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INCREASING INTERNATIONAL MILITARY INTERDEPENDENCE:
DEFENSE COOPERATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

by

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B.S. August 1986, University of Maryland, European Division

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of
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ABSTRACT

INCREASING INTERNATIONAL MILITARY INTERDEPENDENCE: DEFENSE COOPERATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Sheila Callaham-Gay
Old Dominion University, 1992
Director: Dr. David M. Keithly

This thesis examines whether military interdependence among states is increasing or decreasing. Although it is impossible to predict the future, it can be deduced that military interaction is increasing as a result of current world events and stated Presidential policy objectives. In order for interdependency to reach fruition governments must create policy which allows mutual goals to be realized. If military-to-military programs contribute to U.S. political objectives then government policy toward military interdependence should allow the U.S. military to act as a catalyst for international cooperation as well as the guardian of U.S. security interests. Whether global peace and security becomes a collective effort is the responsibility of world political leaders and international organizations who must emphasize the need, as well as the benefit, of increased defense cooperation. The basic documentation of increasing military interdependence is evidenced in current Department of Defense, State Department, and Department of the Army (DA) records and reports, high-level policy statements, interviews with military officials, and scholarly opinion. Further documentation is drawn from activities associated with one of DA's international agencies, the International Army Programs Directorate.

To my friends and family whose support gave me the strength to
continue. And to "Upshaw" for mothering my son Nathaniel
with the greatest of love while I was otherwise occupied

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While acknowledging the invaluable contributions of others, I accept sole responsibility for any errors of fact or judgment that may be found in these pages.

Sheila Callaham-Gay

DISCLAIMER

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, or any other Government agency.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| Chapter | Page |
|--|------|
| 1. INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| Theoretical Fomulation | 2 |
| Method | 2 |
| IAPD Background | 3 |
| 2. DISINTEGRATION OF THE WARSAW PACT AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION | 8 |
| 3. THE MOVE TOWARD INCREASED DEFENSE COOPERATION | 15 |
| 4. COLLECTIVE SUCCESS IN THE WAR AGAINST IRAQ | 21 |
| 5. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY | 27 |
| 6. CONCLUSION | 35 |
| WORKS CONSULTED | 39 |

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As trite as it may sound many incredible events have transpired since the fall of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union are monumental occasions which challenge political, military, economic, and social views on a global scale. Theorist John J. Mearsheimer argues that the multipolar world which has emerged in the post-Cold War is less stable than the bipolar one which preceded it. Mearsheimer asserts that a bipolar balance of power is more stable simply because there is only one dyad across which war might break out. On the other hand, in a multipolar system there are many dyads for war. Furthermore, Mearsheimer states that multipolarism combined with interdependence is especially volatile because ultimately states will "struggle to escape the vulnerability that interdependence creates, in order to bolster their national security."¹ Other theorists admit that multipolarism brings with it some difficulties, but Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price argues that the security dilemma created by interdependence can be solved by a "network of overlapping and interlocking institutional structures, bilateral relationships, and multilateral organizations."² In a scenario using Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, Hyde-Price demonstrates that major powers can work together to promote not only national security, but also regional security among the

¹John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," The Atlantic Monthly 266, no. 2 (August 1990): 45.

²Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price, "After the Pact: East European Security in the 1990s," Arms Control: Contemporary Security Policy 12, no. 2 (September 1991): 280.

newly emerging democracies in Eastern Europe.

Arguments and counterarguments aside, global transition is underway. How the major powers deal with political, military, economic and social dilemmas in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics will set the course which will mark the post-Cold War era in the same manner as containment marked the Cold War. The possibility of a network of overlapping and interlocking or "interdependent" international military relationships is where this thesis question begins.

Theoretical Formulation

In the realm of global transition security issues are vital. This thesis examines whether military interdependence among states is increasing or decreasing. Although it is impossible to predict what the future holds, it can be deduced that military interaction is changing as a result of current world events and stated Presidential policy objectives. When determining whether military interdependence is increasing or decreasing, one must first determine the forces that increase or decrease international military activities. It is important to note that although policymaking is not directly addressed in this thesis, it is understood that the Department of Defense (DOD) is not a political entity and does not, therefore, dictate policy but rather DOD attempts to implement policy as directed by Congress and the Commander-in-Chief.

Method

The basic documentation of increasing or decreasing military interdependence is evidenced in current Department of Defense, State Department, and Department of the Army (DA) records and reports, high-level policy statements, interviews with military officials, and scholarly opinion. Further documentation is drawn from activities associated with one of DA's international agencies, the International Army Programs Directorate (IAPD). Although IAPD activities are used to a great extent to document international military interaction, IAPD is only offered as an example and should not be considered a

focal point of the thesis. However, understanding the function of IAPD is necessary in order to recognize the significance of the illustration.

IAPD Background

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) located at Fort Monroe, Virginia was formed in 1973 and is one of the Army's major commands. Its mission is to develop the doctrine, weapons systems, equipment, organization, and training needed to insure that soldiers are ready to fight and win on the battlefield.³ TRADOC's unique grass-roots position in the development of warfighting doctrine and weapons makes it an obvious choice for the mission of International Military Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (Army Regulation 34-1). This regulation further directs TRADOC to act as the Army Chief of Staff's executive agent for conducting bilateral army-to-army activities with DA-specified countries. IAPD is the proponent agent for these bilateral activities which include the following:

1. Staff Talks: Normally conducted annually, staff talks are aimed at promoting a greater understanding between the U.S. Army and the armies of allies and other friendly nations in all areas of interoperability. IAPD currently conducts bilateral staff talks with Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Spain, and the United Kingdom. DA is negotiating possible bilateral status with several Eastern European countries in addition to Egypt and India; depending on that outcome, IAPD will coordinate bilateral exchanges with those countries as well. Colonel Arthur Bailey, Chief, Political-Military Division at Headquarters, DA states that "Staff talks are representative of efforts we want to take to influence other countries and armies. If we understand other military concerns and

³Department of the Army, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, "Overview," chapter in TRADOC, A Perspective: FY 88-89, ninth ed. (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Management Division Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management, 1990), 3.

how they are reflected through a country's political agenda, then we have an advantage."⁴ Staff talks offer a forum for open communication, and give military leaders an opportunity to exchange opinions, ideas and concerns.

2. Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEE): Similar to staff talks but on a smaller, more specialized scale, SMEEs deal with the mutual exchange of narrowly defined ideas, training, concepts, and doctrine, and are low-cost in terms of money and manpower. They are normally a part of a staff talk program, but are also conducted separately with non-staff talk countries such as Argentina, Chile, Columbia, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela. SMEEs are a good way to begin a relationship with developing countries as they allow a better understanding of and appreciation for the capabilities, culture and skills of these armies, as well as give insight into areas where the U.S. Army can be of future assistance.⁵ Army-to-army training exchanges in Latin America, for example, are said to have reinforced Latin America's transition to democracy. As a result, the United States gains political leverage and military influence which enhances U.S. ability to achieve national security strategies in combatting drug trafficking. The cornerstone of U.S. strategy in combatting drugs hinges on an international cooperative effort whereby all nations work together to help defeat the illicit drug market.

3. Future Battlefield Conference: A special bilateral relationship exists with the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) due to political sensitivities. Although the U.S. Army and Israel do not conduct official staff talks, the program is designed and managed in the same

⁴Colonel Arthur Bailey, interview by author, Washington, 13 August 1991.

⁵Department of the Army, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, International Army Programs Directorate, "Annual International Army Programs Directorate Report to Department of the Army" (Fort Monroe, Virginia.: International Army Programs Directorate, October 1991), 1.

manner. The United States has depended on Israel's cooperative efforts for a toehold in the Middle East. In return, the United States has offered Israel a sense of military security in an environment which the Israelis consider hostile.

4. Familiarization Visits: Selected individual or groups of senior field grade officers and general officers visit various U.S. installations and commands and learn how the U.S. Army is organized, trained and maintained.

5. Partnerships: U.S. training installations and commands enter into an affiliation with other friendly armies of Latin America. Partnership programs currently exist with Tunisia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela. Furthermore, the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Partnership allows U.S. officers to attend CGSC equivalent schools in foreign countries in exchange for positions at the U.S. CGSC for officers of reciprocating countries. This exchange increases the mutual understanding of operations, doctrine, and terminology. Many foreign governments take advantage of this military training program and as a result, the United States has access to and influence on many future military and civilian leaders.⁶

IAPD's implied political responsibility is not only to maintain army-to-army relationships, but to develop and improve such relationships.⁷ As Colonel Bailey noted, staff talks are not simply a forum for the United States to exercise influence, but rather staff talks provide a platform for political-military objectives.⁸ One example of this can be seen in the improved U.S. relations with Brazil. During the Carter administration, relations with

⁶For a more detailed explanation of U.S. influence on emerging foreign military and civilian leaders, see page 24.

⁷Colonel Arthur Bailey, interview by author.

⁸Ibid.

Brazil went sour. The Brazilians were resentful of a number of Carter initiatives--such as Carter's campaign against Brazil as a violator of human rights, and Carter's administrative efforts to dissuade the West German government from implementing a nuclear agreement with Brazil.⁹ Additional sensitivities stemmed over Carter's continuous pressure on Brazil to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as trade barriers. The Reagan administration reestablished relationships with Brazil, as well as Argentina, Chile, and other Latin American states after "muting" the human rights issues and emphasizing economic freedom and development.¹⁰ These military security relations cross-fertilized into political areas such as counternarcotics, which lie solely with Brazil's civilian authorities. Although Brazil remains cautious of U.S. military support of its counternarcotic efforts, the relationship continues. And, even though U.S. influence in Latin America is questionable, the military inroads forged over the last decade represent, in many cases, the limits of U.S. interaction in many Latin American states.

Another example of U.S. military relationships fostering political intentions is the series of bilateral exchanges with China before the Tiananmen Square massacre. Lieutenant Colonel John R. Jirik, former Chinese Program Manager with IAPD, explains that because the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Chinese government have a very close relationship, bilateral training talks insured direct influence from the U.S. Army to the Chinese government. This influence was channeled through the training talks and provided a quick link to Chinese leadership in the highest levels of the Chinese military, and to the top level of the government. In normal circumstances, bilateral Army activities stop at the

⁹Riordan Roett, Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society, 3rd ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 199-210.

¹⁰Tom J. Farer, The Grand Strategy of the United States in Latin America (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1988), 232.

chief of staff of the Army equivalent.¹¹ When states' governments and militaries are closely tied, U.S. foreign policy initiatives encompassing military-to-military relationships are politically warranted.

¹¹Lieutenant Colonel John R. Jirik, interview by author, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 10 December 1991.

CHAPTER 2

DISINTEGRATION OF THE WARSAW PACT AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION

As a result of the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union, former Warsaw Pact states are seeking membership in the NATO alliance of interdependent states. Eastern European states see NATO as the foundation of European security, partially because NATO guarantees the security of its member nations and is capable of military action as well as consultation.¹² NATO has already opened its training centers to officers of all Central and Eastern European states and is conducting various discussions on military activities to include doctrine and training.¹³ Additionally, NATO membership provides access to economic organizations and a give new members a greater chance at aid and assistance, not to mention potential trade links to the European Community.

The Department of the Army has also been solicited by former Eastern-bloc countries--Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia--who petitioned the Pentagon in early 1991 to establish bilateral relations between each of their armies and the U.S. Army. By association with the United States, these countries (which at the time still feared the

¹²Dr. Manfred Woerner, "NATO's changing role in a new world," International Defense Review--Defense '92: Facts, Forecasts, Markets, Personalities and Strategies for Global Defense in 1992 (Geneva: Defense and Aerospace Publishing Services [DAPS S.A.] 1992), 18.

¹³Ibid., 20.

possible advance of Soviet troops) would gain the United States as an ally and the U.S. army at their defense, if needed. Furthermore, if these countries could establish a military relationship with the United States, political and economic support would become more accessible, especially in the area of foreign military assistance which would bolster their defense capabilities considerably as it would decrease the requirement for military investments. These Eastern European states seek security through the U.S. army in order to enhance their political and military power and upgrade their image as emerging democratic states. Because U.S. foreign policy directives support the spread of democracy, U.S. support of Eastern Europe is probable. The questions remaining, however, are what kind of support, how much, and how soon? Other Western countries have already initiated bilateral relations with Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. France, Italy, and the U.K. have bilateral treaties with Poland, Czechoslovakia has a special relationship with Germany, and Hungary has a bilateral relationship with Austria.¹⁴

The Departments of the Army, Defense, and State, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are still uncommitted to bilateral army-to-army relations with Eastern Europe. The most important consideration is the political environment. When Eastern Europe first approached the United States to establish army-to-army relations, Mikhail Gorbachev was still in power in the former Soviet Union, although on shaky ground. At that time, Washington was very sensitive to actions which might have been perceived as non-supportive of Gorbachev's administration. Some critics claim Bush was too sensitive to Gorbachev's political instabilities. Bush feared that U.S. criticism to Soviet upheavals would be perceived as going against Gorbachev's attempted reforms. As a result, Bush was less assertive than he should have been in Eastern Europe and the Baltics.

¹⁴Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price, "After the Pact," 286.

Nevertheless, now that the Soviet Union and Gorbachev are history, these Eastern European countries are still being considered for army-to-army and other military information exchanges. Although Eastern European military capabilities are not as technologically advanced as the United States, their potential contributions should not be discounted. Military-to-military exchanges would mean information exchanges; the United States would learn how each of their military forces operates and in return their military forces would learn modern warfighting doctrine and proven training techniques.

The primary purpose of military contacts is to foster and improve political relations between governments. As such, the armed forces are supporting diplomatic objectives established by the State Department and approved by the President. Normally U.S. forces do not enter into military relationships expecting to gain anything substantive (i.e., no foreign armed force is going to teach the U.S. armed forces the latest in technology or doctrine in airland battle), this is not to say that U.S. military relations with foreign forces are not beneficial, for that is not the case. The greatest U.S. military benefit is derived from interaction which enhances relationships with other states and serves diplomatic and other political needs. One of the most important benefits of military exchanges, such as bilateral staff talks, is the direct line of communication between one military force and the other. Communication contributes to the understanding of foreign ideas, philosophy, and culture and is the first step in understanding the actions and reactions of another armed force. This was best demonstrated in the 1991 coalition war against Iraq where 35 states fought together against one enemy. The U.S. understanding of and sensitivity to Middle-Eastern customs and philosophical beliefs can be partially attributed to U.S. military relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This sociological aspect of military interaction was a major factor in the successful coalition. Knowledge of culture can be learned by reading; however, a true understanding and appreciation can only be learned through experience. Theoretically, if states' interests are fundamentally in harmony, then reasoned discussion

will serve to make this harmony apparent--the more states communicate with each other the more rational their policies toward each other become.¹⁵

Grave international concern revolves around countries willing and able to buy nuclear weapons from the now disintegrated Soviet Union. Chemical warheads and ballistic missiles have fallen into the hands of governments and groups who have a proven record of aggression and terrorism.¹⁶ There is still debate over the launching of an SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missile in Kazakhstan in December 1991. Although Kazakh officials state that the launch was routine, control of these missiles is still a great concern.¹⁷ Chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn (D. Georgia) states that one of the best ways the United States can assist former Soviet states is by establishing a "two-pronged military officer exchange program that would expose large numbers of younger Soviet career officers to our countries, our peoples, and our armed forces."¹⁸ Most importantly, Nunn states that this type of exchange program is fundable indefinitely. Additional problems exist in the Middle East where states are hungry for technology. The Associated Press reported that Libya is offering salaries of \$100,000 per year to nuclear

¹⁵David W. Ziegler, War, Peace and International Politics, 5th ed. (Glenview, Ill: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1990), 350.

¹⁶Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1989, eds. Nancy L. Golden and Sherrill Brown Wells (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1990), 2.

¹⁷R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Asks About ICBM Launch From Kazakhstan," Washington Post, 22 January 1992, A:26:1.

¹⁸Sam Nunn, "U.S. and allied policy after a year of revolutionary change," International Defense Review--Defense '92: Facts, Forecasts, Markets, Personalities and Strategies for Global Defense in 1992 (Geneva: Defense and Aerospace Publishing Services [DAPS S.A.] 1992), 13.

research scientists from the former Soviet Union, and Iran has also been accused of trying to recruit nuclear scientists.¹⁹ The Middle East remains particularly dangerous following the Gulf War, even more so now that Iran is purchasing three of the Soviet Union's most advanced diesel submarines which could easily and effectively be used to fire torpedoes at oil tankers or allied warships.²⁰ When running slowly on battery power, these submarines are extremely quiet and consequently difficult to detect. These submarines constitute a very formidable threat to any ship in the Persian Gulf and add a new dimension of threat to that theater and to the United States which has maintained a high level naval presence in the Gulf for the last 15 years. By establishing military relations with India, naval monitoring of the Persian Gulf could be shared. Additionally, U.S. and other armies can counter regional instability in the Middle East by increasing relations with Egypt and other moderate Arab states. Egypt recently sought to strengthen its relations with the U.S. army by requesting staff talks and subject matter expert exchanges. The Department of the Army remains indecisive on the possibility of closer U.S.-Egyptian ties due to the persistence of the influential Jewish lobby. Nevertheless, Egypt remains a very good prospect for bilateral relations. In fact, the U.S. army and the Egyptian army have already worked together in desert training. As a result, U.S. soldiers experienced desert training in a Middle-Eastern environment and Egyptian soldiers benefited from U.S. planning, logistics, and non-commission officer leadership training.²¹ If the Department of the Army takes a more formalized approach with Egypt and establishes it as a "staff talk country" for

¹⁹"Wire News Highlights," Early Bird (Washington: American Forces Information Service, 30 January 1992), 16.

²⁰"Iran Seeks Soviet Subs," The Washington Post, 21 January 1992, A16.

²¹Colonel Arthur Bailey, interview by author.

example, then U.S. defense presence in the Middle East would increase without the need for forward basing.

The post-Cold War era is marked with increasing regional instability and leaves politicians and military analysts worldwide trying to determine the best way to guarantee their states' interests. Military-to-military relations add to regional stability which increases the relevance of interdependence in foreign policy initiatives. Increased defense cooperation enhances state survival and improves a state's power position.²² For example, collective security arrangements (in theory) offer member states a guarantee against attack from, not only outside aggressors, but also other member states. Furthermore, the balance of power in a collective sense might outweigh an opposing state's or authority's power position. The strength of the Gulf War coalition, for example, had a major impact on the U.N. decision-making process. Dimitri K. Simes states in his article "America and the Post-Soviet Republics" that the United States alone cannot create a new security framework for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The United States can, however, facilitate the creation of a new international security structure designed to prevent and control unforeseen disasters.²³ As a result, the United States, Europe, and the former Soviet states are being challenged to agree on common goals to replace Cold War ideology. These states "must learn to live together within new security structures (political and military) . . . [and] go even further than the concept of 'detente--deterrence--cooperation'

²²Thomas R. Cusack, "The Management of Power in a Warring State System: An Evaluation of Balancing, Collective Security, and Laissez-Faire Policies," in POWER in World Politics, Richard J. Stoll and Michael D. Ward, eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 226.

²³Dimitri K. Simes, "America and the Post-Soviet Republics," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 87.

envisioned in the Rome Declaration of November 1991."²⁴

²⁴NATO Defense College, "Towards New Arms Control: What Is, Or Could Be, The Role of Arms Control In the Development Of A New European Security Concept," memorandum for the members of the military committee, 26 February 1992, 28.

CHAPTER 3

THE MOVE TOWARD INCREASED DEFENSE COOPERATION

Interdependence, as defined by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, is a state of *mutual* dependence whereby the actions of external forces result in reciprocal effects.²⁵ One of the most important forms of interdependence is that of military alliances, such as NATO, in which defense resources are shared among member states. After World War II, states came to believe that they could not independently insure their own defense and they also feared that wars would become so horrendous in the nuclear age that at least minimal cooperation between adversaries would be necessary.²⁶ By pooling resources, interdependent states gained a joint security that each could not have attained in isolation.²⁷ Alliances and coalitions entail an obligation on member states to assist militarily--or at least to refrain from actively opposing other member states in areas of vital concern. Furthermore, alliances tend to restrain one member from attacking another. Even though some states may have varied opinions of interdependence, NATO, as a rule, has been regarded as a productive and successful example of collective security.²⁸ The emerging

²⁵Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 8.

²⁶Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth or Reality?" World Politics 26, no. 1 (October 1973): 18.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 3.

²⁸Gerhard Mally, Interdependence: The European-American Connection in the Global Context (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1976), 6.

European Community demonstrates political, economic, and military interdependency in its best form.

Recent trends point to two major reasons for the move toward military interdependence in the form of greater defense cooperation. First, shrinking global defense budgets limit security boundaries. Shared defense responsibilities offer increased security to states faced with constrained defense budgets. The United States is not the only state making large cuts in its defense budget; the United Kingdom and Germany, for example, also reduced forces to meet budget demands. In the summer of 1991, the British Defence White Paper recommended a 20 percent force cut over the next three years, while Germany also faces a shrinking military due, in part, to economic strains resulting from reunification. Although Germany is reducing its number of military units, most of Germany's cuts will be in weapons procurement.²⁹ Second, not only are defense budgets getting smaller, defense in and of itself, is becoming more and more expensive. Research, development, and procurement of weapons and equipment are one of the most demanding elements of defense and its cost is growing ever higher. Research, development, test and evaluations, combined with procurement of weapons, compose 38 percent of the 1992 defense budget.³⁰ (Fifty-eight percent of the 1992 defense budget is allocated for military personnel, operations, and maintenance.)³¹ It is the "prohibitive costs of modern weaponry" and states' continued desires to be militarily competitive which make a greater

²⁹Theresa Hitchens, "German Cuts Hit Army the Hardest," Defense News 7, no. 3 (20 January 1992): 4.

³⁰Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, January 1991), 109.

³¹Ibid.

defense cooperation virtually a necessity. Military coalitions and alliances permit significant savings of money and time, and also hedge against future, unknown threats. Greater defense cooperation depends on reliable allies to share the responsibilities of maintaining global peace and security. Part of President Bush's national security objectives include improving the division of labor between the United States and its allies "based on the comparative advantages of different allies in different defense activities."³² An example of this is European and U.S. cooperation in manufacturing the multiple-launch rocket system. Originally designed to meet the needs of the U.S. army, the multiple-launch rocket system was made available to NATO countries as well.³³ With the increasing need for collective security, the importance of interoperability between military forces of other countries becomes increasingly significant. Not only weaponry and equipment, but doctrine, organization and training must also be interoperable. This interoperability requires a continuous exchange of information and ideas, and a mutual understanding between armed forces and governments.

When the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist, NATO immediately began reexamining its security goals. In recent history, Europeans have been most interested in military deterrence of the Soviet Union and communism. The policy has been to "enmesh and commit the United States in the defense of Europe in every possible way."³⁴ This threat no

³²United States President (1989- :Bush), National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington: White House Publication, March 1990), 19.

³³"Defence Production Vs Procurement"--Part 5--The NATO/OECD World Multinational Co-operation in Arms Production (Nicosia, Cyprus: Arab Press Service Organisation, 7 May 1990), 19, Dialog, User: 011681.

³⁴Fred E. Baumann and Kenneth M. Jensen, American Defense Policy and Liberal Democracy (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1989), 115-116.

longer exists and, as a result, the United States is pulling back forward-based troops. Most obvious is the reduction of U.S. troop strength from Germany which, before the fall of the Berlin Wall, was at about 350,000. As of January, 1992 there were about 150,000 soldiers based in Germany and this number will continue to decrease to less than 100,000. The 1992-97 Defense Plan outlines a force reduction of approximately 25 percent; additionally, DOD is in the process of closing or withdrawing from 400 bases and facilities worldwide.³⁵ This progressive pullback of American forces, not only from Germany, but also from Korea, the Philippines, and even Japan, should not be seen as a U.S. move toward isolationism but rather as an incentive toward the goal of collective interests and security. In fact, it is not unreasonable to think that the "traditional nationalist notions of military self-sufficiency and economic autarky are . . . being rendered obsolete,"³⁶ says Zbigniew Brzezinski in the Fall 1991 issue of Foreign Affairs. The pullback of troops is incentive for other states to become more active in their own defense. This point does not argue less dependence on foreign forces, but rather it suggests an expansion of possible force structures. In other words, if governments feel the need for more troop support than the United States is willing to provide, then they should form alliances and coalitions with other regional forces, or increase their own defense budgets to make up the difference--Japan is a good case in point. Ultimately, the United States wants Japan to assume a larger military role and cooperate regionally to help insure stability.³⁷ As former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger recently stated, there are parts of the world the United States

³⁵Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense, untitled position paper addressing defense reductions (Washington: 31 October 1991), 6.

³⁶Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Selective Global Commitment," Foreign Affairs, 70, no. 4 (Fall 1991): 4.

³⁷Ibid., 16.

has neither reason nor ability to defend.³⁸ For this same reason NATO is redefining its military role and is seeking out innovative approaches to prosecute "true" coalition warfare with multinational forces and promote the ideology of military interdependence.³⁹ For example, NATO's creation of the Cooperation Council can help ease the security dilemmas of Eastern Europe with proper training and doctrine, information exchanges, and notification of troops movements.⁴⁰ And although NATO is expanding "to become increasingly involved in the political, economic, and social fields, the European Community . . . is entering the military arena through its European pillar of the Western European Union (WEU)."⁴¹ Secretary General Willem Frederik van Eekelen states that the Franco-German corps will be the primary military arm and building block of the WEU, a defense alliance of nine European states.⁴²

Security is increasingly uncertain even for a major power such as the United States. If the United States encouraged regional cooperative actions, such as in Asia and the Middle East, then perhaps stability could be increased. Japan, for example, could take a serious look at working with South Korea in spite of historical antagonisms. Brzezinski quotes a leading Japanese businessman as stating that, "Tokyo should also cooperate with

³⁸Secretaries of Defense, "Fifth Annual Report of the Secretaries of Defense," (Norfolk, Virginia, 13 December 1991).

³⁹Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., eds., U.S. Defense Policy in an Era of Constrained Resources (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1990), xviii.

⁴⁰"Why NATO," The Economist 323, no. 7760 (23-29 May 1992): 16.

⁴¹NATO Defense College, "What Is, Or Could Be," 66.

⁴²John G. Roos, "WEU Secretary General Says Europe's Not Yet Ready for Non-US SACEUR," Armed Forces JOURNAL International 129, no. 10 (May 1992): 30.

Seoul and Beijing to create an Asian security system independent of the superpowers."⁴³ Even though during the Fall 1991 army staff talk, representative from the Japanese Self-Defense Force affirmed that they saw no possibilities of a cooperative military effort with Korea. An example of collective army relations already in place in the Middle East is the newly signed defense pact between Kuwait and the United Kingdom which aims at "upgrading the skills of the Kuwaiti army and improving its training by conducting joint exercises."⁴⁴ It is imperative for states to take a clear-eyed look at their defense capabilities and requirements and think through the benefits of a burden-sharing arrangement where collective defense could be interpreted as regional security and thus a means of promoting regional stability. Most importantly, the only way greater defense cooperation will be successful is if defense becomes associated with cooperation rather than distrust. And this requires "a radical change in the way people think."⁴⁵

⁴³Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Selective Global Commitment," 15-16.

⁴⁴"Wire News Highlights," Early Bird, (Washington: American Forces Information Service, 30 January 1992), 16.

⁴⁵NATO Defense College, "What Is, Or Could Be," 38.

CHAPTER 4

COLLECTIVE SUCCESS IN THE WAR AGAINST IRAQ

When the war with Iraq ended, the United States was inundated with requests from foreign armies for the "lessons learned." The Israelis, for example, campaigned for information on Desert Storm. According to former IAPD Director Richard Guthrie, there were approaches made at every level, in all services, from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all the way down to people walking in the halls of IAPD, to give the Israelis first crack at lessons learned from the war.⁴⁶ Every country dealing with IAPD requested briefings on Desert Storm--even the closest allies of the United States who assisted in the unified effort to liberate Kuwait. It became evident during the war that the United States was the military superpower as U.S. technology in command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C⁴I), airland battle doctrine, weapons technology, and training startled the world. The U.S.-led coalition demonstrated U.S. military expertise far superior to that of the Iraqis, who were equipped with Soviet-made equipment and were trained in Soviet tactics. The successful coalition demonstrated to governments the benefits of collective efforts and demonstrated to the United States the necessity of allies. The coalition in the Gulf War consisted of 35 states which had personnel in the theater--a total of 300,000 allied troops, more than 750 combat aircraft, 200 tanks, and 60 warships.⁴⁷ It

⁴⁶Colonel Richard Guthrie, interview by author, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 13 September 1991.

⁴⁷Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Impact Of The Persian Gulf War And The Decline Of The Soviet Union On How The U.S. Does Its Defense Business, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 27 February 1991, 3-4.

would have been difficult for the United States to fight a successful war in the Middle East without the support of the coalition, since the U.S. armed forces can only exert leverage on a grand scale through alliances and coalitions. This type of military-to-military interaction is not possible without political negotiations and sanctions. Therefore, increasing military interaction also implies increasing political interaction. In other words, governments wishing to become militarily interdependent must first become, to some degree, politically interdependent.

War is becoming increasingly technical and the recent desert war proved that modern technology can be decisive on the battlefield.⁴⁸ The results of Desert Storm put the United States in a position to influence and to train foreign military forces in U.S. warfighting techniques. It is not merely weapons and equipment technology that bring international forces to the U.S., but the basic structure of U.S. doctrine and concepts. Furthermore, other forces want to learn more about how U.S. forces train. In the recent bilateral army staff talk with Japan, the Japanese delegation was most enthusiastic about possible exposure to U.S. army combat simulations--a highly technological, but overall cost-effective means of preparing soldiers for all aspects of warfighting. During an expert working group on simulations at the recent U.S.-Japanese Army Staff Talk, the Japanese (like representatives from other countries) asked how the U.S. army makes combat simulations so realistic that the practice is harder than the real thing.⁴⁹ In addition to the cost-effectiveness of simulation training, the Japanese would benefit from environmental

⁴⁸George H. Quester, "Foreign Policy Secrecy Versus the Open 'American Way'," Teaching Political Science: Politics in Perspective 16 (Winter 1989): 60.

⁴⁹Lieutenant Colonel Kim Winkelman, interview by author, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 11 December 1991.

advantages. Extensive field maneuvering has a tendency to irritate Japanese citizens because of environmental and property damage and that creates additional political pressures on the Japanese Self Defense Force. Furthermore, as a result of Desert Storm, the French and U.S. Army Chiefs of Staff stated their interest in a permanent partnership arrangement between the U.S. 18th Airborne Corps and the French Rapid Action Force (FAR), who worked closely together in Desert Storm, to insure a continuous and ongoing exchange of information on policies and procedures.⁵⁰

During the Cold War, U.S. deployment of military forces reflected the policy of deterring nuclear forces. The Gulf War proved that conventional warfare is not only an effective means of stopping aggression but can also occur without escalation to nuclear war. President Bush's 1992 State of the Union Address underscored a major change in strategic policy when he announced that there would be no funding of nuclear weapons in the year to come. Nevertheless, in spite of defense cuts, technological development of conventional weapons will maintain high priority in overall U.S. defense strategy. Research and development (R&D) is a long and continuous process--current modernization affects military performance 20 to 30 years down the road. The importance of technology was underscored in the 1993 defense budget, which showed an increase of spending on "basic science and technology not tied to specific weapons," up to \$12 billion from \$10.6 billion.⁵¹ The cost of R&D and procurement of technology requires that states work together. If states worked collectively toward a common goal, the increasing costs of R&D

⁵⁰Major Doug Lathrop, interview by author, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 16 August 1991.

⁵¹Peter Grier, "US Military Charts Cutbacks in Forces," The Christian Science Monitor, 31 January 1992, 3.

could be shared instead of becoming the financial burden of states who see military competitiveness as vital to national security.

As the global threat changes security arrangements must be reevaluated. As a result, the United States must reconsider all sources of security and use military-to-military relations as a tool to guarantee them. The U.S. army, in training Latin American soldiers, developed soldiers who embody the U.S. military understanding of the ethics of war and the view of military subordination to civilian authority. These soldiers then become generals and some even become political leaders. Guatemala's former Defense Minister Hécto Alejandro Gramajo Morales, for example, is widely believed to have presidential ambitions for the 1995 election.⁵² How influential is this army training? According to Major Steve Julia', Section Chief of Latin America, it does have an impact.

We can take the cream of their crop, bring them to this country and put them through our professional development system. The benefits derived through that international activity is unquantifiable. But is it apparent? Yes it is when you find that the minister of defense of the Guatemalan army, for example, is a man that went through our infantry advanced course, our command and general staff college, and war college as well as courses in our School of the Americas. This is a man that understands clearly what our value system is and has now, after a period of 20 years, moved into a position of power within his own military and who is a fervent believer that the American system is a workable system and he tries to adapt to this system with the economic and national realities of his own country and his own army.⁵³

As the Persian Gulf War demonstrated, no one country will be militarily self-sufficient in the future. Even Eastern European states contributed to the coalition during

⁵²David Clark Scott, "Guatemalans Protest US Funds for Army Think Tank," The Christian Science Monitor, 3 December 1990, 4.

⁵³Major Steve Julia', interview by author, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 9 October 1991.

Desert Storm for the movement of heavy vehicles,⁵⁴ and Czechoslovakia provided nuclear-biological chemical (NBC) decontamination teams.⁵⁵ NATO's emerging new military strategy is based on multinational forces and Department of Defense policy usually follows NATO leads.⁵⁶ Rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) is one good example of a NATO initiative that has become a DOD, and especially a Department of the Army policy. Rationalization is any action that increases the effectiveness of allied forces through standardization (the process of developing concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs to achieve and maintain the most effective levels of compatibility) and interoperability (the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use these services to enable foreign militaries to operate together effectively).⁵⁷ NATO's objective in RSI has been to "reduce the number and severity of the differences between the military forces of member nations by adopting standard, or interoperable, materiel and methods."⁵⁸ In the case of Brazil, RSI is less

⁵⁴Brigadier General Timothy J. Grogan, "U.S. Head of Delegation Briefing: Desert Shield/Storm," U.S./Japanese Army Staff Talks, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 2 October 1991.

⁵⁵Major Blake Anderson and Lieutenant Colonel John R. Jirik, interview by author, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 28 February 1992.

⁵⁶Theresa Hitchens, "U.S.-European Joint Programs Sink to New Low," Defense News 6, no. 25, (24 June 1991): 1.

⁵⁷Department of the Army, Army Regulation 34-1 update, Operations and Plans, "International Military Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability" (Washington: Government Printing Office, 15 February 1989), 21.

⁵⁸Donald E. Stump, Identification and Documentation of Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) Functions (Fort Lee, Virginia: Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, November 1984), 2.

relevant because Brazil has a healthy defense industry (fifth largest in the world) and it is very competitive with other major defense industrial powers such as the United States, United Kingdom, and France. Historically, RSI has been fueled by allied states who have been willing to "sacrifice their individual national interests for the advantage of projecting a combined capability sufficiently credible to act as a deterrent to Soviet aggression."⁵⁹ But current pursuit of international RSI stems from the need for collective "burden sharing" of defense. As the Gulf War proved, a collective effort against an alleged aggressor increases the chances of success without involving a long-term war that increases the potential use of nuclear weapons.

⁵⁹James H. Gill, Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability: Protecting U.S. Interests in the Process (Alexandria: Defense Logistics Agency, March 1984), 18.

CHAPTER 5

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

National security policy involves not only preventing a breach of national security in a physical sense or learning about potential enemies, it also involves creating and maintaining alliances, supplying arms to friendly countries, and most importantly enhancing U.S. negotiating leverage with other states whenever possible.⁶⁰ The President's national security objectives carry over from the previous administration with relatively few changes: the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, a healthy growing U.S. economy, a stable and secure world, and a healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with U.S. allies and other friendly nations.⁶¹

The end of the Cold War makes the U.S. President, more than any other head of state in modern history, the world leader.⁶² As a result, U.S. policy decisions have an even greater impact on the world than ever before. How is this policy influence being used internationally and how is it impacting on international military activities? U.S. policy, for example, determines whether there is global peace or global war, or whether there is stability in the Middle East.⁶³ In addition, U.S. policy determines to what extent drug-

⁶⁰Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President and Foreign Policy, Politics and Public Policy Series (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, a division of Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1980), 6.

⁶¹U.S. President, National Security Strategy, 2.

⁶²Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle, 5.

⁶³*Ibid.*

producing countries will be pressured through political, economic, and military means to pursue U.S. drug policies. It also determines whether developing states will have access to foreign assistance, not only economic aid, but also in the form of security assistance, to include conventional arms, equipment, and military training. Security assistance becomes a vital link in directly promoting U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives by assisting friendly and allied states in the development of their own defensive forces and by reinforcing their independence.⁶⁴ The United States, for example, has trained soldiers from Botswana in U.S. schools in order to expose them to Western concepts such as military subordination to governmental authority and the Western concepts of "civilized" warfare.⁶⁵ Through security assistance, the United States has developed cooperative relationships with many states. In 1989 the United States provided military education and training to soldiers from 112 states. This provided a great deal of political and military leverage with relatively small funds--slightly over two million dollars--in comparison to the military assistance program which, in the same year, the U.S. government provided 40 million dollars in materials and services (excluding training) to foreign countries without obligation for payment.⁶⁶

In the post-cold war era, the formation of U.S. defense policy, and foreign policy in general, is not simply the result of politically perceived military threat, but rather a combination of international and domestic ideology. Simply stated, international and

⁶⁴Baumann and Jensen, American Defense Policy, 15.

⁶⁵Lathrop, interview by author.

⁶⁶Department of Defense, Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts (Washington: Data Management Division, September 1989), 67, 93.

traditionally domestic issues have become intertwined, says scholar John Vogler.⁶⁷ Issues such as drug enforcement, environment, education, food, inflation, communications, and trade all have international implications. Even downsizing U.S. military affects allied countries who heavily depend on us for security.⁶⁸ The values that dominate the U.S. pursuit of national security should be consistent with the values pursued in the domestic environment. U.S. political leaders and their constituents no longer see the necessity to defend against communism, as was formerly seen in strong constituent support for a large military. Today constituents seek to promote domestic issues which have international significance. Domestic concerns such as drug trafficking, unfair trade practices and energy "can no longer be considered independently of their international consequences."⁶⁹ Politically, economically, and militarily, the United States must seek security and an improved quality of life not only for Americans but, to the highest degree possible, for all people who pursue common values.⁷⁰ This idealistic notion cannot be achieved

⁶⁷John Vogler, "Interdependence, Power and the World Administrative Radio Conference," chapter in Interdependence on Trial: Studies in the Theory and Reality of Contemporary Interdependence, eds. Berry R. J. Jones and Peter Willetts (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 211.

⁶⁸The 1991 U.S.-Japanese Army Staff Talks revealed a deep concern on behalf of the Japanese on how downsizing the U.S. military would effect their ability to defend themselves. Major General Toshiaki Miyamoto, Head of the Japanese Self Defense Force delegation stated that Korea's imminent reunification would cause destabilization and suggested that U.S. forces would be insufficient for regional stability. In an effort to emphasize Japanese desire for increased U.S. force involvement, Miyamoto stressed that the U.S.-Japanese security relationship should be strengthened even further to promote "peace throughout the world."

⁶⁹Department of State, American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1989, 2.

⁷⁰Michael A. Freney, "Toward a Long-term Integrated National Security Strategy

independently, perhaps not even collectively. But in 1902 Theodore Roosevelt reported to Congress that, "The increasing interdependence and complexity of international political and economic relations render it incumbent on all civilized and orderly powers to insist on the proper policing of the world."⁷¹ What was recognized by Roosevelt in 1902 is being implemented today as governments realize the collective benefit of interdependence. Military interdependence allows global "policing" of the world in respect to aggression, terrorism, drug trafficking, and many other fields yet to be discovered.

Historically, the distinction between foreign and domestic policy has been explicit. According to James N. Rosenau, this has been, in part, to the fact that average U.S. citizens do not realize the international impact of domestic concerns. For example, domestic racial issues and discrimination may incite U.S. citizens who, at the same time, are apathetic or even unaware of racial concerns in South Africa.⁷² Rosenau argues that one of the reasons for this differentiation in citizen views between their internal and external environment is due to the fact that citizens are subject to the laws of their systems. As such, citizens feel entitled to help shape or change their own laws; whereas, events or situations in external systems often seem beyond one's control and jurisdiction.⁷³ In 1959 Senator J.W. Fulbright made the bold statement that "if ever the line between domestic and

for the United States," chapter in U.S. Defense Policy in an Era of Constrained Resources, eds. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Richard H. Shultz, Jr. (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1990), 345.

⁷¹Robert Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), 27.

⁷²James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy: Revised and Enlarged Edition (New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 1980), 475-76.

⁷³Ibid.

foreign affairs could be drawn, it is now wholly erased."⁷⁴ Air travel, communications, and computer networks are a few of the factors which have impacted on the "shrinking of the world."⁷⁵ Today, economical, political, and military factors play an increased role in this smaller, more interdependent world, and U.S. citizens are learning that the best way to combat domestic concerns of today is to combine U.S. desire for change with similar desires on a global scale.

President Bush has made clear during his administration that in addition to insuring the United States remains a free and independent state, national security strategy also includes promoting "a stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions."⁷⁶ National strategy incorporates all of a state's powers for the sole purpose of pursuing national objectives.⁷⁷ During a presidential speech to the American Legion in 1983 President Reagan stated that "the maintenance of our alliance partnership is a key to our foreign policy." The Bush Administration further defended this notion by declaring that "our first priority in foreign policy remains solidarity with our allies and friends."⁷⁸

⁷⁴Senator J.W. Fulbright, "What Makes United States Foreign Policy?" The Reporter, 20 (14 May 1959), 19, quoted in James N. Rosenau The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy: Revised and Enlarged Edition (New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 1980), 471.

⁷⁵In 1945 Emery Reves noted in his book The Anatomy of Peace that technological development had engulfed and shrunk the world.

⁷⁶U.S. President, National Security Strategy, 2.

⁷⁷John M. Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1973), 7.

⁷⁸U.S. President, National Security Strategy, 15.

Another trend changing the shape of national security is drug trafficking. The Bush Administration is taking strong actions toward fighting the illicit trafficking of drugs across U.S. borders. Within the last few years the State Department developed a separate bureau to deal with drug trafficking and currently, virtually every government agency is involved in some way in the battle against drugs.⁷⁹ This U.S. effort to combat drug trafficking is an effort with vital international emphasis. As a result, negotiating with other countries in an effort to build a coalition that will attack drug problems is one of the top priorities of the Bush Administration. Although the drug problem was considered for many years to be largely a domestic one, it is now a commonly accepted national security objective with global significance. Gregory Gant, director of a special narcotics project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, stated that "drug transit and market shifts pose a serious foreign policy challenge for the United States as it tries to export democracy and development."⁸⁰ In the Annual Report to the President and the Congress, the Department of Defense includes narcotics trafficking as one of the issues responsible for the sweeping changes in the world security environment and a continuous challenge to U.S. national security.⁸¹ DOD associates the supply and use of illegal drugs in the United States with violence and international instability, and considers drugs a direct threat to security.⁸²

Great strides toward achieving an international coalition to fight drug trafficking can

⁷⁹Ibid., 6.

⁸⁰Lucia Mouat, "War on Drugs Becomes More Cooperative, Global," The Christian Science Monitor, 29 January 1992, 9.

⁸¹Department of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress, January 1991, 3.

⁸²Ibid., 7.

be seen within the Department of the Army (DA). DA has an extensive relationship with Central and South American countries specifically dealing with drug related issues. The U.S. army has been conducting staff talks with Brazil for eight years with the indirect focus, not only with Brazil, but for most of the Latin American countries, on counternarcotics. Major Julia' asserts that army bilateral activities are influencing the Brazilian military--a definite improvement over past relations prior to staff talks. In fact, the U.S. army learned after a recent subject matter expert exchange that the Brazilians were considering work on an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) project with the intention of using them as surveillance platforms in support of the national police's counternarcotics efforts.⁸³ This progress is after several years of staff talks and expert exchanges dealing specifically with aviation. In the after-action report forwarded to the Department of Defense liaison officer at the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), IAPD recommended DEA pursue the possibility of combined Brazilian-U.S. efforts for surveillance type activities.⁸⁴

In addition to the obvious role of the military insuring the security of the United States and its citizens, President Bush's national security policy gives an ever-increasing role to U.S. forces by calling for military support in the war against drugs, fostering political freedoms, human rights and democratic institutions, and for promoting cooperative relations with allies and other friendly countries. These responsibilities are challenging for a defense department that sees less and less monetary support in its future. Peacetime military relations on an international scale can go a long way in furthering Presidential national security objectives. Military expertise can easily be used to supplement civilian enterprise in emerging democracies, and global concerns such as nuclear proliferation and

⁸³Major Steve Julia, interview by author.

⁸⁴Ibid.

drug trafficking can be countered by multinational forces who represent similar governmental values. Interdependence of military forces, however, requires complex integration of political, economic, and social structures. The benefit derived from collective military arrangements is only as great as government bureaucracies are willing to allow. In order for military interdependence to produce viable results, governmental bureaucracies must first create policy which allows the benefit to be realized.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

International military interdependency is an emerging component of the post-Cold War era. States are realizing the benefit of shared responsibilities in the realm of common interests. This interdependent "new world order," however, still contains powerful adversaries, aggressors willing to risk the lives of many for political, economic and military gains. In the common interest of world peace, a coalition of influential allies can surmount problems of national security, aggression, terrorism, narcotics trade, and the degradation of the world environment that could not be managed by one nation alone, no matter how powerful. There are several major forces increasing international military interdependence. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the former Soviet Union, increasing costs of defense combined with decreasing defense budgets, and shared global objectives as stated in the President's national security objectives are among the most prominent factors increasing the possibility in international military interaction and ultimately interdependence.

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the former Soviet Union has opened up parts of the world once inaccessible to the West. Along with this post-Cold War thaw is political, economic, social, and military instability as former communist states attempt to find their niche in the capitalist world. Political sovereignty and economic security are sought by these transitioning states, often through international military relationships. It is imperative that during this time of post-Cold War transition the United States assist Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states in their transition to democracy and political stability by joining other Western European states and motivating other states

to help however possible. Simes states that "Russia may well be central to the future of world politics and, as before, in this realm there is no substitute for American leadership."⁸⁵ The successful transition of former communist states is vital. However, U.S. military negotiations with the Eastern Europeans, for example, have been ongoing for more than a year. The future of Eastern Europe hinges on U.S. policy which must be conducive to international cooperation and integration. Only collective efforts will guarantee successful management of unforeseen international crisis. Military-to-military relations, such as bilateral staff talks and other information exchanges, may be a vital bridge between western powers and former communist states. In some cases, military organizations are the most formal structures available for negotiations and may be used to assist states in political and economic development. For this reason, military connections become critical.

Furthermore, with arms proliferation among the most serious concerns, increased military relations, be it army, navy, air force or marines, might be an important link in monitoring and influencing other states' military decisions. To offset the fear of a nuclear accident, the United States must establish political and military ties with countries which control advanced weaponry, including weapons of mass destruction, and those who are potential markets for Soviet nuclear weapons--Iraq, Iran, North Korea, China, and Taiwan. Military-to-military relations could inhibit the acquisition and use of such weapons and could act as proponent in arranging for their destruction. Bilateral relations with Eastern Europe would also increase coalition capabilities in situations such as the Gulf War with a guarantee that, in the event of crisis, soldiers, supplies, and equipment could be transported onto or through Eastern European soil. Military interdependence can assist in

⁸⁵Simes, "Post-Soviet Republics," 73.

the transition to Eastern and Asian stability through information exchanges, technology transfers, and cooperative research and development programs.

As a result of the successful Gulf War coalition, foreign governments are increasingly requesting U.S. assistance in military matters and are optimistic about possible military exchanges where armed forces can learn, cooperate and coordinate. The success in the Gulf, combined with the increasing costs of technological research and development and decreasing defense budgets, makes governments more cognizant of the benefits of collective defense. Shrinking resources make military self-sufficiency a thing of the past; wars are politically too expensive to be waged without collective support. Increased defense cooperation ultimately guarantees that states' forces can be substantially reduced, which is of major relevance in the era of constrained resources and increasing costs. NATO is already devising separate multinational forces in Europe and, depending on its success, a collective security arrangement involving military forces throughout the world could stem from that. Separate multinational forces could also become an offshoot of the United Nations peace-keeping forces.

President Bush's national security policy calls for an increase in international military interaction and interdependence, especially in combatting drug trafficking, terrorism, and promoting democratic reform. Although collaborative military efforts to combat drugs trafficking can be seen in U.S.-Latin American relations, terrorism and even democratic reforms do not seem to getting anything more than lip service from the current administration. However, if the United States takes the advice of Hyde-Price and attempts to counter the instability accompanying multipolarism by forming a network of powers working together to promote regional stability and pursue common goals, states will be one step closer to forming an interdependent global community. The best example to follow, of course, would be the NATO model, which offers an example of military interdependence working toward common political and social objectives.

The transition to greater defense cooperation necessitates political, economic, and military coordination and cooperation which cannot be controlled by one or two superpowers--it requires an international effort that extends throughout all regions of the globe. Greater defense cooperation requires that regional powers collaborate with each other instead of against each other regardless of historical offenses. In spite of the decreasing defense budget and shrinking U.S. forces abroad, military-to-military exchanges between the United States and the militaries of other governments will continue to increase as armed forces become increasingly interdependent. As long as Congress realizes the potential power of interdependence among allies and does not hinder the process, then the possibilities for global achievements in all arenas improve. Unfortunately, Congress (not unlike alliances and coalitions) requires constant maintenance, negotiation, and prodding to produce even the smallest results.

In order for interdependency to reach fruition governments must create policy which allows mutual goals to be realized. If military-to-military programs contribute U.S. political objectives then government policy toward military interdependence should allow the U.S. military to act as a catalyst for international cooperation as well as the guardian of U.S. security interests. The post-Cold War era requires policymakers to identify and agree on long-term goals which allow the U.S. military to enter into a complex integrated era of international affairs. Whether global peace and security becomes a collective effort is the responsibility of world political leaders and international organizations who must emphasize the need, as well as the benefit, of increased defense cooperation.

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