with the removal of General Stilwell was that he would undertake to reach an agreement with the Communists.² The China tangle should have unraveled after Stilwell departed, according to Hurley's theory.

The United States efforts directed toward unification began with Roosevelt in 1943. Gauss and Hull initiated efforts along these lines prior to Hurley's arrival in China. Now, Hurley decided that he could succeed where the others had failed. Factors demanding some resolution of the Chinese Communist problem were: (1) The Communists

¹Stilwell Papers, p. 271.

²Davies, Senior political advisor to Stilwell, to Vincent, Chief of division of Chinese Affairs, November 14, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 693. This crucial letter exists today only in edited form.

possessed a base near Japan's largest military concentration and second largest industrial base, Manchuria; (2) The Communists represented a rich intelligence source; (3) The Communists encompassed a disciplined aggressive anti-Japanese regime; (4) The Communists represented the greatest single threat to the Chiang Kai-shek government and acted as a check upon the increase of Chiang's power; (5) The Communists were strongest in the area where Russia would attack when she entered the war against Japan; (6) Americans would be welcomed by the Communists.

The Kuomintang blockade permitted no arms, ammunition, food or medicine into the Communist area of north central Shensi province with its capital of Yen-an about 400 miles north of Chungking.³ During the Wallace visit Chiang granted permission for a U.S. Army Observer Group to visit Yen-an. The Group under the command of Colonel David D. Barrett departed Chungking July 22, 1944. John S. Service accompanied the Group as political observer. Stilwell's last official act was to recall Service from Yen-an and order as his replacement, John P. Davies and Raymond Ludden, two other Foreign Service Officers in China. Speculation would lead to the conclusion that Stilwell expected to expose the China situation with Service's assistance. Roosevelt isolated Stilwell, but Service cir-

³Ballantine, Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to Stettinius, January 17, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 309.

culated his story about Mao at the highest levels in Washington. During his one day in Chungking enroute to Washington, Service briefed Hurley October 23, 1944, stressing the confidence and feeling of strength displayed by the Chinese Communists and their determination to receive a share of arms. Hurley told Service repeatedly that he was going to make sure the Communists received arms.⁴

Service carried with him a report dated October 10, 1944. Hurley later cited this report as the primary cause for the defeat of his policy in China. The report had three main points: (1) the Chinese war effort and Chinese resistance was not entirely dependent upon Chiang, (2) the United States could make no progress in bargaining with Chiang as long as he was met on his own terms and treated as the only representative of China, (3) that Chiang, in pressing for the recall of Stilwell, was up to his old tricks of beclouding the issue and introducing irrelevant matters. The veracity of the report remained unchallenged.⁵

⁴Service to W. Walton Butterworth, Director of Office of Far Eastern Affairs, October 19, 1949, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI 714; Hearings: State Department Employee Investigation, p. 2002.

⁵George Atcheson, Chargé ad interim to Hull, November 22, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 708-11. (Subenclosure) Memorandum No. 40, by Service dated October 10, 1944. Omitted is the following paragraph: "Finally, we need feel no ties of gratitude to Chiang. The men he has kept around him have proved selfish and corrupt, incapable and obstructive. Chiang's own dealings with us have been an opportunist combination of extravagant demands and

Service recommended a visit by Hurley to Yen-an. He thought such a visit might cause Chiang to make concessions.

Unfortunately Hurley gave a copy of this report to T. V. Soong.⁶ The Embassy, as well as Service, cautioned Hurley not to go beyond what Chiang would accept in negotiations with the Communists.⁷

Hurley remained buoyant and optimistic during October. He said the Communist military forces could be united with the National Army and a united military force would be directed against Japan. Chiang encouraged Hurley to think that this would happen. Chiang also encouraged Roosevelt to think in terms of the anticipated unification of the

unfilled promises, wheedling and bargaining, bluff and blackmail. Chiang did not resist Japan until forced by his own people. He has fought only passively--not daring to mobilize his own people. He has sought to have us save him--so that he can continue his conquest of his own country. In the process, he has "worked" us for all we are worth. We seem to forget that Chiang is an Oriental; that his background and vision are limited; that his position is built on skill as an extremely adroit political manipulator and a stubborn, shrewd bargainer; that he mistakes kindness and flattery for weakness; and that he listens to his own instrument of force, rather than reason." N. A. file 893.00/11-2244. Augustus S. Chase in Division of Chinese Affairs commented; "While most competent observers would probably concur in many of his conclusions" memorandum dated December 13, 1944, N. A. File 893.00/11-2244. The conclusions advanced by Service in this report have stood the test of time.

⁶ Service to Butterworth, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, October 19, 1949, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 713.

⁷ Document Prepared in the Embassy in China, October 17, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 650.

Chinese military forces.⁸ Chiang told Roosevelt that all problems had been solved and "a period of Sino-American collaboration more understanding, more intimate, and more fruitful than ever before will be inaugurated."⁹ In a personal message to Roosevelt he lauded Hurley in glowing terms and proposed:

To increase the Communist troops in the regular forces of the National Army, and this now constitutes one of the most vital requisites in our war against Japan. General Hurley has my complete confidence. Because of his rare knowledge of human nature, and his approach to the problems, he seems to get on well with Communist leaders¹⁰

Chiang writing to Roosevelt seemed clear enough, however, Chiang's diary entry for October 21, 1944, revealed an opposite thought. Chiang thought the Chinese Communist Party was weak and that it could be easily defeated.¹¹ Chiang said he would resolve the Communist dilemma peacefully while in reality he had no such intention. Vital to Chiang's plans was United States support, and he proceeded to assure that support.

⁸Hurley to Roosevelt, October 23, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 177.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Chiang to Roosevelt, undated, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 170. Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 309. Identified in footnote, p. 496. In the Hurley version the word "incorporate" is substituted for "increase" with regard to communist inclusion in the government and it is dated October 25, 1944.

¹¹Quoted in Tsou, America's Failure in China 1941-1950, p. 169. Soon Hurley thought the Communists were weak.

Ostensibly, Chiang agreed to come to terms with the Communists. With this in mind, Hurley first drafted a basis of agreement on October 28.¹² Chiang's negotiators corrected this basis for agreement on November 7.¹³ Hurley went to Yen-an completely unannounced November 7, 1944. The visit was for the purpose of finding a basis of agreement between the National Government and the Communist Party for the unification of all military forces in China.¹⁴ Upon disembarking from his plane Hurley startled Mao with the loud and piercing "Commanche war cry with which he had delighted the Russian soldiers at Stalingrad."¹⁵ Mao's reaction remained unrecorded.

On November 8 Hurley met with Mao for five hours. Mao told Hurley that there was great danger threatening Chiang's military, political, financial and economic control. Mao explained at length that delay in reorganization would work to Chiang's disadvantage. If the United States really wanted to fight Japan and promote unity then the corrupt government apparatus should be adjusted. Mao

¹²Draft, "Basis for Agreement" October 28, 1944 by Hurley, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 659.

¹³Revised Draft, "Basis for Agreement" November 7, 1944, by Wang Shih-chieh and General Chang Chih-chung, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 666.

¹⁴Hurley to Roosevelt, November 7, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 666-67.

¹⁵Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 312. Though the origin of Mao's term "Paper Tiger" remains obscure, Mao soon began referring to Hurley as a "Paper Tiger."

did not see any special reason to reorganize his troops because they fought the Japanese. Hurley asked what Mao wanted specifically. Mao repeated to Hurley the views of Roosevelt and Churchill. He claimed that if there was no democracy there could be no unity in China.¹⁶

Hurley and Mao signed an agreement November 10.¹⁷ The agreement embodied all of Hurley's demands and called for unification, a government of the people, for the people, and by the people, one national government and recognition for all anti-Japanese parties. Point two proved to be most important:

The present National Government is to be reorganized into a Coalition National Government embracing representatives of all anti-Japanese parties and non-partisan, political bodies. A new democratic policy providing for reforms in military, political, economic and cultural affairs shall be promulgated and made effective. At the same time the National Military Council is to be reorganized into the United National Military Council consisting of representatives of all anti-Japanese armies.¹⁸

Mao told Roosevelt that:

The spirit of this agreement is what we of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people have been striving for in the anti-Japanese united front during the past eight years. It had always been our desire to reach an agreement with President Chiang Kai-shek, which will promote the welfare of the Chinese people. Through the good offices of General Hurley we have suddenly seen hope of realization The Central Committee of our Party has unanimously accepted the

¹⁶Memorandum of conversation Mao and Hurley, November 8, 1944. Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 678-87.

¹⁷Mao to Roosevelt, November 10, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 689.

¹⁸Agreement Between the National Government of China, The Kuomintang of China and the Communist Party of China. Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 687-88.

whole text of this proposed agreement and is prepared to fully support and make it effective. The Central Committee of our Party has authorized me to sign this agreement, witnessed by General Hurley.¹⁹

This agreement received the highest support. Roosevelt told Mao that for the defeat of Japanese aggression, he was willing to cooperate with all anti-Japanese forces in China.²⁰ United States aid to the Chinese Communists seemed assured and Hurley was aware of this commitment. Before Hurley left Yen-an, Mao authorized him to say to Chiang Kai-shek that the Communists pledged themselves to support and sustain his leadership.²¹

When Hurley returned to Chungking on November 11, he turned over a copy of the signed agreement to T. V. Soong. Soon after, Soong called on Hurley and said, "You have been sold a bill of goods by the Communists. The National Government will never grant what the Communists have requested."²² The National Government then "finally and definitely declined the Communist offer as settlement." Chiang agreed that the settlement Hurley had obtained from the Communists would be accepted as a settlement in

¹⁹Mao to Roosevelt, November 10, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 689.

²⁰Roosevelt to Mao, not available, referred to in Mao to Hurley, December 16, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 741.

²¹Hurley to Stettinius, January 31, 1945, Hearings: State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, pp. 2087-88.

²²Ibid., p. 2088.

Washington or London, but owing to peculiar Chinese psychology it would mean the total defeat for him and his party.²³

Gauss, still Ambassador until November 13, in a letter to the Secretary of State advised that it "is not to be expected that Chiang or Kuomintang diehards will accept . . . document . . . which would actually depose the Kuomintang as the governing party of China."²⁴

Chiang Kai-shek told Hurley that the agreement would give the Communists control of the Government.²⁵ Hurley believed the agreement would strengthen the Government both militarily and politically. Hurley pointed out to Chiang that Mao had signed an agreement to put his army under the coalition government. All arguments by Hurley and Chou-En-lai failed to influence Chiang.²⁶

Hurley informed Roosevelt November 16, of the agreement

²³Ibid.

²⁴Gauss to Hull, November 13, 1944. Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 690-91. John S. Service informed Acting Secretary of State Stettinius on October 30 of Gauss's decision to resign. The report was published October 31, 1944; New York Times, October 31, 1944, p. 1. George Atcheson, Jr., served as Chargé d'affaires ad interim at Chungking November 13-December 14, 1944. On December 14, 1944, Hurley became Ambassador designate to China. He presented his credentials to Chiang January 8, 1945 still in the uniform of a Major General. Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI, p. 350.

²⁵Hurley to Roosevelt, November 16, 1944. Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 699.

²⁶Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East, p. 3671.

with Mao, commenting, "I know that it will be apparent to you that nearly all of the basic principles recited in the proposed agreement are ours." He also stated that Mao agreed to recognize Chiang as President of the Republic. All principals to the agreement, Hurley, Mao and Chiang agreed that secrecy was a vital element until final agreement could be reached. As with the Stilwell case, Hurley was confident that Chiang sincerely desired settlement. Hurley's position appeared crucial to the negotiations.²⁷ He had in effect created a vacuum, therefore Roosevelt offered to appoint Hurley as Ambassador to China and Hurley immediately accepted.²⁸

To Davies, Hurley confided that he felt the Communist proposals eminently fair and "that if there is a breakdown in the parleys it will be the fault of the Government and not the Communists." Davies reported further that Hurley suspected the men around Chiang to be sabotaging Hurley's efforts and, additionally, that the British were antipathetic to bringing the opposing sides together in China.²⁹ A crucial factor in all of this was communications. Hurley

²⁷Hurley to Roosevelt, November 16, 1944. Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 699.

²⁸Roosevelt to Hurley, November 17, 1944. Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 700.

²⁹Davies to Vincent, November 14, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 693. This vital letter remains only in edited form.

communicated directly with President Roosevelt through military channels without informing the State Department. Davies' reports, on the other hand, did not arrive in Washington until weeks later and remained unavailable in their entirety.³⁰

Chiang's government made a counter-proposal on November 17. T. V. Soong gave the proposal to Hurley with a request that it be presented to the Communists as General Hurley's basis for settlement.³¹ The Government proposed unification, a government of the people, for the people and by the people and called upon the Communists to give over control of all their troops to the National Government.³² Hurley replied publicly "that there was not one word of the counter-proposal that I considered mine, and that I had not presented it as my idea of an equitable compromise."³³ Hurley reported, "the three-point proposal was not, of course, acceptable to the Communists."³⁴ The Government proposal was a meaningless device and Hurley recognized it as such. But Hurley did not blame Chiang.

³⁰Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 307, 650-754.

³¹Ibid., n. 703.

³²Second Counterdraft by Chinese Government Representative, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 703-04.

³³Hurley to Stettinius, January 31, 1945, Hearings: State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, p. 2089. Hurley made no report of his negotiations with Mao to the State Department until this date.

³⁴Ibid.

At the same time Hurley made his optimistic report to Roosevelt, he expressed some pessimism privately.³⁵ On November 15 Hurley informed Secretary of the Treasury, Morgenthau that he considered:

The situation in Chungking distressing, the government 'traditionalist'--confident that no matter what the Japanese did, they would be absorbed . . . most of the officials at Chungking were interested only in preserving their own position. They regarded the American taxpayer as "a sucker" who they could exploit indefinitely . . . they were really fascists, in favor of dictatorship, and opposed to the concessions necessary for the achievement of national unity. The Communists . . . genuinely wanted multiparty government . . . The Chinese Communists had done a better job of organizing for war than had the subordinates of Chiang Kai-shek . . . The Communists favored the unification of China and of the Chinese army, and that on the whole they "offered a fine, liberal program." The Kuomintang, Hurley said, was resisting Communist overtures largely because of T. V. Soong, whom Hurley considered a 'crook.' The achievement of unity in China would be a difficult task, but Hurley rejoiced in believing that he had brought the Communists to the American side. He also took heart from Roosevelt's recall of General Stilwell and Ambassador Gauss³⁶

Hurley remained ambivalent and confused, but his purge of Americans continued unabated. Gradually Hurley added to his policy an important corollary which became significant in later years. Though it remained unclear exactly when this corollary developed, Hurley himself said this about it:

Then the President had agreed with me in a decision which I made; and, understand, these policies are

³⁵Hurley to Chou En-Lai, December 11, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 733.

³⁶John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries Years of War 1941-1945. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p. 397.

are generated--they are evolved--as you go along, and one of the policies evolved by me and reported was not to arm the Communists with lend-lease supplies unless and until they acknowledged the sovereignty and placed themselves under the command of our ally, the Republic of China.³⁷

Mao, of course, had already agreed to these conditions and Hurley and Roosevelt knew that Mao had agreed.

In China Hurley remained ambivalent. His accounts of his instructions relayed to subordinates changed from week to week. Gradually Hurley adopted the idea of enlisting Soviet influence on the side of Chiang before internal rapprochement could be achieved. Hurley requested Roosevelt to ask Stalin to make his peace with Chiang without reference to Mao.³⁸ The request represented a reversal of procedure. Previously, Roosevelt thought the Chinese Communist problem would have to be resolved before Stalin's support for Chiang could be arranged. Firm in his conviction that the Russian Government did not recognize the Chinese Communist Party as Communists at all, Hurley reported that Chiang also believed that ; "(1) Russia is not supporting the Communist Party in China. (2) Russia does not want dissension or civil war in China and (3) Russia desires more harmonious relations with China."³⁹

³⁷Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East, p. 2899.

³⁸Feis, The China Tangle, p. 255.

³⁹Hurley to Stettinius, December 24, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 747.

Unfortunately, Chiang concluded that without Russian support, Mao would surely lose a civil war. Unfortunately for the United States, Hurley agreed with Chiang. Unfortunately, later leaders in the United States agreed with Hurley.

Regardless of what Hurley reported the situation in China deteriorated. Chiang's forces were useless. The Japanese were threatening Kunming, the Air Transport Command staging area in China. All the Chinese divisions melted away in front of the Japanese advance. By December, Wedemeyer, Stilwell's relief, realized that the only forces capable of saving Chungking and Kunming were the Stilwell trained Chinese divisions in Burma.⁴⁰ There was still a possibility that the Communists might be enlisted to help the war effort. Efforts by Wedemeyer directed toward a Communist war effort assisted by the United States became tangled with Hurley's efforts at unification.

On December 8, Colonel Barrett, head of the mission in Yen-an had held a long interview with Mao Tse-tung. Mao expressed dismay at the attitude of the United States:

It does not seem fair to us that we should be asked to sacrifice so much while the Generalissimo, who is in large measure responsible for the present crisis, is asked to sacrifice so little . . . The whole thing is blocked by the Generalissimo . . . The United States believes that Chiang Kai-shek must be retained in power at all costs . . . We have no objection to such a policy. As long as he fights Japan, we are perfectly willing for the Generalissimo to remain as the leader. We are not, however, going to give up our

⁴⁰Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI, pp. 150 & 221.

right of self-preservation for one seat on the National Military Council . . . As Chiang Kai-shek has refused to agree to a coalition government and we are determined not to give in . . . Our present stand closes the door to negotiations. We have closed the door, but we leave the window open. The five points are the window.⁴¹

The fundamental difficulty was the unwillingness of the Kuomintang to forsake the one-party rule.⁴² Chiang was the Government. Mao represented only a "party." The United States could not deal with such a "party." That "party" had to enter the Government. Mao was willing. Chiang refused to allow the Communists or any other elements into the government with the Kuomintang. Mao was forthright in discussion; "We are not like Chiang Kai-shek. No nation needs to prop us up. We can stand erect and walk on our own feet like free men." Mao continued, "If General Hurley does not understand this now, he never will and it would be useless . . . to say all these things over again." Mao's threat to publish the "five points" brought a quick response from Hurley. Hurley requested that Mao not publish the "five points" because negotiations had not been concluded.⁴³ Mao warned that Hurley's policy would lead to

⁴¹Colonel David D. Barrett to Wedemeyer, December 10, 1944. (Yenan) Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 727-33. The State Department did not know about the five points until January 31, 1945. Then Hurley asked the State Department to maintain secrecy. Hearings: State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, p. 2087.

⁴²Chou En-Lai to Hurley, December 16, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 739.

⁴³Chou En-Lai to Hurley, December 16, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 739.

certain civil war in China.⁴⁴ Chinese historians have accused Hurley of bad faith.⁴⁵ In retrospect, the Communist charge appeared valid.

The War Department, concerned with the war against Japan, began plans for arming the Chinese Communists with or without agreement between the two contending parties prior to Stilwell's departure. The Army had at least three plans to arm the Communists. Hurley was aware of at least one of these plans. The plan was modest, involving 7,500 United States airborne troops to land in Communist territory and disrupt the Japanese line of communications. General McClure, Wedemeyer's Chief of Staff, briefed General Chen Cheng, new Chinese Minister of War and T. V. Soong of the plan on December 19.⁴⁶

Hurley wanted to go home to report to Roosevelt, Stettinius and Stimson as well as attend to some personal matters. A special plane landed at Chungking on December 17, to take Hurley to Washington, but Hurley postponed the trip.⁴⁷ He gave as one of his reasons, lack of agreement

⁴⁴Mao Tse-tung. "The Hurley-Chiang Duet is a Wash-out," and "On Danger of the Hurley Policy." Selected Works. Vol. IV. (New York: International Publishers, 1956), p. 267.

⁴⁵Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, p. 267.

⁴⁶Memorandum of conversation Generals Ch'en and McClure, December 19, 1944. Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 741-43; Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI, p. 252.

⁴⁷Hurley to Stettinius, December 17, 1944. Foreign Relations, 1944, VI 210.

between Communist troop leaders and the National Government.⁴⁸ On December 20 the new Secretary of State, Stettinius, asked Hurley to submit by telegraph the report he had intended to make in person.⁴⁹ Hurley revealed the extent to which the Department of State was in the dark:

About that time Edward R. Stettinius was appointed Secretary of State. Now I knew Stettinius well, and Stettinius sent me a cable, a query in which he asked me to please tell him--now you see, I have the military reporting directly to the President. Now I am Ambassador, and Stettinius as my chief said: 'What is your directive? What are you doing in China? Would you mind giving me a statement?'⁵⁰

The only one that knew what was happening in China was Hurley. Having received the query from the new Secretary of State, Hurley appealed to Mao one more time. Hurley sent a message to Mao: "If General Chou En-lai will come to Chungking again I believe that chances of success along the general lines of your proposals are brighter than ever before."⁵¹ According to Mao, Chou was too busy to leave Yen-an.⁵² The same day Hurley received the answer from Mao, he described his mission to the Secretary of State as

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Stettinius to Hurley, December 20, 1944. Foreign Relations, 1944, 744.

⁵⁰Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East, p. 2907.

⁵¹Hurley to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, December 20, 1944. Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 744.

⁵²Mao Tse-tung to Hurley, December 24, 1944. Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 745.

follows:

(1) To prevent the collapse of the National Government. (2) To sustain Chiang Kai-shek as President. (3) To harmonize relations between the Generalissimo and the American Commander. (4) To promote production of war supplies in China and prevent economic collapse and (5) to unify all the military forces of China for the purpose of defeating Japan.⁵³

In these words on Christmas Eve, 1944, Hurley outlined United States policy toward China. Operating in a vacuum without guidance or control, Hurley defined a United States policy which became virtually sacrosanct. Gradually Hurley became aware that his oversimplistic approach to Chinese affairs was dangerous. He remained optimistic about reunification, but by December 1944, he raised the issues of imperialism and other sources of trouble with Stettinius. Hurley was as positive of unification in November as he had been that Stilwell was going to be appointed by Chiang in September. By December, 1944, Hurley began to have doubts.

Davies, who had relieved Service in Yen-an in October 1944, sent reports to Hopkins during November and December. These reports were more sophisticated than those of Service, but they were as damaging, if not more so, to the Chiang regime and its chances. On December 12 Davies reported to the White House: "The negotiations looking to an agreement between the Generalissimo and the Chinese Communists have

⁵³Hurley to Stettinius, December 24, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 745.

failed."⁵⁴ Davies anticipated "that the Generalissimo will continue to refuse us permission to exploit militarily the Chinese Communist position." Davies recommended "that we unequivocally [tell] Chiang Kai-shek that we will work with and, within our discretion, supply whatever Chinese forces we believe can contribute most to the war against Japan."⁵⁵ Wedemeyer fired Davies at the insistence of Hurley December 26. Hurley threatened his career and Davies departed China before the end of the year.⁵⁶

Chiang, Hurley thought, was being sabotaged by the men around him.⁵⁷ Hurley classed all arguments against the unification of China as "stock arguments of the imperialists and of all others who oppose the principles of the Atlantic Charter."⁵⁸ Hurley identified the British as obstructionists, and he said that the British Ambassador to China, Sir Horace J. Seymour, had attempted to dissuade Hurley from working to "bring the Government and the

⁵⁴Memorandum by Davies December 12, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 734-35. Copy also transmitted to Harry L. Hopkins with copies to Hurley and Wedemeyer.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958), p. 319.

⁵⁷Davies to Vincent, November 14, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 693.

⁵⁸Hurley to Stettinius, December 24, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 749. The Atlantic Charter was a joint declaration by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941.

Communists together."⁵⁹

Hurley proceeded to immerse himself deeper into the milieu of Chinese intrigue. Chiang's "Gestapo" chief, Tai Li, who was supported by the Navy Group and Admiral Miles, told Chiang that the Army planned to arm the Communists.⁶⁰ Chiang confronted Hurley and Hurley concluded that Mao's intransigence was caused by such knowledge. Hurley reported to Roosevelt that his negotiations with the Communists had been compromised by the United States Army.⁶¹ When General McClure, Wedemeyer's Chief of Staff, chided Hurley for sending the telegram to Roosevelt, Hurley roared; "You pup, I've hit men for less than that."⁶² General Wedemeyer reluctantly relieved General McClure and assigned him to a position in the field.⁶³ The chagrined Wedemeyer then issued a directive which prohibited political activity by personnel under his command. Every American officer in China signed an oath to the effect that they would not give assistance to any individual, to any activity or any organization within the China Theatre,

⁵⁹Davies to Vincent, November 14, 1944. Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 693.

⁶⁰Gauss to Hull, February 1, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 19.

⁶¹Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI, pp. 250-54.

⁶²Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports, pp. 306, 317.

⁶³Ibid., p. 307.

except Chiang Kai-shek.⁶⁴

Conversations between the National Government and the Chinese Communist Party resumed January 24, 1945. In his report of January 31, 1945, Hurley reported for the first time to the State Department the agreement which Mao had signed and Hurley had witnessed November 10, 1944.⁶⁵ By this time Hurley was fully committed to Chiang. He thought the Communist party demands were justified, but "any aid from the United States to the Chinese Communist Party must go through the National Government."⁶⁶ He further explained;

On the other side of the ledger there is opposition to the unification of the military forces of China within both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. Members of the Chinese Communist Party oppose unification with the Chinese National Government on the ground that the government is incompetent, corrupt and destructive of the welfare of China. The Kuomintang party points to the fact that it began as the party of Sun Yat-sen, the party of reformation in China, and has brought China through a revolution and through nearly 8 years of the war of resistance. They believe themselves to have been successful. They believe that they have served China well and are naturally reluctant to surrender their one-party control of China.

There is honest opposition among some of our own military on the ground that the Communist armed party is stronger than the National Army and we should deal directly with the Communists by-passing the National Government. This opposition is, in my opinion, based on erroneous and unsound premises. In addition to these factors, all of the representatives of the so-called imperialist colonial powers of southeast Asia

⁶⁴Feis, The China Tangle, p. 266.

⁶⁵Hurley to Stettinius, January 31, 1945. Hearings: State Department Loyalty Investigation, p. 2086.

⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 2087-89.

are opposed to unification. The policy of the imperialist powers appears to be to keep China divided against herself.⁶⁷

An appendix to this report added by the staff in Chungking took issue with Hurley as follows:

There is no one on the staff who believes we should bypass the National Government in dealing with the Communists. From a recent conversation with Mr. Service (who is not substantively a member of the Embassy Staff) I am convinced that he does not think we should bypass the National Government in dealing with the Communists.⁶⁸

Unity of the military forces in China to assist in defeating Japan remained the issue as of January 1945. Soon, Hurley would discover that Japan would be defeated without reference to China.

On January 18, 1945 John S. Service returned to Chungking. Wedemeyer had specifically requested Service when Hurley purged Davies.⁶⁹ A couple of days later Hurley called in Service and confronted him with his report of October 10, 1944. Hurley informed Service that his policy was to uphold Chiang Kai-shek and that Hurley would do all of the policy recommending.⁷⁰

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 2090.

⁶⁸Ibid., pp. 2090-91, Written by Atcheson in cooperation and consultation with four other members of the Embassy staff.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 1973.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 2075. Later Hurley and others would insist that Service had influenced Stilwell by this report; however, the report was delivered to Stilwell by Service in Washington after both had left China. Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 713. Stilwell held these views long before he received this report. Stilwell Papers, pp. 205-08.

Unfortunately, Service worked for Wedemeyer as Davies had and Hurley knew this was true. At the request of Wedemeyer, Service and Ludden prepared a report February 14, 1945. This report embodied recommendations for policy changes in the Far East if the objective was defeat of Japan in the shortest possible time with the least expenditure of American lives. Political unity in China, according to the report, would be impossible unless the United States exerted considerable pressure upon the Kuomintang Government. Diplomatic means to solve Kuomintang-Communist differences had failed and; "at present there exists in China a situation closely paralleling that which existed in Yugoslavia prior to Prime Minister Churchill's declaration of support of Marshall Tito." No arms to the Communists were needed. Merely a statement by Roosevelt, "would be so profound that the Generalissimo would be forced to make concessions of power and permit united-front coalition."⁷¹

Overwhelming evidence existed at all levels in Washington that pressure would have to be brought to bear on Chiang if results were to be expected. Meanwhile, Hurley arrived at a different conclusion. Hurley told Chiang that when the war was over his well-equipped divisions would

⁷¹Report February 14, 1945, U.S. Department of State, United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949. (Washington, D. C., 1949), pp. 575-76. (Hereinafter referred to as U.S. Relations with China.)

have a walk-over if he fought the Communists.⁷² The origin of such an idea could be found in the propaganda of the Chinese Government. Gradually, the Government and Hurley came to believe this propaganda.⁷³ Hurley did not feel concessions to the Communists would be necessary. Before he departed from China he refused a request for a twenty million dollar loan to Communist General Chu Teh because he thought it would have defeated his policy.⁷⁴ Policy, as far as Hurley was concerned, centered around post-war unification rather than any effort against the Japanese. This unification would require Mao's submission to Chiang's terms.

Chiang's terms for unification became increasingly difficult and ultimately proved impossible. Efforts at unification ceased for six months. Chou En-lai left Chungking for Yen-an with new Government proposals on February 15, 1945. These proposals were: (1) the Communist troops should be placed under the National Military Council, which the Communists regarded as tantamount to handing them over to the Kuomintang; (2) The Kuomintang insisted that one-party dictatorship would not be

⁷²Hurley to Chiang, February 16, 1945, Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out in the CBI, p. 388n.

⁷³Ho, Chinese Chief of Staff, to Hearn, Stilwell's Chief of Staff, April 12, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 401-05.

⁷⁴U.S. Relations with China, pp. 86-87.

terminated. A proposed war cabinet would have no power for final decisions of policy. The real issue, formation of a government, remained unresolved. The Communists sponsored a coalition government and the Kuomintang sponsored a National Assembly. By 1950, advocates of coalition government for China were condemned as Communists. The fact that Hurley ardently supported this course in 1944 remained obscure. The story usually began with General Marshall's efforts to bring about unification in 1946. By that time circumstances had changed and in the selective interpretations of the era, Hurley's role remained virtually ignored.

Hurley and Wedemeyer departed China for Washington February 19, 1945. Wedemeyer carried Service's report and Hurley had by now formulated his position. This position he articulated very clearly:

The President and Generalissimo of the National Government of China, known internationally as the Republic of China represents China . . . The Communist Party of China is not a nation and, as far as I know, no one has recognized it as a nation. It is one of the political parties of China. The only difference from the ordinary political party is that it is armed.⁷⁵

Hurley liked this evaluation. He used the same terms in a press conference April 2, and even as late as 1951 still maintained this position publicly. Unfortunately, his public position was not as clear in other matters. According to Hurley, any recognition would destroy the

⁷⁵Hurley to Chou En-lai, February 20, 1945, U.S. Relations with China, p. 577.

possibility of unification in China. Any arming of the Communists would destroy the possibility of unification. This was now his policy. In Washington he transcended even this grandiose scheme.

CHAPTER IV

LAST PHASES OF WORLD WAR II

After Hurley's assumption of the Ambassadorship to China in January 1945, he asked Roosevelt to resolve the Chinese dilemma by arranging Russian support for Chiang before resolution of the internal Chinese problem. At Yalta, February 11, 1945, Stalin formally agreed to enter the war against Japan two or three months after the war in Europe was terminated.¹ Hurley met with Roosevelt March 8, 24 and April 2, 1945. A new approach to the Chinese problem emerged after the meetings. Hurley decided to enlist Stalin and Churchill on the side of Chiang in order to exclude Mao from a leadership position in China.²

Part of the Yalta Agreement provided for a pact of

¹U. S. Relations with China, pp. 113-14. AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE ENTRY OF THE SOVIET UNION INTO THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN, Signed at Yalta February 11, 1945, released simultaneously in London, Moscow, and Washington, February 11, 1946.

²Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East, p. 2906. Mao's polemics date Hurley's speech of April 2, 1945 as the turning point in relations between Yenan and Washington. Mao Tse-tung, "Hurley, Chiang Kai-shek and the Reader's Digest Are a Menace to World Peace," Quoted in Stuart R. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1963), pp. 276-79.

friendship and alliance between the USSR and China, specifically the National Government of China. For his part of the bargain, Stalin was to regain a position in the Far East equivalent to the Russian position before defeat by Japan in the war of 1904-05. Stalin's terms were to be unquestionably fulfilled according to the agreement.

Still under the delusion that negotiations with the Communists and defeat of the Japanese with some help from the Chinese was the United States policy, the Embassy in Chungking continued to function. During Hurley's absence from China the Embassy in Chungking was under the control of the Chargé d'Affairs, George Acheson. Shortly after Hurley returned to Washington, Acheson reported that the Generalissimo had stiffened his attitude toward the Communists. According to Acheson disastrous civil conflict and chaos would be inevitable unless something was done either to influence Chiang Kai-shek to reconcile his differences with Mao, or, barring that, some sort of cooperation with the Communists.³ Hurley opposed any such course of action.⁴ This proved to be the last warning from Chungking. Stimson recalled Service, and Acheson returned to the United States in April upon Hurley's return to China.

With the Yalta agreement in his "hip-pocket," Hurley proceeded to London. He later claimed that he received Churchill's concurrence with American policy in China.

³Acheson to Stettinius, February 22, 1945, U. S. Relations With China, pp. 87-92.

⁴Ibid. p. 92.

From London he flew to Moscow and received Stalin's unequivocal commitment to American policy in China.⁵

Hurley's objectives in April were to obtain the agreement of Stalin and Churchill to the American policy of support for Chiang Kai-shek. A part of this policy, as it developed toward China, consisted of resistance to imperialism. Hurley and Roosevelt consistently discussed opposition to the British, French and Dutch repossession of their colonial empires. After Roosevelt's death Hurley continued his resistance, but Truman did not emphasize this issue.⁶ The British balked at any limitations on their intentions.⁷

Contrary to his later claims, Hurley was not trying to change the Yalta agreement at London and Moscow.⁸ Hurley considered the Yalta agreement absolutely essential for the success of his primary goal. He assumed the Communists

⁵Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 2887-88.

⁶Hurley to Roosevelt, November 26, 1944, Hurley to Truman, May 28, 1945 and Stettinius to Hurley, June 10, 1945. Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 2889-93.

⁷Memorandum Stettinius to Truman, April 18, 1945, Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Years of Decision (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955), p. 61; Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p. 250.

⁸Hurley testimony, Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 2885-86; For refutation see Appendix NN, "Statement of W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President, regarding Our Wartime Relations with the Soviet Union, particularly as They concern the Agreements Reached at Yalta," pp. 3328-42.

were weak and that they would have to come to terms as soon as Stalin publicly abandoned them.⁹ He directed his efforts toward the realization of a Sino-Soviet treaty to eliminate the last vestige of hope of outside support for Mao.¹⁰ At this point in time, about the end of the war against Hitler, Truman came to power in the United States and began to question the necessity for Stalin's assistance against Japan. Although Hurley wanted to expedite the Sino-Soviet agreement, the State Department questioned the necessity for Soviet participation in the war against Japan.¹¹ Henry Luce, Time-Life publisher, told Acting Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew, that he was very much aroused over his government's failure to procure surrender of an enemy already defeated in May, 1945. Grew made this position clear to Truman and Stimson.¹² Stimson thought Russian participation against Japan desirable, since it would reduce military requirements, and he was aware that little military leverage could be brought to bear on the Russians

⁹U. S. Relations With China, p. 99.

¹⁰Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out in CBI, pp. 337-39.

¹¹Grew to Stimson, May 12, 1945, The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan. Military Plans 1941-1945. (Washington: Department of Defense, September, 1955.) Mimeographed, p. 69.

¹²Truman, Years of Decision, I, 416-17; Memorandum, Acting Secretary Grew to Stimson, May 12, 1945. The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan, Military Plans, 1941-1945, p. 69.

"unless we choose to use force."¹³ Instead of encouraging the Chinese and Russians to come to terms, Truman may have tried to delay their impending agreement until the atomic bomb could be proved a success or failure. Truman may have hoped that the Soviet Union would stay out of the war against Japan if one of the conditions for entry could be delayed; namely, the Sino-Soviet Agreement.¹⁴

Hurley, intent upon utilizing the Sino-Soviet agreement to pressure Mao, wanted action on the treaty. On May 20, 1945, Hurley informed Truman that Roosevelt had entrusted him with two specific missions:

The first mission was to bring Churchill and Stalin to an agreement on the policy that the United States has been pursuing in China, namely, (1) to take all necessary action to bring about unification, under the National Government, of all anti-Japanese armed forces in China; (2) to endorse the aspirations of the Chinese people for the establishment of a free, united, democratic Chinese Government; (3) to continue to insist that China furnish her own leadership, make her own decisions and be responsible for her own policies and thus work out her own destiny in her own way. As you no doubt have been advised by the Secretary of State, I obtained concurrence of Churchill and Stalin on the plan outlined . . . The Second mission entrusted to me by President Roosevelt in my last conference with him pertains to a decision affecting China reached at the Yalta Conference . . . I am convinced that he [Chiang] will agree to every one of the requirements but will take exception to the use of two words, "pre-eminent" and "lease" . . . We are therefore, in a position to proceed with dispatch on

¹³Stimson to Grew, May 21, 1945, The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan, Military Plans, 1941-45, pp. 70-71.

¹⁴Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), pp. 110, 123, 125, 192, 193.

the Yalta Agreement when we are authorized to submit the particulars thereof to the Generalissimo¹⁵

Stalin authorized Hurley to reveal the Yalta Agreement to Chiang in April, but Truman delayed revelation to Chiang until June 15, 1945.

Obviously, Hurley's efforts far transcended those of a normal ambassador. He dealt on a personal basis with all four heads of the Allied governments and Mao, as well as the recently deceased Roosevelt. Truman was well advised of Russia's intent. Harry Hopkins, in one of his last official acts, confirmed Stalin's unequivocal commitment to enter the war against Japan August 8, 1945. Stalin made a categorical statement that he would do everything he could to promote unification of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. He further stated that this leadership should continue after the war because no one else was strong enough in China. He specifically stated no Communist leader was strong enough to unify China. He proposed to back the Generalissimo in spite of the reservations he expressed about him. He repeated all of his statements made at Yalta, that he wanted a unified and stable China and wanted China to control all of Manchuria as part of a united China. He stated categorically that he had no territorial claims against China and mentioned specifically Manchuria and Sinkiang, and that he would respect Chinese

¹⁵Hurley to Truman, May 20, 1945, Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, pp. 390-91.

sovereignty in all areas his troops entered to fight the Japanese.¹⁶ Marshal Stalin also pointed out the dangers inherent in Japanese efforts to divide the allies in order to gain terms short of unconditional surrender and requested a share in the eventual occupation of Japan.¹⁷

As early as February-March, the Japanese sought Russian mediation in their desire to end the war with the United States and Britain.¹⁸ The Japanese tried to establish direct contact with the Soviet Government in July. The Soviets informed the allies of these Japanese "peace" moves.¹⁹ At Potsdam in July the news of successful test of an atomic bomb relieved the allies of the need for Russian participation in the war against Japan, or so it seemed to Truman.

In China, Hurley's position remained dependent upon Soviet support for Chiang. Part of Hurley's position should be challenged. For instance, in July Hurley reported as follows:

Before the Yalta Conference, I suggested to President Roosevelt a plan to force the National Government to

¹⁶Hopkins to Truman, May 29, 1945, The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan, Military Plans, 1941-1945, pp. 71-72.

¹⁷Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), pp. 903-04.

¹⁸Alexander Werth, Russia at War 1941-1945, (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1964), p. 1031.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 1032-33.

make more liberal political concessions in order to make possible a settlement with the Communists. The President did not approve the suggestion.²⁰

Such a statement contradicted Hurley's case against Stilwell, Gauss, Service, Davies and the others. For all these people were out of China after Yalta. If this statement was true, Hurley's later accusations were not only improper but insincere.

At any rate, after Yalta Hurley became convinced that the Soviet Union would control the action of the Chinese Communist Party. He felt that Stalin's support of the National Government of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek would cause the Chinese Communists to come to terms.²¹ In July Hurley revealed how much he relied upon Chiang Kai-shek in this instance:

When the Chinese Communists are convinced that the Soviet is not supporting them, they will settle with the National Government if the National Government is realistic enough to make generous political settlements. The negotiations between the National Government and the Communist Party at this time are merely marking time pending the result of the conference at Moscow.²²

Why Chiang should agree to generous political settlements, Hurley never made clear. Evidence to the contrary existed

²⁰U. S. Relations with China, p. 99.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid. The conference in Moscow was conducted prior to and after the Berlin conference in Potsdam July 3 to August 2, 1945, T. V. Soong and Molotov conducted intermittent discussions which finally culminated in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, August 14, 1945.

at the highest levels. In July Wedemeyer told Marshall:

If Uncle Sugar, Russia, and Britain united strongly in their endeavor to bring about coalition of these two political parties in China by coercing both sides to make realistic concessions, serious post-war disturbances may be averted and timely effective military employment of all Chinese may be obtained against the Japanese. I use the term coerce advisedly because it is my conviction that continued appeals to both sides couched in polite diplomatic terms will not accomplish unification. There must be teeth in Big Three approach.²³

There is no difference between this analysis and earlier analyses by the people Hurley forced out of China. The consensus among all observers remained the same; Chiang must be pressured before any response could be expected.

Strangely enough, the action requested of Chiang was considered to be in his own best interests. Chiang was weak and Wedemeyer recognized early the weakness of his position. Wedemeyer believed Chiang had 327 divisions of which only the five trained by Stilwell in India were effective troops.²⁴ Having decided to withdraw, the Japanese forces did withdraw in a leisurely and orderly manner during the summer of 1945. Chinese forces, unwilling to engage in, and unable to see any reason for, costly combat operations, followed closely but carefully. What fighting did occur was a matter of rear-guard patrol action initiated by the Japanese. There were cases of Japanese platoons holding up regiments or divisions for several days

²³Wedemeyer to Marshall, July 9, 1945, Time Runs Out in CBI, p. 383n.

²⁴Ibid., p. 281.

or longer.²⁵

The Chinese leader functioned in a leadership position with hardly any power base. In discussions with the Generalissimo, Soong and Hurley on July 31, 1945, Wedemeyer considered the commitment to transport Government troops as well as the provision of further lend-lease after the war. In his report to Washington, Wedemeyer concluded with a warning that "it would be unsound to plan upon realistic Chinese assistance in the disarmament, demobilization, and deportation of Japanese forces on the Asiatic mainland."²⁶ The weakness of the Chinese ally was such that it would be unable to disarm even a defeated enemy.

Chiang really was as weak as Wedemeyer claimed and this weakness jeopardized Hurley's policy. Hurley acknowledged this point in August when he requested that the Secretary of State insure that the Japanese surrender only to the forces of the National Government. How this impossible task should be accomplished, Hurley did not make clear. Hurley requested aid from the State Department in these terms:

It seems certain that there can be no political unification in China as long as war lords or armed factions are strong enough to defy the National Government. To meet this situation the terms of surrender with Japan should include a requirement that Japan will be responsible for the surrender of all

²⁵Ibid., p. 387.

²⁶Ibid., p. 392; Soong and Chiang made their main point by insisting that troops landed in China not be commanded by Stilwell.

Japanese arms in China, including Japanese arms that are in the hands of Japanese soldiers, Chinese puppet troops supporting Japan, and Chinese partisan armed bandits . . . I suggest that when Japan surrenders, all of her arms in China, and, if necessary, some of her arms from the archipelago be used to equip the Chinese National Army. If the United States decides to continue to furnish lend-lease arms to the Chinese Government after V-J day, some might come from American owned lend-lease equipment now in other foreign theaters.²⁷

Apparently, Chiang would need considerable help even after V-J day and the United States should provide that help.

Any faction strong enough to defy Chiang had to be eliminated or political unification would be impossible.

One faction in China contemplated defiance not only of Chiang Kai-shek but of Hurley and the United States. During the summer of 1945 the climate in relations between Yen-an and Washington became stormy. Mao identified Hurley as the cause for this change. Mao talked about fighting the Americans as well as Chiang. If civil war developed Mao said "the American Government with its own hands will place a crushing burden on its own back."²⁸

After the atom bombs were dropped on Japan and Russia entered the war against Japan, Hurley and Chiang tried to anticipate all eventualities. The Communists, clearly the strongest organization in China, acted independent of control as everyone warned they would. On August 11,

²⁷Hurley to Byrnes, August 11, 1945, Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 403.

²⁸Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966), p. 215.

Generalissimo Chiang representing the largest force in China, instructed Communist Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh to maintain his position and "refrain from accepting Japanese surrenders, and await orders." From Yen-an, Chu Teh ordered that all anti-Japanese forces of the various Liberated Areas should accept the enemy's surrender in their vicinity, take over enemy arms, and occupy and administer towns and communications previously held by both Japanese and "puppet" troops.²⁹

On August 15, General Douglas MacArthur, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in the Pacific, issued his General Order number 1, which inter alia, designated Chiang Kai-shek as the agency for accepting the Japanese surrender in China, Formosa and Indo-China north of the 16th parallel.³⁰ MacArthur excluded Manchuria. The order gave prima facie support to the National Government's claim to be the sole legitimate agency in China. The inclusion of northern Indo China and Formosa in the order would also have historic repercussions and implications.

The efforts by Hurley and MacArthur in August, 1945, which provided for legal surrender only to Chiang's forces failed. Wedemeyer predicted the failure of such efforts. Even with massive United States support, puppet support,

²⁹Edmund Clubb, 20th Century China. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 255.

³⁰Truman, Years of Decision, p. 440.

Japanese support and Russian support, Chiang could not accomplish such a feat. All of this support merely allowed Chiang the opportunity to function in China without reference to a popular base of support.

In the rapidly changing milieu existent at the end of the war Hurley relied heavily upon the pending Sino-Soviet Treaty. Hurley reported the Chinese Communists "alarmed by the pending alliance between Moscow and Chungking." He thought the Chinese Communists were losing some of the assurance they had known early in the spring.³¹ On August 14. Soong and Stalin in Moscow initialed the Sino-Soviet Treaty. On that same date Chiang Kai-shek invited Mao Tse-tung to visit Chungking for a joint discussion of state affairs. The war, which had interrupted Chiang's efforts to eliminate Mao, also ended on the same date.

The State Department, as well as Hurley, considered the Sino-Soviet treaty a decisive weapon in the efforts to unify China:

Release of the text of the Chinese Russian treaty revealed that Russia has pledged her entire material and moral support to the Chungking movement, thus depriving the hostile Communist regime at Yen-an of what might have been its strongest foreign ally. Only a few hours before the text was announced--and perhaps because of it--Communist leader Mao Tse-tung finally agreed to go to Chungking.³²

³¹Hurley to Byrnes, August 13, 1945, Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 404.

³²Quote from United Press Dispatch, August 27, 1945, Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 405.

This assumption proved true as far as Mao was concerned. Mao recognized his weakened position after Japan's capitulation. Mao proved to be amenable in Chungking, only Chiang acted in a uncompromising manner.

The Sino-Soviet agreement of August 14, 1945, fulfilled the Yalta agreement with regard to the Far East. This act was supposed to bring about final capitulation of the Chinese Communist armed Party, but Chiang did not want peace with Mao. One observer analyzed the situation thus:

A basic settlement might have resulted if the Kuomintang leaders had not received a windfall in the form of American military assistance. With the assurance of American backing [the KMT] militarists have not hesitated to plunge the country into civil war.³³

The evidence supported this view which remained a valid premise for the next quarter of a century.

Chinese leaders expressed satisfaction with the Sino-Soviet Treaty. Chiang told Hurley that the treaty showed an intention on the part of the Soviets to assist in bringing about unification of the armed forces in China, as well as an intention to support Chinese efforts to create a strong, unified and democratic government and an intention to support the National Government of China.³⁴ To Hurley, success seemed eminent and he was optimistic about Chiang's desire to come to terms with Mao. Hurley's reports

³³Maxwell S. Stewart, "The Myth of Patrick J. Hurley, The Nation, November 10, 1945, vol. 161, no. 19, p. 491.

³⁴U. S. Relations With China, pp. 120-21.

reflected this optimism thus:

Chiang Kai-shek will now have an opportunity to show realistic and genuine leadership. He will have an opportunity to show his qualifications for leadership of the Chinese people in peace as well as in War. I am with the Generalissimo frequently. I insist continuously that the Chinese people must be responsible for their own policies, select their own leadership, and make their own decisions.³⁵

Hurley consistently maintained faith in Chiang Kai-shek, although grounds for such faith remained ambivalent.

The abrupt end of the war, the Sino-Soviet treaty, and the Russian entry into Manchuria caused Mao to reassess his position and he expressed his willingness to come to Chungking.³⁶ Hurley flew to Yen-an and returned to Chungking with Mao. On the morning of August 28, Mao met with Chiang for the first time since 1927 and Hurley acted as mediator in the discussions.³⁷ Mao stayed in Chungking forty-three days. Despite four specific plans proposed by Mao, including one for popular elections of public officials, Chiang would not agree.³⁸ Mao dropped his requirement for coalition government.³⁹ The Communists appeared to make a

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Mao to Wedemeyer, August 24, 1945, Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 404.

³⁷Ibid., p. 405.

³⁸U. S. Relations with China, pp. 580, 923; Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, 1945-1949, Vol. V. (New York: International Publishers, 1956), pp. 60-63n.

³⁹U. S. Relations with China, p. 120; Summary of Conversations between Representatives of the National Government and of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 577-81.

sincere effort to meet Chiang's terms.⁴⁰ If Chiang had any intention of peaceful settlement there was ample basis in August 1945.

Without any requirements being imposed on Chiang the United States as well as Russia dedicated their might to the maintenance of Chiang Kai-shek in power in China. Chiang had no incentive whatsoever to agree to any consideration of Mao's demands. Chiang made no concessions. There was no discernable reason why he should have done so as long as America backed him up without qualification.

Hurley, the one American of import who had dealt with Mao, chose the time of this second meeting with Mao to return to the United States. The reason for this approach to the Mao-Chiang negotiations remained obscure for some time. But the attempt by the British to restore their empire in the Far East alerted Hurley to changes in United States policy since Roosevelt's death. Hurley's departure during the Mao-Chiang negotiations may be explained by his concern for what he considered a violation of Roosevelt's policy of resistance to colonial imperialism by Britain, France and the Netherlands. On September 11 Hurley wrote to Secretary of State James Byrnes:

Perhaps the Government has decided not to continue what President Roosevelt outlined as the long range policy of the United States in regard to China. Whether this is true or not there seems a definite

⁴⁰Memorandum to Hurley by Chou En-lai, September 16, 1945, Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, pp. 407-08.

trend in American policy toward the support of imperialism rather than democracy in Asia. I would like to have an opportunity to discuss the American Asiatic policy with you, Sir and the President.⁴¹

On September 16, 1945, the British, on their own initiative took over Hong Kong.⁴² This move caused Hurley to return to Washington for a clarification of United States policy.

Mao proved stubborn and refused abject surrender to Chiang. Chiang was not at a loss to explain the reason for the Communist resistance to his arbitrary demands. Before Hurley left, the Generalissimo gave him an Aide-memoire dated September 19, which stated:

Recent reports appearing in the press indicate that the United States Government is establishing a political Advisory Board for General MacArthur to assist in determining United States policy in the Far East. Mr. George Atcheson and Mr. John Service among others are included in the advisory group. Mr. Atcheson and Mr. Service are generally accepted in China as men of strong convictions that a coalition between the Communist and Kuomintang parties should be arbitrarily imposed. They both have expressed views that are definitely unfriendly to the Central Government of China and clearly reveal their support of policies of the Communist party . . . The Communists are now placing great stress on this fact. They know that Mr. Atcheson and Mr. Service are sympathetic, and they interpret the above-referred to appointments as indicative of the change in United States policy.⁴³

The appointment of two minor functionaries to a military

⁴¹Hurley to Byrnes, September 11, 1945, Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 416.

⁴²Truman, Years of Decision, p. 450.

⁴³Aide-memoire from Chiang to Hurley, September 19, 1945. Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 421.

staff in Japan jeopardized United States policy in China according to Chiang Kai-shek. Hurley later took this cue from Chiang, but the British occupation of Hong Kong was the dominant reason for his departure from China.⁴⁴

Prior to his departure from Chungking, Hurley reported negotiations between the two leading parties of China to be progressing, and the discussion and rumors of civil war receding as the conference continued.⁴⁵ Hurley delayed departure until September 22, upon the earnest request of both the Chinese Communist representatives and the Chinese Government negotiators "to render assistance in reaching agreement."⁴⁶ Hurley's influence in China ceased September 22, 1945. His influence on American policy, however, did not end with his departure from China.

⁴⁴Truman, Years of Decision, pp. 446-50.

⁴⁵U. S. Relations with China, pp. 105-07.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 107.

CHAPTER V

THE AFTERMATH

After Hurley departed China, Mao Tse-tung remained in Chungking expressing agreement to over-all nationalization of armed forces provided that there was some democratization of the state. The Communists controlled most of the North China countryside and had a strong head start over the Nationalists in the race for occupation of Manchuria. The United States quickly airlifted three Nationalist armies to key positions in north and east China and then provided ships for the northward movement by sea of large numbers of Nationalist troops.¹ The Americans held political authority in trust for the Chungking Government. The United States maintained that it was "non-involved" in Chinese domestic affairs. In practice, aid given to one side in a two-sided fight resulted automatically in involvement. Chiang recognized this as did Mao Tse-tung. Chiang, of course, depended on this condition continuing unabated.

The Soviet Army in Manchuria proved unwilling to wait for the arrival of Nationalist military units to transfer authority solely to Chungking's representatives. November

¹Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports, p. 366.

15, three months after the Japanese capitulation, was the original date for a Soviet withdrawal. The Nationalists asked the Soviets to delay withdrawal.² The Nationalists were completely unprepared to occupy Manchuria against Communist opposition. Wedemeyer recommended to Chiang that, prior to an advance into Manchuria, the areas south of the Great Wall should be consolidated and communications lines in those areas secured. Wedemeyer concluded his report to Washington with the following assessment:

The Generalissimo will be unable to stabilize the situation in north China for months or perhaps even years unless a satisfactory settlement with the Chinese Communists is achieved . . . He will be unable to occupy Manchuria for many years unless satisfactory agreements are reached . . .³

Chiang paid little attention to such advice.

When Chiang launched a general attack against the Communists on November 15, 1945, the last Communist negotiator, Chou En-lai, departed Chungking for the Communist stronghold in Yen-an. The Communists considered further negotiations to be pointless.⁴

On November 26 Hurley submitted his resignation.⁵ Though his real purpose may never be known, his resignation was not unrelated to the rapidly deteriorating situation in China. His thesis had been proven invalid on two counts.

²Clubb, 20th Century China, p. 262.

³U. S. Relations with China, pp. 131-32.

⁴Ibid., p. 111.

⁵Ibid., pp. 112, 581-84.

Mao had not capitulated and Chiang had not proven very statesmanlike. Chiang renewed the anti-Mao crusade which had been interrupted by the Japanese in 1937. In his previous efforts Chiang enjoyed Russian and German support, but in 1945 he had the support of the United States.

Another reason for Hurley's dramatic resignation could have been Hurley's decision to return to politics as usual. Service in a Democratic administration with the war over would have had little appeal to Hurley. Hurley alternately threatened and offered to resign. The day before he announced his resignation, Hurley agreed to return to his post. The Secretary of State, James Byrnes, thought Hurley would return to China.⁶ The fact that he did not return to China, but instead, released the news of his decision to the Press along with a blast at the State Department and the Foreign Service was strongly indicative of outside pressure. He revealed the nature of this pressure in 1951:

About that time someone called my attention to the Daily Worker and the Chicago Sun and to certain speeches made by a man who was supposed to be a Communist member of Congress named Delaney, [sic] all of which indicated to me that my secret reports to the State Department were made available to the Communists . . . And then Wang Shih-chieh, the Minister of Foreign Relations, had told me that my good friend, Jim Byrnes, had said to him that the war was over and they were going to give my place to a deserving Democrat . . . Well about that time a Dr. Quo, who was

⁶U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Investigation of Far Eastern Policy, Hearings, Before the Committee on Foreign Relations. 79th Cong., 1st sess., (December 1945), (Printers Copy), pp. 206-07. (Hereinafter referred to as Hearings: Investigation of Far Eastern Policy.)

at the United Nations, came down to warn me again that if I would go to China, the idea was to get me over there and find some pretext for public discharge . . . Since the Amerasia case, I have been convinced that the information was being . . . stolen or taken from the State Department . . . So that is where information was coming from that in my mind I was charging to others.⁷

Persons concerned about United States attitudes vis-a-vis Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang, including Chinese representatives, contacted Hurley. They apparently did not wish him to return to China.

Reflection on this incident and the events which resulted from it suggested the conclusion that Hurley was partly motivated by reluctance to accept the responsibility for the failure of his own policy. The desire to turn that failure to the advantage of his party may also have played at least some part in his decision. Hurley spent time in New Mexico after his return from China and press reports suggested he was to be a Republican candidate for the United States Senate.⁸ The strong Republican tide in 1946 failed to carry him to victory over the Democrat incumbent. Two years later he tried again and was soundly defeated by Clinton P. Anderson, Secretary of Agriculture for Truman.

The State Department recommended to the War Department on December 9, a policy requiring "tact and discretion,

⁷Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East, p. 2937. All evidence indicated that Hurley's resignation was written before Congressman Hugh Delacy's speech was delivered. Congressional Record, November 26, 1945, p. 10950.

⁸James F. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1958), pp. 328-29.

patience and restraint." The policy involved United States influence and the "capacity to exercise that influence in the light of shifting conditions in such a way as to encourage concessions by the Central Government, by the so-called Communists, and by the other factions." The State Department recommended that Wedemeyer "put into effect the arrangements to assist the Chinese National Government in transporting Chinese troops to Manchurian ports, including the logistical support of such troops."⁹ Supposedly, the proposal to move Chiang's troops was conditional.¹⁰ Actually, the United States imposed no conditions on the aid.

A statement by President Truman on December 15, revealed the implicit contradictions in policy. Truman declared:

United States support will not extend to United States military intervention to influence the course of any Chinese internal strife . . . The United States is cognizant that the present National Government of China is a "one-party government" . . . Peace . . . will be furthered if the basis of this Government is broadened to include other political elements in the country . . . The existence of autonomous armies such as that of the Communist army is inconsistent with, and actually makes impossible, political unity in China . . . and detailed steps necessary to the achievement of political unity in China must be worked out by the Chinese themselves and that intervention by any foreign

⁹Memorandum by Byrnes for the War Department, December 9, 1945. U. S. Relations with China, p. 606.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 607.

government in these matters would be inappropriate.¹¹ Any United States intervention on behalf of one party would certainly "influence the course of any internal Chinese strife." The National Government was the only government the United States would recognize. The State Department's request for a quid-pro-quo from Chiang for American assistance did not materialize. Only once, in 1946, did Marshall suspend aid because Chiang continued his arbitrary attempts to solve China's problems militarily.¹² Truman supported Chiang in his efforts, yet maintained that there was no intervention.

Hurley testified December 5, 1945, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. For four days Hurley rationalized his errors:

In the defeat of a policy approved by President Roosevelt and approved by Secretary Stettinius, I believe that Mr. Dean Acheson, who is now the Under Secretary, took the leading part. I do not know how many career men, if any, assisted him in his defeat of that policy, but I do know the policy was defeated.¹³

Others named by Hurley included George Acheson, John Service and John Davies. Two of these men, Service and Acheson, Chiang named in his Aide Memoire of September 19, 1945. Hurley continued virtually irrational:

¹¹Statement by President Truman on United States Policy toward China, December 15, 1945, U. S. Relations with China, pp. 608-09.

¹²Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, p. 278; Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-1949, p. 338.

¹³Hearings: Investigation of Far Eastern Policy, p. 150.

That these men disagreed with the American policy is correct, but my contention with them and understand--I assembled them and talked to them and stated the policy. I have asked for the record of my statement of policy, early, after the President appointed me Ambassador, and inasmuch as we were in an active war theater--it was my contention that when the "die is cast," when the decision is made, when the policy is announced by duly constituted authority, it becomes the duty of every one of us to make that policy effective; and I charge that these gentlemen did not do that. They continued to snipe the policy and defeat it.¹⁴

Hurley's policies had such dynamic qualities that it became difficult to determine exactly when the die was cast.

Exactly which of Hurley's policies these accused gentlemen defeated remained necessarily obscure. Hurley continued:

They were disloyal to the American policy. I would not say they were disloyal to the United States Government, they believed that it would be best for China to destroy the National Government and the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, but I tried to tell them that I could not argue, while I could recommend to Chiang Kai-shek and the Government the changes that I thought should take place--which I did, and a lot of changes did take place--that while I might agree with them on a lot of their criticism, our directive, mine and theirs, was to prevent the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek, and whether I believe in it or not, as soon as the policy was made by my superior it became my duty to make it effective . . . ¹⁵

Hurley forgot to add that all these gentlemen had been relieved by him prior to his return in April 1945. He also forgot to mention that their policy was never followed, primarily because of Hurley. Hurley claimed that Service and Davies were brought back to Washington and placed in

¹⁴Ibid., p. 159.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 162.

positions where they became his supervisors.¹⁶ Hurley, better than anyone else, knew that this claim was ridiculous. Hurley acknowledged no superiors except the President. Hurley never acknowledged supervision. Still more important, the people Hurley referred to never influenced policy. If they had influenced policy, Chiang would have been forced to do something. After Hurley's arrival in China, Chiang made no effort to change. Prior to Roosevelt's death the State Department remained in the dark about policy. After Roosevelt's death, only Hurley made and directed China policy.¹⁷

In his letter of resignation and his testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in December 1945, Hurley provided unsubstantiated material for later exploitation by the China Lobby.¹⁸ The resignation of Hurley was used to discredit the policy of America in China and to encourage support for Chiang. There began a series of attacks on the State Department which made Hurley's resignation the point of departure and clearly reflected Chinese influence.¹⁹ The China Lobby began a seditious

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷One argument used to discredit the Yalta Agreement alluded to Roosevelt's deteriorated physical condition. If Roosevelt was weak at Yalta in early February, 1945, how much more weak he must have been nearly two months later during the Hurley interviews, only days before his death.

¹⁸Hurley to Truman, November 26, 1945, U. S. Relations with China, pp. 581-84.

¹⁹Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1960), pp. 186, 302. A

campaign. The campaign predicated loyalty to Chiang as a proper test of loyalty to the United States. The fact that Hurley had tried to effect coalition government between the Communists and the Nationalists caused the lobby concern. No other government official ever went quite so far to disclaim publicly any connection between the Chinese Communists and Moscow.²⁰ His self-assigned mission after Stilwell's recall was coalition government, albeit, based on Communist capitulation.²¹ His criticism of American officials, especially Service, appeared over and over blatantly misrepresented.

Hurley's charges later formed the basis for McCarthy-

Congressman, Dondero, delivered a long speech on the floor of the House of Representatives December 10, 1945. The speech took Hurley's attacks on the State Department and combined with articles published in the Washington Times-Herald and the San Francisco Examiner, claimed that the State Department sabotaged policy in the Far East. There were no specifics. Bishop Paul Yupin contributed the articles to the newspapers. Yupin served as "unofficial adviser" to the Chinese delegation at the San Francisco Conference on the United Nations. Hearings: State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, pp. 2024-26, 2277. Yupin was known in the State Department as one who was very impressed with China's Gestapo Chief, Tai-Li. Whether or not the Church's general antipathy to "Communists" encouraged Tai Li is not clear. Memorandum Augustus S. Chase, April 26, 1944, N. A. file 893.00/97. The Bishop in China was local leader of the Tu Tao Tuan, Tai Li's fascist Youth Organization. The debate in Congress subsided when it appeared that Chiang would win. With the exception of the Senator from Nebraska, Kenneth S. Wherry, Republicans acquiesced with Administration policy in China until 1948. In 1948 Truman administered defeat on the Republicans, and the issue was revived.

²⁰Hearings: Investigation of Far Eastern Policy, pp. 26-35, 131.

²¹Ibid., p. 40K.

ism. The technique used by Hurley in the 1945 Hearings served as a forerunner of McCarthy's technique. Unfounded charges, no specifics, complete disregard for chronological outline, evasive answers to questions, and the arbitrary naming of names. Actually, McCarthy accused many of the people Hurley had accused in his unsubstantiated testimony in December 1945. The obvious tragedy for an individual such as Hurley to accept Chiang's line would not prove catastrophic. The real tragedy materialized in the context of the 1949-51 era.²²

The hyperbole reached new heights in the late 1940's. In July, 1948 the House Committee on Un-American Activities began a series of hearings in which a number of ex-Communists gave testimony concerning Communist "espionage activities" in the United States prior to and during World War II. Two factors relating to the allegations that Communists had infiltrated the United States government were important to the campaign to convince Americans that China was lost by the forces of Chiang Kai-shek because of American traitors. First, was the fact that the charges once made could not be disproved. Second, was the fact that the number of individuals who could ultimately be included was virtually limitless. As a consequence of the first factor, writers for the China Lobby consistently

²²By 1949 almost all of Hurley's unsubstantiated charges and assumptions enjoyed a wide acceptance. All of these charges were repeated by Senator John F. Kennedy, Congressional Record, January 30, 1949, p. A993.

succeeded in identifying Secretary of State Acheson as the Number-One target. Hurley's 1945 testimony was a regular source for the accusations.²³

Immediately after the 1948 election, frustrated Republicans began to zero-in on China policy. By the end of 1949, the China bloc in Congress, hardly very numerous before 1949, succeeded not only in making hostility to China policy a party matter but also employed the technique of associating a particular official who had been named by a Catholic ex-Communist with responsibility for American policy in China. The allegation was then followed by the statement that the official had been named as a Communist or tool of the Communists.²⁴

McCarthy's charges were a "fraud and a hoax perpetrated on the Senate of the United States and the American people."²⁵ The same verdict applied to Hurley's charges in 1945.

The only failure acknowledged by Hurley was a failure to achieve unity in China and this failure he rationalized by blaming the Chinese Communists for not acceding to Chiang's demands. Further, the Chinese Communists did not capitulate because they deduced from the Acheson and

²³Hearings: Investigation of Far Eastern Policy, p. 150.

²⁴Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, p. 90.

²⁵Hearings: State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation Report, p. 167.

Service appointments to MacArthur's Staff that Hurley did not correctly reflect United States policy.²⁶ Convinced of the noxious and intrinsic peril that the Chinese Communist Party posed for the future of Western civilization and the interests of American democracy, Hurley believed Chiang's wildest claims.²⁷ Hurley rationalized support for Chiang because he deduced that Mao was weak.²⁸ Just before the war ended Hurley expressed himself in explicit terms:

The strength of the armed forces of Chinese Communists has been exaggerated. The area of territory controlled by the Communists has been exaggerated. The number of Chinese people who adhere to the Chinese Communist Party has been exaggerated. State Department Officials, Army Officials, newspaper and radio publicity have in a large measure accepted the Communist leader's statements in regard to the military and political strength of the Communist Party in China. Nevertheless, with the support of the Soviet the Chinese Communists could bring about civil war in China. Without the support of the Soviet the Chinese Communists Party will eventually participate as a political party in the National Government.²⁹

Hurley never asserted that the Soviet Union assisted the Chinese Communists. Such an assertion developed later. Such an assertion failed to account for the Soviet dismantling of Manchurian industry in 1946 or the Korean War. Both of these events disadvantaged the Chinese Communists.

Unwilling to believe that United States desires could not shape the postwar world, and unprepared for Mao's

²⁶Hearings: Investigation of Far Eastern Policy, p. 59.

²⁷The Ambassador in China to Stettinius, December 4, 1944, N. A. File 89300/12444.

²⁸U. S. Relations with China, pp. 99-100.

²⁹Ibid.

triumph in China, most Americans became easy victims of simple explanations. They were ready to believe the hysterical charges of treason and subversion, that the Democrats had "sold out" Chiang and that Communists in the State Department had engineered the take-over. In order to attack the Democrats, the roles of Gauss, Hurley, Stettinius and Stimson, all Republicans, had to be ignored. The Republicans attacked China policy to demonstrate "democratic incompetence." The Republicans felt free to attack "because there never [had] been bipartisan cooperation in this area."³⁰ This ironic approach omitted all reference to any Republicans. Neither the purge by Hurley nor Hurley's role in China received examination by John F. Dulles, Republican liason officer with Truman and Eisenhower's Secretary of State. Dulles revealed a greater irony in 1950 when he said:

The greatest failure of Soviet Communism has been in Yugoslavia, itself a Communist-dominated country. Non-Communists have had little or nothing to do with this. It resulted from a defect that is inherent in the present Stalin brand of Communism. Marshal Tito is a Communist. But his Communism differs from Stalin's. It is a brand that Stalin and the leaders of the Soviet Communist party consider to be rank heresy.³¹

The people Hurley condemned consistently used Tito as an

³⁰ John Foster Dulles, War or Peace. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 179.

³¹ Ibid., p. 153. All the individuals fired by Hurley referred pointedly to Tito in Yugoslavia as an example appropriate to the situation in China.

example. Dulles soon lost this ability to distinguish between Soviet Communism and other National Communisms.

Prior to the Korean War the decision was made that vital interests of the United States were not involved in China. In 1948-49 a mass of material appeared supporting this assumption. If America could not solve Chinese problems, surely the Chinese themselves could not. The task of rehabilitating the devastated country would be tremendous. Even assuming that the Chinese Communists gave the country a relatively efficient and honest government and brought the country some stability the Chinese would still be confronted with long-range problems of immense proportions.³² On November 8, 1948, the Embassy in China reported the following assessment:

The main problem facing the new government is to do those things it ought to do in meeting the minimum requirements the government must provide for those it rules. Here we may fairly question whether the new government has this capacity, and from all indications it would appear that the answer is in the negative . . .³³

China's impoverishment meant an inability to accumulate capital needed for the immensely large initial outlay in any program of industrialization.

This view duly appeared in the national media. New

³²Tsou, America's Failure in China 1941-49, p. 394.

³³A Series of Chronicle Summaries by the American Embassy in Nanking to the Department of State during 1948 on the General Situation. November 8, 1948, U. S. Relations With China, pp. 383, 918.

York Times editor C. L. Sulzberger, reported in February, 1949:

The State Department view-which is prevailing policy-is that the U.S.S.R., even if it establishes truly cozy relations with Mr. Mao, cannot provide the necessary cadre and assistance for the Chinese to face their fundamental problems and that the Communists will wear themselves out in the slough of misery, just as did General Chiang.³⁴

George Kennan, then head of the Plans and Policies Division, told a round table conference held in October 1949, to discuss China policy:

It has been my own thought that the Russians are perhaps the people least able to combine with the Chinese in developing the resources of China and producing anything which in a physical sense would be dangerous to us . . . China is a competitor with Soviet Siberia for such things as the Soviet government may have to give--and I have heard Stalin express this same thought and I think with complete sincerity.³⁵

Apparently some sophistication remained at the policy making level until 1950.

For a few months the last part of 1949 and the first part of 1950 a defacto relationship between Communist China and the United States existed.³⁶ The State Department contemplated the loss of Formosa without concern.³⁷

³⁴New York Times, February 18, 1949, p. 8.

³⁵Hearings: Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 1558.

³⁶Harrison Forman, Blunder in Asia (New York: Didier, 1950), p. 103.

³⁷See Appendix I.

CONCLUSION

Despite Hurley some sophistication remained evident in American policy during the first half of 1950. The Korean War shocked this tentative condition. Whatever else that may be said for the war, it saved Chiang Kai-shek. President Truman, unwilling to control General MacArthur allowed him to cross the 38th parallel in an effort to reunite all of Korea by force. This refusal to settle for a status-quo-ante situation brought the Chinese Communists into the war.¹ Mao's government issued several warnings that any close approach to the Chinese border by UN troops might lead to Chinese intervention. The Chinese warnings went unheeded. The Japanese easy victories over Britain and America in 1941 had not removed the myth of Asian inferiority, but the myth exploded in the winter of 1950. On November 24, 1950, MacArthur started an offensive to end the war.² A military victory by Lin Piao's troops quickly followed. The trauma of the defeat ultimately caused Truman to exert control and relieve MacArthur.³

When Chennault failed he blamed Stilwell. When Hurley

¹Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Years of Trial and Hope, (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1956), pp. 341, 359-61.

²Ibid., p. 381.

³Ibid., pp. 366, 373-77.

failed he blamed Service and Davies. When MacArthur failed he blamed everyone but himself.⁴ In the chaos which surrounded MacArthur's relief, Hurley returned to Washington. Hurley testified in 1951 and disclosed several documents. Mainly, Hurley condemned the Yalta agreement. With Mao in charge of China and having defeated one of the two American military heroes of WW II, Hurley identified the Yalta agreement as America's great failure in the Far East.⁵ This bit of interaction with United States domestic politics was not inevitable. The China Lobby defined the Communist victory in China as a victory for Russia. The anti-Communist crusade and witchhunt produced no Communists, but Alger Hiss was convicted of perjury. Hiss was at Yalta, Hiss was in the State Department and part of the New Deal.

The United States had no political policy in China during World War II.⁶ Hurley was sent to determine whom the United States should support. At the time of his arrival the consensus of all observers in China was that Chiang was weak and getting weaker. The corollary to that deduction was that Mao was strong and getting stronger. Hurley accepted Chiang at face value and proceeded to

⁴Ibid., p. 382.

⁵Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East, p. 2887.

⁶Stilwell Papers, pp. 202-04; Hearings: Investigation of Far Eastern Policy, p. 7.

develop a United States policy to assist Chiang. He received Stalin's agreement to such a policy in the Sino-Soviet agreement which may have been superfluous:

This pact was beneficial in that it might help, make clear to skeptics in the United States that Russia's attitude was the same as the United States.⁷

To Hurley it was incomprehensible that a small weak, poor ragtag group which he observed in Yen-an could effectively compete politically with Chiang, especially if Russian assistance could be circumscribed or enlisted on the side of Chiang.⁸ Hurley claimed that the State Department sabotaged his policy. Hurley believed the Russians and British policies to be in accord with the United States policy.⁹ The only way that policy could be upset would be the arming of the Chinese Communists. Hurley rested his case on a tautology. The Communists were weak. If they could be kept weak, Chiang could win. Any arming of the Chinese Communists would defeat Hurley's policy.¹⁰ The Communists won, so someone armed the Chinese Communists.

⁷Gunther Stein, "The Other China," Foreign Affairs, October 1945, vol. 24, no. 1, p. 74.

⁸Hurley, Wedemeyer and Miles told the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1945 that, "They were all of the opinion that the rebellion in China could be put down by comparatively small assistance to Chiang's Central Government." Leahy, I Was There, p. 395.

⁹Hearings: Investigation of Far Eastern Policy, pp. 12, 26-35, 39.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 127, 164.

The Soviets were not the transgressors of this policy.¹¹ According to Hurley, a small group in the State Department who wanted to let "the government that I was sent over there to sustain fall" sabotaged his policy.¹²

Hurley's critics claimed that Chiang would definitely fall unless certain changes were made. Some thought arming the Communists would assist in the war against Japan. Some felt coalition government was the answer. Stilwell considered the former. Roosevelt wanted the latter. As long as aid was forthcoming, Chiang had no reason to seek peace or unity. Chiang knew that peace and unity would cause the Americans to restrict their assistance and possibly even withdraw. The United States never made aid conditional, although that was the stated policy after 1945.

Some reputable Americans, friendly with both Stilwell and Hurley, believed that Mao was the best bet in China. Representative Albert J. Engel reported such a conclusion in 1945.¹³ Analysis of the material available in 1945 would have revealed Mao's strength as well as his independence.¹⁴ Though Mao's strength seemed to be in his

¹¹Ibid., 16.

¹²Ibid., p. 12.

¹³Congressional Record, November 27, 1945, p. A5406.

¹⁴Testimony, "Transcript of Proceedings" Loyalty Review Board meeting in the matter of John S. Service, Hearings, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, pp. 1902-2807. Passim.

social and economic administration, his military prowess received more attention in later studies. It was Mao's military prowess that obscured his greater strength. Almost every American knew that Mao said; "Power grows out of the barrel of a gun." Mao's next sentence was less well known; "Our principle is that the party commands the gun."¹⁵ Ostensibly, Americans subscribed to a similar concept. The idea was difficult to enforce as a principle in the Far East. General MacArthur articulated the view as follows:

A theater Commander, in any campaign, is not merely limited to the handling of troops; he commands that whole area politically, economically, and militarily. You have got to trust at that stage of the game when politics fails, and the military take over, you trust the military . . . ¹⁶

MacArthur apparently considered a war an end in itself, devoid of political objectives outside the military realm. His position was not unique in America, Stilwell, to the contrary, notwithstanding.

Mao achieved his victory in China. He then challenged the United States on its own terms and achieved another victory. The United States denied Mao his legitimate place in international affairs. The policy was based upon two assumptions; the weakness of the Maoist appeal in China and Russian complicity. Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of

¹⁵Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, p. 209.

¹⁶Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East, p. 48.

State for Far Eastern Affairs could say in 1951:

We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they pretend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government—a Slavonic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese. It is not entitled to speak for China in the community of nations.¹⁷

From the same platform, John F. Dulles agreed with Mr. Rusk.¹⁸ The next week Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, testified that he concurred with Rusk's assessment and that no one in the State Department was even thinking about recognizing the Maoist regime.¹⁹ No United States official disputed this claim, though a great deal of sophistication was added.²⁰

Failure to comprehend the Chinese situation was not a unique affliction affecting only the United States. The Americans suffered much the same fate in 1945 as the Russians suffered in 1927 when the Russian agent, Borodin, put his faith in Chiang Kai-shek. A fundamental distinction between the Russians and the Americans was the Russian pragmatic approach. The Russians believed they should learn from experience and relegated their envoy to

¹⁷New York Times, May 19, 1951, p. 3. Mr. Rusk served as a Colonel on General Stilwell's Staff in the China-Burma-India Theater.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East, p. 129.

²⁰U. S., Department of State, "U. S. Policy on Non-recognition of Communist China," Department of State Publication 6705, Far Eastern Series 75, September 1958.

obscurity. The Americans, on the other hand, turned upon themselves and indulged themselves. Hurley and partisan domestic politics allowed such an indulgence. The unqualified and unchallenged power of the United States allowed such indulgence without fear of retribution.

APPENDIX I

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PUBLIC AFFAIRS AREA--POLICY ADVISORY STAFF
(SPECIAL GUIDANCE NO. 28, DECEMBER 23, 1949)
Policy Information Paper--Formosa*

I. Problem

To formulate information policy which will minimize damage to United States prestige and others' morale by the possible fall of Formosa to the Chinese Communist forces.

II. Background

A. Comment on Formosa is on the increase as the Communist advances on the Chinese mainland leave the island as the last substantial part of China under Nationalist control. Attention is focused by three principal elements:

1. Communists, world-wide, who charge the United States with conspiring to build the island into a fortress to be taken over by the United States (if it does not already control it), thereby trying to brand the United States with the mark of aggressive imperialism, and also hoping to get us involved in a risky and unpromising venture;
2. Pro-Nationalists (principally in the United States) who consider Formosa a redoubt in which the Government could survive, and who tend to create an impression the United States is delinquent if it fails to "save Formosa;"

3. Groups in the United States who are inclined to be critical of the United States for failure to act to prevent loss of the island to the Communists, largely because of mistaken popular conception of its strategic importance to United States defense in the Pacific.

B. Loss of the island is widely anticipated, and the matter ~~is~~ in which civil and military conditions there have deteriorated under the Nationalists adds weight to the expectation. Its fall would threaten:

1. Loss of United States prestige at home and abroad to the extent we have become committed in the public mind to hold it;
2. Damage to the morale of other nations,

*This document was declassified and reprinted--over the strenuous objections of Secretary of State Acheson.
Hearings: Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 1667-69.

particularly in the Far East, which are disturbed by the Communist gains and fear its possible further advances.

C. Formosa, politically, geographically, and strategically, is part of China in no way especially distinguished or important. Although ruled by the Japanese (as "Taiwan") for 50 years, historically it has been Chinese. Politically and militarily it is a strictly Chinese responsibility.

It is true that the technical status of the island remains to be determined by the Japanese peace settlement, but the Cairo agreement and Potsdam declaration and the surrender terms of September 2, 1945, looked to its return to China and the United States facilitated its take over by Chinese troops shortly after VJ-day.

Even the small United States military advisory group sent there at Chinese Government request was completely withdrawn a year ago. Merely a handful of military attaché personnel with diplomatic status remains. The United States never has had military bases there, and never has sought any special concessions there.

ECA work done on the island, particularly through the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, has been of purely economic and technical nature for assistance in improvement of conditions, and no quid pro quo had been sought.

D. United States public opinion has concerned itself primarily with the question of the islands' strategic importance; there has been insistent demand from a few sources for military action by the United States, but it has not assumed significant proportions. Rather public opinion obviously is divided and uncertain, and there is no apparent consensus for a particular course of active intervention.

III. Treatment

A. If rising public interest warrants it, gradually increasing attention may be paid Formosa, to establish, publicly, the facts indicated below. Overseas use should be made of unofficial materials in public analysis and comment appearing both at home and abroad, as well as official statements as they may appear. Label conflicting public statements properly as "individual expressions of opinion," as "unofficial," etc.

B. All material should be used best to counter the false impressions that:

1. Formosa's retention would save the Chinese Government;
2. The United States has a special interest in or "designs on" the island or any military bases on Formosa;
3. Its loss would seriously damage the interests of either the United States or of other countries opposing communism;

4. The United States is responsible for or committed in any way to act to save Formosa.

C. Without evidencing undue preoccupation with the subject, emphasize as appropriate any of the following main points:

1. Formosa is exclusively the responsibility of the Chinese Government:

(a) Historically and geographically a part of China;

(b) The national government has run the island's affairs since the take-over and is responsible for present conditions there;

(c) The United States has assumed no responsibilities or obligations, actual or moral.

2. Formosa has no special military significance:

(a) It is only approximately 100 miles off the China coast;

(b) Other potential objects of Communist aggression are closer to points on the Chinese mainland than to Formosa;

(c) China has never been a sea power and the island is of no special strategic advantage to the Chinese Communist armed forces.

3. Economic assistance in Formosa has been for economic and social purposes, has been consistent with demonstrated United States concern for the welfare of the Chinese generally, and has involved no thought of special concessions for the United States.

4. In areas of insistent demand for United States action, particularly in the United States itself, we should occasionally make clear that seeking United States bases on Formosa, sending in troops, supplying arms, dispatching naval units, or taking any similar action would:

(a) Accomplish no material good for China or its Nationalist regime;

(b) Involve the United States in a long-term venture producing at best a new area of bristling stalemate, and at worst possible involvement in open warfare;

(c) Subject the United States to a violent propaganda barrage and to reaction against our "militarism, imperialism, and interference" even from friendly peoples, and particularly from Chinese, who would be turned against us anew;

(d) Eminently suit purposes of the U.S.S.R., which would like to see us "substantiate" its propaganda, dissipate our energies and weaken effectiveness of our policies generally by such action.

5. In reflecting United States unofficial demands for action of various kinds in Formosa, avoid giving them prominence unwarranted by their limited (usually individual)

source, and make clear that the total of such demands does not add up to a consensus on any particular position different from that officially taken.

D. Avoid:

1. Speculation which would show undue concern, with whether Nationalists can hold the island or when Communists may take it;

2. References which would indicate important strategic significance, or that the island is a political entity;

3. In output to China, any emphasis on bad conditions in Formosa under the Nationalists, although to other areas reference can be made among reasons why Nationalists are vulnerable there as elsewhere;

4. Statements that Formosa's final status still is to be determined by the Japanese peace treaty;

5. Name "Taiwan"; use "Formosa."

A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

- U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Investigation for Far Eastern Policy. Hearings before the committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 79th Cong., 1st sess., December 1945, (Printers Copy). National Archives.
- U.S. Department of State. 893.00 unpublished file. 1944. National Archives, Washington, D. C.: (Unpublished).
- U.S. Department of Defense. The entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan. Military Plans. 1941-45. Washington, September 1955. (Mimeographed). The Library of Congress.

B. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

- U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 81st Cong., 2nd sess. on S.R. 231, 1950.
- _____. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. The Institute of Pacific Relations. Hearings before the Subcommittee to investigate the administration of the internal security act and other internal security laws, Senate, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1951-53.
- _____. Senate. Joint Committee of Armed Services and Foreign Relations. Military Situation in the Far East. Hearings before a Joint Committee of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Senate, 82nd. Cong., 1st sess., 1951.
- _____. Senate. Report of State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee pursuant to S. Res. 231, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950.
- U.S. Department of State. United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-49. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1949.

- _____. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1943, China. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963.
- _____. Department of State. Department of State Publications 6705. "U.S. Policy on Non-recognition of Communist China," Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958 .
- _____. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1944, China. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967.
- U.S. Congressional Record, January 30, 1949; November 26, 1945; November 27, 1945.

C. BOOKS AND PERIODICALS

- Alperovitz, Gar. Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965.
- Blum, John M. From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of War 1941-45. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967.
- Byrnes, James F. All in One Lifetime. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958.
- Ch'en, Jerome. Mao and the Chinese Revolution. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Chennault, Claire L. Way of a Fighter. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1949.
- Clubb, O. Edmund. 20th Century China. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964
- Dulles, John F. War or Peace. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1950.
- Feis, Herbert. The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953.
- Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. 2 vols. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948.
- Forman, Harrison. Blunder in Asia. New York: Didier Publishers, 1950.
- Koen, Ross Y. The China Lobby in American Politics. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1960.

Leahy, William D. I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1950.

Lohbeck, Don. Patrick J. Hurley. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1956.

Matloff, Maurice. United States Army in World War II the War Department: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-1944. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959.

Miles, Milton E. A Different Kind of War: The little-known story of the combined guerrilla forces created in China by the U. S. Navy and the Chinese during World War II. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1967.

Pogue, Forrest C. George C. Marshall: Ordeal & Hope 1939-1942. New York: The Viking Press, 1965.

Romanus, Charles F. and Sunderland, Riley. United States Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell's Mission to China. Washington: Department of the Army, 1953.

_____. Stilwell's Command Problems. Washington: Department of the Army, 1956.

_____. Time Runs Out in CBI. Washington: Department of the Army, 1959.

Roosevelt, Elliott. As He Saw It. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946.

_____. Ed. F.D.R. His Personal Letters 1928-1945. Vol. II. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950.

Rothe, Anna, ed. Current Biography, Who's News and Why. 1944. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1945.

Schram, Stuart R. The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1963.

_____. Mao Tse-tung. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966.

Schwartz, Benjamin I. Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961.

- Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948.
- Stein, Gunther. "The Other China," Foreign Affairs. XXIV. (October 1945).
- Stewart, Maxwell S. "The Myth of Patrick J. Hurley," The Nation. CLXI. (November 10, 1945).
- Stimson, Henry L. and Bundy, McGeorge. On Active Service in Peace and War. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947.
- Truman, Harry S. Memoirs. 2 Vols. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1956.
- Tse-Tung, Mao. Selected Works. 5 Vols. New York: International Publishers, 1956.
- Tsou, Tang. America's Failure in China 1941-50. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.
- Wedemeyer, Albert C. General. Wedemeyer Reports! New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958.
- Werth, Alexander. Russia at War 1941-1945. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1964.
- White, Theodore H. Ed. The Stilwell Papers. New York: MacFadden-Bartell Corporation, 1964.
- Young, Arthur N. China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 1937-1945. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.

D. NEWSPAPERS

New York Times, October 31, 1944; February 18, 1949; May 19, 1951.

This thesis was prepared by Bruce W. Platz under the direction of the chairman of the candidate's supervisory committee, and has been approved by all members of that committee. It was submitted to the Dean of the School of Arts and Letters and to the Graduate Council, and has been approved as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Date August 1, 1969

Dean, School of Arts and Letters

Chairman, Graduate Council

Supervisory Committee

Chairman Thomas T. Hamilton

William J. Schellings

Heinz K. Meier