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ARCTIC LEVERAGE: CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY

by

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B.S. June 1977, U.S. Naval Academy

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of
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Approved by:

Patrick Rollins (Director)

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ABSTRACT

ARCTIC LEVERAGE: CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY

Nathaniel French Caldwell, Jr.
Old Dominion University, 1989
Director: Dr. Patrick Rollins

In 1987 the Canadian government recognized that in order to be a major player in collective security with the United States and NATO, it would have to make a significant contribution to the common defense. However, since Canada could not hope to outspend the larger powers, its contribution would have to be leveraged by control of a strategic piece of real estate -- the Canadian Arctic. The major program to enhance Canadian control of the Arctic would be the acquisition of ten-to-twelve nuclear attack submarines. That submarine force was sold to the public and Parliament as a means to enhance Canadian sovereignty which was perceived to be threatened by United States activities in the Arctic. Historically, Canadian sovereignty has been promoted, not threatened, when Arctic territory has been perceived as strategically critical to North American defense. Canadian control of the Northwest Passage is meant to magnify Canada's voice in collective security well beyond its relative contribution.

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The transition from the practical environment of the fast attack submarine to the speculative world of international relations and national security affairs is not simple. Fortunately there are people and organizations within the United States Navy who see the value in maintaining programs for the graduate education of officers. I am grateful for their sponsorship of the Advanced Education Program.

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INTRODUCTION

On Canadian Sovereignty. Sovereignty is an issue in almost any Canadian political topic. Domestic politics is full of disagreements on sovereignty of the national government versus the provincial governments. In Canada-United States relations territorial sovereignty has been a major issue particularly due to the geostrategic value of the Canadian Arctic. Closely related to Arctic sovereignty is sovereignty in the continental defense relationship and in NATO defense.

In Canada sovereignty evolved. There was no revolution to create a fully sovereign nation. The British North America Act of 1867 created Canada as a semi-autonomous dominion within the British Empire. The Canadian government had responsibility for affairs within Canada but depended on Great Britain for defense and foreign affairs matters. In 1931 the British Parliament passed the Statute of Westminster which gave Canada control of its own affairs. However, due to discord among the provinces over how a Canadian constitution would be amended, the British North America Act, which could be amended only with approval of the British Parliament, remained as Canada's Constitution. Canada did not receive full political sovereignty until

17 April 1982 when the Queen of England promulgated the Constitution Act, 1982. Now Canada is completely independent of Britain. Meanwhile as Canada's relationship with Britain has shrunk, the one with the United States has grown.

Canada has to share a continent with a superpower, and the United States' presence could be overwhelming. A shared language, economy, and culture have worked against a separate Canadian identity, but Canada has not gradually dissociated from Britain just to be absorbed by the United States. Canada intends to stay an independent and sovereign nation on the North American continent. Consequently, sovereignty protection has become a major goal of Canadian foreign and defense policy.

Canada's Arctic. Looked at from the North Pole the geographic role that Canada plays in the defense of North America is quickly discerned (Figure 1). Canada shares the Arctic frontier with Alaska, Greenland, Norway, and the Soviet Union. Canadian Arctic territory includes three of the ten largest islands in the world, and the Canadian coastline is the world's longest.

Canada acquired the islands of the Arctic archipelago in two transfers from the British government. The first in 1870 transferred the British North West Territories and Rupert's Land, which was acquired from the Hudson's Bay Company. This vast area included all the territory to the west of Ontario up to the eastern border of British Columbia,

north to the Arctic coast with the exception of Labrador, plus the southern longitudinal half of Baffin Island. The second transfer in 1880 included all remaining British holdings in North America with the exception of Newfoundland and Labrador.

In 1895 the Canadian government indicated that the transfers included the Arctic archipelago, an area claimed but not occupied by Britain. Canada formed the District of Franklin within the Northwest Territories. The boundaries of the District of Franklin included all the Arctic islands north of the Canadian mainland plus the Boothian and Melville peninsulas on the continent. Canada's nineteenth-century claim to the Arctic archipelago has had profound consequences for Canadian sovereignty and security in the latter half of the twentieth century. Since World War II technology has made military access to the Arctic feasible, and Canada has found itself in possession of a buffer between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Defense Strategy. The primary physical threat to Canadian security has been the potential for a Soviet strategic nuclear attack against North America. To counter this threat Canada has cooperated with the United States in the North American Air and Space Defense Command (NORAD).

Canada also faces a maritime threat, but collective security has not served to protect Canadian waters. NATO and United States maritime strategies are directed at the Soviet fleet in its home waters and at resupply of Western

Europe. Canada's maritime commitment to NATO is to help keep the North Atlantic sea lanes open. If Canada's small navy is in the North Atlantic, that leaves Canadian Arctic, Pacific, and most of the Atlantic waters undefended. This prospect has led to consideration of a maritime strategy for Canada. However, for a country with the longest coastline in the world and a relatively small population, a self-sufficient maritime defense is largely problematic.

Despite the odds the Canadian government announced a "three ocean" concept of maritime defense in the 1987 White Paper. The key to this defense is a Canadian nuclear attack submarine program. The program will be small -- ten to twelve submarines -- hardly enough to play a primary role in the maritime defense of a continental nation. However, as in air defense, Canada has a trump to get the attention and maybe the cooperation of the United States. That trump is sovereignty in the Arctic.

Questions. Canada claims sovereign jurisdiction over the waters of the Arctic archipelago as well as the land. Those waters include the strategic Northwest Passage (Figure 2), and with the announced intent to develop a nuclear attack submarine force Canada could use control of the passage to get leverage in NATO and North American collective security. The possibility that Canada's objective is to increase the Canadian voice in collective security out of proportion to its monetary contribution has warranted a study of the relationship of Canadian territorial

sovereignty to defense policy. Questions studied include -- How have territorial sovereignty concerns affected Canadian defense policy and the defense relationship with the United States? How is the recent decision to develop a nuclear attack submarine force related to the issue of sovereignty? These questions are broken down into several more specific questions -- How did Canada establish sovereignty in the Arctic archipelago? What motivated the defense relationship with the United States, and how was it established? What is the role of territorial sovereignty in Canadian defense policy? What is the strategic significance of the new Canadian "three ocean" concept? Does the mutual defense relationship with the United States satisfy Canadian security concerns in the Arctic?

CHAPTER ONE
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CANADA'S TERRITORIAL
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE ARCTIC

The Canadian Sector. Senator Pascal Poirier first publicly raised the issue of Arctic sovereignty in the Canadian Senate on 20 February 1907. He proposed the sector principle:

A country whose possession today goes up to the Arctic regions, will have a right, or should have a right, or has a right to all the lands that are to be found in the waters between a line extending from its eastern extremity north, and another line extending from the western extremity north. All the lands between the two lines up to the North Pole should belong and do belong to the country whose territory abuts up there.¹

In 1907, however, it was disputable whether Canada had possession of the Arctic territory that Senator Poirier claimed. Even though the government had been trying to establish its claims for more than a decade, there were no settlements or outposts, and Canada certainly did not have effective possession of the islands of the Arctic archipelago. However, an official expedition had just been completed by Captain Joseph Bernier on board the D.G.S. Arctic in 1906-7. Bernier left records and cairns on the islands he visited as evidence of Canadian annexation, but no manned outposts were established.² Poirier's sector claim

was based on a conversation with Bernier,³ not on any proven ability of Canada to effectively exercise sovereignty in the North.

Bernier's second and third patrols of the Canadian Arctic, 1908-9 and 1910-11, included the tasks of issuing fishery licenses and enforcing whaling regulations. These activities were the first Canadian attempt at exercising jurisdiction over the waters in the Canadian Arctic. During the second voyage Bernier went so far as to erect on Melville Island a memorial claiming "the whole Arctic Archipelago lying to the north of America from longitude 60 degrees west to 141 degrees west up to 90 degrees north."⁴ This claim went beyond the assigned goals of Bernier's patrol. A report from the third voyage clearly indicated Bernier's understanding of his mission to establish Canadian authority in northern waters:

Two vessels were boarded and notices were left at whaling stations calling attention to the regulations requiring the whaling vessels to obtain licenses, and requesting owners and Captains to recognize the authority of the Department at Ottawa, and the jurisdiction of the government over the territorial waters in the northern regions of the continent.⁵

Taking Possession of Arctic Territory. Gustav Smedal, a noted Norwegian legal expert on Arctic sovereignty and critic of the sector theory,⁶ asserted that a state's authority and sovereignty is limited to the area over which it exercised control, and specifically that the control of one island in an archipelago did not imply control of the whole group of islands. The state's control had to be

"efficient," meaning that the state had to be able to project its authority without being limited by the polar climate or other physical conditions of the territory.⁷ While the authorities obviously couldn't be everywhere at once, they could reasonably be assumed to respond to and take effective action on matters under their jurisdiction.

Canadian inability to exercise effective authority in the Arctic archipelago became the subject of an investigation by the Canadian Reindeer and Musk-ox Commission in 1919. Foreign trading companies were accused of misuse and debauchery of the native population.⁸ Additionally, poaching of Ellesmere Island's musk-oxen by Greenlanders was a challenge to Canadian jurisdiction. The commission recommended that the government establish its authority in the archipelago.⁹ The government was also encouraged to take action due to competing claims from the United States, Norway, and especially Denmark to portions of Ellesmere Island.¹⁰

The Canadian government developed a plan by which it took possession of the Arctic archipelago in the 1920s. Smedal claimed the Canadian example was a "good precedent of how to take effective possession of polar areas." He contended that for a state to take effective possession of polar territory the state must be represented in the territory for the greater part of the year, i.e. "effective occupation." Smedal stated that the state had "to establish a local authority within the territory."¹¹ The patrols of

Captain Bernier years before, intended to establish Canadian jurisdiction over activities in the Arctic archipelago, did not meet that criteria.

The Canadian government took steps to meet the accepted criteria for "effective possession" of the archipelago.

J. D. Craig, the leader of the first expedition to set up permanently manned Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) posts in the Arctic archipelago in 1922, succinctly outlined the plan to be

the establishment of police posts, custom houses, and post offices at various points throughout the North, the intention being to establish additional similar posts from year to year until there is assurance that Canadian laws and regulations will be well administered in the regions controlled by these outposts of civilization.¹²

The plan was a joint venture of the Department of Marine and Fisheries, the RCMP, and the Department of the Interior.

Marine and Fisheries supplied the ship, the C.G.S. Arctic, which had been on lightship duty, and the Department of the Interior paid the cost of overhaul and outfitting. The RCMP supplied the men and material for the posts. Captain Bernier was again given command of the Arctic.¹³

The first expedition got underway from Quebec on 17 July 1922 but was then delayed for a day by boiler problems and the need to adjust the compasses. The sailing roster consisted of forty-three people, including the ten RCMP who would be left at two posts with provisions for two years. A surveying party, Captain Bernier and his officers and crew, a cinematographer, Officer in Charge Craig and his

secretary, and, significantly, an Air Board representative completed the roster.¹⁴

The expedition returned to Quebec in less than three months, on 2 October 1922, having completed the mission of establishing two police posts, one on the southern end of Ellesmere Island at Craig Harbor and another on northern Baffin Island near a Hudson's Bay Company post at Ponds Inlet.¹⁵ The quick return of the expedition certainly proved the feasibility of maintaining and resupplying Arctic posts.

Craig's report on the 1922 expedition pointed out the feasibility of more accurate surveying with the aid of the "wireless" and the favorable aviation conditions during late spring and summer.¹⁶ An appendix to the report by Major R. A. Logan, the Air Board representative, elaborated on the usefulness of aircraft in surveying the interiors of the islands, transporting men and supplies, and in assisting with marine navigation.¹⁷ The expedition was a success.

In following years posts were established on Victoria and Devon Islands, as well as additional posts on Ellesmere and Baffin Islands.¹⁸ Canada's growing interest in the Arctic during this period was reflected in the estimates for costs of administration of the North West Territories. In 1920 the cost was \$4,000, but by 1924 it had increased to \$300,000.¹⁹

Norway and Denmark Withdraw. Norwegian and Danish challenges to Canadian jurisdiction in the Arctic

archipelago were settled fairly easily after the RCMP posts were in place. In 1921 Canada told Denmark that any territory discovered by the explorer Knud Rasmussen to the north of Canada could not be recognized as Danish.²⁰

Rasmussen had authored the Danish response to a Canadian letter requesting a halt to the killing of musk-oxen on Ellesmere Island by Greenlanders. Rasmussen had claimed with the backing of the Danish government that Ellesmere Island was no-man's-land, and the only authority having jurisdiction in the area was his Directorate at Thule Station, Greenland.²¹ Rasmussen then proceeded on the well-publicized Fifth Thule Expedition across Arctic North America, leaving Thule in mid-September 1921.²² Rasmussen did claim Ellesmere Island for Denmark, but the government of Denmark did not challenge Canada's subsequent occupation of the island by the Craig expedition. Norwegian claims to the Sverdrup Islands, named after Norwegian Captain Otto Sverdrup who explored the islands, were dropped in 1930 after negotiations that recognized Canadian jurisdiction and resulted in an "ex gratia" payment of \$67,000 to Captain Sverdrup.²³

Stefansson and Wrangel Island. The occupation by Canada of the Arctic archipelago was the culmination of evolving government policies and the hard work of a number of agencies and individuals. However, there is one protagonist who stands out from the others, the Canadian-American explorer Vilhjalmur Stefansson.

Government interest in the Arctic had peaked with the Bernier voyages; the years before and during World War I became a low point for government-sponsored Arctic activities. The Canadian Arctic Expedition to the western Arctic from 1913 to 1918 led by Vilhjalmur Stefannson was an exception to an otherwise almost complete lapse of official interest.

By his own account Stefannson did not have effective authority over the expedition,²⁴ and he did not have police authority to enforce Canadian laws and customs, as Bernier did. The primary purpose of the Canadian Arctic Expedition was scientific observation and exploration, not the establishment of Canadian sovereignty or jurisdiction. In fact, the expedition bases were in Alaska, not Canada. Stefannson got Canadian government sponsorship only after pointing out to Prime Minister Robert Borden that as an American citizen he would give the United States a claim to any territories discovered by the expedition.²⁵ In a letter to the National Geographic Society which had offered to be a cosponsor, Borden viewed the expedition as an "exploration of the northern waters of Canada" and thanked the Society for withdrawing its funding in favor of the Canadian government.²⁶ Despite his limited commission as leader of a scientific expedition, Stefannson claimed for Canada the last territory to be discovered in North America. In his autobiography he pointed out the appropriateness of his closing the chapter on new exploration, since he was the son

of Icelandic immigrants and a probable descendant of the original Icelandic explorer of North America, Erik the Red.²⁷

After the five-year Canadian Arctic Expedition, Stefansson campaigned for more Arctic exploration. The primary value of the Arctic to most people of the time was its natural and mineral resource potential. Stefansson evoked that potential as an argument for exploration. He also argued that the Arctic was strategically significant as the shortest route for airplanes and submarines going between Europe, Asia, and North America.²⁸ He apparently was the first to envision the strategic significance of the Arctic. The genesis of his strategic vision was a conversation with Alexander Graham Bell in 1913, when Bell suggested that Arctic exploration could be best done by airplane.²⁹ Stefansson's strategic vision led him to urge the Canadian government to grab as much unoccupied territory as possible while other nations still considered it worthless.³⁰

Stefansson was able to impress upon the Canadian government that Norway and Denmark had done more exploration in certain areas of the Arctic archipelago than Canada or Britain, and if the two Scandinavian countries were to pool their resources they might be able to enforce their claims to areas on Ellesmere, Heilberg, and the Rignes group. Stefansson was not a proponent of the sector principle, but he pointed out that if Denmark were to enforce what was

essentially a Canadian principle, incidentally used later quite successfully by the Soviet Union, then portions of Ellesmere would fall into a Danish sector based on lines drawn from the extremities of Greenland to the Pole.³¹

Stefansson's strategic vision was not enough to get him support from either the Canadian or United States government for another expedition. Rebuffed by both countries, he eventually got private backing to sponsor an expedition to Wrangel Island, one hundred miles north of Siberia, in 1921.³²

Although the Wrangel Expedition started out as private, Stefansson stayed behind to continue lobbying for Canadian government support. His lobbying was successful. During discussions in the House of Commons on 12 May 1922 the leader of the opposition forced the minister of militia and defence to take a position on Wrangel Island:

Mr. Meighen (Leader of the Opposition): Well, have we Wrangel Island?

Mr. Graham (Minister of Militia and Defence): Yes, as I understand it, and we propose to hold it.

Prime Minister Mackenzie King backed up the claim of his minister, "The government certainly maintains the position that Wrangel Island is part of the property of this country."³³

King's statement touched off a small whirlwind of diplomatic activity involving the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and Canada, all of whom had claims to Wrangel Island. The Soviet ambassador in Washington had foreseen the potential of a diplomatic fray and had warned

the State Department of the potential for controversy in a memorandum on 30 March 1922. He also pointed out Soviet claims to the island. In a letter on 12 September 1922 to the British Ambassador, American Acting Secretary of State William Phillips briefly described Canadian, British, American, and Soviet claims, and demanded an official inquiry by Britain into the statements made in the Canadian House of Commons on 12 May 1922.³⁴ The unforeseen international pressure was too much for the Canadian government, and its claim perished along with most of the members of the Wrangel expedition. One lone Eskimo woman survived and was rescued on 20 August 1923 by a ship sent from Nome by Stefansson, the Donaldson.³⁵

The Donaldson left a party of twelve Eskimos, all Americans, led by Charles Wells of Seattle, Stefansson's representative, to continue occupation of the island. The purpose of the occupation was to protect Stefansson's commercial interest while the Soviets, Americans and British decided which country had sovereignty over Wrangel. Meanwhile, Stefansson sold his interest to the American reindeer king Carl Lomen. In both Stefansson's and Lomen's minds the sale strengthened the American claim to Wrangel.³⁶ However, the Soviets settled all claims on 20 August 1924 when the Soviet transport Red October, armed with a six-pound cannon, brought a company of infantry to Wrangel Island and forcibly removed the Americans to Siberia.³⁷ Thus, the Soviet Union gained the dubious distinction of

being the first country to enforce its Arctic claims by using naval force. The casualties included Charles Wells who died in Soviet custody in Siberia and two Eskimo children, one of whom died in Vladivostok, the other after deportation to Manchuria.

Physical Challenge from the United States. After the embarrassment of the Wrangel Island incident, Canada stuck to claiming territory north of the Canadian mainland. The first physical challenge to the authority of Canada in the Arctic archipelago came in 1925 from an American scientific expedition led by Dr. D. B. MacMillan and sponsored by the National Geographic Society in cooperation with the United States Navy. The expedition was to sail for Etah, Greenland, from Maine on 20 June 1925.³⁸ On 1 June 1925 the Canadian Parliament passed a bill requiring expeditions in the Northwest Territories to have a government permit. According to the minister of the interior the purpose of the bill was "to assert our sovereignty. We want to make it clear that this is Canadian territory and that if foreigners want to go in there, they must have permission. . . ." He affirmed that Canadian claims reached "right up to the North Pole."³⁹

On 15 June 1925 Canada informed the United States that the MacMillan expedition needed a Canadian permit. The letter questioned "the intention of the members thereof to carry out explorations through and over Canadian territory" and, noting that RCMP posts had been established in the

Arctic, offered "the MacMillan expedition any assistance within the power of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and other Canadian officers in the north." The note concluded with a mild threat: "The Dominion government S.S. Arctic will sail at an early date on her customary northern patrol, and will carry Royal Canadian Mounted Police details and reliefs."⁴⁰

United States Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg was skeptical of the Canadian claim to have established police jurisdiction in the Arctic islands. He replied on 19 June 1925,

Inform me what constitutes a post of the Royal Mounted Police mentioned in the second paragraph of your note and the establishment thereof; how frequently they are visited; and whether they are permanently occupied, and, if so, by whom.⁴¹

The Canadian response of 2 July 1925 described the five permanently manned outposts on islands in Canada's Eastern Arctic Sub-District. The duties of the officers and constables at these posts included not only law enforcement but services for the Post Office and Customs Department, supervision of Eskimo welfare, census taking, the recording of meteorological and topographical information, and other tasks that would be expected for efficient administration of the district. The Canadian government renewed the offer of assistance to the MacMillan expedition.⁴² Kellogg's response on 18 July 1925 was cautious. He stated that the matter was receiving "careful consideration" and that a reply would be forthcoming.⁴³ None ever was.

Meanwhile the MacMillan expedition had left. When the Arctic encountered the expedition at Etah on 19 August 1925, Lieutenant Commander Richard Evelyn Byrd, Chief Petty Officer Floyd Bennett, and two other pilots had been making flights over Ellesmere Island for two weeks.⁴⁴ The commander of the Canadian party, George P. Mackenzie, confronted Byrd and offered to issue him a license to fly over Canadian airspace. Byrd consulted MacMillan privately and then told Mackenzie that MacMillan had received permission from the Canadian government while enroute to Etah. Unable to communicate with his superiors, Mackenzie had to take Byrd at his word.⁴⁵ But after the Canadian challenge, MacMillan would not permit Byrd and Bennett to make any more flights over Ellesmere Island.⁴⁶

MacMillan did not have a permit, and the incident at Etah resulted in official inquiries. MacMillan denied ever saying he had a permit,⁴⁷ but his memoirs of an earlier expedition indicate his scorn for Canadian Arctic sovereignty.⁴⁸ However, the inquiries were effective, and MacMillan expeditions in 1926, 1927, and 1928 all followed Canadian regulations.⁴⁹

Epilogue. In 1933 historian V. Kenneth Johnston concluded that Canada had validated its claim to the Arctic archipelago. Johnston based his conclusion on the actions by Canada to establish effective occupation and, therefore, sovereignty in the Arctic.⁵⁰ He was correct that Canada did have a presence in the Arctic archipelago, although that

presence was meager. The RCMP outposts were not followed by any wave of Arctic emigration nor by any significant growth of commercial activity. In the 1920s and 1930s Canada faced no more external challenges to its claims of sovereignty over the islands of the Arctic archipelago, but by the end of World War II Stefansson's prophesy of the Arctic's strategic value was beginning to unfold.

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48. Donald Baxter MacMillan, Etah and Beyond (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1927), 79.
49. Granatstein, 19.
50. Johnston, 41.

CHAPTER TWO

OGDENSBURG TO NATO:

CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE ORIGINS OF CONTINENTAL DEFENSE

Newfoundland, the Key to the Arctic. Defense of the Arctic was not a major concern in World War II. Canada's strategic defense then hinged on the defense of Great Britain. If London had fallen then Ottawa might have become the capital of the British Empire, and Canada itself would have been threatened. The keystone to Canada's home defense was the St. Lawrence River, and the keystone to the St. Lawrence was Newfoundland. If Britain had capitulated to Germany, Newfoundland, a British territory, might have fallen into German hands. An enemy in Newfoundland would control access to the St. Lawrence. Newfoundland might also have served as a launching point for an invasion down the St. Lawrence and into the industrial heartland of Canada and the northeastern United States. Farfetched? -- or at least long term -- but, if the Germans had the British Fleet. . . .

Before World War II Canada ignored financially insolvent Newfoundland, but the war generated United States interest in Newfoundland. The possibility that Newfoundland would come under American control was much more realistic

than German occupation of the territory, and Canada began to compete with the United States for sovereignty over the territory. Even while Britain was beleaguered, the United States and Canada fenced over who would be responsible for Newfoundland's defense. Newfoundland was Canada's eastern frontier, and an American Newfoundland would put the United States in control of access to the St. Lawrence River, the Hudson Bay, and the waters of the Arctic archipelago including the Northwest Passage.

As World War II was ending, the strategic importance of Newfoundland with respect to a potential Soviet attack across the Arctic became apparent. American bases were already established in the territory, which, though well south of the Arctic circle did afford good air and maritime access to the Arctic. Labrador, the part of Newfoundland on the continental mainland, was located astride the air routes between the Soviet Union and industrial North America. The Canadian air base at Goose Bay, Labrador, could provide facilities for American bombers.

Canadian participation in the postwar defense of North America was not a foregone conclusion in the late 1940s. Agreements made with the United States during the war provided for a thorough evacuation of United States defense facilities on Canadian territory at the conclusion of the war. However, the United States would still have its facilities in Newfoundland as well as certain sovereign powers that had been negotiated with Great Britain. When

Newfoundland became the tenth province of Canada on 1 April 1949, the American bases were an impediment to full Canadian sovereignty. The problem for Canada was how to protect her sovereignty and still cooperate with the United States on continental defense. There was no specific American policy for dealing with Canadian sovereignty concerns. The United States did come to recognize that the concerns existed, and the leased bases in Newfoundland gave the United States a means to incorporate Canada into the strategic defense of North America.

Canada had to protect its territorial sovereignty in the face of friendly but potentially overwhelming help from the United States, and its national security from the physical threats of Germany and then the Soviet Union. An added complication was that initially Newfoundland was not even Canadian territory and clearly not subject to Canadian sovereignty. Acquiring sovereignty over Newfoundland became the key to maintaining sovereignty over Arctic territory as well.

Obligations to the Empire. As a Dominion of the British Empire, Canada fought alongside Great Britain in two world wars. In World War I, Canada was obligated to fight upon the British declaration of war on August 4, 1914.¹ After the Armistice the use of Canadian troops to support British adventurism in Siberia and the delayed repatriation of troops from Europe were irksome to the Canadian public and caused considerable debate within the Dominion

government.² These events helped to promote a cleavage between Dominion and British policy that in 1931 finally led Canada to take control of her own foreign affairs from Britain.³ On 25 August 1939 Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King made clear that the country would not be bound by a British declaration of war when he announced a state of "apprehended war." Great Britain declared war on Germany on 3 September 1939, and Canada made her own separate declaration on 10 September 1939.⁴ Mackenzie King had no intention of keeping Canada out of the war, but he saw to it that the country entered on its own volition, thus demonstrating Canada's sovereign right to determine when and if it would go to war.

North American Neighbors. Canadian-American discussions on defense problems had begun before any declarations of war. Alarmed by events in Europe and the Far East, on 14 August 1936 at Chatauqua, New York, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared, "Our closest neighbors are good neighbors. . . . We can and will defend ourselves and our neighborhood."⁵ Roosevelt strengthened the American commitment to the defense of Canada when he declared in a speech on 18 August 1938 at Kingston, Ontario, "I give to you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened. . . ."⁶ Evidently not too enthralled with the prospect of American troops on Canadian soil, Mackenzie King replied only two days later,

We, too, have our obligations as a good friendly neighbor, and one of these is to see that, at our own instance, our country is made as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it, and that, should the occasion ever arise, enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea or air, to the United States across Canadian territory.⁷

The Ogdensburg Declaration and the Destroyer Deal.

During the parliamentary debates on the declaration of war, concern was expressed about the coastal defense of Canada. On 8 September 1939 MacKenzie King told Parliament that the key to defense of Canada's heartland was defense of the entrance to the St. Lawrence River, and essential to that defense was the "integrity of Newfoundland." It would be necessary for Canada to take over the defense of Newfoundland from Britain.⁸ The United States was also concerned with coastal defense but put greater weight on Newfoundland's strategic position astride the shipping lanes to Great Britain than on the unlikely invasion of Canada.

By the summer of 1940 the possibility of the defeat of Britain was causing both the United States and Canada to view preparation for the defense of North America as more warranted and necessary than before. President Roosevelt wanted to ensure that the British fleet would not fall into German hands, and he also wanted to obtain rights to build bases on British territories, including Newfoundland, on the western side of the Atlantic. In exchange he would send Britain several aging American destroyers.⁹ King was in favor of the deal,¹⁰ his zeal for putting Newfoundland

solely under Canadian protection weakened by the reality that the British Empire would no longer buffer Canada.

On the afternoon of 16 August 1940 King received a phone call from Roosevelt who asked if King could meet him the next day in Ogdensburg, New York, to discuss mutual coastal defense and the destroyer deal. King and Roosevelt met on 17 and 18 August. The defense discussions went beyond coastal defense and destroyers for Britain. King had brought along a list of materiel that Canada needed from the United States. On the morning of 18 August he and American Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson sat on a sofa going over materiel requirements while Roosevelt sat at a table in the same room and drafted a press release on Canadian-American defense cooperation.¹¹ Roosevelt's draft was approved by King and was released that afternoon as a joint statement, The Ogdensburg Declaration. In its brevity and continuing significance it was the Gettysburg Address of mutual defense agreements:

The Prime Minister and the President have discussed the mutual problems of defence in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States. It has been agreed that a Permanent Joint Board on Defence shall commence immediate studies relating to sea, land and air problems, including personnel and material. It will consider in the broad sense the defence of the north half of the Western Hemisphere.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defence will consist of four or five members from each country, most of them from the services. It will meet shortly.¹²

Immediately upon returning to Ottawa King dictated a telegram to Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain detailing the meeting with Roosevelt. In particular

he explained to Churchill the legal necessity of Roosevelt having to provide the destroyers on a "quid pro quo" basis.¹³ Churchill, however, did not want to be seen as trading away British sovereignty for a few old destroyers. He felt that British public opinion could be better satisfied by portraying the deal as two separate gifts. In a letter to the president dated 25 August 1940 he stated that the British Empire, with magnanimous generosity to its good friend, could give the United States rights to lease bases on its territory in the West Indies and Newfoundland; accordingly, the American people might feel a need to reciprocate with the small token of a few aging destroyers.¹⁴

The destroyer deal was finally struck with an exchange of notes on 2 September 1940. Churchill was satisfied to grant ninety-nine year leases to bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, and the West Indies "freely and without consideration." In reply to the British note Secretary of State Cordell Hull satisfied congressional prohibitions on the sale of war materials by adding the caveat, "In consideration of the declarations above quoted, the Government of the United States will immediately transfer to His Majesty's Government fifty United States Navy Destroyers. . . ."¹⁵

Who Protects Newfoundland? On 20 August Churchill had told Parliament that the leases did not involve any "transference of sovereignty" and that no action would be

"taken without the consent or against the wishes of the various Colonies concerned. . . ." ¹⁶ Churchill was undeniably correct concerning sovereignty in the case of Newfoundland, since Newfoundland had none to transfer. Responsible government had been suspended there in 1934 when that dominion had been on the verge of bankruptcy. British sovereignty over the dominion was not much of a political issue, since self-government was supposed to be re-established at some future date. There was also little doubt that Newfoundland's government would consent to whatever deal Churchill concocted, since Newfoundland's Commission of Government, consisting of three British members and three Newfoundlanders, and overseen by a British governor, was appointed by the British government. ¹⁷

The Newfoundland members of the commission may not have appreciated the negotiations that Britain was undertaking to transfer large parts of Newfoundland territory to a foreign power, but without representative government, and with the threat of Germany, there was not much they could do. Before the war Ottawa had shown little interest in Newfoundland, but since June of 1940 Canadians had taken up some garrison duties with the approval of the commission. ¹⁸ Sensing the possibility of an American Newfoundland, King pulled off a minor coup. On the same day that he went to Ogdensburg, he sent Minister of National Defence for Air C. G. Power to St. John's to negotiate an agreement with the commission. The

pact put Newfoundland forces under Canadian command and made Canada responsible for Newfoundland's security.¹⁹

King's maneuver complicated implementation of the Leased Bases Agreement between Britain and the United States. Obviously he had not been very impressed by Churchill's promise to consult the Canadian government on the leases.²⁰ King's suspicions proved correct when the United States insisted that Canada be excluded from negotiations on the details of the agreement. Finally, upon Canadian insistence, a Canadian delegation was allowed to observe, but not participate. Lester Pearson, a future prime minister but then a senior civil servant at Canada House in London, recorded his view of the negotiations in his diary on 26 February 1941:

The Americans are taking advantage of British necessities and exploiting the situation, so it seems, in order to prepare the way for ultimate acceptance of their sovereignty.²¹

Pearson did negotiate with the High Commissioner of the Colonial Office and managed to obtain United States recognition of Canada's interest in Newfoundland. However, Pearson then faced obstinance from the Newfoundland delegation who were concerned that the Canadian commitment to their defense might be only short-term. Exasperated, Pearson confronted the Newfoundland delegates: "After all, it is a very simple matter, whether you prefer to be raped by the United States or married to Canada." Pearson wrote that the head of the delegation replied that of course they

preferred Canada, provided Canada did not seek a "divorce" after the war.²²

The final agreement was effected by an exchange of notes between Great Britain and the United States in London on 27 March 1941. Attached was a protocol signed by delegates from Canada and the United States and by the British delegation headed personally by Winston Churchill. The protocol recognized "that the defence of Newfoundland is an integral feature of the Canadian scheme of defence," and that "in respect of Newfoundland, Canadian interests in regard to defence will be fully respected." The protocol also recognized the Permanent Joint board on Defense as the body to whom the United States and Canada would refer issues of Newfoundland's defense.²³ Overall, the agreement gave the United States a more solid basis to claim sovereignty in Newfoundland than Canada, and without the added protocol Canada's earlier arrangements with Newfoundland would have been nullified.

Wartime Cooperation. In its first meeting on 26 and 27 August 1940 the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD) took up the subject of Newfoundland and recommended an increased Canadian presence. Of the thirty-three wartime recommendations of the PJBD, ten dealt directly with Newfoundland.²⁴ Although not designed with Newfoundland in mind the PJBD proved invaluable in coordinating Canadian and American defense there.

During the war Canada and the United States resolved jurisdictional conflict over defense in Newfoundland by maintaining separate command and control organizations, but at the same time they often shared facilities and equipment. The solution to improving the air warning capabilities of the island was typical. Both the United States and Canada saw the need for a new warning system but could not agree on who would control it. The United States built a five station net, and the Royal Canadian Air Force put in the additional sets that they thought were necessary. By the end of the summer of 1942 the RCAF and the United States Newfoundland Base Command each had set up separate processing stations and operational control centers. The system was not combined into a single Canadian command until May 1944.²⁵

Wartime cooperation resulted in American forces being stationed in Canada, but there was not the same competition as existed in Newfoundland. At the Ogdensburg meeting King had made clear to Roosevelt that there could be no sale or lease of sites to the United States.²⁶ Instead, Canada made sites and facilities available to the United States without diplomatic formality.

Canada insisted on maintaining full sovereignty within its borders. Negotiations on the postwar disposition of United States facilities and equipment in Canada began as soon as the tide of war started to turn. Notes were exchanged that inventoried and defined the facilities and

equipment and just how much Canada would pay for them.²⁷ Canada pressed for the agreements in order to expedite the return of American forces to the United States as soon as the war was over.

A New Menace Foreseen. American forces were removed from Canada quickly after the war, but both countries continued their military presences in Newfoundland. By 1946 the United States was growing concerned over a potential Soviet threat to North America. On 28 August 1946 a letter from United States Ambassador to Canada Ray Atherton to the secretary of state indicated that the United States was actually seeking to integrate Canadian and American defenses, but American intentions were being met with skepticism in Ottawa.²⁸ King was suspicious of American motives in presenting a Soviet menace and pushing for defense integration. In a diary entry of 9 May 1946 he wrote that he had told his cabinet that he "believed the long range policy of the Americans was to absorb Canada." With a sort of postwar fatalism he went on to say that Canada's submission might be inevitable.²⁹ King knew that the world situation had been changed by World War II. He discovered how threatening this change was to Canada in a meeting with President Harry Truman in Washington.

On 6 May 1946 Truman approved the Thirty-fifth Recommendation of the PJBD. This recommendation called for close peacetime military cooperation between Canada and the United States, including the reciprocal use of military

facilities, the reciprocal provision of the right of military aircraft and public vessels to transit through territory and waters of each country, and standardization of equipment, training, and organization.³⁰ In a briefing memorandum to the President two days before Mackenzie King's Washington visit, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson indicated that he knew that provisions in the PJBD recommendation infringed on Canadian concepts of sovereignty in that they limited Canadian freedom of action in defense and would require Canada to break traditional defense ties with Great Britain.³¹ Acheson attached to the memorandum another memorandum that he asked the president to pass to King. It called for specific Canadian cooperation with the United States so that North America would be able to counter a projected Soviet strategic threat in five years. It noted three items for immediate action by the Canadian government -- endorsement of joint planning, approval of the Thirty-fifth Recommendation of the PJBD, and most significant, the stationing of United States Army Air Force units at the Canadian base at Goose Bay, Labrador, in Newfoundland.³² The Army Air Force units would be a United States strategic offensive force operating from Canadian soil, albeit leased soil.

In their meeting on 28 October 1946 Truman and King discussed the defense of North America and the need for United States units at Goose Bay, but Truman did not pass on Acheson's memorandum.³³ He had much more convincing

evidence of the Soviet Union's capabilities in a report from Ambassador to the Soviet Union Bedell Smith.³⁴ King returned to Ottawa impressed but disturbed. He had told Truman that he was concerned over Canadian sovereignty with respect to the facilities at Goose Bay.³⁵ He was already considering bringing Newfoundland into confederation with Canada.³⁶ Canada had only recently established its right to act independently within the Commonwealth and now was starting all over again with the United States. It seemed obvious that the Americans were going to have a big Air Force buildup in Newfoundland whether or not Canada approved, since the United States could always obtain more bases under the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement.

Acheson had not proposed a policy for dealing with Canada's concern for sovereignty. The memorandum that Truman was supposed to have given King did state "that every precaution must be taken to protect the traditional relations of the two countries and the position which each respectively enjoys."³⁷ Acheson told Truman that the sovereignty issue had been made "easier" for King by British cooperation on standardization and shared naval facilities.³⁸ Canadian sovereignty was not seen as an obstacle to United States plans, but neither was it to be respected. In a memorandum dated 12 November 1946 United States Assistant Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs J. Graham Parsons wrote that he had taken advantage of British infringements on Canadian

sovereignty in the defense policy issue of arms standardization. He proposed that the United States continue to take advantage of the rift between Canada and Great Britain by giving Canada equal status at upcoming technical meetings.³⁹

In late 1946 the question for King and the Canadian government was whether Canada should allow American forces to be stationed at Goose Bay where they would be much further north and, therefore, closer to the Soviet Union, or force the Americans to use their own bases in Newfoundland? The United States, of course, still had the bases acquired by the Leased Bases Agreement and the right to acquire more, something that would probably not have been too hard to do considering the unstable political and economic situation in Newfoundland. In February 1946 Newfoundland's Commission of Government had called for a national convention to determine the future political status of Newfoundland.⁴⁰ Failure to comply with the American request might have caused resentment but would not have changed the American course of action. Noncompliance might also have encouraged the United States to take advantage of the uncertainty in Newfoundland.

In November 1946 King held several days of discussion with the cabinet and chiefs of staff. He presented the information from Truman on the Soviet threat and received approval of the PJBD's Thirty-fifth Recommendation. There was much discussion on shifting resources in order to give priority to the development of Arctic defenses.⁴¹

In December at a meeting in Ottawa American and Canadian delegations discussed the stationing of heavy bombardment groups at Goose Bay, but no agreement was reached.⁴² Significant, though, was the breaking of the last ties between Canadian and British defense with the decision "that the policy should normally be followed of keeping the U.K. informed in general terms (concerning Canada-United States defense discussions) and not in detail. . . ."⁴³ Canada had come to the realization that Great Britain could not stand between her and an enemy that could strike from over the North Pole.

On 16 January 1947 the Canadian government approved the PJBD's recommendation on peacetime defense cooperation but only after it was amended to provide specific assurances of sovereignty to the host country within its territory and within territory leased by the host country,⁴⁴ i.e. Newfoundland. The peacetime framework for postwar defense cooperation was announced publicly in Ottawa and Washington on 12 February 1947.⁴⁵ After reading the announcement in Parliament, King felt it necessary to add "that the arrangements, in the present and future, do not impinge on Canadian sovereignty and do not entail the cession of bases in the North to the United States."⁴⁶ In exchange for cooperation with the United States, Canada received recognition of sovereignty over defense activities in the far North and also recognition that she had sovereignty over her bases in Newfoundland. For its part, the United States was

saved the political and economic costs of building or expanding bases in Newfoundland during a time of defense cutbacks.

Cold War in Newfoundland. Throughout 1947 and 1948, Newfoundlanders debated their political future. Feelers towards Washington for an "economic union" with the United States were met with silence, most likely due to Canadian sensitivities⁴⁷ and Canada's cooperation in defense. Finally in July 1948, Newfoundlanders voted by a slim majority for confederation with Canada. The date for accession was set as 1 April 1949.⁴⁸

The Leased Bases Agreement of 1941 would pose challenges to the Canadian concept of sovereignty once Newfoundland entered the confederation. Lester Pearson who became Canada's secretary of state for external affairs in September 1948 explained in his memoirs that one aspect of the Canadian concept of sovereignty was "the need to ensure our survival as a separate state against powerful, if friendly, social and economic pressures from our American neighbour."⁴⁹ In a letter to Acting Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, Canadian Ambassador Hume Wrong pointed out that United States jurisdiction over non-military activities within the leased areas would intrude on Canadian sovereignty.⁵⁰ In a conference with President Truman on 12 February 1949, Prime Minister of Canada Louis St. Laurent also brought up the subject of the Newfoundland bases. Truman assured him that the United States would consider any

specific Canadian proposals when they were presented.⁵¹ The matter was referred to the PJBD who deliberated on Canadian concerns with respect to jurisdiction, taxes on non-military personnel, customs, and military post offices.⁵² The PJBD completed work on a recommendation in March 1950. The recommendation was to subject United States contractor personnel and their civilian employees in the leased areas to Canadian income tax, to remove customs exemptions for the same personnel, and to take away their privileges to use base facilities such as military post offices and exchanges. In an additional sovereignty concession the United States was to give up its jurisdiction over Canadian citizens and other personnel not subject to United States military law. The recommendation was approved by President Truman on 1 August 1950 and by the Canadian government on 21 March 1951.⁵³

Canada had joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in April 1949. Lester Pearson had been a major architect and proponent of NATO, and he had hoped to integrate Canadian defenses with those of the entire North Atlantic. Multilateralism would have diluted the United States presence in Canada. However, the United States-Canada defense relationship retained its bilateral nature.⁵⁴ NATO did serve as a panacea in that Canada could claim that the facilities built by the United States on Canadian territory were in fact to contribute to the defense of the non-sovereign entity NATO.⁵⁵

Meanwhile, negotiations to lease portions of the Canadian base at Goose Bay had gotten nowhere since 1947. However, by 1951 the five-year projection of Soviet capabilities that Truman had presented to King in 1947 seemed to be coming true. The Soviet Union had tested its own atomic bomb and was close to having a strategic delivery capability. The Canadian government was being deluged by requests from the United States for communication sites in Newfoundland and Labrador and for more land for existing United States Air Force bases. Additionally, negotiations were underway for a lease of portions of the Canadian air base at Goose Bay.⁵⁶ The huge volume of requests had the potential, from a Canadian viewpoint, to chip away at Canadian sovereignty. Also disturbing with respect to sovereignty was the desire of the United States to use Goose Bay as a potential launching point for strategic nuclear bomber strikes.

In May 1951 Canadian Ambassador Wrong informed Secretary of State Acheson that Canada expected to be consulted about nuclear strikes to be launched from Canadian territory, except in the case of a Soviet attack on North America, in which case the Canadian government expected as much notification as possible.⁵⁷ The Goose Bay lease was finally effected by an exchange of notes on 5 December 1952. The term of the lease was limited to the nominal lifespan of the NATO treaty, twenty years.⁵⁸ Although nothing was done to shorten the leases on existing United States bases in

Newfoundland, there were to be no additional ninety-nine year leases.

Although an American strategic nuclear force on Canadian soil could negate Canada's sovereign right to choose when and if to go to war, the more difficult challenge for Canada was to maintain territorial sovereignty in the face of the large number of sites requested by the United States for a global communication network in Newfoundland and for a proposed continental radar system across northern Canada. The United States Air Force was insisting that PJBD recommendations for the radar system be formalized by an exchange of notes, since a formal obligation would make Congress more willing to approve appropriations. The Canadian government did not want anything as formal as a note. It feared a public backlash against so many structures to be built and manned by Americans on Canadian soil.⁵⁹ The radar system agreement for the Pinetree Line was effected by an exchange of notes in Washington on 1 August 1951. Typical of the many Canadian-United States agreements of the Cold War, it included provisions that implied Canadian control. That agreement for example provided that "Canada will acquire and retain title to all sites . . . , (and that) Canada may, by agreement, take over the manning of stations initially manned by the United States."⁶⁰ The agreement on communications sites contained similar assurances. In later years guarantees of Canadian territorial sovereignty were

included in the agreements for the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, 1955, and the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS), 1959.⁶¹ Those types of agreements were made easier by the semi-fiction that Canada was cooperating in the context of the non-sovereign North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and in fact in 1952 American military personnel in Canada were put under the NATO status of forces agreement.⁶²

Epilogue. In the face of the postwar Soviet threat, Canada's defense policy became interdependent with that of the United States. However, Canada did not expect interdependence to be solely a bilateral defense arrangement with the United States for Arctic defenses of North America. The government of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent hoped that the creation of a greater "Atlantic Community" through NATO would lessen American hegemony in North American defense and in the economic sphere. As secretary of state for external affairs, Lester Pearson was the architect of Article Two of the North Atlantic Treaty, the "Canadian Article," which was designed to promote common political institutions and a common market among NATO members.⁶³ As far as the military aspect of American hegemony Pearson wrote:

I believed that the North American sector should be an integral part of the North Atlantic defence structure. Any continental command should be an Alliance responsibility. It seemed to me, for example, that Norwegian contingents should operate in our Arctic just as Canadian forces occasionally took part in exercises in Norway.

Pearson's concept of the Atlantic Community did not materialize. Canada-United States relations remained bilateral. Pearson blamed it on American desire for "control" and the Canadian military's preference for dealing directly with Washington.⁶⁴ Pearson lost his enthusiasm but did not give up his support for NATO. He wrote in the Spring 1959 issue of the International Journal, "The blueprints for the Atlantic Community are in existence. They are also in various pigeonholes in various foreign offices where they will soon be available for students doing Ph.D. theses. . . ."⁶⁵

Bilateral cooperation in Arctic defense installations led to command integration of the air defense of North America. The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) was formed in the summer of 1957 and announced in a joint statement following a visit to Ottawa by American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.⁶⁶ NORAD formalized the existent integration of Canadian and American Arctic warning systems and extended operational command and control integration to the rest of the continental air defense forces.

NORAD's nadir was presaged within a week of its formation. On 26 August 1957 the Soviet Union announced a successful test of the world's first ICBM.⁶⁷ Although the Soviet strategic bomber threat, which NORAD's defenses were designed to detect and counter, would continue to grow well

into the 1960s, the ICBM would make the just-completed, Arctic-based early warning systems obsolete.

Chapter Two Notes

1. Canadian Prime Minister Lester Borden telegraphed an offer of military aid to London on August 1, 1914. On 18 August the Canadian Parliament rubber-stamped Canada's war preparations. See Bruce Hutchison, Mr. Prime Minister, 1867-1964, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1964), 157.
2. James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 28-41.
3. The Statute of Westminster passed by the British Parliament in 1931 officially recognized Canada and the other self-governing dominions as independent member nations of the British Commonwealth.
4. Colonel Stanley W. Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945 ((Washington, D.C.): Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959), 5.
5. Department of State, Press Releases 15: 168; quoted in Dziuban, 3.
6. Ibid., 19: 124; quoted in Dziuban, 3-4.
7. House of Commons, Debates, 12 November 1940, 55; quoted in Dziuban, 4; underlining added for emphasis.
8. J. W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), 1: 29. This work is essentially Mackenzie King's diary with narrative and editing for continuity.
9. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 243-47; Pickersgill, 1: 130.
10. Pickersgill, 1: 125, 128, 130.
11. Ibid., 130-31, 133-34.
12. Permanent Joint Board on Defense, The Permanent Joint Board on Defence, Canada-United States, 1940-1965 (Ottawa, 1965), unnumbered pages.
13. Pickersgill, 1: 136-37.

14. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2, Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), 410-12.

15. Department of State, "Exchange of Notes Regarding United States Destroyers and Naval and Air Facilities for the United States in British Transatlantic Territories," 2 September 1940, Annex I to "Leased Naval and Air Bases," 27 March 1941, Executive Agreement Series 235.

16. Churchill, 408.

17. David MacKenzie, Inside the Atlantic Triangle: Canada and the Entrance of Newfoundland into Confederation 1939-1949 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 14-16.

18. St. John Chadwick, Newfoundland: Island into Province (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 180.

19. Dziuban, 30; C. P. Stacey, "Twenty-one Years of Canadian-American Military Co-operation, 1940-1961," in Canada-United States Treaty Relations, ed. David R. Deener (Durham: Duke University Press, 1963), 106.

20. Churchill, 407.

21. Lester Pearson, Mike, the Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972), 1: 190.

22. Ibid., 1: 191.

23. Department of State, "Leased Naval and Air Bases," 27 March 1941, Executive Agreement Series 235.

24. These recommendations were adopted virtually automatically by the governments of Canada and the United States. Dziuban, Appendix A, contains the texts of all thirty-three wartime recommendations.

25. Dziuban, 176-77.

26. Pickersgill, 1: 135.

27. Department of State, "Postwar Disposition of Defense Installations and Facilities," 27 January 1943; "Payment for Certain Defense Installations," 23 and 27 June 1944; "Postwar Disposition of Defense Installations and Facilities," 31 March 1946, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, vol. 6.

28. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, vol. 5, The British Commonwealth; Western and Central Europe (Washington, D.C.), 1969), 53-55; hereafter cited as FRUS followed by the appropriate year.

29. J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Foster, The Mackenzie King Record (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 3: 219.

30. FRUS 1946, 5: 56.

31. *Ibid.*, 5: 57.

32. *Ibid.*, 5: 59-61.

33. *Ibid.*, 5: 63.

34. *Ibid.*, 5: 62.

35. Pickersgill and Foster, 3: 362.

36. *Ibid.*, 3: 35.

37. FRUS 1946, 5: 60.

38. *Ibid.*, 5: 57-58.

39. *Ibid.*, 5: 63-65.

40. Chadwick, 195.

41. Pickersgill and Foster, 3: 366-69.

42. FRUS 1946, 5: 73.

43. *Ibid.*, 5: 75.

44. *Ibid.*, 5: 66.

45. Department of State, "Permanent Joint Board on Defense: Postwar Cooperation," 12 February 1947, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, vol. 6.

46. P. J. Phillip, "Prime Minister Explains Action," New York Times, 13 February 1947, 17.

47. MacKenzie, 201.

48. *Ibid.*, 204-5.

49. Pearson, 2: 25.

50. FRUS 1949, 2: 400.
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Ibid.*, 405, 410-11.
53. Department of State, "Leased Bases in Newfoundland," 13 February, 19 March 1952, TIAS no. 2572, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 3, pt. 3.
54. Pearson, 2: 84.
55. FRUS 1951, 2: 901-2.
56. *Ibid.*, 2: 870-871.
57. Eayrs, 4: 246.
58. Department of State, "Defense," 5 December 1952, TIAS no. 2730, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 3, pt. 4.
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CHAPTER THREE

SOVIET THREAT, AMERICAN CHALLENGE, AND CANADIAN POLICY: CRISIS IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF NORTHERN WATERS

The Maritime Threat. At the same time that Canada's Arctic territory peaked in value as North America's primary air defense region, the seminal event for growth of the region's strategic maritime value was taking place. On 1 August 1958 the United States nuclear submarine Nautilus submerged off Point Barrow, Alaska. Only six days later the Nautilus surfaced a few miles north of Iceland.¹ The nuclear submarine had transformed the strategic value of Arctic waters, but Canada was not prepared to establish control over the waters of the Arctic archipelago.

Canada geographically appears to have the same maritime incentives as the United States, but until World War II Canada could count on the British Navy for its maritime defense. Then suddenly with Britain under siege, maritime protection was gone, and Canada had to build a navy. By the end of World War II, the Canadian Navy with over four hundred ships was the third largest in the world. Having been tasked with protection of convoys in the North Atlantic, it had proven its effectiveness in anti-submarine

warfare (ASW).

By 1947 only ten ships of the Royal Canadian Navy remained in commission. However, the Navy did have the "arcticized" carrier Magnificent.² Mackenzie King wrote in his diary that he believed "one aircraft carrier may be advisable. If war should come at any time, flying from the northern regions would be an important factor."³ After his 1947 spring summit with Harry Truman, King recorded concern about "the display of air power in Moscow, (a reference to the 'flypast' of long range bombers that had startled military attaches), . . . and submarine power as recently developed."⁴ In 1948 the Magnificent and its destroyer escort became the first warships to enter Hudson Bay.⁵ Apparently, even with a drastically reduced Navy, Canada had the rudiments of a maritime strategy that considered the Arctic's geostrategic location. Soon though, Canada's Navy returned to a more traditional role. Under the NATO doctrine of collective defense, Canada was assigned sea lane protection duties between Europe and North America. Budgetary constraints limited the Canadian Navy, but by January 1960 it had grown to 45 warships.⁶

In September 1955 the Soviet Union fired the first submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from a converted diesel-electric Zulu class submarine. Five Zulus were converted to carry three SLBMs each. At the same time Whiskey class diesel-electric submarines were being converted to carry nuclear cruise missiles with a land

attack range of more than four hundred miles. Conceivably a Soviet submarine would soon be able to sneak into the Hudson Bay and from well within the interior of the North American continent launch a nuclear attack on Canadian and American cities. By 1959 the Soviet Union had the nuclear powered Hotel class ballistic missile submarines and the nuclear powered Echo class cruise missile submarines at sea.⁷ ASW needed a strategic defense dimension.

The Beginnings of a "Canadian" Defence Policy: The 1964 White Paper. Canada's defense had always been subsumed in British defense, or North American defense, or NATO defense. In 1964 the Canadian government issued White Paper on Defence, an attempt to focus on Canadian defense needs. The 1964 White Paper set out to define "defence of Canada," the objectives of which were

to preserve the peace by supporting collective defence measures to deter military aggression; to support Canadian foreign policy including that arising out of our participation in international organizations, and to provide for our protection and surveillance of our territory, our air space and our coastal waters.

The roles of collective defense and international peacekeeping in Canadian defense policy were not new. The new role of "protection and surveillance," i.e. sovereignty protection, was an extension of a long-standing foreign policy, but a new one for the Canadian defense establishment. Sovereignty protection was to make Canadian defense "Canadian." The White Paper concisely defined the "defence of Canada"

as those aspects of North American defence which must, for reasons based upon Canadian national interests, be subject to Canadian control. The minimum requirements for the defence of Canada are: the ability to maintain surveillance of Canadian territory, airspace and territorial waters; the ability to deal with military incidents on Canadian territory; the ability to deal with incidents in the ocean areas off the Canadian coasts; and the ability to contribute, within the limit⁹ of our resources, to the defence of Canadian airspace.

Obviously, the Government was defining a role for Canadian military forces that was independent of, but not divorced from, NATO and NORAD -- a role to justify the expense of providing for well-equipped Canadian armed forces.

Notably, points in the 1964 White Paper's definition of "defence of Canada" required a maritime strategy -- e.g. surveillance of territorial waters and the ability to deal with incidents there. The Soviet submarine threat was still growing; by 1964 Soviet ballistic missile submarines could launch their missiles submerged. United States submarines were operating freely in the Arctic. The USS Seadragon had made the first submerged transit of the Northwest Passage in 1960; a Canadian observer was onboard.¹⁰

Canada's maritime responsibilities within NATO were primarily to assist in keeping the sea lanes to Western Europe open, i.e. anti-submarine warfare. Canada's 1964 White Paper recognized a need to improve the country's ASW forces and was optimistic that an effective ASW force could be put to sea. To get the most effective ASW force, the government proposed to consider building two or three nuclear powered submarines.¹¹

By the time of the Canadian proposal to build nuclear submarines, access to the technology to do so was extremely difficult to obtain. A 1956 agreement permitted Canada and the United States to exchange naval nuclear propulsion information.¹² In 1958 the United States shipped to Great Britain a complete submarine nuclear reactor plant and associated spare parts and information. The agreement under which it was transferred required strict limitations on sharing military reactor technology. The British-American agreement was modified in 1959 to require "authorization by competent bodies of such other Party," i.e. congressional approval by United States law, before a third-party transfer of information or technology could take place.¹³ At the same time the United States reached new agreements with Canada and other countries that removed the ability to exchange naval nuclear propulsion information.¹⁴ The 1964 proposal to build Canadian submarines was determined to be too expensive; any Canadian program would have had to start from scratch.

The 1964 White Paper was an attempt to get a handle on postwar Canadian defense and to give defense policy some direction. It set forth no definite capital program. The White Paper was purely a policy document to define where Canadian defense policy was and where it should go. As such it was successful; the themes it set forth have been repeated in the two white papers since 1964.

Despite a growing Soviet submarine threat and Canada's NATO commitments, the paper was not successful in establishing a need for a strong Canadian maritime presence. No Canadian strategy to counter the increased maritime threat appeared. By 1968 the Navy had shrunk to 28 warships, although four new helicopter destroyers for ASW were proposed. Of course, the maritime threat was submerged and therefore not publicly visible. Canada's inability to control waters she claimed did not become visible until the voyage of the experimental tanker Manhattan through the Northwest Passage.

The 'Manhattan' Crisis. The Norwegian Roald Amundsen made the first complete transit of the Northwest Passage from 1903 to 1906. He voyaged from east to west in a 47-ton herring boat, the Gjoa, powered by a 13-horsepower kerosene motor. The next ship to complete the passage was the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Schooner St. Roch commanded by Sergeant H. A. Larsen between 1940 and 1942.¹⁵

When the Manhattan set sail from Chester, Pennsylvania, on 24 August 1969, the passage had been completed by only eight surface vessels, the Gjoa, the St. Roch, two Canadian and four American icebreakers. Completely submerged transits had been made by the United States nuclear attack submarines Seadragon and Skate. The Manhattan was the first merchant ship to complete the Northwest Passage.¹⁶

Humble Oil and lesser partners, British Petroleum and Atlantic Richfield, sponsored the tanker's experimental

voyage but sought governmental assistance.¹⁷ The Canadian government cooperated from the outset.¹⁸ The Canadian icebreaker John A. Macdonald accompanied the Manhattan,¹⁹ although the United States government had not made an official request for an escort. Canada provided ice guides one of whom was Captain Thomas C. Pullen, RCN, the senior observer and coordinator of Canadian assistance throughout the voyage. The American icebreaker Northwind also escorted the Manhattan, but the smaller American icebreaker was underpowered and fell behind.²⁰ On the return trip the USCGC Staten Island joined the party, and the new CCGS L. S. St. Laurent, then the world's biggest and newest icebreaker, interrupted sea trials to meet the party in the Prince of Wales Strait.²¹ Bad weather prevented scheduled, token participation by a Soviet icebreaker.²² The John A. Macdonald was the workhorse of the party, several times breaking the tanker free from ice. Usually, though, even the John A. Macdonald travelled in the tanker's wake, since at full speed the tanker could easily burst through ice that would have trapped the Canadian icebreaker.²³

Aerial reconnaissance was critical to the experiment's success. Major Logan had made the point over forty years before that aircraft could assist in navigation of the Arctic archipelago, and Canadian aircraft did provide the Manhattan with sailing directions for the ice fields. They were critical for the experimental phase, too, as they

searched for ice of the appropriate thicknesses to generate data on Manhattan's icebreaking power.²⁴

During a visit to Washington in March 1969, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau directly asked President Richard Nixon for a formal United States request of permission for the Manhattan's transit. Washington did not wish to make an official request. Such a request might have given tacit acknowledgement of Ottawa's sovereignty over Arctic straits, thereby weakening maritime rights in other strategic straits around the world. Moreover, the voyage was viewed as a private venture. Nixon, therefore, declined Trudeau's request.²⁵ However, the accompaniment of a United States Coast Guard icebreaker tended to give the voyage official Washington sanction and contributed to public outrage in Canada.

The potential for an oil spill from the mammoth tanker raised environmental concerns and magnified the Canadian public's perception that Canadian sovereignty was being violated.²⁶ Of course, there was no oil to be loaded in Alaska, since the North Slope oil fields at Prudhoe Bay had not yet been developed. Six centerline tanks of the Manhattan were loaded with oil before leaving Pennsylvania and were surrounded by 45 tanks of seawater ballast.²⁷ An oil spill was unlikely without the destruction of the ship. However, the environmental concerns were valid with regard to future transits and would have to be taken into account in future Arctic tanker designs and in future passages.

Of course, Canada had as much to gain from the voyage as did the United States, and with the support of the John A. Macdonald and aerial reconnaissance did more than the United States to ensure the success of the experiment. While the experiment tested the feasibility of transporting oil from Prudhoe Bay to the East Coast, it also proved that commercial access to the mineral richness of the Arctic archipelago and tanker transport of oil from Canada's Mackenzie Delta oil fields was possible.²⁸ However, these possibilities only increased environmental concerns and, anyway, seemed to be lost in the public's perception that Washington was running roughshod over Ottawa in the Arctic.²⁹

The Hundred Mile Limit and "Effective Control." From an experimental point of view the Manhattan's voyage was an outstanding success. The experience and data from this transit proved that a tanker could be designed that would not need to be escorted by "comparitively puny" icebreakers.³⁰ However, some discontent was generated by Humble's secrecy in keeping data from its lesser partners and from Ottawa.³¹

The political fallout from the voyage was significant. The high level of public concern can be attributed not to a perceived violation of territorial sovereignty but to the less direct sovereignty erosion caused by American capital. Already American companies owned almost all of Canada's producing natural resources.³² Now Americans were trying to

open up the far North, the treasure house of mineral riches described by J. D. Craig in his 1922 report.

Environmental concerns were real, but they were certainly exploited to get parliamentary and government action to block potential American activity in the Canadian Arctic. In June 1969 Parliament passed the Oil and Gas Production and Conservation Act, claiming for Canada exploitation of the continental shelf to a depth of 200 meters or to the depth of exploitability. In February 1970 Canada finally became party to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.

When the Manhattan transited the Northwest Passage, Canada still recognized a three-mile territorial sea. Thus the passage could be navigated in international waters. In December 1970, however, Canada decided on a twelve-mile territorial sea. That meant some small islands in the Parry Channel could conceivably extend territorial waters across the channel. However, the territorial sea is generally measured from the larger land mass, not minuscule islands lying off the coast.

For a merchant ship whether the Northwest Passage is territorial waters, an international strait, or high seas is a moot point, since the right of innocent passage applies. It is customary for warships to notify the affected country of their intent to cross territorial waters. To consider American icebreakers as warships would be to stretch the point, and in any event notification of transit is only a

formality not required by international law. So, whether considered as territorial waters or high seas the voyage of the Manhattan and her escorts did not violate international law of the sea. From the Canadian perspective, however, the waters of the Arctic archipelago are not international and are not territorial -- they are Canadian. As previously noted, the concept of "Canadian waters" goes back to the turn of the century.

In April 1970 the minister of external affairs reaffirmed Canada's claims: "Canada has always regarded the waters of the Arctic archipelago as being Canadian waters (and) the present Government maintains that position." In an official statement containing the minister's statement Mr. J. A. Beesley, legal adviser to the Department of External Affairs, claimed that

as far as Canada is concerned, the special characteristics of the Arctic waters and ice combine to give them a special status -- however defined -- which implies special rights and responsibilities for the Arctic coastal states. Accordingly for many years Canada has exercised effective control over the uses of the waters of the Canadian Arctic archipelago and over a wide range of activities carried out on their ice-cover.³⁸

Mr. Beesley was only partially correct. True, Canada had exercised some manner of fisheries protection since Captain Bernier's voyages in the first decade of this century and had exercised approval over scientific and exploratory expeditions since the Byrd-MacMillan affair in 1925. However, before the Manhattan crisis Canada had not asserted a formal claim of jurisdiction over the waters of

the Arctic archipelago. If the Manhattan had proven that the Northwest Passage was a usable route for commercial shipping, Canada was not prepared for regular commercial navigation of the passage. In 1969, therefore, no legal framework existed for Canadian jurisdiction over "Canadian waters" in the Arctic, but by 1971 the Canadian government was talking in terms of "effective control" of those waters.³⁴ The Manhattan crisis spurred the Canadians to pass the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of June 1970. This law proclaimed Canadian jurisdiction over pollution control out to 100 miles from land in the region above 60 degrees north. That allowed Canada to claim some legal jurisdiction over all vessels operating in the Arctic archipelago, and it particularly discouraged tanker transits. A communique released with the regulations to enforce the Act indicated that its real intent was to prevent any future Manhattan incidents:

The Ministers emphasized that the promulgation of the Act and the regulations should not, therefore, be taken as an indication that the government is prepared at this time to approve the passage of large oil tankers throughout Arctic waters.³⁵

The only country to recognize Canadian jurisdiction over pollution control in the Arctic archipelago was the Soviet Union which had long maintained effective control over the Northeast Passage. The United States and some of the Western European countries openly disputed Canadian jurisdiction over Arctic waters. They wanted an

international or regional solution to the problems of Arctic pollution and navigation.³⁶

The 1971 White Paper. Canada's desire to exert "effective" control in the waters of the Arctic archipelago was reflected in defense policy. In the 1971 White Paper Defence in the 70s the Government stated that its first national concern was the

re-examination (of defense responsibilities) as a result of Government decisions to regulate the development of the North in a manner compatible with environmental preservation, and with legislation enacted to prevent pollution in the Arctic and Northern inland waters.³⁷

Evidently, Canada planned to defend the waters of the Arctic archipelago as inland waters.

The 1971 White Paper assigned the armed forces to defend the "sovereignty and independence" of Canada from "external challenges," which were defined as "actions by foreign agencies or their nationals involving territorial violations or infringements of Canadian laws governing access to and activity within these areas." The paper mentioned the potential of oil spills and challenges to Canadian control of resources on the seabed of the continental shelf.³⁸ Apparently, "external challenges" was a euphemism for the United States.

In establishing defense priorities the White Paper ranked "the protection of our sovereignty" ahead of "the defence of North America in co-operation with U.S. forces."³⁹ The first priority in "national aims" was "that Canada will continue secure as an independent political

entity."⁴⁰ Since sovereignty ranked ahead of security as a defense priority, then the United States must have been considered a greater threat to Canadian independence than any threat to North America as a whole. Of course, the Canadians did not ignore the Soviet nuclear threat, but that danger was seen to exist only because of proximity to the United States.⁴¹ Moreover, that threat was seen to be diminishing with detente and the potential for arms reductions based on the SALT talks.⁴² The 1971 White Paper also reduced Canada's NATO contribution -- another indication that Canadians perceived a reduced threat from the Soviet Union.⁴³

Epilogue. The Navy inherited by the Trudeau government included one aircraft carrier, four diesel-electric submarines (one a loaner from the United States), and twenty-three destroyers and frigates.⁴⁴ The aircraft carrier was sold for scrap in 1970 right after a mid-life refit. Despite the precedence of Arctic sovereignty protection stressed in the 1971 White Paper, the Trudeau Government supported no new maritime initiatives and seemed satisfied with the statement that "the present naval ships cannot operate safely in ice-covered waters, or above 65° N latitude at any time of the year. . . ."⁴⁵ The Navy inherited by the Mulroney Government in 1984 included only three submarines and twenty destroyers and frigates, with six new frigates proposed.⁴⁶ Maritime Command (MARCOM) was in the worst shape of all the Canadian Forces, and even with

six new frigates would be left in the mid-1990s with only ten serviceable warships, i.e. the frigates and the four early-70s vintage Tribal class helicopter destroyers.

Chapter Three Notes

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CHAPTER FOUR

ARCTIC MARITIME STRATEGY: A "CANADIAN" DEFENSE POLICY

No Effective Control. In 1984 the Progressive Conservative government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was elected in a landslide victory. Mulroney and the Conservatives came to office with an apparent mandate to strengthen Canadian defense and to strengthen the Canadian voice in NATO and North American defense.

The Liberal government of Pierre Elliott Trudeau which had taken office a year before the Manhattan crisis had essentially frozen defense spending at a level that was already low when Trudeau's time in office began. In the early 1970s North American early warning systems were near obsolescence because of the decreased bomber threat for which they were designed. Intercontinental ballistic missiles could overshoot Canadian airspace. The feeling was that the only physical danger to Canadians from a nuclear war was the spread of radioactive fallout from atomic weapons exploding on United States targets. Besides, SALT talks seemed to indicate that deterrence was working and the nuclear threat was decreasing.¹ The Trudeau government did not see Canadian defense as a priority and curtailed defense expenditures accordingly.² Trudeau's was the government

that promised to maintain "effective control" of the Northwest Passage. However, the only defense strategy in the 1971 White Paper related to "effective control" was a proposal to increase aerial surveillance of Arctic waters.³ With the cutback in defense spending essentially nothing was done outside of pollution control legislation to enhance Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic archipelago.

The increase in aerial surveillance was not enough to prevent another maritime-related crisis in the North. What use was surveillance in sovereignty protection when the intruder being watched tells you when and where he is going to violate your sovereignty, and when there are Canadian observers onboard the intruder to carefully note and assist in the violation? Such was the case with the transit of the USCGC Polar Sea in 1985. An exchange between External Affairs Minister Joe Clark and another member of parliament on 20 June 1985 takes on new meaning when the above question is kept in mind:

Mr. Chretien: Will the Minister tell the American government that when they come to the Northwest Passage this summer they are in Canadian waters and must ask permission from the Canadian government to be there?

Right Hon. Joe Clark (Secretary of State for External Affairs): Mr. Speaker, we will do better than that. We will have Canadians on board to guide them through waters which we consider to be ours.⁴

All Canada could do was what it had done with the Manhattan, monitor the passage. As in the Byrd-MacMillan affair sixty years before, in the Manhattan crisis Canada could only ask the United States to request permission. The United States, however, held that the waters of the Northwest Passage were

an international strait, and, therefore, neither permission nor notification was required.⁵

The 'Polar Sea' Crisis. No United States ship had transited the Northwest Passage for sixteen years -- that is since the Manhattan. But then in August 1985, after coming through the Panama Canal to take over the annual Thule resupply mission for the crippled USCGC Northwind, the Pacific-based USCGC Polar Sea took the Northwest Passage home to Seattle.⁶

Canadian public reaction to this transit was acrimonious. Rock-weighted messages and flags were hurled from a private aircraft onto the Polar Sea's decks as she passed through Vincent Melville Sound.⁷ The Canadian government received specific assurances from the United States government that the voyage in no way was a challenge to Canada's legal position. It also received advance formal notification of the planned transit. It did not, however, obtain a United States request for permission. External Affairs Minister Joe Clark explained, "When we looked for ways to exercise our sovereignty we found that the Canadian cupboard was bare."⁸

The government's response to the Polar Sea crisis was more immediate with more specific proposals than its reaction to the Manhattan's voyage. The government sought and received Parliament's approval for actions to assert Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic archipelago. The major initiatives proposed by Joe Clark were

immediate adoption of an Order in Council establishing straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago; . . . immediate talks with the United States on co-operation in Arctic waters on the basis of full respect for Canadian sovereignty; . . . construction of a polar, class 8 icebreaker and urgent consideration of other means of exercising effective control over our Arctic waters.

Straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago were adopted on 10 September 1985 to become effective on 1 January 1986.¹⁰ Canada formally claimed the waters enclosed by the baselines as internal waters (Figure 2). The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), to which Canada was a signatory, had recognized the right to draw straight baselines and to designate sea lanes through the enclosed waters where ships of other states would enjoy the new right of "transit passage." However for coastal states the baselines could be drawn only where the coast was deeply indented, or where there was a fringe of islands. The baselines had to follow the general direction of the coast.¹¹ Canada met none of the conditions for drawing baselines around the Arctic archipelago but did so anyway.

The "Polar 8" icebreaker was put under contract at an estimated cost of C\$500 million. Designed for year-round presence in the Arctic, it seems to have been planned for "effective control" of the waters, just as the Mounted Police posts in the 1920s were for "effective occupation" of the land.

Meanwhile, the government was holding talks with the United States and at the same time working on a defense

White Paper. Those talks and the White Paper gave the government arenas to practice the number one goal of the 1985 Green Paper on foreign policy, "unity." In 1986 the Special Joint Committee on International Relations stated with regard to unity, "Canada has to be able to present an image abroad that Canadians recognize as their own."¹² The defense White Paper was to be one that Canadians would recognize as "Canadian."

The 1987 White Paper. Towards the end of the Trudeau government it became apparent that the maritime defenses of Canada had been seriously neglected. The Canadian Senate Sub-committee on National Defence concluded: "By running down its forces, as it did in the late 1960s and through the 1970s, Canada contributed not to raising but to lowering the nuclear threshold."¹³ The sub-committee also found "that there is a requirement for Canada's maritime forces to be equipped to perform a sea-denial role in waters over which Canada claims jurisdiction."¹⁴ The sub-committee was scathing of the government's failure to follow up on sovereignty protection as espoused in the 1971 White Paper and pointed out that MARCOM had not been given the tools to do the job despite "enormous additions to Canada's maritime jurisdictional claims:" the twelve mile territorial sea (1970), the two hundred mile economic exclusion zone (1982), and continuing historical claims to sovereignty in the waters of the Arctic archipelago.¹⁵

The sub-committee was incredulous that nothing was being done to halt the decline of the Navy which, besides sovereignty protection, had a NATO duty to protect huge ocean areas in the Atlantic and similar commitments in the Pacific with the United States. To arrest that decline the committee recommended a maritime defence policy that built up to "a balanced fleet within twelve years." The proposed force included sixteen frigates (twelve new frigates plus four of the Tribal class) and twenty diesel-electric submarines.¹⁶

The Conservative government of Brian Mulroney came to power in 1984 with the belief that it had a mandate to upgrade the Canadian Forces. The Mulroney government intended to issue a preliminary paper on defense shortly after coming to power but then decided to wait for the completion of air defense negotiations with the United States. Meanwhile, the government was able to stop the downward spiral of the Canadian Forces by getting real increases in defense spending of over 2 per cent a year. However, without a review of defense commitments the money was spread thin through all areas and was barely enough to maintain the status quo.¹⁷

The government had been negotiating since 1983 with the United States to modernize North American air defenses. In 1985 the United States and Canada reached agreements for modernizing Arctic-based warning systems. The decision to modernize resulted from a change in the Soviet strategic

threat. Cruise missiles could be launched from Soviet bombers far from North American air space. Soviet bombers were once again a first strike threat. To provide early warning against air-breathing weapons the two nations agreed to construct a modern North Warning System (NWS) across the Arctic on the 70th parallel, the same latitude as the obsolete DEW Line constructed thirty years before.¹⁸ The agreement was announced in a joint declaration by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and President Ronald Reagan in Quebec City on 18 March 1985. It was intentionally reminiscent of the Ogdensburg Declaration made 45 years before. The 1985 declaration included guarantees of Canadian sovereignty, thus continuing the framework of defense cooperation conceived for the first early warning systems. The NWS would be Canadian-operated from the start. The 1985 declaration also reaffirmed Canada-United States defense production sharing agreements that had been in existence in one form or another since WW II and had provided "free trade" in defense goods. Significantly, Mulroney got a concession on sharing defense technical knowledge and skills.¹⁹

Canada's Arctic was regaining its strategic value. In addition to the changed threat, the United States Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) with its potential for ballistic missile defenses stationed on Canadian soil was cited by a special joint parliamentary committee as giving Canada more leverage in the "strategic environment." Since cruise

missiles and precision-targeted SLBM's made industrial and population centers as targetable as they once were with bombers,²⁰ Canada was no longer a "fire proof house" that could watch missiles flying overhead to their strategic targets in the American plains.

By the time the air defense agreements were completed, the reviews of defense commitments were well under way, and the government decided to proceed directly to a White Paper without any preliminary direction. At any rate, the air defense negotiations had already settled one major defense area. That left only two other major areas -- maritime defense, and the commitment to NATO. Another area, international peacekeeping, was popular, cheap and, therefore, was not at stake. The Mulroney government appeared ready to close what was commonly called the "commitment-capability gap." That could be accomplished by cutting commitments, increasing capabilities, or both.

Besides its maritime role Canada's commitment to NATO consisted of a mechanized brigade group and two air groups in southern Germany, plus the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable brigade group (CAST) to be formed when necessary for deployment from Canada to northern Norway.²¹ A test deployment of the CAST in 1986 was a failure. Consequently, it was no surprise when the 1987 White Paper announced that the commitment to northern Norway would be dropped in favor of beefing up forces in southern Germany.²²

The White Paper which had been promised for 1986 was not issued until June 1987. By that time the only unanswered question was what was the government going to do about MARCOM. The frigate program had already been extended to a proposed twelve new frigates above the six already under contract. In May 1987 the government had put forth a tentative proposal for a nuclear submarine program, but it had not been approved by the cabinet. The Canadian Submarine Acquisition Program (CASAP) had been underway for some time and had already ruled out nuclear submarines. Although nuclear submarines had been proposed in 1964, and considered again in 1983, they were rejected by CASAP as too expensive.²³ Despite the initial cabinet resistance the government announced in the White Paper that it would acquire a force of ten to twelve nuclear powered attack submarines. The program was estimated to cost C\$8 billion.²⁴

The Nuclear Submarine Decision. When the results of the CASAP review of conventional submarines were presented to Defence Minister Perin Beatty in late 1986, he directed MARCOM to consider the nuclear option before the White Paper was published. Beatty apparently remembered that a review of Canada's ability to construct, operate, and support nuclear submarines had been ordered in 1985 by his predecessor.²⁵ That review was not concerned with a detailed analysis of costs and effectiveness. Sent back to the drawing board with an impending deadline, MARCOM went

directly to the United States Navy's Naval Reactors division. Naval Reactors was startled and perturbed when MARCOM bypassed diplomatic channels and ignored a 1959 treaty that prohibited the exchange of military reactor technology. Under pressure because of the close working relationship that had developed between the United States Navy and MARCOM over the years, Naval Reactors grudgingly agreed to answer a list of questions.²⁶ With the information gleaned from Naval Reactors, some information obtained from French and British parties vying to supply the submarines, and from its own review of Canadian capabilities, MARCOM was able to give Beatty what appeared to be a well-founded analysis favoring a Canadian nuclear submarine program.

The nuclear submarine proposal ran into opposition in the cabinet even before the White Paper's release. However, Beatty silenced some of the critics by pointing out that only nuclear submarines could patrol the Arctic.²⁷ The United States would have to acknowledge Canadian effective control of the Northwest Passage and the rest of the waters of the Arctic archipelago when planning Arctic operations. Beatty later detailed that argument in a speech given on 7 March 1988, when he appeared before the Standing Committee on National Defence in support of a sovereignty protection role for Canadian nuclear submarines:

Our preferred approach (when a foreign submarine is encountered) will be to deter intrusions into Canadian waters. I think that the prime directive given any foreign submarine commander with thoughts of intruding

into Canadian waters in peace time would be, "Don't get caught!" Therefore, indicating to him that he is being tracked would in all likelihood chase him away.

Beatty compared the above approach to other means of stopping intruders:

(Mines would) blast him out of the water - crew and all, . . . (listening devices, with) no means to enforce our policy, would be like installing a burglar alarm, but then disbanding the police force, . . . (and icebreakers would be) entirely useless against submarines.²⁸

In May 1987 the Cabinet was still feeling the aftershocks of the Polar Sea incident, and the sovereignty role got support for the nuclear submarine program.

Once announced, the nuclear submarine program was criticized not only by opposition parties who questioned its expense but also by Washington and other NATO allies. The 1987 White Paper presented a program for the acquisition of ten to twelve nuclear attack submarines. To cover part of the costs the eighteen frigate program would be reduced to twelve. Defense spending would grow at 2 percent per annum for fifteen years, with periodic additional boosts to pay for major projects.²⁹ Washington and the other NATO allies wanted that money to be spent on other ASW assets and on Canadian Forces in Europe.³⁰ United States submariners did not take the program seriously, in part because they knew that C\$8 billion was not nearly enough for the submarines plus enough infrastructure to ensure a safe and secure naval nuclear propulsion program.

The submarines being considered for the program were the British Trafalgar and the French Rubis (see Appendix A

for specifications). When the program went out for bids, the real costs became apparent. While the French submarine might have been able to meet the cost ceiling, its capabilities were limited, and it would have to be modified for under-ice operations. The British submarine was proven under-ice but was more expensive, much bigger, and required more personnel. The British choice had the added drawback of requiring United States permission for Britain to transfer reactor technology obtained from the United States to Canada.³¹

Beatty visited the director of Naval Reactors, Admiral Kinnard McKee, shortly after the White Paper was released and tried to smooth over American resistance to technology transfer. The meeting did not go well, but at lunch later that day Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger soothed Beatty with a promise of cooperation.³² Even so, Weinberger could not promise that Congress would agree to permit Britain to transfer the reactor technology.

In November 1987 the American naval attache to Ottawa made a very controversial speech on the Canadian submarine program. The attache, Captain Robert Hofford, pointed out that Admiral McKee was concerned that the Canadians were embarking on a nuclear submarine program without the commitment of national resources needed to ensure nuclear safety and security. Hofford was also concerned that should congressional approval be required for technology transfer, the Canadian government was making approval difficult by

selling the program to Parliament and the public as a means to force American recognition of Canadian Arctic sovereignty. Captain Hofford's views were distorted by splashy, negative press,³³ but in actuality his intent was to acquaint Canadians with the difficulty of obtaining American support when the technology issue came before Congress.

Finally, on 27 April 1988 President Ronald Reagan promised Prime Minister Mulroney that the United States would not stand in the way of a technology transfer from Britain to Canada. Mulroney got the promise while he was in Washington to discuss the transfer with the President and Congress, along with other bilateral issues such as acid rain and the free trade pact.³⁴ Mulroney returned to Ottawa with Reagan's promise but found opposition to the program still existed in his own cabinet.³⁵ The original plan to get the submarines under contract before the elections was too far behind schedule to continue. Besides, Mulroney found his Conservative Party rising in the polls, and to decide between the French and British submarines then would have been a potential liability in the elections.

A "Three Ocean" Concept for Canada. Nuclear attack submarines are what would make the "three ocean" concept announced in the White Paper work. The White Paper noted a lesson from the Falklands war: "Through their mere presence, nuclear submarines can deny an opponent the use of sea areas."³⁶ Prime Minister Mulroney went further to claim in

an interview with Macleans that Soviet submarines were in the Canadian Arctic on a "regular basis."³⁷ The White Paper stated that nuclear submarines would allow the Canadian Navy to "determine what is happening under the ice in the Canadian Arctic, and to deter hostile or potentially hostile intrusions."³⁸ The White Paper also pointed out that nuclear submarines would give Canada a "balanced" naval force.³⁹ In its NATO support role Canada has maintained two legs of the ASW triad: maritime patrol aircraft and surface ships. Nuclear submarines would complete that triad.

More important, the White Paper's "three ocean" concept would link Canada's maritime interest to NATO security. Nuclear submarines would not only be used for surveillance and control in the Arctic but also to help keep open sea lanes to resupply Western Europe or to protect shipping in the northeast Pacific.⁴⁰ With its under-ice capability the nuclear fleet would permit Canada to use a "swing strategy." Using the Northwest Passage, a squadron of Canadian nuclear submarines could have access to all oceanic theatres of interest to Canada and her allies. Canadian submarines, sold to the public as a way to express Canada's Arctic sovereignty, have a real security value to Canada and her allies. The "three ocean" concept could be a maritime policy that is recognizable to Canadians as their own, but one which still meets Canada's maritime commitments to NATO and the United States. Canada has even expressed a desire

for a joint maritime command in the Arctic modelled on NORAD.⁴¹ Unfortunately, Canada has announced that the submarines would not be used in a forward deployed manner as envisioned in the United States Maritime Strategy⁴² -- a policy that could drastically impede cooperation with NATO.

Control Without Sovereignty? Talks with the United States concluded on 11 January 1988 with an agreement (Appendix B). Without recognizing any Canadian claim to jurisdiction over the waters of the Arctic archipelago, the United States would request permission for the transit of American icebreakers. Notably, the agreement did not apply to submarine operations in the Arctic.

Canada has decided on other means besides submarines to expand its presence in the Arctic. Five new fighter bases in the high Arctic to accomodate recently acquired CF-18 interceptors were announced.⁴³ Canadian Forces have established unmanned submarine listening posts in the Arctic, for example on Hobson's Choice ice island.⁴⁴ Most significantly, the government announced in February 1988 that a permanent Arctic military base would be built near the eastern entrance to the Northwest Passage at Nanisivik on Baffin Island.⁴⁵

Epilogue. On 10 October 1988, for the first time, the United States State Department asked Canada for permission to send an icebreaker through the Northwest Passage. The Canadian government granted permission that same day,

although the USCGC Polar Sea was already underway from Prudhoe Bay and headed for Canadian-claimed waters.⁴⁶

Prime Minister Mulroney's government was re-elected on 21 November 1988. These elections were a referendum on the free trade pact, but the submarine program was hanging in the balance, too. Meanwhile, the decision on the choice of submarine has apparently been locked in the safe of the nuclear submarine program director.

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CHAPTER FIVE

SOVIET ARCTIC POLICY

No Containment Policy in the Arctic. Canadian policy described in the 1987 White Paper concentrated defense resources in the Arctic while maintaining international, NATO, and bilateral commitments. The "three ocean" concept was designed to give Canada a near continuous naval presence in the Arctic while still providing a force that could be used in NATO and Pacific theatres. Only the Soviet Union has maintained a permanent naval presence in the Arctic. Arctic bases on the Kola peninsula have been the Soviet Navy's only ice-free, open access to the world's oceans. From the perspective of the West's policy of containment, the Arctic is the only area of the world where the Soviet presence has not been proportionately countered. The Soviet reaction to the White Paper and the strategic significance of the Arctic to the Soviets warrant a brief overview of the development of Soviet Arctic policy.

The Soviet Arctic Invasion. The Arctic was not a big factor in tsarist Russian economic and strategic calculations, and except for a few exploratory and hydrographic expeditions, the government tended to dissuade investment in the far North.¹ For the Soviets the Arctic

was one of those gigantic challenges that the Soviet brand of socialism finds intriguing. Viljalmur Stefansson claimed that the Soviet investment in the Arctic stemmed from Stalin's years of exile in Siberia. In the early years of Stalin's rule Arctic successes were used as public examples of the accomplishments of socialism.²

From 1917 to 1920 much of the Soviet Arctic was in the hands of anti-communist forces, but by 1920 those forces had been crushed.³ Soviet concerns in the Arctic then took on both a strategic and an economic focus, strategically with the exit from the Barents Sea and economically with trade along the Northern Sea Route. The Northern Sea Route allowed supply of Siberian settlements by way of rivers that emptied into the Arctic Ocean.

The Soviet Union's seriousness about Arctic development was underscored by the Wrangel Island incident in the 1920s. That incident was not the first use of force involving the Soviet Union and Canada. About 500 Canadian troops under British operational command had been in Archangel fighting Bolsheviks from 1918 to 1919. At the same time 4000 Canadian troops helped occupy Vladivostok.⁴ Given that background, the Soviet's forcible response to the Canadian claim to Wrangel Island a few years later was not too surprising.

Two years after occupying Wrangel Island, the Soviet Union made a formal claim to Arctic territories. On 15 April 1926 the Presidium of the Central Committee of the

U.S.S.R. claimed by decree all territories "north of the coast . . . up to the North Pole, within the limits between the meridian longitude 32⁰-4'-35" east . . . and the meridian longitude 168⁰-49'-36" west."⁵ This decree appropriated 44 percent of the Arctic to the Soviet Union.

Straits and Baselines. Another, and possibly more significant, strategic appropriation by the Soviets was the enclosure of Arctic straits, the White Sea, and other areas with straight baselines, which annexed those areas as internal waters of the Soviet Union. Laptev and Sannikova Straits had already been closed as "historic straits" by an Aide Memoire in 1964. The baseline system was announced in two Decrees of the Council of Ministers on 7 February 1984 and 15 January 1985.⁶ The intent of the baselines in the Arctic was obviously to enhance Soviet effective control of the Northern Sea Route (or Northeast Passage).

In the 1960s there had been two United States attempts to test Soviet effective control of the Northern Sea Route. The USCGC Northwind planned to sail through Vil'kitskogo Strait but was ordered back after informal protests by the Soviet government. Two years later the Coast Guard icebreakers Edisto and Eastwind were also ordered back from the mouth of the strait, even though the Soviet government had been formally notified of the passage. The Soviets made it clear that the passage through the strait would have been a violation of Soviet law, which declares foreign warships do not have the "right of innocent passage" through Soviet

territorial waters. The strait was only 22 miles wide, so all of it came within the Soviet twelve mile limit. By Soviet law, i.e. the Provisional Rules for Foreign Warships Visiting USSR Waters, which were promulgated in March 1931,⁷ the American icebreakers would have required "permission" from the Soviet government thirty days in advance. The Soviets enacted more restrictions in Decree No. 384 of April 1983, Rules of Sailing and Stopovers of Foreign Warships in the Territorial Sea, Internal Waters, and Ports of the U.S.S.R. The rules restricted innocent passage of foreign warships to "routes ordinarily used for international navigation."⁸ The Soviet Union has claimed that the Northern Sea Route is not an international route.

Soviet Naval Forces in the Arctic. On the Kola Peninsula the Soviet Union has the greatest concentration of naval might above the Arctic Circle. The Soviet Northern Fleet operates out of six major bases there and is headquartered in Murmansk.⁹ The fleet includes 302 combatant ships, 350 naval aircraft, and one naval infantry brigade, i.e. about a third of the Soviet Navy.¹⁰ Compared to the temporary presence of units from allied navies in the Arctic, the Northern Fleet makes the Arctic a Soviet lake.

The primary operating area of the Northern Fleet is the Barents Sea. As such the Barents is the primary object of the United States Maritime Strategy, in which Admiral James D. Watkins, then Chief of naval operations for the United States Navy, proposed that NATO navies

would fight our way toward Soviet home water . . . (and) threaten the bases and support structure of the Soviet Navy. . . . At the same time, antisubmarine warfare forces would continue to destroy Soviet submarines, including ballistic missile submarines, thus reducing the attractiveness of nuclear escalation by changing the nuclear balance in our favor.¹¹

Thus, the United States Maritime Strategy attacked the Soviet Union's greatest naval weakness. Soviet maritime vulnerability was best described by World War II Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov when he told his Norwegian counterpart Trygve Lie:

The Dardanelles . . . here we are locked in. . . . Oresund . . . here we are locked in. Only in the North is there an opening, but this war has shown that the supply line to Northern Russia can be cut or interfered with. This shall not be repeated in the future. We have invested much in this part of the Soviet Union, and it is so important for the entire Union's existence that we shall in future ensure that Northern Russia is permitted to live in security and peace.¹²

The military strategic value of Soviet Arctic waters does not rely merely on the concentration of the Northern Fleet. Effective control of the Arctic waters permits use of a "swing strategy." For instance, in 1940 the German cruiser Comet was escorted along this route to the Pacific by Russian icebreakers. The Comet sank ten Allied transport ships, assisted in the bombardment of Nauru, and after 515 days returned to Germany unscathed. In 1942 two Soviet destroyers and several submarines traversed the route from the Pacific to the White Sea for use in action against Germany.¹³

In a future conflict the Soviets could use the Northern Sea Route to move ships, troops, and equipment to the

Pacific or from the Pacific to the Barents Sea to fight a multi-front war. Such maneuvers could frustrate the United States Maritime Strategy. NATO forces might fight their way into Soviet home waters only to find that much of the Soviet Navy that they had come to destroy was now harassing them in the Pacific.

Gorbachev and the Arctic. Less than four months after the release of the 1987 Canadian White Paper, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev gave an address in Murmansk on Soviet Arctic policy. In the speech on 1 October 1987, Gorbachev announced Soviet initiatives to make "the North of the globe, the Arctic, . . . a zone of peace." His proposals included a nuclear free zone and restrictions on naval activity in the seas off Northern Europe. The nuclear free zone naturally was not to apply to Soviet territory, and Soviet naval activity in the Barents Sea would not be affected. Gorbachev also recognized the global economic potential of the Northern Sea Route by proposing to open it to foreign ships escorted by Soviet icebreakers.¹⁴ The importance of the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route is one Stalinist policy not likely to be discarded by the reformist Soviet leader.

Epilogue. The 1987 White Paper has prompted the Soviet Union to make Arctic demilitarization proposals to Canada. First Counsul Alexei Makarov of the Soviet embassy in Ottawa specified cancellation of the Canadian nuclear submarine program as one example of how Canada could demilitarize the

Arctic. Canadian Defence Minister Perrin Beatty replied that the demilitarization proposal was meaningless since it did not apply to the Kola Peninsula.¹⁵

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CONCLUSIONS

Effective Occupation. Senator Poirier's sector theory has never been generally accepted under international law. However, it is obvious that it was followed in the Arctic. Disputed territories have gone to the country whose sector they fall within. Svalbard, Wrangel Island, and the Arctic Archipelago went to Norway, the Soviet Union, and Canada, respectively. The sector claim was insufficient to counter competing claims. It had to be backed by multilateral or bilateral negotiations with other interested parties and, in the case of Wrangel Island, by the use of force. Even so, the key to settling claims was "effective occupation" by the sector country.

For Canada the "effective occupation" of the Arctic archipelago was important to national survival. Occupation by a foreign power would have meant that Canada would have been surrounded by foreign territory. Canada was able to occupy her Arctic land territories with small detachments of the Mounted Police. Though small, they were effective. The Byrd-MacMillan affair proved that Canada was serious in the matter of Arctic sovereignty. The confrontees in the affair were both commissioned representatives of their governments, and consequently the results of the confrontation were

thoroughly reviewed in Ottawa and Washington. By not pursuing the issue of Ottawa's claim to control of access of expeditions to the Arctic, Washington essentially accepted Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic archipelago. However, the Mounted Police posts and infrequent maritime patrols did not settle Canadian claims to northern waters. The question of "effective control" of the waters was to wait several decades due to a lack of Canadian maritime development in the Arctic.

Motivation for Continental Defense Cooperation. Canada faced the reality in World War II that Great Britain could not provide a defense umbrella. Canada, forced to depend on the United States for defense, found that there was little Canadian control in that relationship. To make matters worse the United States-Great Britain destroyer deal exposed Canada's eastern frontier to the threat of American domination. Only Lester Pearson's skillful diplomacy protected Canada's presence in Newfoundland.

The postwar Soviet threat to North America made Canadian control of Newfoundland territory essential to Canada's national survival. Canada did not face direct competition from the United States for Newfoundland, but that was only because the United States needed Canadian cooperation for construction of early warning and air bases within Canada. The threat of an American Newfoundland was real, since without Canada's cooperation the United States would have needed Newfoundland even more for strategic

defense. Canada's cooperation in continental defense was motivated not only by the Soviet threat, but also by the threat of United States control of the eastern frontier.

Territorial Sovereignty and "Leverage." The willingness of the United States to give up sovereign rights in Newfoundland and to recognize Canadian sovereignty over defense activities in the North was evidence of the leverage that control of the Arctic access to North America gave Canada. With this leverage Canada was able to work out a continental defense arrangement that satisfied the sovereignty concerns of Canada and the security concerns of both countries. Potential domination by the United States caused Canada to embrace multilateral arrangements, i.e. NATO, but the European members were not directly interested in the defense of North America, and the hoped-for dilution of the United States presence in North American security did not happen.

Development of the ICBM diminished the Soviet bomber threat to North America. Consequently, Canadian territory carried less weight in continental defense. SLBMs made the defense relationship with the United States even worse, since Canada without nuclear submarines had to depend on the United States for Arctic ASW. Without a means of leverage, Canada could not hope to counter United States hegemony in continental defense, and Canadian sovereignty was perceived to be put in danger. Territorial sovereignty was the key to Canada's ability to act as a sovereign nation within the

defense relationship. With its contribution to continental defense being relatively less important, Canada was deprived of a medium within which to exercise sovereignty.

Three Oceans. The 1964 White Paper recognized the necessity of sovereignty protection as a function of defense policy and proposed that Canada should provide for as much of its own defense as possible. In that regard the paper proposed to buy two or three nuclear submarines for ASW. However, American and British restrictions on access to nuclear propulsion technology made the proposal dependent on Canada's development of an independent naval nuclear program, a prohibitively expensive proposition.

Canada's lack of maritime capability in its own Arctic was invisible to the public eye as long as the challenger was a submarine. The Manhattan's voyage unmasked Canada's inability to control the waters of the Arctic archipelago. However, the illusory potential of detente was an excuse for the Trudeau government not to spend more money on improving maritime capability. Consequently, Canada's naval decline continued, even though the government asserted "effective control" of Canadian-claimed Arctic waters, promulgated pollution control regulations, and extended the territorial sea.

In 1985 the United States icebreaker Polar Sea transited the Northwest Passage without Canadian permission and exposed Canada's failure to establish "effective control." This time the new Conservative government named

specific actions to be taken to ensure Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic archipelago. Those measures included the building of a year-round icebreaker and enclosure of the Arctic archipelago with straight baselines, which formalized the Canadian claim that the Northwest Passage is internal waters.

The United States insists that the Northwest Passage is an "international strait," essentially a corridor of the high seas, and has designated it as a strait "vital to U.S. interests." Even with the right of "transit passage" established by UNCLOS III, which Canada endorsed and the United States recognized (except for the deep-sea mining regime), the distinction between an international strait and internal or territorial waters is significant. Submarines transiting territorial waters are required to move on the surface, an impossible feat in ice-covered waters.

The strategic significance of access to the Arctic for submarines is readily apparent. The Arctic is where the globe narrows down like the hub of a wheel. A submarine entering the hub has access to any of the world's oceans. Anyone who has ever worked in the E-ring of the Pentagon is familiar with the fact that it is usually quicker to walk into the inner ring of the Pentagon and back to the outer ring than to walk from one point to another in the outer ring.

This focal nature of the Arctic is made more significant by the number of high value bases and early

warning sites (e.g. the Soviet Kola bases, the Canada-United States NWS) targetable from the Arctic by cruise missile-launching submarines. Additionally, the Arctic gives NATO submarines access to the Soviet Northern Sea Route, and Soviet submarines access to the shipping lanes of the North Atlantic. Soviet ballistic missile submarines may also utilize the Arctic archipelago as a hiding place close to the NWS in order to reduce American reaction time. Soviet nuclear attack submarines using the Northwest Passage would have access to the eastern seaboard without having to run a gauntlet of NATO ASW forces in the North Atlantic.

Canada cannot spend enough money to make a significant contribution to NATO European forces. The 1985 agreement on the NWS was a step towards regaining sovereignty in the continental defense relationship, particularly since Canada is picking up 40 per cent of the tab and is manning the NWS. Still, NWS participation only gives Canada a medium for bilateral sovereignty, and even that is diluted by the multiplicity of threats to continental security, many of which do not require Canadian cooperation for defense. The failure of the European NATO members to take an interest in North American defense is another factor diluting Canadian sovereignty, and the NWS agreement does nothing to change NATO's ambivalence.

Canadian nuclear submarines would compel the United States at least to reach an agreement similar to the recent agreement on icebreaker operations. In that arrangement the

United States asks permission to operate in the Arctic archipelago without officially recognizing Canadian claims to the waters (Appendix B). The Mulroney government has already said it would like to form a maritime Arctic NORAD with the United States and Great Britain -- another forum for Canada to exercise a voice in western defense.

Security Concerns. With the "three ocean" concept, Canada has used its claim to sovereignty over the Northwest Passage as leverage to put a Canadian voice in multilateral defense. The "three ocean" concept fills a significant gap in NATO security, because NATO does not maintain a continuous maritime presence in the Arctic. A Soviet attack against early warning sites and bases in the Canadian Arctic is a real threat, and Canada is proposing forces to counter that threat. While the Canadian submarine force would clearly give Canada more control of the Northwest Passage, security is at least as much a concern as sovereignty.

The Soviet Union has already recognized Canadian sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago, a step that enhanced similar Soviet claims along the Northern Sea Route. However, Canada's "three ocean" concept more than cancels any advantage gained from that recognition. The Arctic has been essentially a Soviet lake with the Northern Fleet threatened only if it attempts a breakout. Now, with the United States already having announced a maritime strategy that threatens the Northern Fleet in its home waters, the Canadians are proposing a concept that

supports a "swing strategy." A western "swing strategy" threatens both ends of the Northern Sea Route, ensures closure of the Northwest Passage to Soviet submarines, and provides a permanent NATO presence in the Arctic -- a small presence, but a quantum increase over what now exists.

Significance. Canada's assertion of territorial sovereignty was originally a means to ensure that Canada was not surrounded by foreign territory and in that regard was necessary for national survival. In the postwar period, Newfoundland and Arctic territory became leverage to enhance Canadian sovereignty by giving Canada a bigger voice in the continental defense relationship with the United States, a share out of proportion to the capital Canada could provide for continental defense.

When the Soviet strategic threat evolved from bombers to ICBMs and SLBMs, that leverage disappeared, and Canada lost a major forum for expressing Canadian sovereignty. In the face of perceived United States hegemony in continental defense, the multiplicity of the threat, and the failure of NATO to work as a forum to express Canadian sovereignty, Canada turned to international peacekeeping as a way to express independence and sovereignty. Unfortunately for Canada, its western partners did not acknowledge peacekeeping in Cyprus to be as important as defending against the Soviet Union.

When Canada did decide to increase contributions to western security it was to be on terms that would enhance

Canadian security and sovereignty directly. Canada's Arctic would be the focus of Canadian defense efforts, but NATO and United States ties would be retained. The public reactions to United States maritime operations in the Arctic archipelago also made Arctic defense easier to sell than would have been the case with increased NATO contributions. Retaining NATO and United States defense ties was still necessary due to the very real Soviet threat, and besides, Canada is a western nation and these ties provide forums for Canada to express its sovereignty.

Canada's voice and sovereignty are to be enhanced by Canadian control of a key piece of strategic real estate. If Canada does develop a nuclear submarine force, the United States will have to pay attention to Canada in the formation and implementation of defense policy, and naturally there will be carryover into economic and political areas. As far as United States recognition of Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, the current icebreaker agreement is satisfactory. A Canadian submarine force will need American Arctic operational expertise and cooperation, and inter-navy arrangements will be made. Possibly, a tri-lateral command may develop to coordinate Arctic submarine operations, but in any case Canada cannot afford to turn down thirty years of American and British Arctic submarine experience.

The Soviet Union will face a very real increase in western Arctic forces -- not just a strategy on paper and annual NATO exercises in Norway, but a continuous NATO

submarine presence in the Arctic. The Soviet Union will be excluded from the Northwest Passage and have to face a permanent NATO Arctic maritime presence. The Soviet's own recognition of Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage has turned against them. From the standpoint of western defense, the Arctic is the final region of the world for the application of the policy of containment.

APPENDIX A



National
Defence
Défense
nationale

FACT SHEET

RUBIS/TRAFALGAR CLASS SSN'S

Canada is considering the purchase of 10-12 nuclear-propelled submarines. Although no decision has yet been made, the French Rubis/Amethyste class and the British Trafalgar class submarines are being considered. Regardless of the class chosen, certain modifications would have to be made in order to meet particular Canadian requirements.

CHARACTERISTICS

	Rubis	Trafalgar
Displacement:		
Surfaced/Dived	2,385/2670 tons	4200/5208 tons
Dimensions: (Length)	72.1m	85.4m
(Beam)	7.6m	9.8m
(Draught)	6.4m	8.2m
Machinery:	2 turbo alternators; 1 electric main motor	2 geared steam turbines
Reactor:	1 pressurized water cooled	1 pressurized water cooled
Speed:	25 knots	32 knots
Armament:	4X21 in (533mm) tubes	5X21 in (533mm) tubes
Complement:	66 officers and non- commissioned members	97 officers and non- commissioned members
Builder:	Cherbourg Naval Dockyard ¹	Vickers Shipbuilding & Engineering Ltd. Barrow-in-Furness ²

NOTES: 1 First of class laid down Dec 1976. Four are currently in service with a further three building or fitting out for the French Navy. The Amethyste is a follow-on variant of the Rubis class.

2 First of class laid down 1978. Four are currently in service with a further three building or fitting out for the Royal Navy.

APPENDIX B

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA ON ARCTIC COOPERATION

1. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada recognize the particular interests and responsibilities of their two countries as neighbouring states in the Arctic.

2. The Government of Canada and the Government of the United States also recognize that it is desirable to cooperate in order to advance their shared interests in Arctic development and security. They affirm that navigation and resource development in the Arctic must not adversely affect the unique environment of the region and the well-being of its inhabitants.

3. In recognition of the close and friendly relations between their two countries, the uniqueness of ice-covered maritime areas, the opportunity to increase their knowledge of the marine environment of the Arctic through research conducted during icebreaker voyages, and their shared interest in safe, effective icebreaker navigation off their Arctic coasts:

- The Government of the United States and the Government of Canada undertake to facilitate navigation by their icebreakers in their respective Arctic waters and to develop cooperative procedures for this purpose;
- The Government of Canada and the Government of the United States agree to take advantage of their icebreaker navigation to develop and share research information, in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law, in order to advance their understanding of the marine environment of the area;
- The Government of the United States pledges that all navigation by U.S. icebreakers within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of the Government of Canada.

4. Nothing in this agreement of cooperative endeavour between Arctic neighbours and friends nor any practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the

Governments of the United States and of Canada on the Law of the Sea in this or other maritime areas or their respective positions regarding third parties.

5. This agreement shall enter into force upon signature. It may be terminated at any time by three months' written notice given by one Government to the other.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, have signed this Agreement.

Done in duplicate, at Ottawa, this 11th day of January, 1988, in the English and French languages, each version being equally authentic.

George P. Shultz

Joe Clark

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF CANADA




Figure 1. A Polar Perspective.
 Reprinted from United States Naval Institute's
Proceedings (September 1987).




Figure 2. Northwest Passage Routes.
 Reprinted from United States Naval Institute's
Proceedings (September 1987).




Figure 3. Canadian Arctic Straight Baselines.

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