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Containment, Cliency and the Revolution in Vietnam

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CONTAINMENT, CLIENCY AND THE REVOLUTION IN VIETNAM

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ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses the question, why does U.S. foreign policy contribute to political instability in developing nations? To ascertain the answer, it analyzes the post-World War II administrations from Truman through Johnson. One mode of containment, cliency, a foreign policy relationship between a major power and a weaker state, is developed within the framework analyzing containment. The cliency model provides a theoretical basis for explaining how the domestic structure of the client state is systematically distorted by the patron's actions in pursuit of its global interests. The cliency model is also linked to the pattern of development and stability of a state, with state-society relations, highly vulnerable to the effects of applying the instruments of cliency within the client state, having a key role in state stability. This framework is then applied in a case study of Vietnam which analyzes the implementation of U.S. foreign policy through containment and cliency and how this affected state-society relations in Vietnam. The results of the case study reveal that U.S. foreign policy significantly contributed to political instability in the developing state of Vietnam.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

One of the primary objectives of United States foreign policy since 1947 has been the prevention of global communist expansion. Communist expansion was seen by national security managers and President Harry Truman's Administration as a direct threat to the security of the United States. No longer were United States security interests limited to the confines of its borders and trustee territories. The Truman Administration was concerned over what it perceived was an increase in communist expansion in the world. This administration witnessed the rise of communist movements in Eastern Europe supported by the Soviet Union, a communist backed insurgence in Greece in 1947, the "loss of China" to communism in 1949, the invasion of South Korea by North Korean forces supported by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and the rise of domestic insurgency in Vietnam against the French to name only a few incidents. To stem what the Truman Administration

perceived was a rising tide of communist expansionism, the administration adopted the policy of containment. At first formulated to deter Soviet expansion in Europe, the Truman Administration found quick application for containment in Korea and Southeast Asia.

The policy of containment became the prescription against communist expansionism and justification for a policy of intervention in other nations' domestic affairs. With the fall of the Nationalist government in China to the communists in 1949, Vietnam became the watershed for containment in Southeast Asia. Each successive administration became more involved in South Vietnam. President Dwight Eisenhower sent military and economic assistance and advisors to South Vietnam to bolster the government. President John F. Kennedy increased United States presence in South Vietnam through the counterinsurgency program requiring an increase in advisors, troops, and military and economic assistance. President Lyndon Johnson continued the escalation of United States involvement by committing U.S. troops, increasing military aid, and bombing North Vietnam. All of these presidents increased the involvement of the United States in South Vietnam to deter communist expansion with little appreciation for the national liberation movement that had support among the Vietnamese people.

As a part of containment, cliency was utilized by presidential administrations from Truman to the present. The purpose of the establishment of client states in various regions of the world was to facilitate containment of communist expansion. The policy of containment presented the use of military and economic measures to restrain what was perceived as communist movements throughout the world. Containment justified the large amounts of military and economic aid given to client states to combat communist insurgency. However, the United States chose the tone for the patron-client relationship with South Vietnam when the presidential administrations decided to stabilize the client government through a heavy reliance on military measures.

South Vietnam, as a client state of the United States, utilized large sums of U.S. military and economic assistance to contain insurgent movements in that nation. A prerequisite to receiving aid from the United States was that the client government be supportive of the anti-communist policy of the United States. The regimes of Ngo Dinh Diem, Nguyen Khanh, and Nguyen Cao Ky in South Vietnam from 1954-1965 were anti-communist and received substantial U.S. assistance as part of the policy of containment. As a result, the client state of South Vietnam had a major role in helping the United States develop and implement containment in Southeast Asia.

A framework of containment will be developed in Chapter Two and added to a cliency model developed by Mark Gasiorowski. Together this framework will help to demonstrate that a patron-client relationship can lead to political instability and revolution in a client state. These relationships lead to political instability in client states when patron interventions in the client, through the implementation of various instruments of containment and cliency, support repressive authoritarian governments. Patron intervention in this way can influence the development of revolution in a client state through a gradual evolution of state autonomy. The development of state autonomy in the client state by the patron often requires measures which enhance the repressive mechanisms of the client state, such as the military and the police, to maintain a stable client government. The strengthening of the repressive elements over the civilian structures in government and society in the client state encourages the advancement of political instability.

Chapter Three provides the theoretical base for understanding the state and social groups that comprise and help develop a state. There will be a discussion of the internal and external factors that affect state making and their influence upon state longevity and political stability. This chapter addresses the elements of state

making which were the cause of political instability in many nations including South Vietnam.

Chapter Four contains the case study which addresses the application of containment and cliency in South Vietnam under President Diem and subsequent military regimes. The application of containment and cliency in South Vietnam created a condition of political instability which contributed to the course of the revolution which ended in 1975. To illustrate this point, the case study will focus primarily upon the implementation of containment and cliency in South Vietnam from 1954-1965, and the affect this had on the state, ruling elites, domestic social groups, and the political stability of the state.

CHAPTER 2

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: CONTAINMENT AND THE ROLE OF CLIENCY

At the close of World War II, there were two major vacuums of power in the world. One was in Europe; the other in the Pacific Island and Asian territories previously occupied by Japan. The countries of Europe, Japan, China, Indonesia, Indochina, and the Philippines experienced considerable wartime devastation to their economic, political and military institutions. If these nations were to recover they would require foreign assistance. The only two nations capable and willing to fill the vacuums were the United States and the Soviet Union. The rush to fill the vacuums of power in Europe and the Pacific directly influenced the course and objectives of post war United States foreign policy.

The primary objective of United States foreign policy since 1945 has been to expand United States influence to ensure that national security needs were met.

Security needs were defined as the requirements necessary to maintain a safe defensive and prosperous economic environment for the people and government of the United States. The United States government at the time believed that it would not be safe unless the world was open to freedom of economic choice and freely elected governments. The government at that time under President Truman also believed that, not only the security of the United States, but that of the world was endangered by the Soviet-communist ideology. Therefore, ideologies and systems not compatible with the United States democratic and capitalist system, namely, the communist system, were viewed by the government as threats to United States security.

The course of United States foreign policy since World War II has been dominated by containment. The formulation of the idea of containment was credited to George Kennan and suited the aspirations and concerns of the Truman Administration. Containment was created to counter Soviet expansionist behavior, (in Iran, and Eastern Europe) communist ideology, and the threat it posed to the Western world. Kennan, as Charge' at the Moscow Embassy, expressed his concern about Soviet expansion, and the Soviet behavior and ideology which prompted it, in a telegraphic message from Moscow on February 22, 1946. In this telegram he wrote about the

Soviet policy to strengthen the "military-industrialization" of the state, and the plan to "advance official limits of Soviet power" vis-a-vis Iran, Turkey or Bornholm" or "other points." In regard to colonial areas, or "backward or dependent peoples," Soviet policy worked toward the "weakening of power and influence and contacts of advanced Western nations" in order to create a "vacuum which will favor communist-Soviet penetration." Kennan also stated that Soviet policy required that if "individual governments stand in the path of Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office," and that in foreign countries the Communists will work to destroy "personal independence, economic, political, or moral" and to set major "Western powers against each other. . . ." In general, he stated, "all Soviet efforts on unofficial international plane will be negative and destructive in character . . . there can be no compromise with rival power. . . ."[1] A year later, as the head of President Harry Truman's Policy Planning Staff, Kennan wrote the article "Sources of Soviet Conduct" in which he outlined the elements which should be part of United States foreign policy regarding the Soviet Union. He wrote, "In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the

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[1] George Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 552-556.

Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies" and that "Soviet pressure against free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points. . .which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence."[2] He referred to Soviet internal deficiencies which could weaken the Soviet Union and said that this might "warrant the United States entering. . .upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world" [in addition] Kennan also believed it possible to influence Soviet "internal developments" through U.S. actions."[3] Kennan believed that it was "Russian political power" that was more of a threat to United States security needs rather than military power.[4] He pointed out in the Long Telegram

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[2] Mr. X, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947): 575-576. See also, "Charge' in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State," Foreign Relations of the United States Eastern Europe: The Soviet Union, Vol. VI, 1946 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 707.

[3] Ibid., 581.

[4]John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 40. Cited from "Comments on the General Trend of United

from Moscow that the political power of the Soviets could be countered through psychological means such as better education of Americans regarding the nature of the Soviet system, building a healthy American society and maintain American methods and concepts regarding a human society.[5] He believed that the primary instrument to strengthen a weakened Europe was to reconstruct or modernize their economies. For Kennan, "the most effective contribution the United States could make toward stabilization. . .lay in the area of technology, not military manpower."[6]

With these ideas in mind the concept of containment was eventually incorporated into United States foreign policy-making reports of the National Security Council. National Security Council documents from 1947-1949 included many of Kennan's ideas on containment and also those of the Truman Administration which believed the

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States Foreign Policy," August 20, 1948, Kennan Papers Box 23.

[5] "Excerpts from Telegraphic Message from Moscow of February 22, 1946," cited in, George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), 558-559.

[6] Comments from Richard M. Leighton, "The American Arsenal Policy in World War II," 221-52, in Daniel R. Beaver, ed., Some Pathways in Twentieth Century History (Detroit: 1969). Cited from Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 40.

Soviet Union was pursuing a policy of world domination.[7] Both NSC 7 and NSC 20/4 emphasized the Russian ideological and political threat to U.S. national security. "The ultimate objective of Soviet-directed world communism is the domination of the world"[8] and ". . .the USSR has engaged the United States in a struggle for power, or 'cold war' in which our national security is at stake. . ."[9] are examples of the threat perceived by the U.S. government at that time. NSC 20/4 reflected the government's belief that the behavior of the Soviet Union was the result of its goal to conquer Western Europe. NSC 20/4 indicated the administration's concern for a possible

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[7] In his memoirs Truman was convinced of Soviet plans after the Potsdam meeting with Premier Joseph Stalin in 1945. Truman stated, "As I reflected on the situation during my trip home, I made up my mind that General [Douglas] MacArthur would be given complete command and control after victory in Japan. We were not going to be disturbed by Russian tactics in the Pacific. . . . I had proposed the internationalization of all the principal waterways. Stalin did not want this. What Stalin wanted was control of the Black Sea Straits and the Danube. The Russians were planning world conquest." Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decisions (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1955), 411-412.

[8] NSC 7, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism," March 30, 1948, National Security Council documents (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America Inc.), film reels, 1-2.

[9] NSC 20/4, "U.S. Objectives With Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," November 23, 1948, National Security Council documents (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America Inc.), film reels, 1.

military invasion of Europe by Soviet forces but stated that "a careful weighing of the various factors points to the probability that Soviet Government is not now planning any deliberate armed action calculated to involve the United States and is still seeking to achieve its aims primarily by political means, accompanied by military intimidation."[10] This statement coincided with Kennan's belief that at that time the Soviet Union was too weak to initiate a military invasion against the West and that the U.S. should concentrate on internal methods in the Soviet Union to weaken the political structure. Containment therefore became a policy of the Truman administration with a definite goal and definite strategies reflecting a mixture of Kennan and the Truman administration.

By 1950, however, international events altered the position of the Truman Administration toward acceptance of a more militaristic solution to Soviet expansion. The Soviet Union, between 1948 and 1950 had established satellite police state in Eastern Europe, had exploded an atomic weapon, and in 1949, the United States supported nationalist government in China was replaced by the Communist party government led by Mao Tse-Tung. Some nationalist movements in third world nations had gained momentum through guerrilla warfare, some with communist support, Vietnam was one such nation. Kennan's methods

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[10] Ibid., 6.

of economic and psychological counterforce were delegated to a lesser priority and military solutions gained in priority. Evidence of this is in National Security Council (NSC) document NSC-68 which was approved on April 14, 1950. The document defined containment as a policy which "seeks by all means short of war to:

1.) block further expansion of Soviet power.

2.) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions.

3.) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence.

4.) in general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system so that the Kremlin is brought. . .to modifying its behavior to. . .international standards."[11]

The document states further that one of the most important ingredients of power is military strength and that in containment "the maintenance of a strong military posture is. . .essential [in order to] guarantee national security and as an indispensable backdrop to the conduct of the policy of containment."[12] This document called for the strenghtening of United States military forces and

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[11] NSC 68, "U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security," April 14, 1950, National Security Council documents (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of American Inc.), film reels, 21.

[12] Ibid.

"those of the free world."[13] Based on the NSC documents and George Kennan's writings, it is clear that blocking the expansion of Soviet hegemony, was the primary goal of containment. However, a caveat must be mentioned regarding the primary goal. Under the presidential administrations of Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson the goal was modified to include the blockage of communist expansion in general, not only Soviet expansion. This was due to a change in international events which produced other communist states that threatened United States security needs. The normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China during the Nixon Administration enabled U.S. foreign policy to continue with containment by using the weaknesses of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union against them and to construct a balance in which the United States was the balancer.

Containment, therefore, is modified in response to international events. Central to the policy of containment, and most directly affected by international events, is the goal and strategy of containment. The goal of containment is the prevention or halting of Soviet and communist expansion. The strategy to achieve that goal requires the implementation of available military, economic, and diplomatic resources. The effectiveness of

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[13] Ibid., 49.

containment is therefore determined by the response of its goal and strategy to changes in the international environment and the modifications in the goal and strategy to meet United States security needs relative to international changes.

The effectiveness of containment is a function of available international and domestic resources. The utilization of those resources is dependent on the perception of international events by various presidential administrations. Therefore, the success and failure of foreign policy rides on the presidential administration's perception of events and its implementation of resources accordingly. Because United States foreign policy since World War II has been dominated by containment it is important to focus on how international events have affected the progress of containment. It is necessary to focus on what process occurs in foreign policy regarding containment to account for modifications in the goal and strategy of containment once an international event transpires. The goal and strategy are closely related and an alteration in one produces a change in the other. The focus of this framework is to study the process which produces modifications in the goal and strategy of containment, why the changes are made, who or what is most influential in precipitating change within the process, and the repercussions the changes have on the course of

U.S. foreign policy. The study begins with an analysis of the relationship between the goal and strategy of containment.

Since strategy is central to achieving the goal I will begin with strategy. John Lewis Gaddis, author of Stategies of Containment, defines strategy as "the process by which ends are related to means, intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources."[14] This definition will assist in analyzing the relationship between the goal of containment, the "ends" under the Gaddis definition, and the strategy of containment, the "means." According to Gaddis, containment strategy has undergone "transformations" over the years.[15] These transformations (in response to international events) led to large scale readjustments in United States foreign policy which in the case of Vietnam resulted in the United States entanglement in war.

The first step towards understanding the alterations in the goal and strategy of containment is the development of a framework of analysis. The framework will focus on how changes in the goal and strategy of containment produced changes in foreign policy. The changes in foreign policy are manifested in the means or

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[14] Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. viii.

[15] Ibid.

instruments which comprise the strategy of containment; the success or failure of which influences further alterations in foreign poilcy. Containment strategy utilizes the economic, military, and diplomatic resources available to the United States government to achieve the goal of containment-halting Soviet and communist expansionism. [I call these economic, military, and diplomatic resources the instruments of containment because they are the means of implementing the containment strategy.] The economic instruments include trade agreements, the conferring or withholding of most-favored-nation status, incentives and structured plans (i.e., Marshal Plan), and loans and credits to foreign nations from which they were to build a strong domestic economic and political base incompatible with if not hostile to Soviet expansion. The military instruments consist of material assistance to foreign governments in the form of arms, military training, and advisors. Also included in this category are the United States military build-up in nuclear arms and personnel, and United States direct intervention in foreign nations, as well as covert operations, and foreign aid and procurement of military bases in foreign countries. The diplomatic instruments used include active encouragement of the formation of collective agencies such as SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organization), NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization),

and other regional defense pacts, along with the normalization of relations with nations (United States-People's Republic of China) and summit meetings (United States-Soviet Union during Johnson and Nixon administrations) between the U.S. and major nations.

The instruments of containment are employed individually or in combination but the instruments chosen and their manner of implementation are dependent on what I call the implementation factor, the presidential administration. The administration not only chooses the instrument of containment but determines the goal, the strategy and the policy that shapes U.S. foreign policy. The policy of containment, its goal and strategy are shaped by the president, the executive and legislative branches, and domestic and international environmental factors such as the relative prominence of certain presidential advisors and/or administrative agencies in the foreign policy decision-making process, pressure from domestic constituency groups, Congressional pressure for a larger role in foreign policy decision-making, domestic economic conditions such as inflation or recession, political events such as an upcoming election, and events occurring in strategic areas of interest of the U.S. that require assessment of the world geopolitical and economic situation (i.e., civil wars, overthrow of a government, oil crisis). The implementation factor is important

because it is the basis of strategic doctrine: it identifies strategic areas, determines their relative importance to national security, and identifies what resources will be used to meet U.S. strategic needs.

An area is defined as strategic depending on the administration's view of the world and its perception of how changes in the world affect U.S. national security needs. The power of the administration to formulate the policy of containment and establish areas of strategic significance makes it the primary variable for determining the course of U.S. foreign policy. The administration decides the course of foreign policy by altering the goal and strategy of containment in response to changes in domestic and international environmental factors. The administration then chooses the preferred instruments of containment, and depending on the effectiveness of the instruments at achieving the goal of containment, the administration will reassess the strategic importance of the area, taking in domestic and international environmental changes, and choose alternate instruments accordingly. For example, the presidential administration may precipitate a change in the emphasis of the goal and strategy of containment due to domestic or international pressure or as a result of the president's own personal belief that a change is necessary. The president then initiates a change in the emphasis of the goal from

blocking or containing Communism to one that seeks to "roll back" communism, i.e., to include an actual retreat or reduction in the effectiveness projection of Soviet power. The instruments of containment would then be altered to compensate for the change in emphasis. A change in emphasis can require a decrease or an increase in the quality and the quantity of the instruments of containment which are primarily dependent on the domestic economic and political capabilities of the nation. The domestic capabilities of the nation are influenced by domestic and international environmental factors. Therefore, anything that initiates a change in the domestic and/or international factors causes a change in domestic capabilities which then changes the quality and quantity of the instruments of containment. This in turn determines achievement of the change in emphasis and possibly achievement of the goal.

Administration modifications of the goal or the strategy of containment produce policy patterns or constellations which I will call passive and dynamic containment. Passive and dynamic containment are phases of containment resulting from the expansion and contraction of the goal and strategy of containment. Containment is passive when the goal consists only of halting Soviet expansionism, and when the means utilized to implement the strategy are narrow and limited in scope.

Containment is dynamic when the goal is expanded to include halting all communist as well as Soviet expansion, or when the goal changes from simple containment to rollback. In the dynamic phase the means employed to implement the strategy are more extensive and wider ranging in scope. In a phase of passive containment, strategic areas of interest are narrowly defined by an administration to maintain but not expand present areas of interest. It is possible for containment to shift from one phase to another during the course of an administration. This occurred during the Truman Administration. The Administration pursued passive containment by cutting back the deployment of military personnel and direct military intervention (use of United States troops in combat overseas), and increasing economic assistance programs from 1947-1949 only to have that course altered and a new dynamic phase initiated with the start of the Korean War in 1950. Shifts in phases usually occur with a change in presidential administration.

The concept of strategic areas of significance is particularly important in containment. When an area or country is designated strategic because it is believed to be vital to United States security it becomes an integral part of the policy of containment. Following World War II, Western Europe and Japan were considered important strategic areas that the United States government wanted

to stabilize and did so by utilizing the strategies set forth in the policy of containment. Eventually these governments stabilized to a point where United States economic and military aid were no longer necessary. The United States government expanded its strategic areas of significance to include areas in the Third World. This was in response to the growing nationalist insurgency movements, some supported by communists, which the United States government considered a threat to United States and world security. Expansion of United States strategic areas of significance was done through cliency. Patron-client relationships were established between the United States and selected nations and many continue today because these nations or areas continue to be defined as strategic to United States vital interests and because their governments are too politically and economically unstable to defend themselves against revolutionary movements, regarded as a major means of Soviet and communist expansion. Maintaining assistance to these nations then becomes necessary for the achievement of the goal of containment.

Cliency is therefore an important strategy or mode of containment. By utilizing the instruments of containment to foster economic development and "modernization" (improved agricultural techniques using machinery versus manual labor, chemical fertilizer,

agricultural production to export instead of to feed only a few, building an industrial base, increasing urbanization, increasing education among citizens, building a more mechanized and heavily armed military, etc.) along capitalist lines the U.S. government believed that a country or an area would not be vulnerable to Soviet and communist influence, thus containing communist expansion. Depending on the strategic importance of a particular client state, changes in the course of the patron-client relationship itself may move containment from one phase to another. One such change might occur in the domestic security status of the client state. Depending on its strategic significance, which would be determined by the presiding administration, appropriate instruments of containment would be chosen and the goal of containment modified in such a way as to justify U.S. intervention to meet the domestic security needs of the client. Therefore, changes in patron-client relationships which involve the domestic security of strategic third world nations influence the phases of containment, the policy of containment and the course of foreign poilcy. For example, the course of the United States patron-client relationship with South Vietnam changed with modifications in the containment policy from the Truman administration to the Ford administration, to achieve the primary goal of United States foreign policy.

Initially, under the Truman administration the U.S. had no direct patron-client relationship with the Vietnamese government. The U.S. provided military assistance to the French to maintain containment of the communist insurgency. As the U.S. presidential administrations changed, there were subsequent changes in the goal and strategy of containment which produced modifications in U.S. foreign policy regarding Vietnam. Their strategic significance increased particularly after the fall of China and onset of the Korean War. Therefore, when the French colonial government withdrew from Vietnam in 1954, the Eisenhower administration felt compelled to fill the vacuum of power and took direct responsibility for providing economic and military assistance to the new South Vietnamese government to strengthen it against the rising strength of communist insurgency. The economic and military instruments of containment increased in quality and quantity as each successive administration increased the strategic significance of South Vietnam. The modifications in the policy of containment, which led to a deeper United States commitment in South Vietnam, resulted from each administrations's perception of the strategic significance of South Vietnam and its role in containing Soviet and communist expansion. A more thorough analysis of the implementation of the policy of containment and the United States commitment in South Vietnam will be

addressed in the case study. Another framework will also be used in the case study. This framework, developed by Dr. Mark Gasiorowski, evaluates patron-client relationships based on security needs, the instruments chosen to fulfill those needs, and the effect the implementation of the instruments has on the political stability of client states.

Gasiorowski's model defines cliency as a "mutually beneficial, security-oriented relationship between the governments of two countries, known as the patron and the client, that differ greatly in size, wealth, and military and political power."[16] Cliency is not confined to relationships between capitalist states. Cliency can also be an unequal relationship between socialist states. He emphasizes that cliency manifests itself most significantly in the reciprocal exchange of goods and services that enhance the security of the patron and the client and cannot easily be obtained elsewhere.[17] The main goods and services provided by the patron to the client are: "economic aid, including loans, grants and

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[16] Mark J. Gasiorowski, "International Cliency Relationships and the Client State: A Theoretical Framework," paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, Anaheim, California, April 1986, p. 2. See also Gasiorowski, "Dependency and Cliency in Latin America," Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs 28 (Fall 1986): 51-52.

[17] Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Dependency and Cliency in Latin America," Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs 28 (Fall 1986): 52.

indirect transfers such as loan guarantees and import quotas; security assistance, including training and equipment for the client's military, police, and intelligence forces; security agreements, such as treaties, alliances, and informal commitments of support; and overt or covert intervention in the client's domestic politics."[18] He refers to the goods and services as cliency instruments. The client recipient "generally reciprocates by participating in the patron's regional security arrangements" which may entail providing the patron with military bases, intelligence gathering facilities, and/or overflight privileges.[19]

Gasiorowski's cliency instruments and my instruments of containment have the same function: they are intended to meet the security needs of the client and the patron. Gasiorowski notes that client relationships are motivated by conditions that bear on the security of both the patron and the client.[20] Cliency instruments, or the instruments of containment applied in a client state, may enhance the relative power of the client. For example, if the patron needs the client for base facilities as part of its policy, it may have to increase

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[18] Gasiorowski, "International Cliency Relationships and the Client State: A Theoretical Framework," 2.

[19] Ibid., 3.

[20] Ibid.

its payments to the client in order to maintain access to its bases. An example of this is the negotiations between the United States and the Philippine government for use of the American bases in Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base. However, client dependency on the patron's economic and military aid may give the patron more influence and may serve as a means of coercion to change the client's domestic policies or even government personnel.[21] The political stability of the client state is important to the patron who requires access to the client's domestic assets, and resources may be provided to enhance the client state's repressive or cooptative mechanisms as a means of maintaining a client regime that has demonstrated its willingness to meet patron needs.[22] These resources can be used to repress or benefit certain social groups over others in the client state. These resources also increase the power of the government in the client state, making it more difficult for social groups to influence government policy or take part in government decision-making. Therefore, the state (which is the government and the institutions which implement policy) can become autonomous from the social groups in the nation by the repressive use of the cliency instruments. The state can

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[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

also be autonomous to external forces but I will be dealing strictly with state autonomy from internal forces.

The state is autonomous to internal forces when the government and its institutions are able to exclude social groups from the decision-making process or to refuse to consider the needs of social groups which comprise the nation. Gasiorowski calls those factors which can determine state autonomy instrumental determinants and structural determinants.[23] Structural determinants are "broad, systemic characteristics of a society, including certain aspects of its involvement in the international system."[24] Instrumental determinants are "specific capabilities of societal groups or of the state itself that affect society's ability to influence the state."[25] Structural determinants include the mode of production (capitalism, feudalism), the stage of the mode of production (emerging, declining), the form of the mode of production (dependent capitalism, state capitalism, centrally-planned socialism, rentier capitalism), foreign penetration (economic, military), colonial domination, timing of industrialization (early, late), and cliency.[26]

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[23] Ibid., 9.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid., Figure 1, "Structural and Instrumental Determinants of State Autonomy."

The instrumental determinants include the instrumental capabilities of societal groups (such as their strategic position in society, their internal characteristics, and their usefulness of the group to the state) and the instrumental capabilities of the state (autonomy-enhancing instruments such as the repressive apparatuses, allocative apparatuses, and socialization organs).[27]

Gasiorowski stresses that the structural determinants of the mode of production, stage of mode of the production, the form of the mode of production, foreign penetration, and colonial domination "affect state autonomy through their influence on the instrumental capabilities of societal groups and those of the state."[28] He points out that "the effect of these structural determinants on state autonomy is mediated through the instrumental determinants."[29] This means that the mode of production and the stage it is in affect state autonomy by "determining the class structure of society and the distribution of power among classes."[30] The forms the mode of production take can affect state autonomy by "shaping the class structure of society (in the case of dependent capitalism) or by affecting the capabilities of

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[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid., 11.

[29] Ibid., 13.

[30] Ibid.

the state (in the case of state capitalism, centrally-planned socialism, or rentier capitalism). . .[whereas foreign penetration and colonial domination] affect state autonomy by reducing the power of the dominant classes over the state."[31] The timing of industrialization "affects the historical evolution of state-society relations and therefore the autonomy-enhancing capabilities of the state."[32]

Cliency, as a structural determinant,

> affects state autonomy by increasing state autonomy in the client country by augmenting the autonomy-enhancing capabilities of the state. . . . Structural determinants of state autonomy simply shape the political environment within which the state must operate: those that increase the power of certain groups make it more difficult for the state to ignore the pressures exerted by these groups; those that increase the state's autonomy-enhancing capabilities make it easier for the state to ignore such groups.[33]

Repression of social groups can, in the short term, provide political stability for the state. However, long-term repression of social groups can be potentially destabilizing to the state if the autonomy-enhancing capabilities of the state have been brutal and discriminatory, provoking an organized popular assault on the regime.

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[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

discriminatory, provoking an organized popular assault on the regime.

Therefore a dependent relationship can develop between the cliency instruments provided by a patron and stability in a client state. This relationship is fostered by "strengthening the state's repressive and allocative apparatuses which enables it to suppress and coopt disaffected groups."[34] Gasiorowski points out that "cliency instruments enable the state to become more autonomous in the client country by strengthening its autonomy-enhancing capacities vis-a-vis all societal groups, including both groups that are potential sources of instability and groups that are not."[35] His analysis of the U.S.-Iran cliency relationship, which began in 1953 with the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq, shows that U.S. aid to Iran strengthened the autonomy-enhancing apparatus. This aid, in conjunction with Iran's oil income allowed the state to become autonomous from the middle, working, and upper classes. The Iranian Revolution in 1978 and 1979 was the result of the policies the government was able to implement because of its autonomy which was built (in part) by the patron-client relationship. "While the short-term consequence of cliency was therefore stability and state autonomy, the

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[34] Ibid., 16.

[35] Ibid.

long-term consequence appears to have been instability and revolution."[36]

Economic aid is used to promote political stability in the client state. The object is to "reduce dissatisfaction among the affected groups and therefore undermine group mobilization. This increases state autonomy by inhibiting a group's ability to exert pressure on the state and therefore "reduces societal influence over state policy."[37] Military and diplomatic instruments, such as the ones mentioned as instruments of containment, along with treaties and alliances, are also used to "strengthen the state's repressive apparatus . . .to suppress societal groups and thus reduc[e] societal influence over the state."[38]

Direct intervention by the patron state in the domestic affairs of a client can take the form of overt military intervention, overt and covert assistance to "organizations such as labor unions, political parties, and newspapers; and covert action such as propaganda, assassination, and coups d'etat."[39] Gasiorowski believes

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[36] Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy in the Client State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming).

[37] Ibid., 17.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

that the function of intervention is to weaken opposition groups and/or assist friendly groups. "Intervention . . .supplements the client state's repressive apparatus, increasing its ability to suppress societal groups and therefore reducing societal influence over it."[40] It is the cliency instruments that increase the capability of the state to act with greater autonomy from domestic groups.[41] If a client state is very important to the patron, cliency instruments may be provided by the patron to the client state in sufficient amounts to maintain stability and withstand pressure from groups which oppose the state.[42] With sufficient autonomy the client state may then institute policies which ignore the needs of society. If this persists, then repercussions involving popular unrest and revolution may result. Therefore, a relationship between patron and client which was intended to promote stability may actually result in political instability in the client state.

The efforts of the United States to maintain its influence in Europe and Asia after World War II led to the development of the policy of containment to maintain that influence and meet what it perceived was a threat to its and the world's existence. Containment was designed to

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[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid., 19.

[42] Ibid.

deter Soviet and all communist expansion throughout the world by the use of political, military and economic instruments. In response to international and domestic events the implementation factor (the presiding presidential administration) determines the goal of containment and the strategy (type and use of the instruments of containment) that will be employed to achieve the goal. The presidential administration, the relative prominence of certain presidential advisors or administrative agencies in the foreign policy decision-making process, pressure from domestic constituency groups, congressional pressure, domestic economic conditions, domestic and international political conditions, and strategic areas of interest together influence the presidential administration's determination of the goal and strategy of containment.

Cliency, as a mode of containment, influences change in the policy of containment and in turn is influenced by changes in policy. The structural and instrumental determinants of cliency are directly influenced by the implementation of the containment strategy, particularly the application of instruments of containment in the client state. The patron's military, economic and diplomatic assistance to the client state changes the dynamics of the state's political environment by altering the political and economic strength of certain

social groups over others, and by increasing the effectiveness of the state's repressive apparatus, autonomy-enhancing instruments, allocative apparatus, and socializing organs. The changes in the relative status and capabilities of social groups and the state can result in political stability or instability. The outcome of this process is then evaluated, and depending on the strategic priority of the client state and other domestic and international elements, the policy of containment may be modified to maintain U.S. influence.

How is it that a patron-client relationship can alter the political and social organizations within a state to a point resulting in either political stability or instability? To answer this question it is necessary to understand how the state effects and is affected by state organizations and social groups in the process of state making. The next chapter will discuss the role of the state, state organizations and social groups in the process of state making and their subsequent contribution to stability and instability in the state.

CHAPTER 3

CLIENCY, STATE MAKING AND THE PATHWAYS TO POLITICAL INSTABILITY

> To the extent that outside states continue to supply military goods and expertise in return for commodities, military alliance or both, the new states harbor powerful, unconstrained organizations that easily overshadow all other organizations within their terrorities. To the extent that outside states guarantee their boundaries, the managers of those military organizations exercise extraordinary power within them.[1]

Tilly's statement indicates how patron-client relationships have influenced the process of state making or nation-building in new decolonized agrarian nations such as the Philippines, Vietnam (which will be addressed later), Korea, Iran, Egypt, and others. Cliency redistributes political and economic power among social groups and state structures by manipulating changes in the

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[1] Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Bringing the State Back In, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 186.

process of state making which favor one group or certain groups or structures over another. The results of these changes include authoritarianism, the preemption of democracy, and/or political instability such as rebellion or revolution.

Cliency influences the process of nation-building in the state and therefore the level of political stability in the nation. The effects of cliency on this process and the political stability of the state are shaped by history and by the groups and structures within the state responsible for state formation. These groups and structures often reap most of the benefits of a patron-client relationship. Since cliency inhibits the development of certain social groups and state structures while it enhances others, the state develops in a manner that conforms to the aspirations of the patron government and the state structures it creates to support itself, dominant social groups, and the regime's domestic clients in the client state. To understand how this transpires it is necessary to focus on the basic composition of a state, its purpose in forming, and the state structures and social groups essential for its survival.

The state, as defined by Theda Skocpol, is "a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed and more or less coordinated by, an executive

authority."[2] A state is formed to consolidate power in a given geographical area. Within this bounded area the state must be capable of protecting its society and state structures and must extract the means to do so from its population. James Caporaso identifies four "ideal-type conceptions" of the state. The first is the liberal concept of the neutral state, whereby the state provides goods the markets do not such as defense, roads, and public health along with being an arbiter of the "interest-group process."[3] The state is neutral in this process, being neither an interest group or serving the interests of any specific societal group.[4] The second state is the Marxist concept that the state is nothing more than the political expression of the dominant class in society.[5] The third state concept is the nationalist state in which "state institutions mobilize societal resources exclusively for national concerns."[6] An example of this would be fascist Germany in the 1930s and 1940s. Finally, the last state concept is the state-for-itself

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[2] Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 29.

[3] James Caporaso, "The State's Role in Third World Economic Growth," Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, 24 January 1982, 105.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

interpretation which is a "combination of individual careers and organizational interests that are primarily self-serving."[7] This describes nations which undergo military coups or have family and close friends controlling the state, as was the case during the Diem regime in South Vietnam. Cliency would have minimal effect on the neutral state since it would favor no interest or societal group for which military or economic assistance could be preferentially diverted to. However, cliency could in the long term benefit some domestic social groups over others, depending on the cliency instruments. This could result in a change in the state. Cliency under the Marxist concept would favor maintaining the dominant class in society. Cliency with the nationalist state would favor the state institutions over society since the purpose of the state is to meet national concerns thereby giving state institutions a higher priority for assistance. Cliency with the state-for-itself would be a gamble for the patron since each organizational group or combination of individuals would be clamoring for a piece of the assistance. In this case the patron could command a great deal of leverage as to which group would be in control of the state. However since the groups are primarily self-serving once in control of the state it may be difficult for the patron to

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[7] Ibid.

control a group if it becomes too strong. The assistance would strengthen the power base of the stronger client group versus others in order to shape the state to keep them in control. The client government in this instance is the state which makes the state vulnerable to political instability.

To maintain specific boundaries, the state must control the means to exploit resources within them. A state's exploitation of resources enables it to confront and deter external threats to power holders. Tilly notes that,

> Power holders' pursuit of war involved them willy nilly in the extraction of resources for war making from the populations over which they had control and in the promotion of capital accumulation by those who could help them borrow and buy. War making, extraction and capital accumulation interacted to shape European state making.[8]

The European nations of England, Germany, the Netherlands and France during the seventeenth century were heavily engaged in resource extraction from their societies to defend or expand state borders. Both the agrarian and developing industrial sectors in the individual nations at that time were exploited. The Netherlands and England were commercially prosperous enough to exploit the agrarian and industrial sectors and build strong navies. France and Germany had stronger agrarian sectors which

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[8] Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," 172.

they exploited.[9] One of the lessons of the state making process in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is that state survival is compromised without the capability to deter external threats and maintain a dependable level of resource extraction to fulfill state needs.

However, state survival depends not only on a state's ability to deter external threats but also its ability to maintain domestic order. Skocpol states that exploitation of resources for state survival is manifested in the performance of two basic tasks: maintenance of internal order and competition with actual or potential rival states.[10] However, maintenance of internal order must take precedence so the state can extract sufficient resources to repel external threats or expand its boundaries to increase the scope of its resource exploitation.

How then does the state maintain internal order? The state maintains internal order by having state

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[9] The French Bourbon administration was involved in expansion through military means and relied on the dominant class of nobles to extract more resources from the peasants in the way of feudal dues. Therefore, this left the peasant on the land tied to the nobles through feudal obligations. The nobles, who were commercial landlords, took a large share of the crops. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 52-53. See also Skocpol, 54.

[10] Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 30.

organizations (bureaucracy and/or the military) and certain social groups (nobles in France, the gentry in China) exploit and extract resources from society.[11] The state's repressive structures (the military and police) and dominant classes achieve internal order through coercion and protection. In Tilly's comparison of government to racketeers, one notes that protection is a characteristic of state making.

> To the extent that the threats against which a given government protects its citizens are imaginary or are consequences of its own activities, the government has organized a protection racket. Since governments themselves commonly simulate, stimulate, or even fabricate threats of external war and since the repressive and extractive activities of governments often constitute the largest current threats to the livelihoods of their own citizens, many governments operate in essentially the same ways as racketeers.[12]

Therefore, protection of citizens from real or imaginary threats is the source of justification for state actions in the process of state making and resource extraction. State protection ranges from the economic, political, or military shielding of specific domestic groups or state structures, to the military shielding of the entire society from external threats. Protection of state structures or social groups by economic means includes formulation of policy to benefit one group over

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[11] Ibid.

[12] Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making As Organized Crime," 171.

another or one state structure over another (i.e., nationalization of industry and designation that the military manage it after nationalization, or favoring modernization over the traditionally organized economic structure), payoffs to certain groups, discriminatory tax structures, state job allocation, pay scales (i.e., military and state workers), and land distribution.[13] A byproduct of economic protection for certain groups is that they attain not only a higher standard of living in the present, but receive the added social benefit of superior education and higher social status for their children. This assures the domination of a few families or a dominant class over time.[14] Protection of certain social groups and structures also facilitates state extraction and exploitation of resources because it shields the organizations that are responsible for the extraction of resources from repercussions from the exploited population.

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[13] The enclosure system instituted after the civil war in England in the seventeenth century redistributed land in favor of the landed upper class over the peasants. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 21-29. Land redistribution in 1861 after emancipation of the serfs favored the noble class who required the serf to rent the land for forty-nine years to help the state pay off the advance given the noble for the loss of their serfs. Skocpol, 129.

[14] Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism: The Wheels of Commerce, Vol. 11 (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), 480-488.

Political protection of the state and dominant social groups is obtained by limiting or restricting political mobilization. The result is that the dominant social groups and state structures retain control of the regime and the mechanisms to exploit state resources. This enables their members to enjoy a more prosperous life than other sectors of the population. Therefore, state organizations and dominant groups are often the beneficiaries of state exploitation of resources.

The state must protect its citizens from threats in order to extract resources and this is where military protection is most important to state making. To ensure the integrity of the state, certain state structures, ruling individuals or groups, and dominant groups supporting the state receive the benefits of military protection. Groups or individuals in opposition to the state are often the victims of state military protection. An example of this is the recent rebellion in Burma. The military reacted by shooting members of opposition groups to protect the state. In the Republic of South Vietnam in 1963, Buddhists opposed to the Diem regime were shot at and many were killed by the military in response to the government's perception that the Buddhist groups posed a threat to the state. Thus military protection is an important part of the repressive mechanism of the state.

State structures that are heavily involved in the extraction of resources and in maintaining internal order are the repressive agencies or what Gasiorowski refers to as "autonomy-enhancing mechanisms" of the state. These are the military, police, and intelligence agencies. Tilly points out that governments acquire authority by organizing and monopolizing violence.[15] Effective protection of state structures and dominant groups, and the efficient extraction of resources requires state monopolization of violence. This is seen in the application of coercion in the extraction of resources.

State structures and dominant social groups utilize various means of economic, political, and military coercion. Coercion by economic means entails an oppressive tax structure on public goods or land, subsidies to certain social groups, unequal land distribution, etc. Coercion by political means can be manifested in a state's decision to impede political mobilization of certain social groups. The czar in imperialist Russia forbade the formation of labor unions. Labor unions not only would have increased political mobilization, imposing a threat to the czar's rule, but also would have restricted the state's easy access to economic resources. Political mobilization is also limited by restricting the flow of information (closing

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[15] Tilly, 171.

opposition newspapers), arresting opposition leaders, restricting voting privileges to certain groups or prohibiting elections altogether.

Coercion by military means is more violent and also reinforces the political and economic means of coercion. Military coercion involves the active participation of the armed forces of a state, covert or intelligence groups, and the police, in assuring that the policies of the state are implemented. Military coercion is applied through declarations of marital law, coups d'etat, deployments of soldiers in the streets to disband demonstrations, assassinations of opposition leaders, etc. While the military is a powerful structure of the state, and defends the state from external and internal threats, a build-up in its strength can also provide an added internal threat to the longevity of an existing regime. The military is capable of repressing or eliminating the civilian sectors of government if it becomes too strong. Evidence of this is manifest in many examples worldwide such as the series of coups in Haiti the most recent of which saw the ouster of Lt. General Henri Namphy by General Proper Avirl; in Burma the overthrow of newly appointed President Maung Maung by General Saw Maung; in Central America, the coup led by General Manuel Noriega to topple the government in Panama; and in South America the military coups in Brazil in 1964, Argentina in 1966, and

in Chile in 1973. The military can also assume an instrumental role in changing the ruling member or members of a government by throwing its support to one party or individual during an election. Evidence of this was seen in the Philippines with the fall of President Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. A military coup also occurred in South Vietnam in 1963, and will be discussed in more detail in the case study. Military and policing structures play a pivotal role in state development and in determining state longevity.

However, coercion and protection sometimes fail as mechanisms for the exploitation of resources and the maintenance of internal order. The result is political instability--the fall of the executive authority or regime through rebellion, coup d'etat, or the demise of the state through revolution. A rebellion is defined here as the overthrow of the existing government by civilian domestic groups. A coup is the overthrow of the government by the military institution. Both the rebellion and coup can create further political instability. A revolution, however, is often the apogee of political instability and results in a total change in the political and social structures of the state. How is it that the coercive and protective mechanisms of a state fail to the point of resulting in the most radical form of domestic political

instability, a revolution? An examination of past revolutions may shed light on this question.

Revolution, as defined by Samuel Huntington, is "a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of society, in its political institutions, social structures, leadership, and government activity and policies."[16] Theda Skocpol describes two types of revolutions: social and political. She defines social revolutions as

> rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures. . .accompanied and in past carried through by class-based revolts from below. . . . Political revolutions transform state structures but not social structures and they are not necessarily accomplished through class conflict.[17]

States fall victim to revolution when they fail to eliminate external threats through available means of resource extraction and/or are unable to adjust the state's economic and political structures to aggressive resource exploitation. Tilly's belief cited earlier emphasized that war-making, extraction of resources and capital accumulation created the European states by permitting rulers to expand their boundaries. The same war-making, extraction and capital accumulation can also weaken the state because the production of violence

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[16] Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 264.

[17] Skocpol, 4.

requires large economies of scale.[18] As a state responds to external or internal threats, it increases the exploitation of resources particularly if state institutions are inefficient in responding to threats.[19] The increasing demands of the state on the dominant class and subordinate groups to return more resources to the state creates domestic stress and weakens the support for the state, particularly if the state can no longer protect the classes or groups from the escalating imposition of economic or military burdens. If the stress is greatest on the dominant or middle class a political or bureaucratic revolution may rsult, but if the stress is heaviest on the subordinate or peasant groups in society a social revolution could result.

A pre-revolutionary state's military and civilian structures, and the dominant classes responsible for extraction of state resources, respond to the increase in state needs by extracting more from peasants and workers. To maintain the income of the dominant classes, its members compensate for the losses that might occur due to increased extraction by the state by appropriating a

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[18] Tilly, "War Making and State Making," 175.

[19] In Imperialist China in the late 1800s the combined stress of internal disorder and external threats required the dominant groups to extract more resources for the state. Skocpol, 75.

larger share from rents and taxes forced on the peasant.[20] This decreases the share going to the state, prompting the state to define such a reduction in its revenues as "corruption." Under feudalism lords reaped the benefits of corruption because peasants were obliged to lords not kings. However, in the modernizing state, corruption significantly diminishes the state's ability to strengthen itself without more resources. For a state attempting to survive without reform of ineffective institutions, corruption may be a necessary alternative. Huntington states that "corruption provides immediate, specific, and concrete benefits to groups which would otherwise be alienated from society."[21] I argue that corruption might be condoned by the government to protect and coopt groups necessary for the functioning of the state, and that the state cannot afford to alienate them without fear of losing resources and risking domestic unrest. Huntington writes that this kind of corruption may be a substitute for revolution by serving to decrease pressure for reform.[22] "Corruption, like violence, occurs when absence

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[20] This was the case in Imperialist China when taxes such as the likin were imposed on production, transit and/or sale of commodities. This produced great revenues but only twenty percent reached Peking the rest was kept by local and provincial authorities, who collected the taxes and kept most of them. Skocpol, 64.

[21] Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 64.

[22] Ibid.

of mobility opportunities outside politics combined with weak and inflexible institutions, channels energies into politically deviant behavior."[23] However, even though the state can work to strengthen its support through corruption, it is also weakening its own institutions and its social base of support from exploited groups. Therefore corruption is not a substitute for revolution but merely a symptom of a declining state system with the potential for a revolution due to increasing state demands and ineffective state institutions.

As the existing structures and groups overextend themselves in the process of increasing resource extraction, the population of the state experiences an appreciable decline in living standards and the quality of life. Living standards are measured by income distribution, per capita income, famines, death due to war or famine, and refugees. Social groups in the traditional state affected by increasing resource extraction have been concentrated in the agrarian sector of the economy, particularly the middle peasants. Eric Wolf emphasizes that the middle peasant is most instrumental in "dynamiting" the peasant social order because he is most vulnerable to economic changes "wrought by commercialism."

> He is. . .threatened by population growth, the encroachment of rival landlords, the loss of rights to grazing, forest and water, falling

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[23] Ibid. 66.

> prices and unfavorable conditions of the market and interest payments and foreclosures. . . . this stratum depends most on traditional social relations of kin and mutual aid between neighbors; middle peasants suffer most when these relations are abrogated, [and] they are least able to withstand the depredations of tax collectors or landlords.[24]

The state's failure to recognize the need to relieve the pressure on exploited groups through reform, or its reluctance to grant reforms, ultimately decreases its ability to extract more resources and undermines state survival. This occurred in Japan under the Tokugawa Shogun and in Imperialist China under the Manchu dynasty.[25] State longevity is threatened because delay of reform or the pace of reform influences the level of violence in the state. Barrington Moore stresses that "gradual and piecemeal reform is superior in advancing human freedom where the opposite is true in violent

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[24] Eric R. Wolf, "Peasants and Revolution," in Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative and Historical Studies, ed., Jack A. Goldstone (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1986), 178.

[25] The Meiji Restoration of Japan occurred as a result of an alliance between the social groups of merchants and the samurai in response to their perception that the national sovereignty was endangered by the Shogunate's inability to deter Western (U.S.) aggressive actions. Skocpol, 101-102. See also, Ellen Kay Trimberger, "A Theory of Elite Revolutions," in Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative and Historical Studies, ed, Jack A. Goldstone (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1986), 162.

revolution."[26] He points out that the gradual changes in seventeenth century England paved the way for government by parliament in the eighteenth century.[27] In contrast, Imperialist China experienced considerable violence during the 1800s and early 1900s in response to state resource extraction pressure and refusal to institute reforms.[28] The fall of the Manchu dynasty followed after the dynasty instituted large scale reforms in 1905 which resulted in rival warlords fighting for territory.[29] The reforms strengthened the upper classes and the military but

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[26] Moore, 505. Moore points to the peaceful, legal changes made in the enclosure system from 1688 to the 1800s which secured parliamentary democracy as the system of government in England. Moore, Social Origins, 20-30.

[27] The Civil War in England in the seventeenth century was the result of a clash between the "commercially minded elements among the landed upper classes, and to a lesser extent among yeomen opposing the King and royal attempts to preserve the old order. . . . The growth of commerce in the towns during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had created in the English countryside a market for agricultural products, . . .leading toward commercial and capitalist agriculture in the countryside." Moore, Social Origins, 14-29.

[28] Peasant-based rebellions occurred: The White Lotus Rebellion 1795-1804, The Taiping Rebellion of 1850-1864, the Nien Rebellion of 1853-1868, the Moslem Rebellions from 1850-1870, and the Boxer Rebellion 1899-1901 which drained the resources of the state. Skocpol, 74-77.

[29] The Confucian examination system was eliminated by 1905, military academies were established, modern Western-style schools were established, a national budgeting system was instituted and by 1908 the Manchu dynasty began to create representative assemblies. The provincial and local gentry began to ally with local warlords to maintain power. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 80.

contained little relief for the peasant. The consequence was that from 1911 until 1949, power rested with the "modernized military machines and "warlord" rivalries as the army and its commanders competed for material resources and territory.[30] There was considerable violence in the Communist Chinese revolution after the end of World War II. This was because the Communist Party sought rapid state reform by eliminating the government and clients of General Jiang Kai-shek, with the assistance of a peasant army from 1944-1949 and through party organizations after 1949.

States have been vulnerable to revolution when they were unable to control state mechanisms (state bureaucracy and dominant classes) which extract resources which thereby caused a decline in the living standard of subordinate social groups. The failure of the state to exhibit an ability to channel resources into state structures and to protect itself also has made the state susceptible to revolution.[31] Moore notes that in the process of modernizing agrarian economies, failure by the "landed upper classes" to take up commercial agriculture

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[30] Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, 80.

[31] Moore states that a "highly segmented society" that only requires diffuse sanction for extraction of resources is less likely to encounter a peasant rebellion. Agrarian bureaucracies that depend on a central authority to extract resources are vulnerable to peasant rebellion. Moore, Social Origins, 459. China, France and Russia are all examples of this.

influenced the political outcome. "Where the landed upper classes have turned to production for the market in a way that enables commercial influences to permeate rural life, peasant revolutions are weak. . . . Revolutionary movements (are) more likely to develop. . .where the landed aristocracy fails to develop a. . .commercial impulse."[32] The key to state longevity, however, is how this commercialization occurs, what toll the process exacts from the peasants and other groups, and how it does or does not disrupt their social organization and living standards. To maintain internal order and counter external threats the state must extract the resources from the population and channel them to its advantage without disrupting the living standards of exploited social groups.

Modernization of the agrarian sector may be the only means for the states to extract resources efficiently in order to deter an external threat. According to Huntington, "Modernization involves changes in the distribution of power within a political system and in the amount of power in the system."[33] Agrarian states that must deter an external threat through modernization invite tremendous political consequences for the state. As

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[32] Moore, Social Origins, 459-460.

[33] Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 145.

policies change, the concentration of power changes. In the nineteenth century the need to modernize arose from imperialism. Military structures and industrialization were given priority by peripheral states over peasants, nobles, and other groups associated with traditional agriculture. The pre-revolutionary state structures were unable to accommodate the demands made by the social groups arising from industrialization, or to retain the support of social groups suffering under the old oppressive agricultural policies. Revolution was the result.

Cliency influences state making and the political stability of the state by enhancing the economic and political power of certain state structures and social groups over others. This is done through the coercive and protective mechanisms employed by the client state to extract resources. The patron state assists coercion and protection in the client state by supporting certain social groups of state structures which advocate the objectives of the patron state. These state structures or social groups may or may not have been a part of the original formation of the state. This is not important: it is only important to the patron that the dominant social groups and state structures favor the objectives of the patron state.

Assistance from the patron state comes in the form of military aid, supplies and training, economic assistance for selected programs and development of selected types of business, pay-offs to influence elections, intelligence, support of organization of coups if the ruling government governs contrary to the objectives of the patron state, direct military intervention, etc. This assistance can alter the delicate economic and political balance in a new state by building and strengthening the military which intimidates those governing the state, or harasses social groups that threaten the existence of power of the state or certain state structures, such as the military. A strong military can overthrow the presiding rulers or impose the will of those rulers on the public through the means of coercion and protection implemented through the cliency instruments mentioned earlier. Continued harassment of social groups by the military and/or intelligence organizations will increase domestic political pressure to a point where open rebellion or revolution can result. Such was the case in the client state Iran in 1979 when the revolution occurred, in part, due to years of harassment of social groups by the Shah's state intelligence organization SAVAK which was financed and trained by the United States. The need to deter external threats, or to maintain the support of the military for the government, may place additional

pressure on the government to increase funding to the military. This decreases the financial resources available for the economic sector of the state and society. The decrease in resources available for the economic sectors (i.e., agriculture and industry), can also result in a decrease in the standard of living for affected social groups, creating a foundation for revolution. An example of this was seen in the client state, the Philippines, in which former President Ferdimand Marcos built up an army primarily to assure his position in government and to enforce his policies. The Philippines had no external threat yet had a sizeable army trained, supplied, and financed by United States aid. The military build-up and depletion of the economy by President Marcos resulted in severe economic and political hardships for the middle class and peasants. These conditions, along with other circumstances (such as the assassination of Benino Aquino), fueled the rebellion by the Philippine people in 1986.

Assistance may also encourage modernization over traditional economic methods. Modernization refers to the process of the development and transportation of resources and products from predominantly labor-oriented techniques of production and local markets to machine and technologically-oriented methods of production and national or international markets. This involves

utilization of techniques to increase crop yields, the construction of transportation infrastructure, increased investment in agricultural and industrial machinery and education to meet the demands of industry.

Traditional economic organization revolves primarily around the family and the village. Agricultural production to maintain the subsistence of the family and the village are the primary goals of the traditional economy. Modernization, on the other hand, is concerned with increasing production well beyond the village or family subsistence level to feeding, clothing, housing, and providing for the needs of the entire state and perhaps a portion of the world. Efficient utilization, production, and transportation of resources by the individual is more important than simply meeting village or family needs. Modernization can, therefore, be a disrupting influence in the traditional life of the peasants. This is true especially if members of a village leave to pursue employment in the city. Moore writes,

> The most important causes of peasant revolutions have been the absence of a commercial revolution in agriculture led by the landed upper classes and the concomitant survival of peasant social institutions into the modern era when they are subject to new stresses and strains.[34]

Cliency and modernization stress peasant social and economic institutions. If the patron favors more

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[34] Moore, Social Origins, 477.

modern agricultural and industrial techniques these techniques, are chosen because they provide a substantial opportunity for more extraction of resources versus the traditional economic methods and because they remove population from the land to the cities. The United States advocated more modernized agricultural techniques and equipment in South Vietnam. Projects involving road and school construction, and a commodity import program are examples of the modernization program encouraged by the United States in South Vietnam. The granting of assistance to the client usually requires that the patron approve of the programs. In such cases the client government approves of the patron's decision in order to obtain the assistance which, in the case of the United States, means modernization over traditional methods.

The patron's decision to modernize the client state could make it difficult for individuals and groups who may not be able to purchase or effectively use modern equipment or modern techniques. Modernization techniques could cause a disruption in living standards. The pull of higher paying urban employment due to modernization or drafting peasants due to a war may deplete the village of the necessary manpower to plant and harvest crops. This can cause decreases in crop yields, risking famine and decreasing peasant income. Therefore, the individauls or groups who can afford to modernize their businesses or

agricultural equipment and whose income is not dependent on the village and agriculture, benefit most from modernization. Also, the large quantities of imported modernization machinery and consumer goods strain the foreign exchange reserves of the client and may also set off inflation. The traditional methods and standard of living therefore are jeopardized by the modernization of the agrarian state.

If an external threat to the state exists and the extraction of resources must increase, the living standards of subordinate and traditional social groups are drastically altered. This is particularly true in an agrarian state undergoing modernization. In contrast, state organizations, dominant groups, or individuals may prosper if modernization is adopted because the assistance is oriented to maintaining the state and its supporting dominant groups. The patron-client relationship permits state organizations and dominant classes to ignore the decreasing living standard of subordinate social groups because the state leadership, organizations (or members thereof), and dominant groups usually experience an increase in their living standards due to the patron's assistance. The economic strength gained by state structures and dominant groups can then be transmuted into political power. The inability or unwillingness to compensate for declines in the living standards of

subordinate social groups can lead to political instability as it did prior to the revolutions in China and France.

Patron assistance increases the economic strength of certain organizations in the client state resulting in an increase in the political strength of specific patron-favored organizations or groups vis-a-vis other state organizations and social groups. The patron-favored social groups or state organizations can then dominate the economic and political structure of the state by denying other subordinate social groups and state organizations representation, leverage in policymaking, or jobs. The patron-favored state organizations or social groups may gain sufficient strength to overthrow the government, or strengthen the position of the governing leader or leaders where the dissolution of elected domestic national assemblies then may occur.

In client states that face an external threat, the patron is more likely to bolster military assistance rather than economic to the client, thereby strengthening the military structure of the state versus civilian structures. This encourages military coups and increases military influence in the political system, jeopardizing not only the possibility of civilian representation in government but the long-term stability of the client state. The manipulation of assistance by the patron to

the client state to strengthen the political and economic positions of patron-favored groups and organizations can therefore determine the formation of the state. The possibility exists then to build a state according to the patron's preference. Again the danger here is ignoring the needs of less favored social groups and state organizations (civilian vs. military) within the client state.

In patron-client relationships corruption becomes an issue when existing state structures and dominant social groups are unable or unwilling to restructure or reform state structures to adequately distribute economic or military assistance among lesser groups or individuals to increase or maintain living standards. The dominant social groups and state structures instead distribute the bulk of assistance amongst themselves. The lack of reform and corruption then decreases the living standards of exploited and subordinate groups. The exploited groups then become less and less willing to support state programs for resource extraction. This becomes an internal threat to a state's longevity as well as a threat to the state's ability to deter external threats. Corruption, therefore, threatens the existence of the state by decreasing the living standards of subordinate groups necessary for the extraction of resources. The reluctance or refusal of the patron to insist on reform

and proper distribution of assistance coupled with the continued support of a corrupt client regime jeopardizes the political stability of a client state.

In conclusion, states have been formed and maintain their existence through the capacity of state structures and dominant groups to extract resources from subordinate and productive groups. The state does this to deter external threats and to keep state structures and dominant groups functioning and in control of the state. A state's inability to deter external threats creates pressure on existing state institutions and dominant social groups to increase resource extraction. Persistent increases in resource extraction decrease the living standards of social groups. The continued pressure forces social groups to reform existing state institutions either through political revolution or social revolution. Cliency influences statemaking by providing assistance selectively to patron-favored state institutions and dominant groups. These state structures and dominant groups in turn are responsible for channelling extracted resources to deter external and internal threats and to implement patron state policies. The assistance and the extracted resources maintain the existing government and keep the state in the patron's sphere of influences. Cliency contributes to political instability in the client state by providing assistance to state structures and

dominant groups which build up the strength of the repressive mechanisms in the state. The repressive mechanisms of the client state foster political instabilty through their strength to maintain the existing state structures and dominant groups in control by the suppression of subordinate, opposition, and productive groups. However, the continued coercive suppression of these groups for resource extraction in association with a decline in living standards may cause these groups to unite and revolt. The following chapter is a case study of the patron-client relationship between the United States and Vietnam. The study will analyse the history of that relationship and the role cliency had in the social revolution in Vietnam.

CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN VIETNAM

> We pay for huge highways through jungles in Asian lands where there is no transport except bicycle and foot. We finance dams where the greatest immediate need is a portable pump. We provide many millions of dollars' worth of military equipment which wins no wars and raises no standard of living.[1]

This statement in the factual epilogue of The Ugly American characterizes the mistakes of United States foreign policy and cliency in the 1950s and 1960s in Vietnam. United States involvement in the Vietnam conflict did not occur until 1947, even though Vietnamese nationalist forces, led by Ho Chi Minh, had been engaged in a war with French colonial forces since the end of World War II. The armed conflict between the Vietnamese nationalist forces and the French eventually resulted in U.S. intervention in Vietnam. United States intervention

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[1] William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1958), 282.

encompassed both indirect and direct assistance to Vietnam. The United States utilized indirect assistance by supplying economic and military aid to the French in Vietnam during the Truman Administration. Direct assistance was provided through military and economic aid to the South Vietnamese government by the Eisenhower Administration, economic aid and the build up of U.S. military advisors and equipment by the Kennedy Administration, and, finally, the continuation of economic assistance coupled with a massive infusion of troops by the Johnson Administration.

The increases in U.S. involvement in Vietnam by the presidential administrations from Truman to Johnson were directly related to the implementation of the policy of containment in the region. As the conflict in Vietnam progressed, the nationalist forces made military advances which threatened the stability of the colonial state of Vietnam and later the independent state of South Vietnam. This in return threatened the success of containment in the region. The perceptions of those threats by succeeding presidential administrations led to an increase in U.S. assistance to alleviate the threat to the state and to the implementation of the policy of containment in Vietnam.

U.S. indirect involvement in Vietnam ended with the fall of the colonial government and the French signing

of the Geneva Accords in 1954. The Accords divided the colonial state of Vietnam into North Vietnam, governed by Ho Chi Minh, and South Vietnam, headed by Bao Dai and later Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem. The Accords were perceived as a threat to containment in the region by the Eisenhower Administration, which responded by becoming directly involved in the domestic politics of South Vietnam.

United States direct involvement in Vietnam began with the creation of the independent state of South Vietnam. The United States utilized containment and cliency instruments to build a client state compatible with United States foreign policy interests. These instruments neither raised the living standard for the majority population--peasants--nor did it enhance political stability in the state of Vietnam. Instead these instruments, in the hands of both governments, enlarged the gap between the state and the Vietnamese people which had begun to widen under colonialism. This gap was the beginning of the autonomy of the state from domestic social groups. The United States sought to build a state with a democratic infrastructure that could preserve its autonomy. However, U.S. assistance eventually helped to destroy state mechanisms and oppress social groups which might have built a democratic state.

Cliency instruments were implemented by United States personnel in Vietnam and by the Vietnamese government to develop the state. The presence of an armed conflict between nationalist forces and the government of South Vietnam was one factor that influenced the apportionment of military assistance as a major part of the instruments. Although the institutions of the new state were exceedingly weak, U.S. military assistance made these institutions weaker by strengthening the repressive mechanisms of the state over the civilian representative institutions of the state. This allowed the state to insulate itself from the population of the country. The economic and military assistance favored one sector of the government over another, and some sectors of society over others. This assistance created a division between the state and society that eventually resulted in political instability.

This case study will explain how United States foreign policy contributed to political instability and revolution in Vietnam. The first part of the study will discuss the historical background of the political and economic institutions of Vietnam before French colonial occupation. There will also be a discussion of the effect of colonialism on Vietnamese political and economic structures. The second part of the study presents the strategic considerations which guided United States

foreign policy toward a deeper commitment to Vietnam beginning in the Truman Administration, proceding through the fall of the Diem regime in 1963, and ending with the introduction of U.S. combat troops in 1965. Part three will provide an explanation of the containment and cliency instruments and the effect they had on the political, economic, and social institutions of Vietnam. Part three will also detail the instruments utilized in creating the client state. The focus will be on economic and military aid implemented by South Vietnamese state institutions and United States agencies in Vietnam.

Historically, Vietnam's political and social institutions were derived from those of imperial China. The administrative structure consisted of a governing emperor, territorial and provincial administrators, and district and village mandarins.[2] District mandarins, beginning in the seventeenth century, assessed the total shares of taxes (paid in crops) to be met by the commune (collection of local villages) and corvee' (quota of personnel to be provided by the village for government projects); the village notables apportioned the amount to

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[2] Dennis J. Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 44.

be paid by each household.[3] Demands for corvee' fell on rich and poor equally.[4]

However, the key to the social and political stability in precolonial Vietnam was the village;

> Almost self-sufficient, the villages required from the government only the planning of large-scale public works (dikes) and external defense. Their councils of notables, selected by co-optation from among the senior. . .and the wealthy men of the village conducted their external affairs, organized their religious and social life. . . .[5]

The councils of notables provided the stabilizing element in the countryside by administering the political and social institutions of the village. The councils reserved portions of land for common use, organized cooperative enterprises and, as mentioned above, apportioned the common burden of taxes and conscription in the army.[6] To protect the village from harsh punishments by the mandarin government, the councils often settled petty disputes themselves rather than bringing them to the attention of the mandarin, keeping in mind that the reality of the land and its production of rice sustained the village.[7]

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[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., 58.

[5] Francis Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), 58.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid., 59.

To understand the roots of political instability in the Republic of Vietnam at the time of its independence in 1954, it is necessary first to look at the influence the French colonial regime had on the social and political institutions of Vietnam prior to independence. John T. McAlister, Jr., stated in The Vietnamese and Their Revolution, that the village in Vietnam was the important element of stability. "Vietnam owes its success throughout its history to the cohesion and enterprise of those institutions."[8] Under the dynasty, the village "enabled the population's obligations owed the emperor to be transferred to those he designated to represent his person in the provinces. The French altered this system of legitimacy."[9] French colonialism destroyed the cohesion and enterprise of the villages and circumvented the mandarin structure of government by creating provincial councils and parallel institutions. French replacement of village-appointed councils by elected officials created a group of village leaders dependent on the colonial regime.

It was the provincial councils and parallel institutions which facilitated the state control that

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[8] John T. McAlister, Jr. and Paul Mus, The Vietnamese and Their Revolution (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1970), 52.

[9] Allan E. Goodman, Politics in War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 13.

ultimately destroyed native Vietnamese institutions and divided Vietnamese society. Under French colonial rule Vietnam was divided into Tonkin in the north, the protectorate, Annam, in central Vietnam, and Cochinchina in the south. To circumvent and replace the governing strength of native Vietnamese instititions comprised of the emperor, the mandarians, and the villages, the French colonial government established province councils throughout the three states. "The members [of the province councils] were chosen by the electorate from a group made up of active and retired chiefs and deputy chiefs of hamlets nominated by the French resident superior."[10] Election to the province councils depended not upon one's ability to secure popular votes, as the village council system had, but upon the ability of one local elite to secure the votes of other local elites and, of course, the support of the French administrators.[11] The French used these councils to foster greater collaboration between their officials and the Vietnamese local elite and "as an institution [to] co-opt influential Vietnamese to support the French administration."[12] Once

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[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid., 14.

[12] De l'evolution et du developpement des institutions annamites et cambodgiennes sous l'influence francaise, [The Evolution and Development of the Annamite and Cambodian Institutions under French Influence], (Rennes, Edoneur and Ruesch, 1923), 99, cited by Allan E.

elected, the councils had only an advisory role with the French colonial government, unlike the predecessor village councils which participated directly in the precolonial government.[13]

By setting up the provincial and municipal councils in this way, the French had a mechanism to divide the Vietnamese population against itself through the assimilation of the pro-French Vietnamese. The pro-French Vietnamese elite, particularly in the south, was further coopted because much of its living standard depended on its economic and political ties to the colonial regime. Secondly, the provincial and municipal institutions eliminated the influence and importance of the village in state government. The Vietnamese peasants, therefore, had no one to represent their interests in the government, nor did the government need to accommodate peasant interests.

The consultative council or assembly was another mechanism designed to circumvent the village and coopt the Vietnamese elite. It was composed of elite Vietnamese, had limited advisory powers, and was present in each

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Goodman, Politics in War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 13.

[13] Allan E. Goodman, Politics in War, 14. The French resident superior submitted the province budget which the council voted on. The council also voted on public works projects or changes in the province boundaries. Similar functions were given the municipal councils in Saigon-Cholon, Hanoi, Haiphong and DaNang. Most importantly, during the council sessions, discussion of political issues was forbidden.

state. None of the councils could legislate except for Cochinchina and there the French governor-general set the agenda and nullified decisions at will.[14] In Cochinchina, the Colonial Council was established by the French to retain control of the state in French hands. Fourteen seats out of twenty-four were held by Frenchmen and the rest were held by members of the pro-French Vietnamese elite. The institutions of representation in the other two states were called Chambers of the People's Representatives. In Annam, where the emperor was permitted to rule according French wishes, the chamber was wholly elected and dominated by Vietnamese. In Tonkin, the chamber was Vietnamese-dominated, but one quarter of its members were local citizens considered "safe" by French authorities who were appointed to the Chamber rather than elected. These chambers by no means ensured self-government; at best, they provided an opportunity for the Vietnamese members to face their French colleagues and

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[14] Ibid. All statements made by the Vietnamese on the council had to be submitted in advance to the president of the council who forwarded them to the governor-general. Only Cochinchina could send a deputy to the French legislature and that deputy was elected by the French citizens of the colony. He represented only the Europeans and the "few thousand Vietnamese (out of a population of five million) who had gone through the French naturalization process." Bernard Fall, The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1963; reprint ed., Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 34.

express their opinions on local conditions.[15] Since the electorate in Vietnam during the colonial era was composed entirely of Vietnamese elites endorsed by, and loyal to, the French, membership on councils eliminated the need for these elites to represent any portion of the Vietnamese peasant population.[16] Indeed, these institutions became the means to rationalize the domination of a portion of the elite over the entire polity.

Overshadowing all the French created and controlled Vietnamese institutions were the French political structures in the colony. These were comprised of the French appointed Resident-Superieur of Tonkin, who governed in the name of the Emperor whom he did not consult;, the Resident-Superieur of Annam, appointed to prevent the Emperor from asserting any independence; the Residents in Annam, appointed to suppress uprisings; and, in Cochinchina, the French Provincial Chiefs, who oversaw both the Vietnamese province district chiefs (who had little power of their own). Finally, over all these French-appointed officials, was the Governor-General, who was the highest French authority in the colony.[17]

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[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid., 15.

[17] Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam, 89-90, 92.

French colonial institutions repressed the Vietnamese population. They prevented representation of the majority of the population in the government and imposed heavy conscription quotas and devices which strengthened the state government at the expense of the economic viability of the villages.

French colonial rule undermined the traditional economic structures of the village. The land was the most important recourse that provided a living for the village and, thus, for the French, the best means of funding the colonial administration. On the Red River Delta, despite local resistance, the administration made "huge land grants to a few French settlers, and more to numerous Vietnamese collaborators: minor bureaucrats, servants, cronies and those useful to the state apparatus France imposed on the region. . .[The] Mekong Delta and. . .Annam became the source of additional grants."[18] In Tonkin, Annam, and the Mekong Delta the transfer of land to French settlers was a burden on the growing Vietnamese peasant population. After 1931, pressure from population growth in Tonkin had fragmented peasant land holdings to the point where the largest to be found was not much over three acres, while two-thirds of the holdings were three-

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[18] Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 14.

quarters of an acre or less.[19] This was not much land from which to make a living and pay taxes. The shortage of land brought about by the colonial government contributed to an increase in corruption among the village notables. This occurred because of French regulations relieving notables of their community responsibility for census-taking and tax collection. The result was that notables began to hold the best land in the village for themselves.[20] This undermined the governing legitimacy of the village notables and weakened the economic and political institutions of the village.

French colonialism brought the beginnings of economic modernization to Vietnam. Large land concessions in empty frontier regions were granted to French and pro-French Vietnamese who settled the land and obtained manpower through tenants. This was the beginning of the replacement of the traditional domestic order of family farming--oriented toward production for self-sufficiency--to one of tenancy, directed toward the production of rice for export and subjected to world price fluctuations and avaricious nouveau riche landlords.[21]

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[19] Yves Henry, Conchinchie francaise [French Cochinchina], n.p., 263, cited by Dennis Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 114.

[20] Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam, 114. See also Francis Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 73.

[21] Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 14.

The colonial government's modernizations enhanced the living standards of the pro-French Vietnamese elite and the French. The standard of living for the majority peasant population declined as landownership rapidly went from communal to private individual ownership. A change in the land tenure system from 1867 until the 1940s was responsible for this. New land was opened up in Cochinchina through drainage and irrigation projects done by French engineers. These new lands were called concession lands. The lands were sold only to French citizens or Vietnamese who fulfilled the requirements of French citizenship. As a result, the lands were only sold to those who could supply capital. This attracted merchants, officials, and urban dwellers without alternatives for their savings and prevented the peasant from acquiring land. In this way, the French government recovered the cost of the hydraulic engineering projects.[22]

> By the late 1930s, 6,200 landlords with estates of over fifty hectares in Cochinchina owned forty-five percent of the rice acreage. . . . About 60,000 owned another thirty-seven percent, and at least three-fifths of the Delta was worked by tenants while nearly three-fifths of the rural population was landless. In land-scarce Tonkin, in the late 1930s twenty percent of the rice land belonged to large estates of fifty hectares--two percent of the landowning

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[22] McAlister, The Vietnamese and Their Revolution, 80, and Duncanson, Government and Revolution, 113-116.

population.[23]

By 1940 out of the six million inhabitants of the Tonkin Delta there were 965,000 landowners and of those, some 896,000 were small land owners (less than 1.8 hectares) and they owned the greatest amount of land.[24] In contrast, in Cochinchina, ownership of the land was concentrated in very few hands, while the majority of peasants were sharecroppers or tenants.[25] Those lands which were devoted to communal ownership for the village welfare comprised 20 percent of the cultivated area in Tonkin and 26 percent in Annam but only two and a half percent in Cochinchina.[26] Therefore, in Cochinchina, the French had created a privileged landowning class dependent upon the colonial administrative system.[27] The change in the system of landownership was jeopardizing the living standards of the peasant and the existence of the village, especially in the south.

The peasant's ability to earn a living off the land was rapidly decreasing. The strengthening of French colonial institutions resulted in the expansion of state

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[23] Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 15.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam, 115.

[26] McAlister, The Vietnamese and Their Revolution, 83.

[27] Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 15.

exploitation through rents, interest, and taxation. Tenants paid landlords forty to sixty percent of the yield, which in the Mekong was calculated as a fixed amount of a hypothetical yield for a "normal" year. Rents, therefore, in some instances reached eighty percent of real output.[28] Landlords frequently granted tenants loans with an annual interest of fifty to seventy percent, which deepened tenant debt.[29] The French introduced a monetary economy in the rural areas through land taxes which had to be paid in cash. This often forced peasants into the hands of usurers which also increased their debt.[30]

A smaller developing sector in the colonial economy in Vietnam was wage labor. Few Vietnamese profited from the French land grants in the north as they did in the south. Tonkin's wealth was in its cheap labor, minerals, and mines owned by the French. Tonkinese labor was exploited to develop a labor-intensive export sector. As lands were sold to wealthy landowners, who could pay the taxes and rents, landless peasants migrated to the cities in search of work. Fitzgerald points out that wages paid to the mine and factory workers should have compensated for the agricultural dislocation but these

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[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

wages were calculated on the basis of the barter economy of the village, while the taxes and prices of goods were based on the monetized urban economy. As a result, the peasant could not get ahead financially.[31] To earn money to pay taxes the worker in Tonkin had to divide his time between working in the factory for wages and in the village to raise food. This decreased village production of food but created a connection between the city and the village in the north which did not exist in the south. This later helped the Viet-Minh to organize and recruit members.

Colonialism introduced modernization to Vietnam and in so doing disrupted traditional Vietnamese political and social institutions. Under colonialism half of French capital went into building railroads and mining coal to extract Vietnamese resources to maintain the colony. The resources maintained the French colonial state but few benefits were passed to the remaining population. One effect of modernization on Tonkin was that it split society not along the usual cleavage between city/country or modern/traditional as it did in Cochinchina but between French/Vietnamese.[32] This also contributed to the relatively greater ability of the communist party later to organize in Tonkin.

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[31] Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 81.

[32] Ibid., 83.

The security of the colonial state in Vietnam required the establishment of military garrisons manned by French officers at strategic points in all three states. The lower ranks, however, were comprised of Vietnamese conscripts from villages with assigned draft quotas; deserters were replaced by men from the same village.[33] Along with the garrisons were the paramilitary forces which were composed of native volunteers. Independent of the garrisons and of each other, the paramilitary forces were concerned with internal security and were subject to military command of the Resident during an emergency.[34] The paramilitary forces were the Garde-Urbaine, the Garde Indigene de l'Indochine, the Garde Civile de Cochinchina and the Garde Indochinoise.[35] The Garde-Urbaine, the Garde Indigene de l'Indocine, and the Garde Indochinoise were commanded by the French Territorial Resident. The Garde Civile was an all-Vietnamese corps and came under the command of the Province Chiefs.[36] The indigenous personnel who volunteered for the paramilitary forces came from the villages. These native volunteers were given tax exemption privileges at the expense of the village,

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[33] Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam, 100.

[34] Ibid., 100

[35] Ibid., 101.

[36] Ibid., 101

depriving the village of scarce revenues for taxes.[37] Thus, French-led civilian and military measures to maintain security depleted the villages of essential manpower, and revenues to fulfill the mounting state requirement for taxes.

Other state institutions created by the colonial regime to maintain internal order and protect the colonial state were the local police, called the Surete'. The Surete' was primarily a detective body, a "pan-Indochina service, owing loyalty solely to the state interests of France, not to the native sovereigns of whose territory it had nevertheless a free run."[38] The legal system was based on French law. The courts tried cases according to French penal law and the only appellate courts were French.[39] The French military and legal institutions created during the colonial era created barriers between the state and the Vietnamese people which alienated and frustrated the population, enabling the state to achieve autonomy for a time through repression.

The political and social repression by the colonial state and its destruction of traditional Vietnamese social and political institutions eventually

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[37] Ibid., 101. The Garde Civile received two-fifths of its budget from the village.

[38] Ibid., 99

[39] Ibid., 96.

gave rise to anti-colonial groups among those Vietnamese educated in French schools to be administrators and teachers. One of the groups formed in response to colonial repression was the Dao Lanh, which later became the Hoa Hao sect in Cochinchina. Another was the Cao Dai movement which emerged in southern Vietnam in 1925 and by 1938 had 300,000 members.[40] Cao Dai leaders came from the local elites but their mass base consisted of poorer peasants living in the regions least affected by the French land system.[41] Many of the Cao Dai leaders held important posts in the French private and colonial bureaucracies or were landlords, and they overlapped the leadership of the Constitutionalist party, a loyally pro-French organization which sought greater legal and economic rights for the educated Vietnamese elite by working within the existing colonial system.[42] Some of the Cao Dai leaders became prominent politicians in the government of South Vietnam after the signing of the Geneva Accords.

Another nationalist group emerging at the same time as the Cao Dai was the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD)

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[40] Ibid., 127.

[41] Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 18.

[42] Ibid.

or Nationalist Party of Vietnam, located in Tonkin.[43] It was eventually shut down in Tonkin by the Surete' because it was successful in subverting the Garde Indochinoise resulting in the murder of all its French officers at Yen Bay in 1930.[44]

The Vietnamese Communist Party was formed in Hong Kong in 1930. Ho Chi Minh had been working in Shanghai for the Comintern and organized the meeting in Hong Kong at the request of the Soviets. The three disunited Vietnamese factions also sent representatives to Hong Kong at the request of the Soviet Comintern. This meeting resulted in the uniting of the various communist factions in Vietnam and the creation of the Vietnamese Communist Party. However, the Soviets did not care for the nationalist flavor of the title and ordered the name changed to the Indochina Communist Party.[45]

The election, in May 1936, of the Popular Front in France, which had a more lenient colonial administrative policy, helped the Party grow in Vietnam. The Popular Front government freed some political prisoners and authorized political parties and newspapers to operate

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[43] Ibid., 127. The VNQDD was considered a branch of the Kuomintang (KMT) or Nationalist Party of China and was a large non-communist organization in Tonkin.

[44] Ibid., 128-129.

[45] Duncanson, Government and Revolution, 143-144. See also Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 27.

openly. This provided the opportunity for the "Indochinese Democratic Front" under Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap to put out its own newspaper soon followed by the opening of eight pro-Communist newspapers.[46] The Indochinese Democratic Front, led by Vo Nguyen Giap and Pham Van Dong, supported guerrilla activity along the main highway from Hanoi into China.[47] In May, 1941, the Viet-Minh (Brotherhood for an Independent Vietnam) was created. Most of the recruits to the organization were living in China along with Ho Chi Minh, who had been forced out by the French and Japanese. When Ho and his troops returned to Vietnam he worked with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the United States intelligence group in Vietnam, to help recover downed American pilots.

The end of World War II saw the survival of three intact Vietnamese political organizations in Vietnam. These groups were the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai, sects which were strongest in the south, and the Viet-Minh whose strength was in the north. The primary impetus leading to the destablization of the colony of Vietnam after World War II, however, was the crippling blow that the war dealt to French administrative and repressive institutions. This provided the opportunity for the Viet-Minh to move

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[46] Bernard Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, 38.

[47] Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam, 147.

for independence. The fighting within Vietnam during the war had placed the Viet-Minh of the north on the side of the Vietnamese peasants and independence. The cooperation of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects and the pro-French Vietnamese elite of the south with the governing Japanese and Vichy government officials, however, placed these southern groups in opposition to independence in the minds of the Vietnamese peasants. Also, incidents such as the agreement by the French colonial government to supply the Japanese with Vietnamese rice, which contributed to a devastating famine in the north in 1945 and cost almost two million lives (approximately two-fifths of Tonkin's population), helped the communists recruit peasants to fight the Japanese and then the French.[48]

The vacuum of power in Vietnam following the Japanese defeat at the end of World War II provided the opportunity for the creation of a new state under Ho Chi Minh, who proclaimed Vietnamese independence and established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on Hanoi in September 2, 1945. This initiated a military conflict between the Viet-Minh militia and the French army which was attempting to reestablish French rule in Vietnam.[49]

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[48] Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 36.

[49] The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, Senator Gravel ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), Vol. 1, 15.

In January 1946 the Vietnam National Assembly was created in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.[50] The Communist Party in Tonkin established "Administrative Committees," later called "Resistance Committees," which developed a network of cadres in the villages to "mobilize all the inhabitants of town or village into vocational, age-grade, or similar association[s];. . .to [assign them] tasks in suppport of the war efforts."[51] The Communist Party was successful in creating institutions which mobilized the peasant population against the French in the north. But the French were able to maintain a strong colonial hold in the south. They had the support of the Vietnamese elite, a strong military presence, and there was no well organized Viet-Minh in the south.

The French were unsuccessful at subduing the communist army in the north despite significant amounts of United States aid. United States economic and military assistance to the French in Vietnam began in 1947 under the Truman administration with a $160 million dollar grant to equip French forces in Indochina.[52] Recognition of the French-backed Bao Dai regime by the Truman Administration in May 1950 brought the approval of $150 million dollars

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[50] Goodman, Politics in War, 19.

[51] Duncansom, Government and Revolution in Vietnam, 168-169.

[52] James William Gibson, The Perfect War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), 58.

in financial aid; in 1951 U.S. aid reached $450 million; in 1953 $785 million; and, by 1954, the military aid program reached $1.1 billion, seventy-eight percent of the French war burden.[53] The U.S. aid maintained the colonial institutions in the south because the military and economic aid agreements between the United States and France required that the aid be directed through the French in Vietnam. United States aid could not, however, prevent the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu at the hands of the Viet-Minh. This military setback speeded the multilateral negotiations resulting in the Geneva Accords which divided Vietnam in 1954 into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north, headed by Ho Chi Minh, and the Republic of Vietnam in the south, nominally headed by Emperor Bao Dai but in reality governed by the French. Therefore, in 1954, the French continued to control the state institutions and retained the support of key social groups in South Vietnam. The Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, pro-French elites in business and government in the cities, the large landowners, the Surete', and the police, groups and institutions that had for years favored the French and exploited the peasant remained strong supporters of the new state.

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[53] Neil Sheehan, Hedrick Smith, E. W. Kenworthy, and Fox Butterfield, The Pentagon Papers, New York Times ed. (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), 10. See also James William Gibson, The Perfect War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986), 59.

What about the international events which influenced the application of containment by the United States government in the late 1940s in Vietnam and established the Republic of Vietnam as a client state in 1954? United States support for French military action against the communists in Tonkin was minimal until the start of the Korean War. The initial policy of the Truman Administration regarding Vietnam was a "hands off" policy. In October 1945, it looked like this:

> [The] US has no thought of opposing the reestablishment of French control in Indochina. . . . However, it is not the policy of this GOVT to assist the French to reestablish their control over Indochina by force. . . . French claim to have the support of the population of Indochina is borne out by future events.[54]

Letters sent by Ho Chi Minh requesting United States support for Vietnamese independence went unanswered, along with French requests for United States recognition of French sovereignty in Vietnam.[55] Ho sent the letters

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[54] The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, 16-17.

[55] These letters were sent on February 27, 1946. On March 6, 1946 Ho Chi Minh signed an agreement with the French government which affirmed French recognition of the Republic of Vietnam (Tonkin) as a "Free state having its own government, parliament, army and treasury belonging to the Indochinese Federation and the French Union." On June 1, 1946, the High Commissioner for the French in Vietnam, Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu, [without the authorization of the French government] recognized the Republic of Cochinchina as a "Free State with its own army, parliament, finances, etc," in much the same terms as the Republic of Vietnam. This was taken as a betrayal by the

hoping that the U.S. would support him and his revolution. His hopes were based on Roosevelt's anti-colonial stand against the French, the intervention by U.S. authorities to have him freed from prison in China in 1944, and his work with the Office of Strategic Services in Vietnam.[56]

In 1947 and 1948 the containment policy of the United States was being applied in Europe, Japan, and China but not in Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union had established "satellite police states in Poland, Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and [had] threatened Italy, Greece, Finland, Korea, the Scandinavian countries and others."[57] It was the success of the communist party under Mao Zedong in toppling the regime of the Nationalist government in China in October 1949, that altered the perception of the United States government toward domestic insurgency in Asia in a negative way. The result was the expansion of the policy of containment to Asia. The Pentagon Papers state,

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French of the agreement made between the French government and Ho Chi Minh and the Viet-Minh. Quoted from Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, 73-74.

[56] Fall, The Two-Viet-Nams, 51-52; 82-99.

[57] NSC 7, film reels, 2.

> Events in China of 1948 and 1949 brought the United States to a new awareness of the vigor of communism in Asia, and to a sense of urgency over its containment. U.S. policy instruments developed to meet unequivocal communist challenges in Europe were applied to the problem of the Far East. . . . Concurrent with the development of NATO, a U.S. search began for collective security in Asia; [and] economic and military assistance programs were inaugurated.[58]

United States policymakers began to see communism in monolithic terms, and believed that the Soviet Union was behind the revolutionary insurrection in Southeast Asia. The fall of the Nationalist regime in China was considered by the Truman Administration to be a "grievous political defeat" for the United States that threatened to spread communism to Southeast Asia.[59] A National Security Council document written in March 1949 confirms this view, and indicates the beginning of the development of the domino principle to justify United States containment policy.

> [C]olonial-nationalist conflict provides a fertile field for subversive communist activities, and it is now clear that southeast Asia is the target of a coordinated offensive directed by the Kremlin. . . . [I]f southeast Asia also is swept by communism we shall have suffered a major political rout the repercussions of which will be felt throughout the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East and in a then critically

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[58] The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed., 35.

[59] NSC 51, "U.S. Policy Toward Southeast Asia," March 29, 1949, National Security Council documents (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, Inc.), film reels, 6.

> in the Middle East and in a then critically exposed Australia. . . . [N]on-communist base areas in this quarter of the world--Japan, India, and Australia--depend. . .on the denial of SEA to the Kremlin.[60]

Another factor which spurred increased United States involvement in Vietnam was the recognition of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in January 1950. The United States countered this act by officially recognizing the government of Bao Dai in the Republic of Vietnam in February 1950. The administration's perception of the growing influence of the People's Republic of China in the Pacific was further strengthened by the invasion of South Korea by the North Korean army in June 1950. This elevated the strategic importance of Southeast Asia to such a degree that the stability of Europe and the United States were linked in a domino fashion to the loss of a "single state of Southeast Asia."[61]

> [T]he loss of any single country would probably lead to relatively swift submission of or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of this group. . .the rest of Southeast Asia and India, in the longer term, of the Middle East. . .would. . .follow. Such widespread alignment would endanger the stability and security of Europe. Communist control of all of Southeast Asia would render the U.S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain precarious and would seriously jeopardize fundamental U.S. security

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[60] Ibid., 6-7, SEA countries included Indonesia, Indochina Vietnam, Cambodia (Kampuchea), Laos, Burma, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines.

[61] The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed., 197.

interests in the Far East.[62]

The invasion of South Korea led to the deployment of troops there by the Truman Administration and increased military assistance in the Pacific generally. This marked the beginning of the development of client states in the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, and, later, in the Republic of Vietnam. Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to Taiwan; he stepped-up military assistance to and military forces in the Philippines and increased military assistance to French forces and "the Associated States in Indochina," dispatching a military mission to Vietnam and assigning the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) to Indochina in August 1950.[63] The military mission referred to was the Erskine Mission headed by Major General Graves B. Erskine. The mission reported that a permanent solution to the "Indonchina Crisis" went beyond military action alone. The "core problem" was a deep seated hatred among the population for the French. The amount of aid requested by the French would be inadequate to resolve the situation. (MAAG will be discussed in more depth in the section on

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[62] NSC 124/2. "United States Objectives and Course of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia," June 25, 1952, National Security Council Documents (Frederick: University Publications of America, Inc.), film reels, 1-2.

[63] American Foreign Policy 1950-1955, Vol. 11 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), 2540.

cliency instruments.) Under the Truman Administration, however, Vietnam was a lower priority due to the military demands of Korea.

After the armistice was signed in Korea in July 1953, the Eisenhower Administration concentrated on developing a foreign policy requiring a less dynamic and expensive mode of intervention. Eisenhower's "new Look" in foreign policy was set out in the October 1953 National Security Document NSC 162/2. This policy emphasized "regaining the initiative" as the administration perceived it, and maintaining economic stability while lowering defense expenditures.[64] Costly ground force was to be avoided in favor of strategic bombing and massive nuclear retaliation to counter communist expansion.[65] Yet, measures needed to be developed to contain the increase in third world insurgencies perceived by the administration as communist inspired and supported by China and the Soviet Union. The administration carried on the perspective embraced by Truman and outlined in NSC-68, that if any nation, regardless of its geographic location or strategic potential, embraced communism, then American security was endangered.[66] This justified and required increases in foreign aid to third world nations. To

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[64] Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 136, 147.

[65] Ibid., 150.

[66] Ibid., 137.

compensate for minimal use of United States ground forces the U.S. government increased covert operations in third world nations and increased military and economic assistance to pro-Western nations, particularly in the Pacific. This shift can be seen in Table 1. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles set the tone for United States foreign policy toward Vietnam in the Eisenhower Administration with his statement that indicated the presence of the domino principle in foreign policy formulation. Dulles states that if "communist forces" overtook Indochina "they would surely resume the same pattern of aggression against the other free peoples in that area."[67] The French defeat at the hands of the nationalist forces in Vietnam was perceived as a threat to containment in that region by the Eisenhower Administration. The Administration was neither successful neither in keeping the French fighting in Vietnam, nor preventing them from signing the Geneva Accords. Therefore, to shore up containment in the area, Secretary of State Dulles began to develop the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). The SEATO members, however, saw the organization as a deterrent against attack from the Chinese, whereas the U.S. stipulated that its involvement would be limited to cases where the aggressor

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[67] Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed., Vol. I, 98.

was communist.[68] SEATO provided the context for the establishment of an American-protected state in the southern half of Vietnam.[69] The Eisenhower Administration began supplying the Bao Dai government and later President Ngo Dinh Diem's regime with military and economic aid and covert assistance (which will be discussed in the next secton). The stated intention of the Administration was to build democracy in South Vietnam, however, the cliency instruments provided made this impossible. The military and economic assistance that was provided helped to develop the repressive institutions of the state.

During the Eisenhower Administration the focus was on Laos as the nation that was the primary front on which to contest communist power in Indochina.[70] A neutral Laos was not acceptable to the Administration, which provided covert assistance to right-wing groups led by Prince Boun Oum and General Phoumi Nosavan and resisted the formation of a coalition government with the communist-backed forces of the Pathet Lao or the centralist forces of Prince Souvanna Phouma.[71] The actions taken by the Eisenhower

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[68] George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How the U.S. Became Involved in Vietnam (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 72.

[69] Ibid., 75.

[70] Ibid., 128.

[71] R. B. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War: The Kennedy Strategy (New York: St. Martins Press, 1985), 30.

Administration following the Accords were calculated steps leading a direct and deeper involvement in Indochina was than characteristics of the earlier years with the French.[72]

The Kennedy Administration's foreign policy was called Flexible Response or the "New Frontier." This foreign policy initially stated that the United States would be secure in a world where nations could determine their own futures.[73] Diversity in societies was acceptable and adherence to democratic values was not required.[74] This was in contrast to the Eisenhower Administration's requirements that the Third World nations accept democracy and be staunchly anti-communist. The Kennedy Administration differed from the Eisenhower Administration in that it accepted genuine neutrality as a part of logical policy for the new nations emerging from colonial rule in the Third World.[75] However, the Kennedy Administration would not accept losses of territory that would jeopardize its access to resources or ability to "create the type of environment it desires."[76]

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[72] Ibid., 92.

[73] Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 203.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Smith, International History of the Vietnam War, 23.

[76] Ibid.

Essentially, then, the administration was saying that nations could be diverse as long as they didn't interfer with U.S. interests.

As a strategy, flexible response denied the notion that there had to be financial limits on the defense of U.S. global interests. The strategy set out to expand the measures by which the U.S. could respond to a perceived threat in communist expansion. The Administration wanted the capability to respond to Third World nationalist movements without having to rely solely on a nuclear deterrent, which would escalate risks beyond the original provocation.[77] The Kennedy Administration wanted options to respond to perceived communist expansion below the nuclear level. By eliminating the financial barriers which were present under the Eisenhower Administration, the Kennedy Administration was free to expand "the arsenal of limited overt and covert countermeasures. . .to make crisis-mongering, deeply built into Communist ideology. . .an unprofitable occupation."[78] This administration took very seriously President Nikita Krushchev's promise in January 1961 to support wars of national liberation in the Third World. Also the perception in this and the previous administration was that the People's Republic of China was

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[77] Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 214.

[78] Rostow draft, "Basic National Security Policy," March 26, 1962, 173-174, cited by Gaddis, The Strategies of Containment, 214.

a growing threat to the stability of the Pacific region, especially in Southeast Asia. The domino principle was part of this administration's thinking as it had been during the Eisenhower years. President Kennedy believed that if Vietnam "fell to communist insurgency" then all of Southeast Asia would follow.

> No, I believe it, I believe it. . . . China is so large. . .that if South Vietnam went, it would not only give them improved geographic positions for a guerrilla assault on Malaysia but would also give the impression that the wave of the future in Southeast Asia was China and the Communists.[79]

International factors which influenced the administration to adopt an aggressive third world policy were the successful revolution in Cuba in 1959 by what the administration perceived to be primarily pro-Soviet forces, the failed Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961, the Berlin Crisis in August 1961, and the growing erosion of Laotian neutrality by Soviet and Chinese backed forces. In May 1960 civil war broke out in Laos because the CIA backed Royal Army led by General Phoumi jailed the leader of the Pathet Lao, Prince Souphanouvong, and denounced the Geneva Accords in a bid for unrestricted American military aid.[80] In response, Hanoi and the Soviet Union began sending aid to the Pathet Lao. President Kennedy wanted

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[79] President Kennedy, quoted in "Falling Dominoes," Theodore Draper, New York Review of Books, October 27, 1983, 14.

[80] Gelb and Betts, The Irony of Vietnam, 65.

to intervene in Laos with U.S. troops but the beginning of the Berlin Crisis prevented this. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) advised Kennedy that intervention in Laos would require 60,000 troops and permission to use atomic weapons if Chinese forces intervened.[81] The JCS informed the President that if another crisis were to occur elsewhere forces would have to be pulled from Europe where the crisis in Berlin had become acute.[82] As a result, the Administration settled on negotiating for a neutralist solution in Laos and on concentrating U.S. support in Vietnam. This choice was readily supported by the JCS.[83] President Kennedy's statement addresses some of the international factors influencing his decision to become more involved in the third world.

> The message of Cuba, of Laos, of the rising din of Communist voices in Asia and Latin America--these messages are all the same. . . our security may be lost piece by piece, country by country. . . . We intend to re-examine and reorient our forces of all kinds. . .for a struggle in many ways more difficult than war.[84]

The administration was concerned that the appearance of reluctance to intervene in Laos would encourage Soviet and

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[81] Kahin, Intervention, 128.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Ibid.

[84] U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service), John F. Kennedy, 1961, 23.

Chinese support of the insurgency in Vietnam. The Pentagon Papers summarized the administration's reasoning for an increased commitment in Vietnam: "After the U.S. stepped back in Laos, it might be hard to persuade the Russians that we intended to stand firm anywhere if we then give up on Vietnam."[85] This indicates a shift in strategy from the Eisenhower Administration which believed that Laos was the country in which the United States should confront communist forces. The change to Vietnam required the Kennedy Administration to increase military and economic aid, along with military personnel sent as advisors, in order to strengthen the government of the client state. The administration, therefore, by deciding to make its stand for containment in South Vietnam, deepened its commitment to maintain the client state.

The change from Kennedy to Johnson saw no changes in the staff and little change in the international environment, but did involve a change in the perception of the extent of the United States' commitment in Vietnam by the President, Lyndon Johnson. The Johnson Administration was responsible not only for the deepest commitment by the United States in Vietnam but also for ending the patron-client relationship. Cliency ended because the government of the client state was no longer capable of implementing

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[85] The Pentagon Papers, New York Times ed. (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), 87.

the policy of containment in South Vietnam. The result was the massive large-scale utilization of United States combat troops in South Vietnam beginning in 1965 (as part of flexible response) which ended the patron-client relationship. This administration carried flexible response so far because it too was committed to maintaining United States credibility. The Eisenhower Administration perceived Laos as the country to maintain U.S. prestige in the region, whereas Presidents Kennedy and Johnson saw Vietnam as the watershed of United States credibility if not of the entire the policy of containment. Vietnam was explicitly regarded as the test case of United States capabilities to stop wars of liberation. Johnson's commitment to the credibility of the United States deepened the U.S. commitment in Vietnam.

> American responsibility is a fact of life which is palpable in the atmosphere of Asia, and even elsewhere. The international prestige of the United States, and a substantial part of our influence are directly at risk in Vietnam. There is no way of unloading the burden. . .there is no way of negotiating ourselves out of Vietnam.[86]

Its commitment to United States credibility and its inability to maintain containment through the client state, led the administration to increase the number of combat troops and military aid sent to South Vietnam when the military regime there seemed unable to run the

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[86] Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 126.

government and fight the communists. Therefore, the failure of the client state to implement containment resulted in the direct intervention of U.S. troops and the termination of cliency in Vietnam.

The implementation of containment during the presidential administrations from Eisenhower to Johnson directly affected the evolution of domestic events in Vietnam after the Geneva Accords. The process of developing the patron-client relationship began in 1954. As the French colonial apparatus withdrew in 1954 and 1955, the United States stepped in to replace it as the patron of the new state. The Emperor, with encouragement from the United States, chose Ngo Dinh Diem to be premier of South Vietnam. It was under the leadership of Diem that the patron-client relationship blossomed between the United States and the Republic of Vietnam.

The following analysis begins in 1954. The Eisenhower Administration set out to create a strong state, and a strong government as part of that state, so the client could implement containment. The United States chose to do this by strengthening state institutions, and the mechanisms that protected and supported the government. However, in so doing, the United States created a state that was dependent upon the U.S. government for its continued existence. Because of United States assistance, Diem was able to consolidate and

centralize his control of state institutions, elites, and constituency groups in the government of the new client state. This enabled him to govern for a time without his government or the state feeling the effects of resentment from societal or institutional organizations. Diem's refusal to include other elites in the decision-making process of the state system, the absence of functional civil representative state institutions in the decision-making process, and the strengthening of the military institution increased state autonomy.

However, this condition was not permanent for several reasons. State autonomy created conditions that formented political instability in the new state. Political instability occurred because the state did not have strong institutions that could survive without the Diem regime and because of the repression dealt by the military, state officials, and supporting elites to subordinant social groups. The weakness of state institutions and increased opposition to the state contributed to the fall of the Diem regime and the state that existed under him. This occurred because the regime and the state were one in the Republic of Vietnam. Therefore, when the Diem regime eventually collapsed in a military coup, state institutions also collapsed and the military took control by maintaining or creating new state governing institutions. Thus, the key to the failure of

cliency in Vietnam lies in U.S. support of the Diem regime and its centralization of state control in the government.

In 1954, when direct U.S. involvement began in South Vietnam, the state was a cacaphony of small independent territorial, ethnic, and religious organizations such as the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai in the Mekong Delta area whose armies had been funded by the French, the Binh Xuyen mafia-style organization in the Saigon area, the Montagnard tribe in the Central Highlands, the Chinese, the majority Buddhists and the minority Catholics most of whom were refugees from the north. The United States, through the cliency instruments, helped Diem build an autonomous state by consolidating a power base which eliminated some groups while strengthening and coopting others. Just as colonialism permitted the state to suppress the indigenous dominant class, so cliency allowed the dominant state institution and class to repress subordinate groups. Within South Vietnam, without much political or military interference from any of these groups, Diem and his family ruled, primarily through repressive mechanism.

Consolidation of state control began with the filling of cabinet positions. Diem's idea of a secure government was one where family members held these positions. Of the nine cabinet ministeries in his first government Diem held three, three other relatives, Tran

Van Chuong, Tran Van Do, and Tran Van Bac also served the father-in-law of his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, was an ambassador, Nhu's wife's uncle was foreign minister, and another relative was minister of education.[87] Two other in-laws, Nguyen Huu Chou and Tran Trung Dung, held the key positions of Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary of State for National Defense.[88] The Pentagon Papers summarized Diem's family in this way, "The President's family thus became an entirely extra-legal elite which in class and geographic origin, as well as religion, was distinct from the South Vietnamese as a whole."[89]

Diem and the United States relied on successful consolidation of state control by strengthening Diem's ability to control the military. This choice was made because Diem had no widespread social base of support from which his government could control the state. United States Air Force Colonel Edward Lansdale was sent by Allan Dulles, head of the CIA, to Vietnam to work as CIA station chief for domestic affiars to help the Diem regime consolidate power.[90] Lansdale prevented a coup in 1955 by informing the commander-in-chief of the Vientamese army,

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[87] Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 86. See also The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed., Vol. I, 299.

[88] The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed., Vol. I, 299.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 104.

General Nguyen Van Hinh, that United States military aid would cease if a coup occurred. Then Lansdale shipped Hinh off to the Philippines.[91] After this, military subsidies were channeled through Diem's office giving him greater control of the army. In 1955, Diem went on to crush the sect armies (with the help of bribes paid to the armies by the United States) and the Binh Xuyen mafia which controlled the National Security Police.[92] The Surete' discredited itself in the eyes of Diem by continuing to work for French and sect interests. It languished without government funding until its remnants were combined into the National Police in 1962.[93] Diem increased his control over the officer corps in the army by weeding out those officers predominantly loyal to the French and creating new officer schools in areas loyal to himself.[94] Once Diem was sure of the army's loyalty, the army became the beneficiary of United States supplies and training by United States advisors working out of MAAG (Military Assistance and Advisory Group). United States military assistance also guaranteed a paycheck for Vietnamese military personnel and this induced loyalty to

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[91] Ibid., 105.

[92] Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 106. See also The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed., 297.

[93] Duncanson, Government and Revolution, 258.

[94] Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 89.

Diem. However, much of the training and supplies were not utilized by the client to engage the enemy. Some training was wasted because Diem often gave his generals orders not to pursue the enemy or sustain casualties.[95] The Vietnamese generals themselves were reluctant to risk casualties because Diem did not want to lose troops which he depended on to defend the palace in case of a coup. To risk the displeasure of Diem would also jeopardize the generals' promotions.

Petty jealousies also plagued the army. In one instance a Vietnamese major refused to move his regiment against the Viet-Minh because he did not wish to "share his big victory with another regiment" much to the chagrin of the presiding United States advisor, Lt. Col. John Paul Vann.[96] From the late 1950s through 1961 the threat of denying a promotion and the guarantee of pay kept generals in the Vietnamese army loyal to Diem. This enabled Diem to control the army, the police which had been taken over by the military in 1956, and the province chiefs who were his military appointees. By 1962, the American advised and supplied Vietnamese army and security system was in place. "The village chiefs reported to the military district and province chiefs, the province chiefs to the

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[95] Neil Sheehan, A Bright and Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1988), 122.

[96] Ibid., 87.

three (later, four) corps commanders, and the corps commanders to the presidential palace."[97] Because the district chiefs and corps commanders were only accountable to Diem they were not afraid to abuse peasants or to ignore peasant problems in their areas.

Diem used the repressive mechanisms of the army, paramilitary groups, and the police to arrest the opposition to his regime, detain the opposition without trial, quell demonstrations and forceably remove and relocate peasants. The number of political prisoners jumped from 3,000 in 1959 to 276,000 in 1962. This number included criminals, women, and children rounded up by military patrols through villages. They were not only imprisoned but also interrogated, lectured, and released.[98] Rapport between the peasants and military was poor because of the many incidents of troops stealing from, and physically harassing villagers. The military did little to improve its image among the peasants who had to live in wooden shacks while government-appointed military province chiefs, whose allegiance was to the Diem regime that paid them, lived in villas.[99] The U.S. military and economic assistance strengthened the

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[97] Ibid., 87.

[98] Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam, 403.

[99] Sheehan, A Bright and Shining Lie, 49.

Vietnamese army to the point where it could supply Diem with the means to maintain his regime in control of the state.

The next phase of consolidation was to coopt the National Assembly. Elections for representatives to a Constituent Assembly were held in 1956 and for the National Assembly in 1959. Most of the candidates were selected, designated, or asked to run by the inner leadership of the government party while others were approached by province chiefs and other officials.[100] The result was an elected assembly which acceded to the wishes of President Diem. The prohibition on the formation of new political parties went unchallenged by the assembly. The previously established nationalist parties such as the Dai Vet, and Vietnam Quaoc Dan Dang (VNQDD) and the Hoa Hao had difficulty finding a place in the new regime and were only representative of elite military and civil servants.[101] Elections for village chiefs and members of municipal councils were abolished; instead people were appointed to these positions by the province chiefs, thereby giving Diem state control down to the village

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[100] Robert Scigiano, "The Electoral Process in South Vietnam: Politics in an Underdeveloped State," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 4 (May 1960), 15, cited in Allan E. Goodman, Politics in War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 21.

[101] Ibid., 22. See also Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 319.

level.[102] The assembly during Diem's reign was called into session only three times, always to rubber stamp his policies. Often Diem simply ruled by presidential decree. The National Assembly's approval of Ordinance 47 in 1956 and Law 10/59 provided the legality for imprisoning those opposed to the regime and detaining anyone suspected of being a communist or working with communists.[103] The regime's repressive measures harassed and alienated a large number of non-communist social groups.

The Can Lao party (Personalist Labor Revolutionary Party), was a parallel structure of the regime that worked solely to provide the Diem regime with security and control of the state by surrounding it with loyal elite supporters. The party was organized by Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu.[104] It was comprised of approximately 16,000 members in 1959; it was directed by Diem and Nhu.[105] By controlling recruitment, Diem and his family could guarantee the loyalty of key persons in both the state and the army and purge from both any French

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[102] Ibid. See also Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1965), 133.

[103] Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 89.

[104] Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 86.

[105] Ibid.

loyalities as well as any other opposition.[106] Can Lao members of the army were at times able to give orders to their non-Can Lao superiors. Under Nhu's leadership, the party took over much of South Vietnam's organized crime in order to build up its treasury.[107] The five man cells of the party existed throughout the government structure and the Vietnamese Army. They were able to exert a strong influence on the advancement of civil servants and senior field commanders often at the expense of military proficiency.[108] The Can Lao party helped keep control of the state and the government in the hands of the Diem family and its loyal supporters.

The Catholic minority (1.5 million) in South Vietnam was the social group which benefitted most from the Diem regime and this group was the largest element in Diem's social base of support.[109] The United States provided large amounts of aid to resettle Catholic refugees from the north.[110] Diem's regime was heavily staffed with Catholic administrators; many of the senior officers in the military were Catholic; and Catholic

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[106] Ibid.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, 250.

[109] Shaplen, The Lost Revolution, 192.

[110] Sheehan, A Bright and Shining Lie, 137.

villages were favored over the rest.[111] The Diem officials worked closely with Catholic priests and villages, providing them with the bulk of United States relief aid. The Catholic villages had the right to "take lumber from national reserves and were given monopoly rights over the production of new cash crops introduced by the American aid technicians."[112] Catholic villages also received the most land grants to build schools and hospitals with the help of assigned soldiers and were given priority for loans under the government's agricultural credit system.[113] Following a saying that first became popular under the French regime, "Turn Catholic and have rice to eat," many villages converted en masse to Catholicism to obtain aid and avoid resettlement.[114] By 1963, many of the district and province chiefs, as well as many village leaders, were also Catholics. This preferential treatment of Catholics eventually alienated the regime from the majority Buddhist population.

While building his own autonomy Diem repressed, alienated, and intimidated many social groups. His attempt to create an autonomous state involved a process

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[111] Fitzgerald, A Fire in the Lake, 139.

[112] Ibid.

[113] Shaplen, The Lost Revolution, 191.

[114] Fitzgerald, A Fire in the Lake, 139.

of trying to control the collection of revenues for the state. This was done by intimidating and applying repressive measures to the Chinese population. In the early 1950s the Chinese were one-tenth of South Vietnam's population but held over one-half of the private capital invested in commerce, industry, and artisan shops, plus nearly all of the larger hidden capital.[115] The Chinese controlled over four-fifths of the retail trade, and dominated textiles, import-export, transport, metalworking and other trades. Legally, they were subject only to their bangs--congregations or villages. In order to control the economy and taxation of business, Diem, in 1956, granted Vietnamese nationality to all Chinese born in Vietnam and required them to Vietnamize their names. The bangs were dissolved and their property confiscated. Diem then banned foreign nationals from eleven categories of economic activity which together formed the basis of Chinese domination of the economy.[116] The Chinese were then given a year to liquidate and turn their businesses over to Vietnamese. The Chinese reaction was to refuse Vietnamese nationality and conduct their business behind various facades. Diem's actions only mobilized this

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[115] Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 88.

[116] Ibid., 89.

social force against him; afterward, the Chinese invested no more than necessary to maintain their businesses.[117]

The Montagnards in the Central Highlands were other targets of the regime's repressive measures. The only tribe that would support the Vietnamese government and defend the mountain region was the Rhade tribe.[118] After Diem came to power, he insisted that the Montagnards adopt Vietnamese language and customs. Diem also refused to recognize the Montagnards' rights to land in the Central Highlands and continued to resettle Vietnamese on the land.[119] Vietnamese officers and troops discriminated against the tribes and had a strong dislike for them. All of this came to a head in 1964 when the Montagnards rebelled against the Vietnamese.[120] This resulted in the disgruntled tribes remaining in the jungle, where they provided food and transport to the Viet-Minh.

The Buddhists became a major problem for Diem as a result of his repression. The Buddhists constituted 11 million out of the country's 15 million people. When Diem instituted the strategic hamlet program the Buddhist peasants had to do the physical labor involved. The strategic hamlet program required peasants to leave

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[117] Ibid.

[118] Shaplen, The Lost Revolution, 177.

[119] Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 317.

[120] Shaplen, The Lost Revolution, 178.

ancestral ground. Often, when they were relocated, it was farther inland where the land was inferior and life more dangerous due to the close proximity of the Viet-Minh.[121] Most government positions went to Catholics rather than to Buddhists, and this also alienated the group. The response by the Buddhists to years of alienation and repression at the hands of the Diem regime eventually brought about its fall.

The peasants were another group the Diem regime was able to suppress. This was done through its land reform program. The repressive system of land reform alienated the peasants, particularly in the Mekong Delta area. In 1954, forty percent of South Vietnam's 2,300,000 hectares of riceland was owned by one quarter of one percent of the rural population; about a fourth of the large landholdings were French, and the rest were owned by wealthy Vietnamese or by the Catholic Church.[122] Diem fixed the maximum rents at 25 percent of the crop yield and confiscated French-held lands while limiting Vietnamese-held land to 115 hectares.[123] The Vietnamese peasant was forced to pay rent and sometimes back rent on land which the Viet-Minh, in 1954, had given them freely.[124] Landlords were allowed

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[121] Ibid., 192.

[122] Ibid., 142.

[123] Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 93.

[124] Ibid., 94.

to keep the best land and sell the surplus mainly for bonds. To pacify the landlords and businessmen, however, Diem lowered their taxes.[125] By 1961, when the program was almost over, Diem had collected 422,000 hectares plus the French-owned lands, or about 650,000 hectares total.[126] Of these, 244,000 hectares were redistributed after 1958, mainly to Catholic refugees or to former soldiers and new landowners living in urban areas.[127] Land owned by absentee landlords was not distributed freely and the biggest reason for the failure of the program was that huge amounts of land were obtained by members of the Diem family from French or Vietnamese landlords, and were not distributed to the peasants.[128] Another land reform plan which alienated the peasants was initiated in 1959 when Diem began the "agroville" program. This program was intended to resettle the rural population in order to isolate it from the communists. The plan required the peasants to tear down their homes taking the materials with them and leaving their ancestral lands for and acre and a half of new land.[129] After a year and a

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[125] Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 138.

[126] Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 93.

[127] Ibid.

[128] Shaplen, The Perfect War, 83.

[129] Ibid., 143.

half the program was dropped because of peasant opposition.

The strategic hamlet system was instituted in 1962 as a substitute for the agrovilles. The Kennedy Administration believed that the strategic hamlets would secure the loyalty of the villagers for the Diem regime. In reality, the strategic hamlets were "an attempt by a weak government to control physically people it did not understand because of antagonistic class and religious differences."[130] Many of the peasants who moved to the hamlets ended up with no land at all or they had to walk many miles to their fields each day and back to the fortress.[131] Most of the peasant families did not voluntarily take part in the strategic hamlet program which was financed by the United States. U.S. advisors and material were supplied to transfer thousands of peasants to areas the South Vietnamese and United States governments believed defensible against communist attack. The first of these transfers took place in March 1962 and was called Operation Sunrise. Peasant response to the operation was an example of the overall reluctance of most Vietnamese peasants to take part in strategic hamlet relocations. The operation also indicated the government's necessity and willingness to utilize

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[130] Gibson, The Perfect War, 83.

[131] Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 166.

repressive mechanisms to implement the hamlet program and suppress peasant opposition. In Operation Sunrise, only 70 of the target families volunteered; the remaining 135 were forced from their homes by the Vietnamese army and their dwellings were burned.[132] Very little of the money the United States allocated for the operation actually reached the peasants, who had left their homes with few belongings. Instead, the Diem government withheld the funds to make sure the families would remain in the hamlet. Of the more than 200 families in the group, only 120 males had remained behind to provide security for the hamlet, indicating that the rest had gone over to the Viet Cong.[133] The number of strategic hamlets actually established was roughly half of those reported to have been set up to the Vietnamese government and the United States. In 1963 approximately 8,600 strategic hamlets were reported established but the number estimated by U.S. officials in 1964 indicated that there were only 1,200 operational hamlets.[134] It is probably true that large numbers of peasants were uprooted as a result of the strategic hamlet program, earlier resettlement programs, and United States reliance on firepower to secure rural

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[132] The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed., Vol. II, 149.

[133] Ibid.

[134] Kolko, The Anatomy of War, 134.

areas after 1962. The exploitative treatment of the peasant population by the South Vietnamese and American government enabled the communists to secure the loyalty of the peasants and increased the opportunity for political destabilitzation.

In contrast, the land reform programs of the Viet-Minh in the late 1950s, and of the National Liberation Front (NLF), formed in 1960, did not require peasants to destroy their homes, move to different areas, or live with strange villagers in a new hamlet. After the Geneva Accords, the Viet-Minh, in accordance with policy established by the government in North Vietnam, set out and removed the landlords by assassination or by driving the off the land. The land was then redistributed to the peasants. Much of the land in Cochinchina had been redistributed to the peasants. However, when Diem consolidated his control of the state the redistributed land was returned to the landlords, who required the peasants to pay back taxes. In 1957, the Viet-Minh, in an effort to gain the support of the peasants and regain lost territory, implemented a land reform program. The first phase involved redistribution of uncultivated land and the land of absentee landlords to middle, poor, and landless peasants.[135] The amount of land distributed to the

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[135] William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), 215-216.

peasants averaged one-half acre per family. Eventually, collective groups or co-ops were formed, some with common land and tool ownership. For the poor and middle peasant, the co-ops provided stability and "offered a structured system of poor- and middle-peasant control and participation in village government."[136] The Viet-Minh and then the NLF trained and sent cadres to live and work with peasants in villages and hamlets encouraging villagers to help the NLF regain territory which the peasants knew would be distributed to them. Taxes were initially on a voluntary basis and only gradually did they become compulsory.[137] By 1964, according to NLF statistics, almost four million acres of land had been distributed to peasants.[138] The NLF cadres were also instructed to protect the villages from landlords, or in most cases the landlords' agents, or the military which was sent to collect taxes. By working to maintain and protect the traditional Vietnamese structure of the village, rather than destroying and relocating it as the Diem land reform programs required, the NLF was able to obtain the support of the peasants against the Diem regime. This condition weakened a vitally important element necessary for state survival. The loss of support

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[136] Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 68.

[137] Ibid., 216.

[138] Ibid.

and control of the majority population increased political instabilty within the client and diminished the state's ability to maintain control.

The military contributed substantially to the political instability of South Vietnam. The political power of the military grew with United States assistance and support. The state depended upon the army to collect taxes and rents in the provinces, to protect villages from the communists, and to protect the palace in Saigon. The building of strategic hamlets was supervised by the Vietnamese army. Diem relied heavily on the army to protect him and keep his regime in control of the state. Growing discontent among junior officers in a paratrooper company led to the first attempted coup against Diem in 1960. But, the growing unrest within the military did not encourage the United States to support an alternative to Diem at this time. Kennedy's policy, outlined in National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 111, sought to create a "limited partnership" with the Diem regime.[139] A telegram sent by the administration to Ambassador Frederick Nolting on November 14, 1961, stated that the United States government "would expect to share in the decision-making process in the political, economic and military fields as they affected the security situation."[140] When this was

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[139] Ibid., 113-119.

[140] Ibid., 126.

brought to Diem's attention, he balked at the idea of a partnership. Diem felt that he could resist reforms requested by the United States that would jeopardize his control of the government since he was confident that he controlled the state with the support of the military, his family, and loyal social groups such as the Catholics. In December, the administration sent a telegram backing down on the demand of a limited partnership and reforms, and settling for a "close partnership."[141] The Kennedy Administration perceived no real alternative to Diem's leadership and therefore did not push for political, military, or economic reforms. Maintaining the containment policy in Vietnam was more important than whether there was dictatorial leadership in a client state. What eventually changed the administration's perception of Diem's leadership were the Buddhist revolts and the effect they had on the Vietnamese military.

The Diem regime's use of repression against the Buddhists and other social groups, coupled to the growth in strength of the military, led to the downfall of the regime and the state as Diem and the United States had created it. The Diem regime exercised repressive measures against the Buddhists through the military and police. The repression united Buddhists against him. The Buddhist rebellion, beginning in May 1963, negatively affected

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[141] Pentagon Papers, New York Times ed., 109.

United States support for the Diem regime. The rebellion began in Hue at the time of the 2,507th anniversary of the Buddha's birth in response to government enforcement of a two-year ban on flying religious flags. The Catholics in Hue were celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of Archbishop Thuc's consecration as bishop by flying the Vatican flag, and Thuc's pictures were all over Hue. In response, the Buddhists showed their flags and demonstrated on May 8, 1963. Troops commanded by Ngo Dinh Nhu responded by killing nine demonstrators. The regime refused to admit wrongdoing. This further alienated the Buddhists and stirred the Kennedy Administration into pressuring Diem to mollify the Buddhists by accepting responsibility for the incident. The administration called Ambassador Nolting, who could not get Diem to admit responsibility, home and replaced him with the more assertive Henry Cabot Lodge. Through June and July there were several incidents of hunger strikes, demonstrations, and self-immolation by Buddhist monks. Nhu and his wife ridiculed the bonzes, increasing the Kennedy Administration's concern over the stability of the regime.[142] Major concern by the Kennedy Administration for the regime surfaced after Ngo Dinh Nhu's troops raided Buddhist pagodas in the major cities of South Vietnam on

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[142] The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed., Vol. II, 228.

August 20, 1963. Diem declared martial law but military support for the regime was diminishing as a result of the attack on pagodas. The generals approached United States representatives in Saigon regarding the possibility of Kennedy Administration support for a coup. The commander of the South Vietnamese armed forces, General Tran Van Don, spoke directly with an officer of the United States Central Intelligence Agency.[143]

At this point, the Kennedy Administration believed that the Diem regime was jeopardizing containment and formulated measures to insure that the implementation of containment would continued in South Vietnam. This led to U.S. support of the military as alternative leadership in the client state. On August 24 the following cable from Washington drafted by Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Michael Forrestal, National Security Council staffer on Far Eastern Affairs and Roger Hilsman, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence, was sent to Ambassador Lodge, with the President's approval:

> US Government cannot tolerate situation in which power lies in Nhu's hands. Diem must be given chance to rid himself of Nhu and his coterie and replace them with best military and political personalities available. If in spite of all of your efforts, Diem remains obdurate and refuses, then we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot

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[143] Ibid., 233.

be preserved.[144]

Ambassador Lodge cabled back to Secretary of State Dean Rusk,

> Believe that chances of Diem's meeting our demands are virtually nil. . . . Therefore propose we go straight to Generals with our demands, without informing Diem. Would tell them we prepared have Diem without Nhus but it is in effect up to them. . . .[145]

In August, one attempted coup was aborted due to an imbalance of forces within the South Vietnamese army. The actions of the regime regarding the Buddhist uprising, coupled with disregard for United States opinions on the matter, turned the leadership of the Vietnamese army against the regime. In October, President Kennedy authorized covert contacts with the dissident generals, to "identify and build contacts with an alternative leadership. . . ."[146] With no cooperation from Diem regarding changes in his government, Kennedy suspended the commodity import program, cut Special Forces funds for Vietnamese forces, and, when Diem and Nhu did not respond to these measures, suspended foreign aid in the form of payments to Colonel Le Quang Tung's Special Forces and

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[144] Ibid., 734.

[145] Ibid., 735.

[146] Ibid., 250. See also, Leslie Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1977), 89.

Nhu's palace guard.[147] Additional pressure was applied against Nhu by the withdrawal of John Richardson, the CIA chief in Saigon, who was identified with the Nolting ambassadorship and who favored a more conciliatory approach to the regime.[148] Contacts at this time also increased between Lt. Colonel Lucien Conein, a CIA officer at the Saigon embassy, and senior generals of the Vietnamese army. Most of the contacts were intended to convey the Kennedy Administration's support for a direct coup and the possibility of a new regime. There is no evidence of U.S. participation in the planning of the coup. Conein (and subsequently Ambassador Lodge) was kept informed of the progress of the coup plans developed by the Vietnamese generals.[149]

U.S. support for a coup focused on the strongest and most cohesive organization in South Vietnam--the military. The coup and subsequent political ramifications occurred because the U.S. believed that only through backing the military could containment and cliency prevail. The November coup plotters consisted initially of two main groups with the generals emerging dominant in the end. The first group was the Tuyen or Thao group, so-

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[147] Gelb and Betts, The Irony of Vietnam, 90.

[148] The Pentagon Papers, Senators Gravel ed., Vol. II, 254.

[149] Ibid., 252-255.

called because of the names of its successive leaders. It was formed in June by Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen, Director of Political Studies (national intelligence) under Diem. It involved elements of the Ministeries of Civic Action and Information and certain subordinate elements of the Army.[150] Dr. Tuyen's group had planned two coups during the previous summer but in both cases did not have the support to pull them off. The Diem regime discovered Tuyen's plotting and forced him to leave the country in September 1963. The group then merged with a separate group of middle level officers headed by Lt. Colonel Phamh Goc Thao.[151] As this grouped planned coups, key personnel were transferred by the Joint General Staff (JGS) under General Tran Van Don who was aware of the group's plans and wanted to frustrate them.[152]

The second group of plotters was composed of senior generals of the Vietnamese Army. The Pentagon Papers named the leader of this group as General Duong Van Minh, and the other members as General Tran Thien Kheim, General Tran Van Don, and General Le Van Ki.[153] The latter three were stationed in Saigon without troop

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[150] Ibid., 264.

[151] Ibid.

[152] Ibid.

[153] Ibid.

command. General Minh was the palace military advisor.[154] General Minh was responsible for the military operation of the coup itself. General Don was the liaison with the Americans and responsible for wooing General Ton That Dinh, commander of III Corps and the Saigon Military District. General Kim handled the planning for the post-coup government.[155] At this time Nhu became aware of the coup plans and developed his own plan for a "pseudo-coup" which required that General Dinh order the transfer of Colonel Tung's forces out of Saigon before a phony coup that would have Diem and Nhu escape to a hideway. Nhu's plan then envisioned the loyal 5th and 7th divisions counterattacking the city, and Diem and Nhu returning, more secure than ever.[156] This never transpired. General Dinh did order the special forces group under Colonel Tung out of Saigon on maneuvers on October 29. However, whether he was acting for the generals or the palace remains unclear. The chief of intelligence who had been a member of the Thao group was working with the generals and passed phony intelligence concerning a Viet-Minh build-up outside Saigon to Diem and Nhu, getting them to divert loyal units that could have thwarted the coup.[157]

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[154] Ibid.

[155] Ibid., 264-265.

[156] Ibid., 266.

[157] Ibid., 267.

On November 1, the generals successfully mobilized a majority of loyal forces. Marine and Air Force units under the leadership of Vietnamese junior officers, and units from the 5th Division under orders from Dinh attacked. They were deployed in positions near the palace, the barracks of the palace guard, and the special forces headquarters near Tan Son Nhut Air Base.[158] By the end of the day General Van Thanh Cao, the general commanding the IV Corps area near Saigon and the Delta, pledged his support for the coup but was placed under guard.[159] Diem and Nhu fled the palace only to be captured by General Mai Huu Xuan, a long-time enemy, who gave permission for troops to kill them.[160] The generals clearly would not have been capable of a coup without United States approval nor could they have successfully planned and implemented the coup without United States training and equipment of Vietnamese troops. The generals utilized the power they had obtained from United States assistance to overthrow Diem and form a new government and state.

The military was able to reorganize the state according to its own wishes because it had United States

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[158] Ibid.

[159] Ibid., 268.

[160] Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed., Vol. II, 269.

support. The Kennedy Administration chose to endorse the military to assure that the implementation of containment was carried out in South Vietnam. Control of the state by the military was assured because it possessed the capability to suppress any unrest. It was the largest and most cohesively organized non-communist group in South Vietnam. Exercising its control of the state, the military, in the four days following the coup, abolished the National Assembly, eliminating any possible arena for the development of opposition or the inclusion of any other elites in the government. The power of the military to repress all other state institutions and social groups, however, created a cycle of political instability after the fall of the Diem regime.

Coups and countercoups by General Khanh and Air Marchal Ky, and the lack of any civilian representative institutions, paralyzed the state, making it incapable of eliminating internal and external threats and thereby jeopardizing containment. Military committees and councils were formed and utilized as state institutions in the years following the overthrow of Diem in an attempt to consolidate power in the hands of the military. The Military Revolutionary Committee, created by the military regime that was headed by General Duong Van Minh after the fall of Diem, represented only the military elites. The Armed Forces Council was another state structure formed by

the military to consolidate its power. This structure replaced the Military Revolutionary Committee after a coup by General Nguyen Khanh in 1964 to overthrow Minh. After the coup, the Pentagon Papers indicated that the military was able to increase its power within the state.

> The high turnover of district and province officials around the time of the Khanh coup put ARVN officers everwhere; and the corps commanders gradually consolidated their power throughout 1964.[161]

Years of U.S. assistance to strengthen the military institution of the client left the civil institutions in South Vietnam weak and incapable of countering military power, thus eliminating civilian representation in the government. Government unresponsiveness to the needs of the elites and subordinate groups created the conditions for continued political instability. Civilian institutions that were allowed by the military were not permitted a decision-making role in the government. The Council of Notables--a group of fifty-eight men and two women--lacked the power to enforce or implement any agreements or policy produced by the group. This lack of representation provoked political unrest among the civilian elites. Buddhists and Catholics began demonstrating against each other and the

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[161] Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed., Vol. II, 278.

military government for representation.[162] The rivalry among Buddhist, Catholic, and military elites established an impentrable barrier toward the building of social and political stability in South Vietnam. The strength of the military locked out the civilian elites from any decision-making roles in the government. The civilian governments created under Prime Minister Tran Van Huong and Dr Phan Huy Quat were both overthrown by military coups because they lacked the unity and power to counter the strength of the military. The continued U.S. support for the military regimes, which refused to include civilian elites in the government, weakened and destabilized the state.

The military governments were unable to stablize the state. These governments lacked strong state institutions which could have deterred the internal and external threats posed by the increasing NLF insurgency and supported by the government of North Vietnam. As a result, the implementation of the policy of containment and cliency was threatened and the U.S. government had to take countermeasures to decrease the threats to the client. As domestic support for the client government diminished and political instability continued the U.S. implemented measures to decrease the influence of the NLF and the North Vietnamese in the south. U.S. sponsored across-border guerrilla operations in North Vietnam under

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[162] Ibid., 300, 135.

OPLAN 34A, with South Vietnamese-trained soldiers and U.S. advisors, however, were not successful at discouraging North Vietnamese support for the NLF. The leaking of information regarding these operations by General Khanh on July 19, 1964, was followed one week later by the alleged attack on the destroyer Maddox by North Vietnamese PT boats. This incident provided President Lyndon Johnson with the opportunity to extract the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution from Congress which authorized the President to "take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force" to aid any Southeast Asian state.[163] This provided the Johnson Administration with the pretext for sending in U.S. ground forces in 1965. The insurgency continued to increase in South Vietnam throughout 1964 and into 1965. There was an increase in military confrontations between the NLF and the Vietnamese army which the Vietnamese army lost. The Vietnamese army appeared incapable of defeating the NLF forces and in February 1965 the NLF attacked the American barracks at Pleiku airbase and Duinhon. In a response that escalated the implementation of containment in South Vietnam, President Johnson ordered reprisal bombing raids over North Vietnam. The instability of the South Vietnamese government and the weakness of the Vietnamese army in

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163 The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed., Vol. III, 145-146.

battle required the Johnson Administration to increase U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Therefore, to maintain containment in South Vietnam, the Johnson Administration authorized the deployment of a contingent of American soldiers to Vietnam in April 1965 and 53,000 regular combat troops in June 1965.[164] This marked the end of the cliency period and the beginning of a massive military intervention by the United States.

The Instruments of Cliency and Containment

United States military, economic, and diplomatic instruments of containment and cliency helped foster the political instability that led to the fall of the Diem regime and to the military machinations following it. The type and quantity of the instruments applied by the United States in Vietnam explain why certain state institutions and social groups were strengthened over others, thereby causing political instability.

United States economic and military assistance had gone to Vietnam since the French returned after World War II. However, direct United States assistance to the new South Vietnamese government began in 1955 after the appointment of Diem as Prime Minister. Much of this aid was utilized to subsidize the Vietnamese government, pay for the cost of the South Vietnamese armed forces, and pay

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[164] Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 347.

for trade deficits.[165] It was the allocation of aid by the United States and South Vietnamese governments into primarily security and military programs that favored the development of military more than civilian groups in the state. As Tables 2 and 3 show, large sums of assistance went to the Diem regime to finance the budget and the military and as indicated on Table 2, security supplement assistance was included with economic assistance.

In order to understand how United States economic assistance affected the growth of certain groups in the state of South Vietnam it is useful to look at the effect the aid had on social and state organizations and how the aid was used. Much of the economic assistance from the United States was dispersed through the Agency for International Development (AID). The United States took an active role in establishing the National Bank of Vietnam into which counterpart funds of the Commercial Import Program were deposited.[166] The Commercial Import Program (CIP) was one of the largest programs funded by AID. The purpose of the CIP was to industrialize the nation, increase the availability of consumer goods to peasants and the middle class, finance the armed forces and supplement the budget of the South Vietnamese govern-

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[165] Ibid., 136.

[166] Larry Berman, Planning A Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1982), 14.

ment.[167] The modernization of South Vietnam, however, only resulted in decreasing the living standards of the peasants. Economic assistance increased the control the Diem regime, the military, and supportive elites had over the repressive mechanisms that were used on subordinate groups. More than seventy percent of United States economic funds supported the CIP.[168] Vietnamese importers (preference was for the industrial importer) obtained CIP import licenses. The importers then ordered foreign goods to be paid for in dollars by the United States government, which put their value in piastres into a counterpart fund for the United States to supplement the budget.[169] With this fund the Saigon government could pay the salaries of the military and the loyal civil servants. From 1956-1962 CIP piastres provided almost half the state revenue of the Diem regime.[170] Expenditures on the CIP program continued to increase in 1962-1965, going from 95 million dollars in

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[167] Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam, 287.

[168] Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam, 287.

[169] Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 138. See also Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 225.

[170] Institut de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, [Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies], Annuaire statistique du Vietnam, [Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam], (Saigon, 1962), 432-433, cited in Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam, 406.

1962 to 398.1 million dollars in 1965.[171] Unfortunately, this program only benefitted government officials and merchants.[172] The program resulted in the importing of mostly luxury products, such as televisions, watches, Hondas, and motorcyles to meet the needs of wealthy citizens who could use and purchase them.[173] There was also evidence that some economic assistance from the import program and other foreign aid was hoarded by the Vietnamese government in the Bank of Vietnam to increase foreign reserves. These funds were spent by the government as it chose such as to close a trade deficit in 1960, rather than on the economic reform projects to benefit subordinant groups like the peasants, as was stipulated by the United States.[174] This assistance helped to coopt and gain the support of other social groups such as the business sector, Catholics in and out of the government, and the military. For a time this helped to deter unrest in the urban areas.

The Food for Peace Program (PL-480) exported rice, milk, tobacco, cotton, wheat, and industrial machinery to

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[171] U.S. Congress, Senate, Government Operations, Improper Practices, Commodity Import Programs, U.S. Foreign Aid, Vietnam, Hearings before subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 1st sess., April 25, 1967, 2.

[172] Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 138.

[173] Ibid., 466.

[174] Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, 305-306.

South Vietnam because the rural population was unable to maintain an adequate production of food for the entire population from 1956-1965.[175] Diem feared the political backlash from possible food shortages, and encouraged imports, particularly of rice. One result of the massive importation of basic commodities was to make South Vietnam more dependent on U.S. imports. The rice imports kept the price low which benefitted the urban population but discouraged the peasants from expanding rice production, keeping their standard of living low. Table 2 shows the massive increase in assistance from the Food for Peace program, particularly from 1962 to 1965. Food for Peace aid increased substantially from 11.3 million dollars in 1960 to 49.9 million dollars in 1965. This increase may have been dictated by the effects of the strategic hamlet program and the peasants' inability to tend crops due to relocation and the increase in communist insurgency in rural areas. However, this program contributed to the destabilization of South Vietnam because it decreased the living standard of the peasants by decreasing the price of rice--their primary crop.

United States economic assistance also helped to finance industrialization in South Vietnam, mostly in the Saigon area. A large cement plant at Ha-Tien was completed along with a hydro-electric installation at Da

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[175] Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, 294.

Nhim not far from Saigon. In addition, a shoe factory, two textile factories, a Michelin tire plant, a glass plant, and a paper plant were all constructed in the Saigon area.[176] The cement plant and the hydro-electric facility were rendered unuseable after 1963 due to communist sabotage.[177]

The public works financed by the United States in Vietnam served primarily to meet military rather than civilian needs. There was a restoration of a major railway from Saigon to the seventeenth parallel, along with a great deal of road construction.[178] Irrigation and drainage projects were implemented in Annam which became the I Corps and and II Corps areas. The Plain of Reeds project in this area created forty miles of canals. Tonkin refugees were resettled there mostly as a political move by Diem who believed the presence of refugees would decrease insurgency in the area.[179] In addition to the above measures, economic assistance was utilized for schools, flood and refugee relief, and malaria control but these programs reached only a small portion of the

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[176] Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam, 241. See also Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, 301.

[177] Ibid.

[178] Ibid.

[179] Ibid., 242.

population.[180] There is evidence that AID advisors and assistance were procured to train the Vietnamese national police.[181] These large scale economic projects did little to improve the living standards of the peasants and gave them few reasons to support the government.

U.S. Military Assistance

The main purpose of the United States military assistance program in the Republic of Vietnam from the Truman to the Johnson Administrations was to decrease domestic unrest by strengthening the ability of the Vietnamese armed forces to maintain domestic security. This involved assistance to the various branches of the Vietnamese armed forces and to paramilitary groups, such as the national police and civilian defense groups. It also financed the movement of civilians under the strategic hamlet program.

Military assistance, however, benefitted only one state institution--the military. The assistance facilitated the destruction of civilian and social institutions in the state. This was accomplished through the development of repressive mechanisms that were implemented against the civilian institutions in government and the political and social institutions of

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[180] Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 137.

[181] William Colby, Honorable Men, My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 176.

the villages in which lived the majority of the state's population. This enabled the military to maintain control over the state under Diem and subsequent military regimes. Military assistance fostered the growth of repressive mechanisms within the state which led to the alienation of elites and subordinate groups from the Diem regime, thereby destabilizing the state. United States military assistance provided guns, munitions, helicopters, aircraft, and boats for the South Vietnamese armed forces. United States military assistance was also used to increase the number of troops in the Vietnamese armed forces. Table 3 shows that military aid at times accounted for one half or more of all the military expenditures of the Vietnamese government, including amounts allocated to the payment and housing of troops. Military expenditures comprised forty percent of the Vietnamese budget for fiscal years 1957-1960 and fifty percent or more of the budget for fiscal years 1961-1965. The increases in military aid in the 1960s paralleled increases in United States MAAG advisors and in the Vietnamese armed forces which were used to implement the counterinsurgency program developed in 1961 by the patron for the client state. Total military advisors, which included naval, MAAG, technical, CIA, and other combat support personnel, grew rapidly after 1960. With United States military assistance, these advisors trained

Vietnamese armed and paramilitary forces, repaired military equipment, and trained health personnel. Many advisors also fought in battles with the South Vietnamese army against the growing communist insurgency.

United States military assistance financed the United States agencies in Vietnam that implemented the instruments of containment and cliency. MAAG in South Vietnam was created in 1950 by President Truman after the invasion of South Korea. Its functions in Vietnam in the early 1950s were limited to the provision of materials and military assistance to French forces in Indochina and to information gathering.[182] After the Geneva Accords, MAAG took on the task of training the Vietnamese army and grew from 324 advisors in 1954 to over 4,000 in 1965. The advisors initially were concentrated at the upper levels, with the commanding Vietnamese generals, but eventually went to the battalion level, and by 1963 were at the district and sector levels.[183] After 1961, MAAG was also responsible for advising the Self Defense Corps (the local militia) and the Civil Guard Forces (provincial level forces which originated from the colonial La Garde

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[182] The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed., Vol. I, 197.

[183] The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed., Vol. II, 198.

Indigene) in the rural areas.[184] Military Assistance Program (MAP) funds were increased in 1961 to fund the civilian regional and popular forces. These civilian units, formed in 1955, were responsible for the defense of provincial and local areas around villages and strategic hamlets. In 1961 there were 32,000 paid civilians in the Civil Guard and 107,000 in 1965.[185] The increases in the number of civilians in the Civil Guard were stipulated and approved by the United States with the idea that the Guard would enhance the client's ability to implement containment in the state. Instead, this increased military control over the state and its capacity to harass the peasants. MAAG was also used as a front to move CIA personnel into South Vietnam and throughout the country. An example of this was the Saigon Military Mission whose personnel were included in the MAAG numbers in order to get into South Vietnam in 1954. This was necessary because one means of implementing containment in South Vietnam was through utilization of covert intelligence projects. These projects required trained U.S. intelligence personnel to initiate programs that would strengthen the client state.

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[184] The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed., Vol. II, 38-39. See also Sheehan, A Bright and Shining Lie, 55.

[185] The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed., 39 and 511.

The CIA in South Vietnam was another instrument of containment and cliency utilized by the United States. In 1954, the Saigon Military Mission was established. Headed by Colonel Edward Lansdale, it trained paramilitary groups in South Vietnam to infiltrate North Vietnam on sabatoge and propaganda missions.[186] It was also Lansdale's assignment to assist President Diem in strengthening his control over the government and the state. The personnel under Lansdale at the Saigon Military Mission trained Diem's bodyguards and provided him with a direct channel to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother the head of the CIA, Allen Dulles.[187] Lansdale also forestalled coups in order to shore up the Diem regime. By 1961, the CIA had set up a "Vietnamese private air-transport corporation--VIAT--and arranged that it contract with some experienced pilots from the CIA's old friends on Taiwan" to fly covert missions over North Vietnam.[188] Most of the CIA missions into North Vietnam were halted by 1963 due to their lack of success. The CIA trained the paramilitary groups in a program called the Citizens' Irregular Defense Groups. This program trained and armed Montagnard villagers to defend villages and the region

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[186] The Pentagon Papers, New York Times ed., 54-66.

[187] William Colby, Honorable Men, 144.

[188] Ibid., 170.

against attack.[189] This was effective against the NLF until the policies of the Diem regime and subsequent regimes alienated the Montagnards. The CIA assisted the People's Forces program under the direction of Nguyen Can, Diem's brother, which trained Vietnamese peasant cadres to move into rural communities and live and work with the community.[190] This program proved unsuccessful since many of the cadre were either killed by Viet Cong in the villages or deserted to the NLF. In 1965, the People's Forces group became the Revolutionary Development Teams, still financed by the CIA.[191]

CIA support went to the Vietnamese Special Forces who attacked Buddhist pagodas in the major cities in Vietnam in 1963. U.S. financing and training of these troops created a deadly repressive mechanism for the client that was responsible for the escalation, in 1963, of political instability in South Vietnam. These forces were independent of the regular South Vietnamese Army general staff command structure and reported to Nhu and Diem in the Palace.[192] These forces permitted the Diem regime to selectively and quickly mobilize against any opposition.

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[189] Ibid., 169.

[190] Ibid., 169.

[191] Ibid., 233.

[192] Ibid., 209.

In addition to these programs, the CIA in Vietnam had officers informing the United States Embassy in Saigon of the status of the 1960 and 1963 coups to overthrow Diem. CIA personnel working with the generals in 1963 before the overthrow of Diem, by their very presence, encouraged the formation of a coup, thereby helping to destabilize the client. Colonel Lucein Conein kept the embassy informed of the 1963 coup developments from the information he received from Vietnamese generals. After the coup he paid 42,000 dollars to the troops involved.[193]

The primary diplomatic instrument implemented for the defense of South Vietnam was the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, formed two months after the Geneva Accords were signed in 1954. Its members included the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand with South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia added as protocal nations. The treaty stated that in cases of aggression by armed attack from outside, each SEATO member was "to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes," while in cases of subversion, each member was to "consult with other signatories in order to agree on

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[193] David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972), 289, cited in Gelb, The Irony of Vietnam, 90.

the measures to be taken for common defense."[194] These statements do not support the United States contention that it had a commitment to defend South Vietnam according to the treaty. The treaty stated that other members would consult with each other on common defense measures in the event of an attack on a member. The treaty, however, was used to justify further United States intervention in Vietnam to the U.S. Congress. "SEATO was to be the new shield against further Communist expansion."[195] After failing to prevent the French from signing the Geneva Accords, the Eisenhower Administration, with most of the encouragement coming from Secretary of State Dulles, put SEATO together in the belief that it would stop further communist advances. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson utilized it to justify to the American public and the world the increase in the commitment of United States and SEATO personnel to Vietnam and also to maintain the policy of containment in the region. Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, Roger W. Hilsman, in June 1963, stated that "If any of these nations is attacked the United States is committed to help defend it."[196] The United States used the SEATO agreement to procure personnel from

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[194] George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United States in Vietnam (New York: Delta Books, 1969), 62.

[195] Gelb and Betts, The Irony of Vietnam, 62.

[196] The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel ed., 822.

member states to help with its commitment in Vietnam. Professional trainers from Australia eventually contributed one-tenth of overall troop strength with new Zealand not quite a tenth, and Philippine troops were also employed.[197]

SEATO was also utilized by subsequent administrations to justify intervention in South Vietnam to Congress and the world, thereby keeping alive the possibility of containment in the region. This enabled each administration to continue to implement the instruments of containment and cliency that created new weak state structures but crippled traditional structures in South Vietnam, which ultimately destabilized the client.

In conclusion, cliency in Vietnam resulted in the destruction of society. It was the destruction of society and the institutions that represented it--the National Assembly and the village--that resulted in political instability in South Vietnam. The instruments of containment and cliency, as implemented by the United States and the government in South Vietnam, eliminated civilian representative institutions and oppressed many of the social groups which could have helped to build the civilian sector of the state. The reliance on military

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[197] Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam, 291 and 368. See also Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 456.

power to strengthen and consolidate a government and develop state autonomy utilized resources which could have help build civilian institutions. The creation of an autonomous state which represented and met the needs of only a minority of the population destroyed whatever political stability existed in the new state of South Vietnam. Also, the majority of the instruments of containment and cliency were alien to the domestic environment of South Vietnam. Many of the peasants only wanted a few acres of land to live on and a village to live in as their sole means of political stability. The instruments that were provided clearly forced the peasants away from their land and villages into strange hamlets and cities which gave little protection from the state or from the military conflict, and provided little means with which to make a living. The modernizing nature of the instruments helped to destabilized and destroy society. Cliency ended with the direct intervention of U.S. troops not only because the presiding government could not stabilize the state and fight the communists, but because the patron-client relationship was no longer mutually beneficial. Only the patron was benefitting from involvement in Vietnam in 1965 because the presence of U.S. troops assured the implementation of containment. The domestic distruption caused by the implementation of beneficial for

Vietnamese society and for state stability in South Vietnam.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

State-society relationships play an important role in state-building by maintaining the internal order of the state through resource extraction. A state that is unable to extract sufficient resources to meet its needs and those of society will experience cycles of political instability until order is either restored or the state falls due to revolution. States that experience an external threat involving military conflict, similar to that of South Vietnam, are under an additional burden of having to increase resource extraction for war. The case of South Vietnam indicated that increased resource extraction due to state expansion or response to external threats can result in decreased living standards for society. The case of South Vietnam also shows that a substantial decrease in the living standards of society due to resource extraction can compromise state-society relations to the point of political instability.

Extraction of resources either fosters or precludes political instability in the state. The case of South Vietnam shows how state extraction of resources led to political instability. In South Vietnam, the repressive means of extracting resources through taxes and the unequal distribution of land decreased the living standards of the majority population of peasants while protecting and enhancing the living standards of the minority population of elites. Repression was utilized by the state in order to develop autonomy from societal groups such as elite opposition groups, peasants, and other subordinate groups like the Buddhists and Montagnards. Repression of society involved detention, assassination, forced movement from village land, beatings, harassment, and discrimination in jobs and landrights. However, the employment of repression by the state to consolidate its power alienated the most important resource of the state and its mechanism for extraction of resources--the people--particularly the peasants and the opposition elites. In the process of building state autonomy, the Diem government appointed village council leaders, province chiefs, and district commanders, and eliminated the National Assembly. The lack of civilian representation of the majority population and opposition elites within the political infrastructure of the state enabled the state to build autonomy but also

resulted in the alienation of society. This alienation weakened state-society relations in South Vietnam, causing political instability. Special attention should be given to the lack of representation of South Vietnamese society at the village level because this is where the breakdown in state-society relations undermined the political stability of South Vietnam. Since the village council leader was appointed he often did not take action to meet the villagers' needs. Therefore, the villagers stopped supporting the Diem government. The Viet-Minh utilized the village in the political infrastructure of the communist movement by including the peasant in the decision-making process of the village. As a result, the peasants were easily persuaded to support the communists against the state. The alienation of the peasants from the state enabled the Viet-Minh to build and maintain a stronghold in the rural areas of South Vietnam. This hindered the production of food and recruitment of soldiers, both of which are vital for a state fighting a war. The repression of the peasants and members of the opposition elite by the Diem regime prevented the development of institutions representative of the population which could have helped to unite and stabilize the state. Therefore, the repression employed by the state destroyed the political infrastructure of society in South Vietnam. The creation of state autonomy deprived

both state and society of the political infrastructure needed to decrease the tension between society and the state. This weakness in the state-society relationship resulted in political instability.

As seen in the case of South Vietnam, the impact of cliency on state-society relations can result in the development of state institutions which are repressive and nonrepresentative of the population. This impedes the development of cooperative state-society relations. Cooperative state-society relations include society in decision-making, essential for the long-term political stability of the state. The cliency instruments, as applied in South Vietnam, helped the Diem government build an autonomous state by strengthening its repressive mechanisms. The state was then able to consolidate its power through the ruling regime. The instruments supplied by the U.S. government strengthened the repressive institutions of the state at the expense of civilian representative institutions, thus eliminating any rival for power. In this way, cliency fosters the repression of society by the state. In South Vietnam, the United States, through the instruments of containment and cliency, strengthened the repressive institutions, thereby encouraging Diem and subsequent regimes to employ repression to maintain control of the state. This destroyed any state-society relations which could have

encouraged communication between South Vietnamese society and the state. Without the cliency instruments, the state would not have been able to continue the repression of society. Therefore, the instruments of containment and cliency, as implemented by the U.S. and South Vietnamese governments, facilitated the destruction of state-society relations in South Vietnam.

Cliency binds the state to the government in a dependent relationship that diminishes the role of society in the state, thereby making the state too weak to function when the government changes. This was seen in South Vietnam. Cliency in South Vietnam created a state that survived only as long as the government was in control. Cliency weakened the state of South Vietnam by consolidating the power of the state in the government and preventing society from having a role in the decision-making processes of the state. Once the power of the government was threatened the stability of the state was also jeopardized because the existence of state institutions depended on the survival of the government. When the Diem regime fell, the only institution left to govern was the military. Its ability to control the state was dependent on continued U.S. support, the lack of strong rival state institutions (because the Diem family was removed), and the previous absence of civilian representative institutions. A government controlled by

the military guaranteed the continuation of the repression of society, thereby feeding the cycle of political instability in the state.

Cliency becomes nonbeneficial to the client state when the instruments of the patron create a state so weak and dependent that the patron must continue to provide a large amount of assistance to maintain the state. When cliency reaches the point where the patron must deploy thousands of its own soldiers to maintain the client, or the client is so strong that the existence of the state is no longer dependent on the patron, then the cliency relationship ends. In South Vietnam, the massive influx of U.S. troops ended cliency.

Cliency as a mode of containment is influenced by the same events that affect the policy of containment. Cliency also precipitates alterations in the implementation of containment. These alterations then influence state-society relations in the client state. The implementation of containment by the United States has been highly dependent on cliency. Cliency negates the need to deploy massive amounts of patron soldiers all over the world, enabling the patron to husband its resources, and providing the opportunity to build and protect democratic states. Domestic changes in the political stability of a client state, in an area perceived as strategic by the presidential administration, directly

influences the imnplementation of containment. This was seen in South Vietnam. As presidential administrations from Truman to Johnson perceived a decline in the political stability of Vietnam and later South Vietnam, the instruments of containment were altered to bolster the policy in the region. In the case of South Vietnam, this usually meant an increase in the military instruments because of the military conflict. International events also influence containment and cliency, particularly those involving China and the Soviet Union which had a strong effect on the strategic significance of Vietnam. Truman's support of the French in Vietnam was influenced by Soviet advances in Eastern Europe, the new communist government in China, and the invasion of South Korea by Chinese-sponsored North Korean troops. These events expanded the original goal of containment from a simple blocking of Soviet expansion to one seeking to halt all movements perceived as communist. This modification in containment led presidential administrations to increase the strategic significance of states such as Vietnam, engaging them in cliency relationships to implement containment.

The withdrawal of the French from Vietnam and the threat of Chinese intervention led the Eisenhower Administration to become directly involved in establishing South Vietnam as a client state even though Laos was the major concern in Indochina for the administration. The

international pressures of the Berlin Crisis, the inability of the U.S. to intervene directly in Laos because of that crisis, and the continued perception by the administration of the expansion of communist influence in the Third World increased the strategic significance of South Vietnam under the Kennedy Administration. The Kennedy Administration's decision to make its stand for containment in South Vietnam, coupled with the Diem regime's inability to stop communist advances in the rural areas and maintain political stability, required the administration to increase advisors, military equipment, and support for a coup to overthrow Diem. Further advances by communist forces in South Vietnam, along with the instability of the South Vietnamese government, led President Johnson to endorse a large-scale deployment of troops in an effort to preserve the implementation of containment in the client state. International events and domestic events in the client affected each administration's perceptions of the strategtic significance of the client. These factors influenced the administration's strategy to alter the implementation of containment in the client state.

Cliency, however, creates its own momentum. This momentum can determine the type of assistance the patron provides to the client state which in turn influences domestic stability. Cliency in South Vietnam created its

own momentum when the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Administrations, particularly the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, began to link U.S. credibility and strength to the success of containment and the survival of the client state.[1] The purpose of cliency as a mode of containment was to prevent massive deployments of troops and limit U.S. expenditures which still helping to build democracy in and providing security to strategic developing states. However, since cliency developed momentum by escalating the requirement to respond to increases in political instability within the client state, the successive administrations felt compelled to increase troop deployments and expenditures in South Vietnam or risk damaging U.S. credibility should the client state collapse. This resulted in substantial increases in assistance to the client during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations with the intention of reviving political stability and thereby maintaining containment and U.S. credibility.

The patron, therefore, when implementing containment in the client, placed the survival and interests of the state over those of society and provided assistance according to its own priorities. Therefore, as

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[1] Bruce W. Jentleson, "American Commitments in the Third World: Theory vs. Practice," February 1987, 24-27. Presented at the annual meeting of The International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., April 1985.

the military conflict in South Vietnam continued, military and security assistance became a predominant part of U.S. foreign aid to that state. The domino theory contributed to the momentum of cliency by justifying continued U.S. involvement in South Vietnam. This was seen in the various administrations' references to the domino effect involving South Vietnam. The domino theory intensified U.S. apprehension by implying that if the client could not be maintained then containment would be in jeopardy. This perception continued even though the SEATO nations most closely threatened by the communist movement in South Vietnam perceived no such threat to their states.[2] The momentum of cliency, therefore, pressured the U.S. government to the point that it pushed containment to its limits in South Vietnam. The failure of cliency and containment in Vietnam exposed the limits of the policy of containment to provide for state and global stability. South Vietnam also exposed the capacity of containment and cliency to create political instability within a client state which thereby limits the effectiveness of containment as a foreign policy.

The development of containment after World War II had its foundations in the fears of communist expansion into Europe and the Third World. Many of the U.S. client

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[2] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Foreign Policy and the American Character," Foreign Affairs (Fall 1983): 10.

states were adopted to mollify that fear. However, cliency is not confined to states of the capitalist world; the Soviet Union also has clients. Cliency for the United States and the Soviet Union became a means of containing and manipulating changes in world order occurring as a result of the increase in newly formed independent states in the Third World. These manipulations many times did not contribute to state or global stability. For the United States, each presidential administration came to accept the fact that it could manipulate the domestic affairs of a client state without considering the overall effect these manipulations would have on the state-society relationship within the client. This was also true for the Soviet Union. But their manipulations only increased the likelihood of political instability.

How the newly decolonized and developing Third World state system evolved has been directly influenced by cliency. The emphasis on military instruments in cliency assures the development of strong military institutions in the states of the Third World. A repressive state system increases the likelihood of state violence within a state and escalates the possibilities of an outward direction of that violence to other states. This is one example of how cliency increases the risk of superpower confrontation and jeopardizes regional and global stability.

The effects of cliency in South Vietnam, mentioned in chapter four, and in Iran, mentioned in chapter two, suggest a pattern that may lead us to look elsewhere for signs of political instability caused by cliency. The cliency policies of the superpowers in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Afghanistan are a few examples. The Soviet military build-up of its client in Afghanistan led to the U.S. military strengthening its client, Pakistan, which in turn sent U.S. military aid to other U.S. clients, the rebel Afghan Islamic groups fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. In Central America, Soviet military assistance to Nicaragua and the United States's support of its client group--the contras--in neighboring Honduras, threaten regional stability. The arms shipments from Nicaragua to El Salvador not only threaten a U.S. client (which resulted in a United States military build-up in that nation) but risk escalating the confrontation to neighboring states. A military confrontation would threaten the economic and political stability of the individual states and the region.

The continued use of cliency can only encourage the development of a Third World state system mired in violence. Some client states, whether purposely or not, make slow progress toward more representative civilian rule because of the presence of a strong military structure developed during cliency. South Korea moves

slowly toward democratic reform because the ruling elite is supported by such a strong repressive structure and moves toward reform jeopardize its control of the regime. In the Philippines, the new Aquino government is in control because of military support but remains under a constant threat of a military coup from rebel officers.

Cliency and containment have not enhanced deterrence nor served United States, Soviet, or global interests, but have contributed to state violence and regional instability. Cliency in U.S. foreign policy must be curtailed because it escalates containment beyond its intended limits and increases political instability in developing nations by encouraging repressive solutions to the problems of state-building. Cliency in all foreign policies must be reduced to permit states to develop without the burden of repression and political instability. The case of South Vietnam points out the need for the United States to return to the original premise of containment put forth by George Kennan which emphasized maintaining a narrow definition of U.S. vital interest and a minimal use of military measures to counter expansionist behavior. However, not only must there be a narrowing of the areas of vital interest but also an elimination of the anti-communist ideologically based criteria on which U.S. interests have been based in the past. These criteria led to the adoption of cliency as

part of U.S. foreign policy and hindered the development of state stability in South Vietnam.

Table 1.--Average Yearly United States Foreign Aid to Selected Countries 1949-1953 and 1954-1961

(millions of United States dollars)

Region/Country	1949-1953	1954-1961
Europe	4850.1	1016.1
Austria	157.0	15.4
Belgium	283.2	49.4
Denmark	123.6	28.9
France	1301.4	149.6
Great Britain	658.0	79.1
Ireland	29.7	0
Italy	578.5	180.2
Netherlands	379.4	42.4
Norway	148.2	35.1
Portugal	58.0	14.1
Spain	12.5	175.5
West Germany	644.4	51.8
Yugoslavia	157.2	145.1
Near East/South Asia	655.4	1280.9
Egypt	2.8	36.2
Greece	304.5	129.3
India	58.8	295.3
Iran	27.2	124.5
Israel	32.0	54.3
Jordan	1.6	36.7
Pakistan	24.2	227.1
Turkey	200.7	291.4

Table 1.--Continued

Region/Country	1949-1953	1954-1961
East Asia	969.0	1671.1
Cambodia	0	38.1
China/Taiwan	216.4	337.5
Indonesia	25.1	32.0
Japan	262.5	137.0
Laos	0	49.4
Philippines	149.4	58.2
South Korea	136.4	522.5
South Vietnam	0	274.7
Thailand	27.0	67.4
Latin America	54.9	244.1
Brazil	22.9	54.8
Chile	3.7	28.2
Africa	6.6	145.9
Morocco	0	49.8
Tunisia	0	41.7
All Countries	6672.0	4836.6

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations (Washington: AID, 1982), and worksheets provided by AID cited in Mark J. Gasiorowski, United States Foreign Policy in the Client State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), (forthcoming).

Table 2 - U.S. Economic Assistance to South Vietnam

(millions of U.S. dollars)

	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
I. TOTAL ECON. ASSIST.	210.0	282.2	192.3	207.4	181.8	152.0	156.0	195.9	224.8	274.9
A. AID	195.7	259.4	182.7	200.9	170.5	140.5	124.1	143.3	165.7	225.0
LOANS	25.0	25.0	3.3	19.5	9.7	12.7	-	-	-	-
GRANTS	170.7	234.4	179.4	181.4	160.8	127.8	124.1	143.3	165.7	225.0
(SEC. SUPP. ASSIST.)	(192.2)	(255.0)	(171.4)	(177.0)	(156.0)	(122.5)	(112.9)	(133.0)	(159.8)	(216.5)
B. FOOD FOR PEACE	14.3	22.8	9.6	6.5	11.3	11.5	31.9	52.6	59.1	49.9

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Series of Yearly Data, Vol. III: East Asia (Washington, 1984).

Table 3.--U.S. Military Assistance to the Republic of Vietnam, 1956-1965

Year	U.S. Military Aid	U.S. Military Advisors	Vietnamese Military Trainees	Vietnamese Military	Vietnamese Expenditures Military Government	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1956	33.1	685	645	150,000	n.a.	n.a
1957	314.2	685	1,026	150,000	188.5	426.0
1958	50.3	685	1.123	150,000	171.9	403.8
1959	58.6	685	1,042	150,000	176.3	436.4
1960	93.0	685	1,268	150,000	208.6	543.9
1961	100.0	2,067	1,380	170,000	236.6	464.9
1962	205.0	3,150	1,633	200,000	199.8	367.5
1963	217.5	3,150	3,598	425,000	223.1	419.8
1964	195.9	4,215	1.302	500,000	314,4	618.5
1965	322.5	4,375	1,116	518,780	493.9	854.5

Sources: Col. 1: U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Series of Yearly Data, Vol. III: East Asia (Washington, 1984). Col. 2: (1956-1960) The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel, ed., 38, 438; (1961-1962) Ibid., 454; (1963-1965) Ibid., 471.474. Col. 3: U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Fiscal Year Series, 1980 (Washington, 1980), 64. Col. 4: (1956) Ronald H. Spector, U.S. Army in Vietnam (Washington: Center of Military History, 1983), 259; (1957-1960) The Pentagon Press, Senator Gravel, ed., Vol. II, 38. (1961) Ibid., 454; (1962) Ibid.; (1963-1964) U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Trace, 1963-1973 (Washington, 1974), (1965) The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel, ed., Vol. II,

511. Cols. 5-6: United Nations, Satistical Yearbook for Asia and the Far East (New York, 1968), 282.
Note: Figures in columns 1 are expressed in millions of U.S. dollars. Also there was no recorded sale of U.S. Foreign Military equipment during this time period except for 1960 when there was a sale of $4,000 to South Vietnam. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Fiscal Year Series, 1980 (Washington, 1980), 64. Column 2 is U.S. military advisors as members of the MAAG unit which began operating in South Vietnam in 1954 and later became Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) in 1962. Total military personnel in South Vietnam: 11,300-1962; 16,700-1963; 23,000-1964; 30,000-1965. James William Gibson, The Perfect War, 81. Column 3 is Vietnamese military trainees trained in the United States. Column 4 is Vietnamese Armed Forces--Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. Figures for Columns 5 and 6 in millions of U.S. dollars converted from piastres. Exchange rate used for conversion was 30 piastres to a dollar from 1957-1961 and 60 piastres to a dollar from 1962-1965 given in (1956-1961) International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics, (1963) (Washington, 1963), 272-273; and (1962-1965) IMF, International Financial Statistics (1966), 286.

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