

Summer 1982

Kazakh Nationalism in the Gorbachev Era

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KAZAKH NATIONALISM IN THE GORBACHEV ERA

by

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B.A., May 1985, Elon College

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

HISTORY

OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
August 1992

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ABSTRACT

KAZAKH NATIONALISM IN THE GORBACHEV ERA

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Old Dominion University, 1992
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The primary purpose of this study is to survey specific manifestations of Kazakh nationalism in the Gorbachev era and ask what provoked a seemingly cooperative people to exert their nationalist sentiment. The two principal forms examined are the passage of the Kazakh Language Law in 1989, and the emergence of informal groups and alternative political parties in Kazakhstan.

The nationalism that was expressed by Kazakhs in the Gorbachev era was a resumption of the nationalism that was suspended or suppressed during seventy years of Soviet rule. The December 1986 demonstration in Alma-Ata irreparably altered ethnic relations in the republic and had repercussions that directly influenced the implementation of perestroika, glasnost, and democratization.

The principal sources used were Soviet newspapers and journals, such as Kazakhstanskaya Pravda. In addition, material translated in the Joint Publications Research Service and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports was utilized. Numerous secondary works by western scholars were consulted.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. THE KAZAKHS, 1750-1986	8
III. LANGUAGE AND NATIONALISM	33
IV. TRANSITIONAL POLITICS: INFORMAL GROUPS AND ALTERNATIVE PARTIES IN SOVIET KAZAKHSTAN, 1988-91	58
V. CONCLUSION	76
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	80
APPENDICES	
A. KAZAKH SSR DRAFT LAW ON LANGUAGE	87
B. KAZAKH AND RUSSIAN POPULATION IN THE KAZAKH SSR, 1959-89	94

CHAPTER I

Introduction

In March 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), an event that had far reaching consequences for the course of world events. He introduced three policies--perestroika, glasnost, and democratization--to revitalize a stagnant, obsolete, and bureaucratic multi-national state that possessed a powerful military which was fueled by an inefficient, heavily subsidized economy. In less than seven years the USSR dissolved, crumbling under the weight of seven decades of rigid central control. In its place were fifteen independent republics, each beset with the rusted shackles of Soviet rule: ethnic tensions, ruined economies, and environmental degradation. Kazakhstan emerged as perhaps the most stable and economically progressive of the former Soviet republics in a region traditionally known for its conservative nature.

After the breakup of the USSR Kazakhstan received an important share of the world's attention. With its myriad of ethnic groups, size and strategic location, importance to the other former Soviet republics as a trading partner, and its nuclear potential, it is a republic whose future stability is of vital importance and hinges on two

fundamental conditions: 1) the continued relative harmony between ethnic groups and 2) the solution of the republic's economic problems. Both conditions are mutually dependent on each other. Because numerous works have been devoted to Soviet economics over the last seventy years and very little to ethnic relations, attention must be given to Kazakhstan's largest nationality.

What provoked a seemingly cooperative people to exert their nationalist sentiment? What form(s) did Kazakh nationalism embrace in the Gorbachev era? Essentially, there were two specific manifestations of Kazakh nationalism; the passage of the Kazakh Language Law in 1989 and the emergence of informal groups and alternative political parties during the last four years of the USSR. Kazakh language took on almost hyperbolic proportions, histories were rewritten, and national qualities and characteristics found expression. Intellectual and political life prospered and continued to be secularized.

Hans Kohn, a noted authority on nationalist expression, defined nationalism as a "state of mind," in which the subject people have "certain objective factors distinguishing them from other nationalities like common descent, language, territory, political entity, customs and traditions, and religion."¹ Kohn adds that "none of these

¹Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1965): 9.

factors is essential to the existence of nationality."² The pattern taken by Kazakh nationalism mirrored the nationalism experienced by Europe in the nineteenth century and Africa and Asia in the twentieth century. Most interestingly, according to Kohn, democracy was often adopted because it was "the inherent form of political organization characteristic of nationalism."³ This was indeed the constitutional system that the Kazakhs attempted to establish.

The nationality issue was often declared "solved" by Soviet authorities and scholars. In 1986 Gorbachev reaffirmed this supposition. In 1988, after a series of violent ethnic clashes throughout the USSR, Moscow acknowledged the urgency of reexamining Soviet nationality policy and ordered a plenum of the Party's Central Committee to address it. Because of the reform policies, the Soviet leadership was reacting to, not directing or controlling, events as it attempted to struggle with the problem.

What developed in Kazakhstan during the next five years was an attempt to protect all national traditions, cultures, histories, languages, and democracy, with primacy usually conceded to Kazakhs. Kazakhstan declared its independence on 17 December 1991, symbolically celebrating the fifth anniversary of the 1986 riots in Alma-Ata. Many scholars

²Ibid.

³Hans Kohn, A History of Nationalism in the East (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929): 9.

believe that those riots were the spark that ignited the flame of reform. Glasnost was put to its second test⁴ under conditions that Soviet scholars and authorities had claimed were nonexistent in their state--namely ethnic tensions. During the heat of the riots nationalist banners flew and repeated calls of "Kazakhstan for the Kazakhs" were heard.⁵

The most important expression of nationalism in Kazakhstan was language. Language was used in the Soviet Union to gauge loyalty to the state, with Russian assuming a greater role in society, education, and public life in every republic. In the Gorbachev era the language issue was used by Kazakhs to define their national and cultural distinctiveness.

Language was an emotional nationalistic force because it has two functions in society. First, language is a means of communication. In a planned society, like the Soviet Union, primacy was given to the Russian language as the tool for interethnic communication. Control of a language, through limited publishing, education, and cultural and social influences, created a discriminatory atmosphere between nationals living in the same republic. Language is also a means of identity. It was used in Kazakhstan as a

⁴The Chernobyl disaster was the first test for glasnost.

⁵Taras Kuzio, "Nationalist Riots in Kazakhstan," Central Asian Survey 7 (1988): 79-100.

way to characterize the differences between the republic's two major nationalities.⁶

With almost 99 percent of the native Kazakhs claiming Kazakh as their mother tongue, why was it necessary to adopt the language law? Certainly perestroika and glasnost bear some responsibility, but the language issue--when other factors were present--was often used to mobilize public activism. According to Christina Bratt Paulston,

When ethnic groups see learning the national language well and fluently as in the best interest of their children--and there are social institutions available, like the schools and the religious institutions, which can help them do so--there are very few problems associated with the educational policies for minority groups.⁷

However, Paulston continues, when the same ethnic group sees "stigmatization, discrimination, economic exploitation, or systematic unemployment," they will use language as a tool for mobilization.⁸

Two other scholars, Joshua Fishman and Frank Solano, in Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, convincingly argued that when the triple combination of "deprivation, authoritarianism, and modernization" are perceived in

⁶The five most populace ethnic groups in Kazakhstan according to the 1989 Soviet census were: Kazakhs, 6,534,616; Russians 6,227,549; Germans 957,518; Ukrainians 896,240; Uzbeks 332,017. There are four other groups with over 100,000 people.

⁷Christina B. Paulston, "Understanding Educational Policies in Multilingual States," Annals 508 (March 1990): 39.

⁸Ibid., 39-40.

society, then linguistic heterogeneity "may be exploited for mobilization purposes attending civil strife."⁹ In the case of Kazakhstan, the necessary factors, whether real or perceived, did exist. The riots in Alma-Ata and later in Novi-Uzhen in 1989 ignited Kazakh nationalists into action. Democracy in Kazakhstan had to confront the ethnic realities of the republic.

Kazakhstan was unique in the Soviet Union. The local Russian population, most of whom lived in the northern oblasts, was the largest outside the RSFSR and the Ukraine. Geographically it was the second largest republic of the USSR. It is five times the size of France and located in the heart of Eurasia, nestled between Russia to the north, China to the southeast, and Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, and Turkmenia to the south. Kazakhstan was also the most urbanized society of the former Soviet Central Asian states. According to the 1989 Soviet census, only 38.3 percent of the Kazakh people were urban dwellers (comprising only 26.6 percent of the total urban population), while 77.4 percent of the republic's Russian population lived in cities (making up 51.3 percent of the urban inhabitants).

For the first time in several decades, ethnic Kazakhs comprised the largest population in the republic; however, Kazakhs were the only titular nationality that did not enjoy

⁹Joshua Fishman and Frank Solano, "Cross-Polity Perspective on the Importance of Linguistic Heterogeneity as a 'Contributory Factor' in Civil Strife," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 17 (1990): 131-141

a clear majority. In fact, they were the majority in only seven of the nineteen republic oblasts. In addition, Kazakhs numbered less than 23 percent of the population in the capital Alma-Ata. According to the last census Kazakhs were the third fastest growing ethnic group in the republic, after the Uzbeks and Uigurs.

Because of the unusual demographics Nazarbayev had to be particularly sensitive to the Russian population. The majority of new political parties and informal groups formed along national lines. Except for the environmental groups and the former Communist Party there were few organizations with multiple ethnic memberships. Those groups that proclaimed nationalist programs were often harassed or maligned in the press.¹⁰

This work is divided into three parts: history, language, and democracy. Chapter One reviews the history of the Kazakh people from the mid-eighteenth century to 1986. Chapter Two deals with the language issue and the passage of the Kazakh Language Law in 1989. Chapter Three focuses on the emergence of informal groups and alternative political parties in Kazakhstan from 1988 to 1991.

¹⁰The Kazakh nationalist party Alash had received constant attention from Nazarbayev and other authorities. Some members were even arrested on charges of insulting the president and disturbing the peace at a mosque in Alma-Ata in early 1992. See Chapter Three and "Kazakhstan: Vegas of the East," The Economist (March 7, 1992): 52.

CHAPTER II

The Kazakhs, 1750-1986

The Kazakhs were a pastoral nomadic people who for several centuries inhabited the region of present day Kazakhstan. Although their ethnogenesis is unknown there are several theories. Most scholars agree that the Kazakh nation came into being by the mid-fifteenth century after two sons of the khan of the Mongol White Horde, Janibek and Kirai, broke away from their Uzbek ruler and roamed the region around modern Semirechie.¹

As for the name *Kazakh* its origins are also unknown. The word was used by various tribes in the area around the Lake Balkhash region by the end of the fifteenth century. Rene Grousset believed it meant "adventurers" or "rebels" in Turkic.² Other definitions are that it came from the Turkish verb *gaz*, meaning to wander, or the Mongol word *khasaq*, for a wheeled cart, which the nomadic Kazakhs used to carry their belongings.³

There are also legends. According to one a white

¹Martha B. Olcott, The Kazakhs (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987): 1-2.

²Rene Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, translated by Naomi Walford (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1970): 480.

³Olcott, The Kazakhs, 2.

steppe goose turned into a princess, who then gave birth to the first Kazakh.⁴ This was probably based on another traditional Kazakh legend that combines two words from Turkish, *ak*, meaning white and *kaz*, meaning goose. The most famous tale, for which there is no historical evidence but stirs Kazakh emotions, was that *Alash*, described as a great khan, was with Tamerlane at the battle of Saray Su (1395) and later formed the first Kazakh tribe. Later his three sons were each supposed to have created the three traditional Kazakh *zhuz*, or hordes.⁵

At the beginning of the eighteenth century the Kazakhs were divided into the three different loose confederations. The Great Horde was centered around Lake Balkhash, the Middle Horde near the Aral Sea, and the Lesser, or Small Horde near the Ural river. Although perhaps of greater importance to the nomad was the *aul*, or clan.⁶ According to a traditional Kazakh proverb "it is better to be a herder in one's own clan than to be a king in an alien clan."⁷

In the early 1730s the khan of the Lesser Horde, Abul Hayir (1693-1748), requested Russian military protection

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.; Hasan Oraltay, "The Alash Movement in Turkestan," Central Asian Survey 4 (1985): 41-58.

⁶Alfred E. Hudson, Kazakh Social Structure (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938): 17-24.

⁷Thomas G. Winner, The Oral Art and Literature of the Kazakhs of Russian Central Asia (Durham : Duke University Press, 1958): 7.

from his aggressive enemies, the Djungars, whose continuous attacks were demoralizing the Kazakh population and destroying the economic life of the community.⁸ Russia agreed to provide military aid if the khan swore allegiance, which he did. By mid-century the khan of the Middle Horde, Ablai (1711-1781),⁹ had also sworn fealty to St. Petersburg. This concluded the first phase of relatively bloodless acquisition of Kazakh territory by Russia.¹⁰

The second phase was not so peaceful. From the 1780s until the 1840s, Kazakh uprisings plagued their relations with the Russians. The most famous, and perhaps the most costly in lives, destroyed livestock, and revenue, was lead by Kenisary Qasimov (1802-1847), the grandson of Ablai and khan of the Middle Horde. It was the last unified resistance by Kazakhs to Russian encroachment. It was sparked by Kazakh economic concerns. For several decades Kazakhs had felt threatened by Russian encroachment from the north and Kokand raids from the south. Russian authorities continued to refuse additional pasturelands to the Kazakhs

⁸Baymirza Hayit, "Some Reflections on the Subject of Annexation of Turkestani Kazakhstan by Russia," Central Asian Survey 3 (1984): 62.

⁹Kazakh SSR Kyskasha Entsiklopediya 1 (Alma-Ata, 1984): 43.; Olcott, The Kazakhs, 28-55.

¹⁰In the early 1980s the Soviet government decided to celebrate the 250th anniversary of the acquisition of this territory and the incorporation of the Kazakh people into the Russian empire. There was considerable debate about the "voluntary" aspects of the annexation and the actual dates of the Russian occupation. See Hayit, "Annexation of Turkestani Kazakhstan," 61-76.

and Kokand terrorized the Kazakh population.

Kenisary began his opposition in 1837. At his most powerful he commanded over 20,000 men. He sought to restore the dignity of khan, which had been revoked upon the death of his father by the Russians in the 1820s. He also wanted to destroy Russian settlements built on traditional Kazakh grazing lands. He supported his rebellion through direct taxation and by exacting payment from all caravans passing through his territory. Due to his attacks the Russians lost millions in revenue. In addition, they could not tolerate a strong rival in their suzerain lands. In 1844 the Russians dispatched a powerful enough force to defeat Kenisary. Instead of fighting he accepted amnesty from the Russians and left the Middle Horde to assist the Kirghiz in their struggle against Kokand. He died in battle three years later.¹¹

During the 1850s the first generation of Kazakh intellectuals appeared. Three men are usually credited with being the first "democrat-enlighteners," the geographer Chokan Valikhanov, the pedagogue Ibrahim Altynsarin, and the poet Abai Kunanbayev. Each influenced the embryonic Kazakh nationalism that was emerging under the Russian yoke.

Chokan Valikhanov was the first Kazakh intellectual and, had he lived longer than thirty years, perhaps the most brilliant. Born in 1835 he was the great-grandson of Ablai.

¹¹Olcott, The Kazakhs, 64-66.

He was raised primarily by his grandmother Aiganym. She was an educated and perspicacious woman with a thorough knowledge of Kazakh folklore and songs. She was probably the first to cultivate and influence his deep interest in his people and their past. At the age of twelve he was sent to the Siberian Cadet Corp in Omsk. His professors encouraged his keen intellect. He became fluent in Russian. In fact, he never became literate in Kazakh and all his writings were in Russian. While at school his sharp mind and zeal for learning caught the attention of instructors and students. One schoolmate and lifetime friend was the geographer Gregorii Potanin. Upon graduation Chokan stayed in Omsk as adjutant to the Governor-General of Western Siberia, G. Kh. Gasfort. During that time he enjoyed the social and intellectual life of the city and developed enduring, affectionate relationships with Russian political exiles and scholars.

Three had a tremendous influence on him. One was the Petrashevets¹² S. F. Durov, who appeared to have fostered Chokan's democratic character. The great novelist Fedor Dostoevsky, also exiled to the East for Petrashevets activity, encouraged Chokan to serve his people as a scholar

¹²The Petrashevets were an idealistic group of young intellectuals, minor government officials, and students who met at the home of M. V. Petrashevskii to discuss various philosophical theories, art, and literature. In April 1849 the police, alarmed by the 1848 European Revolutions, arrested many members and sentenced most to internal exile in Siberia.

and intermediary between Kazakhs and Russians. The third major influence on his life and career was P. P. Semenov, the explorer of the Tian Shan mountains. Semenov recommended Chokan for full membership in the Imperial Geographical Society and also to head the dangerous expedition to the western Chinese city of Kashgar in 1858-59. This trip was Chokan's greatest achievement, although it was his role as investigator and recorder of Kazakh poetry, legends, and songs for which Kazakhs owe gratitude. He died of tuberculoses in 1865.¹³

Ibrahim Altynsarin¹⁴ was the first Kazakh pedagogue, in the Western sense of the word. He believed that the benefits of Western culture would emancipate the Kazakhs from Russian domination, primarily through widespread secular education. He was born in 1841 in the Middle Horde, in what today is Kustanai Oblast. He attended the Orenburg Kazakh School where he was eventually introduced to Nikolai Il'minskii, a noted orientalist and Turkic language specialist. In 1879 Altynsarin was appointed inspector of schools for the Turgai district, the first Kazakh to be

¹³Kermit E. McKenzie, "Chokan Valikhanov: Kazakh Princeling and Scholar, Central Asian Survey 8 (1989): 1-30. Valikhanov's memory has remained very popular in Kazakhstan and his name has been bestowed upon the Institute of History, Archeology, and Ethnography of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences. For a brief account in English of his literary works see Winner, Oral Art and Literature, 101-07.

¹⁴Isabelle Kreindler, "Ibrahim Altynsarin, Nikolai Il'minskii and the Kazakh National Awakening," Central Asian Survey 2 (November 1983): 99-116.

named to such a post. In 1887 he attempted to introduce a program of education for women. Of significant importance were the textbooks Altynsarin wrote and the Latin based alphabet he attempted to adapt to the Kazakh language. He also wrote a Kirghiz Anthology,¹⁵ a collection of Russian and Kazakh folk tales and proverbs.¹⁶ Altynsarin also wrote another work of great importance focusing on the reformist point of view of Islam, one that perhaps inspired twentieth century Kazakh nationalists.¹⁷ He died in 1889, but his influence on Kazakh education was unmatched. His textbooks were perhaps the reason the nomadic Kazakhs had the highest literacy rates of all Central Asian peoples in the 1897 census.

Abai Kunanbayev¹⁸ (1845-1904) was the greatest Kazakh literary figure of his day, though not only because of his original prose and poetry. He read avidly and was responsible for numerous translations from Russian to

¹⁵Until 1925 the Russians referred to the Kazakhs as "Kirghiz." The people known today as Kirghiz were called "Kara-Kirghiz," or Black-Kirghiz by the Russians. Many native Kazakhs writing in the 19th century used the Russian terms, primarily for clarity since the majority of their readers were Russians.

¹⁶Kreindler, "Altynsarin," 109. The book consisted of translations of Krylov's fables adopted to a Kazakh setting, some original works of Altysarin's, and a few Kazakh tales and legends.

¹⁷Ibid., 109-11.

¹⁸Abai Kunanbayev, Selected Poems (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970).; Winner, Oral Art and Literature, 110-20.; Olcott, The Kazakhs, 105-07.

Kazakh. Because of his efforts the works of Pushkin, Lermontov, Krylov, Nekrasov, Saltykov-Shchedrin, and Tolstoy were available to Kazakhs in their native language. He was also well versed in the writings of Belinski, Chernyshevsky, and Herzen, as well as Goethe, Byron, Darwin, Spencer, and many Greek classics. His interests also carried him into the world of Eastern writers, particularly Arab, Persian, and Chagatai poets.¹⁹

Unlike Valikhanov and Altynsarin, Kunanbayev did not believe Russian rule was advantageous for Kazakhs. By the 1890s Russian peasants were beginning to seize large tracts of lands and thousands of Kazakhs were without livestock, grazing lands, or agricultural knowledge. The Kazakh economic situation was in decline and the Russian administration offered no solutions.

Beginning in the 1820s tsarist migration policy to the Kazakh steppe began to ease. What started as a movement to Siberia was extending southward.²⁰ During the 1830s the Russian army began offensive operations that successfully conquered the Great Horde in 1846 and captured Tashkent in 1865. The Russian migration increased after 1822 when the government permitted crown serfs to apply for resettlement in Siberia. Government decrees in 1843 and 1881 made application simpler and provided inducements, such as

¹⁹Winner, Oral Art and Literature, 111.

²⁰Marc Raeff, Siberia and the Reforms of 1822 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1956): 39-88.

cheaper land. In addition, there was no prosecution of immigrants who had illegally settled on Kazakh lands. In 1894 rates on trains were reduced significantly for migrants. Four years later rates were again reduced so that a peasant family of five could travel 1,100 versts for fifteen rubles, down from fifty-seven rubles.²¹

According to George Demko a "push-pull" force motivated the peasant migration.²² The push force from European Russia was primarily because of the lack of sufficient farm land, population growth, inequitable land holding, and, before 1861, serfdom. The pull force to Central Asia was due to the abundance of land and the distance from European Russia which provided a greater amount of freedom. Land and liberty were too great to ignore.²³

From 1896 to 1916 more than 1.5 million Russians moved to Kazakhstan. In 1910 the government began offering interest free loans to Russian migrants. The Russian population tripled in the twenty years before the first 1917 revolution, whereas the Kazakh population increased only 14 percent.²⁴ Kazakh livestock population decreased dramatically during this period. The Stolypin reforms of

²¹George Demko, The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 1896-1916 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969): 58-60

²²Ibid., 50-57.

²³Ibid., 57.

²⁴Ibid., 129.

1906 and 1910 legalized enclosures in the region, and that insured diminished native herds.²⁵ Many Kazakhs were forced to abandon their traditional way of life and take up farming or become semisedentary.²⁶

In the late 1880s Islam began to have more influence in Kazakh society. Islamic practices originally had little appeal to most Kazakhs because certain aspects, such as the seclusion of women, were impractical for the nomadic lifestyle. As the number of settled Kazakhs increased and exposure to Islam also increased, the influence of the religion grew. The number of clerics and mosques expanded, although most Kazakhs were educated in the Russian schools and trained for service in the Russian steppe administration as translators. However, religious schools also produced Kazakh intellectuals whose allegiance was to Islam and Kazakh culture. Many graduates of both schools were angered by the increased poverty of their fellow Kazakhs. Islam became a unifying force for many educated Kazakhs against the Russian domination. A number of these individuals played a significant role in the Kazakh national movement that began with the 1905 Revolution and ended in 1920 with the destruction of the Alash Orda Autonomous government.

Most leaders of the emerging Kazakh nationalist

²⁵Olcott, The Kazakhs, 89.

²⁶By 1926 60 percent of all Kazakhs were semisedentary, 30 percent sedentary, and only 6 percent perennial nomads. See Demko, Colonization of Kazakhstan, 189.

movement had received a secular education but identified themselves as Kazakhs and Muslims. The most prominent among them were Ali Khan Bukeikhanov (1869-1932), Ahmed Baitursunov (1873-1937), and Mir Yakub Dulatov (1885-1937).²⁷ After the 1905 Revolution the government eased restrictions on publishing in native languages and there emerged an active, though limited, Kazakh press. In addition, small reform-oriented political organizations formed.

The most prominent of these was *Alash Orda* (The Horde of Alash), which was founded in December 1905. Bukeikhanov was the party's leader. They adopted the Constitutional Democrats' program. Beginning in 1907 several newspapers started, some independently, others under the auspices of the Alash party. The majority of these had very short appearances, like Kazakh Gazeti, which was suspended after only one issue. In 1911 there appeared the first of two important and influential newspapers, Ay Oap,²⁸ a monthly paper published at Energiya Press in Troisk and edited by Mohammed Dzhan Siralin (1872-1929). Baitursunov and

²⁷ Winner, Oral Art and Literature, 120-30.; Martha B. Olcott, "The Emergence of National Identity in Kazakhstan," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 8 (Fall 1981): 285-300.; Alexander Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979): 192-205.; Oraltay, "The Alash Movement," 41-58.

²⁸Alexander Bennigsen and Chantal Lemerrier-Quelquejay, "The History of the Kazakh Press, 1900-1920," Central Asian Review 14 (1966): 151-163.

Bukeikhanov were also on the editorial board. Ay Qap was more political than any of its predecessors. Emphasizing traditional Kazakh culture, it was very important in the formation of the Kazakh literary language. In addition, the editors believed the treatment of women had deteriorated under the influence of Islam in recent years and they advocated emancipation. The paper published numerous articles denouncing the Russian presence in Kazakh lands and advocated armed revolt against Russian power. In September 1916 Russian authorities suspended the paper after its eighty-eighth issue.

In February 1913 the bi-weekly paper Qazaq²⁹ first appeared. It was published at Orenburg by Mustafa Urazayev and the editor-in-chief was Baitursunov. Bukeikhanov, Dulatov, and the poet Magzhan Zhumbayev (1894-1937) often contributed to the pages of the paper. The editors were extremely critical of Russian occupation and believed the division of land was severely inequitable. They advocated continued education in the Kazakh language and interestingly, the adoption of sedentary lifestyles.³⁰ Most of all they campaigned for the cultural development of the Kazakh people. Baitursunov wrote, "The very existence of the Kirghiz [Kazakh] people is facing us . . . we should

²⁹Ibid., 157-60.; Olcott, The Kazakhs, 115-18.

³⁰Baitursunov wrote "only a nation that has its own language, its own literature, will be preserved. The national character of a people who speak their own language never disappears." See Olcott, The Kazakhs, 118.

struggle with all our strength in order to acquire education and culture."³¹

Qazag maintained a neutral position during World War I, although during the revolt of 1916 they supported the tsarist call-up of Central Asians. On 25 June 1916 Nicholas II signed the mobilization order that touched off the revolt among the native Central Asians. Two-hundred and fifty thousand men between the ages of 19-43 were to report for duty by 8 July. The revolt started in the sedentary regions of Turkestan, but by August it had spread among the Kazakhs. Rumors spread among the population. Often the natives believed they were going to the front as soldiers to fight with no weapons or training. In truth the men were needed to work in transportation and as laborers behind the lines.

Many Kazakh leaders were prepared for the conscription order, even debating the matter several months earlier in Qazag in December 1915. Resistance usually took two forms in Kazakh lands. Often the call-up list was stolen and the government official was injured. But on several occasions the official was murdered and unrestrained riots were greeted with a violent response by tsarist troops. By November over 2000 Kazakhs were listed as killed, although the number was probably much higher. There has been much debate as to the precise reasons for the revolt, although

³¹Bennigsen and Lemerrier-Quelquejay, "History of the Kazakh Press," 158.

many scholars believe it was in response to severe economic conditions.³² The summer harvest was just about to begin and many believed the loss of so many men would be devastating. In addition, many nomads, who had watched their livestock perish due to poor grazing lands and a lower allotment of fodder, simply believed they had nothing to lose by resisting.³³ The revolt was extinguished and over 100,000 men were conscripted before the outbreak of the February Revolution.

The overthrow of tsarism was greeted enthusiastically in the Kazakh steppe. Many believed their grievances, particularly over land, would receive fair treatment by the Provisional Government. The democratic ideas advocated by Petrograd were welcomed by the reform-minded Kazakh intelligentsia. The Provisional Government quickly ceased forced conscription and declared amnesty for those arrested during the 1916 uprising. Soviets also quickly formed throughout the region, although they had very little influence.

The leadership of Alash Orda cooperated with Petrograd and after October 1917 they struggled to form their own autonomous government. The attempt by Kazakh intellectuals to govern themselves was plagued by the inability to implement any of their programs. In addition, Alash Orda

³²See Edward D. Sokol, The Revolt of 1916 in Russian Central Asia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1953).

³³Olcott, The Kazakhs, 123.

was unable to resist the military power of either Bolshevik or White forces. Thus the Kazakh government was used by each side when Kazakh support was necessary. Eventually it became clear that the Bolsheviks would not support an independent Kazakh state, but they persuaded many Kazakhs that they intended to rectify the inequitable tsarist land policy.

In late 1920, after three years of difficult assiduous rule, the Alash Orda government was dissolved by the Bolsheviks and most of its members were incorporated into the Communist Party.³⁴ Many of its leaders, like Bukeikhanov and Baitursunov, joined the party and continued to exercise significant influence on Kazakh affairs.³⁵ Moscow hoped once the new regime attained popular support, then the traditional leadership, like aul, secular, and religious heads, could gradually be phased out and more drastic economic and social reforms could be introduced among the native population.³⁶

The 1920s was a period of relative peaceful, although difficult, transition to Soviet authority in the steppe. Moscow needed to create Kazakh loyalty for the new regime

³⁴At the time there was no Kazakh Communist Party, therefore they joined the Bolsheviks. The first congress of the KCP was held in June 1937, shortly after Kazakhstan gained full republic status.

³⁵Oraltay, "The Alash Movement," 54.

³⁶Martha B. Olcott, "Pastoralism, Nationalism, and Communism in Kazakhstan," Canadian-American Slavic Studies 17 (Winter 1983): 536.

and at the same time remain committed to their program. Many clan and village leaders had simply reconstituted themselves as communists and governed as before.³⁷ In 1921 the Bolsheviks launched the New Economic Policy [NEP] in the steppe in an effort to persuade the eponymous population to reject the traditional leaders and nomadic lifestyle.

NEP restored limited private ownership in agriculture and addressed some Kazakh grievances. Initially, taxation policy was eased and the regime started to provide loans for any Kazakh who voluntarily ceased migration to begin farming. Unfortunately Moscow did not have all the resources to direct the process of economic recovery and therefore could not supply the assistance necessary to the majority of Kazakhs to become sedentary or economically secure.³⁸ However there were some encouraging, even sanguine signs. By 1925 the sown area in Kazakhstan was almost two-thirds that of the prewar level and livestock numbers had also increased.³⁹ By the late 1920s Moscow had grown restive with NEP and started to move toward more direct supervision of the economy, despite the economic improvements and the modicum of support from Kazakhs.

The most catastrophic period of Kazakh-Soviet relations was the 1930s. In December 1929 the Kazakh Communist Party

³⁷Olcott, The Kazakhs, 162.

³⁸Ibid., 162-64.

³⁹Ibid., 165-66.

Central Committee agreed to the general goal of collectivization. One month later Kazakh authorities decided that out of the 566,000 nomadic and semi-nomadic households, which was about half of all Kazakh households, 544,000 should be settled by the end of the First Five Year Plan [1928-1933].⁴⁰

Most collectives were set up in desert or semi-desert locations. There were few completed houses, sheds, agricultural implements or seed, and often inadequate water supplies. Furthermore, little or no fodder was provided for the livestock, while driving the herds to pasture was forbidden.⁴¹ By the end of 1932 only 106 houses and 108 baths were available for the 320,000 settled Kazakh households. Four years later 400,000 Kazakh households were settled, though only 38,000 new residences had been built.⁴²

The effects of collectivization on the human and livestock populations was dramatic. Collectivization and the Stalinist purges decimated the native population. A whole generation of Kazakh intellectuals, historians, and journalists were systematically purged from the party

⁴⁰Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror Famine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986): 192-93.; Martha B. Olcott, "The Collectivization Drive in Kazakhstan," Russian Review 40 (1981): 129-30.

⁴¹Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow, 193-94.

⁴²Ibid., 196.

leadership. Writers were especially targeted. Often they were accused of collusion or nationalism. Many, like Saken Sayfullin (1894-1938),⁴³ Ilias Dzhansugurov (1894-1937), and Beimbet Mailin (1894-1938), were arrested, charged with nationalism and shot. Many leaders of Alash Orda suffered the same fate. Bukeikhanov was shot in 1932. Others, like Baitursunov and Dulatov, survived until 1937 when mass arrests and executions took place. In addition, sanguinary reprisals were taken against Kazakhs who participated in, or even sympathized with, the resurgent Basmachi revolt.⁴⁴

The 1930s was also a period of rapid social transformation in the steppe. The cornerstone of the Soviet social agenda was education, in particular the elimination of illiteracy. Kazakh State University was opened in 1934 and a Kazakh branch of the Academy of Sciences was created four years later. In 1936 Kazakhstan was granted full union status and became the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (KaSSR).

Soviet collectivization and Kazakh opposition to it

⁴³"Saken Sayfullin, The First Kazakh Soviet Poet," Central Asian Review 13 (1965): 267-73.; Winner, Oral Art and Literature, 181-83. Sayfullin was the first Kazakh writer to join the Bolsheviks in 1917. He was arrested in 1937 and died one year later. He was rehabilitated in 1956, along with Mailin and Dzhansugurov. Before being shot he denied any treason and wrote on his case file "Subjected to brutal tortures, I involuntarily confessed that I was an 'enemy of the people.' Before dying I declare that I am one of the honorable citizens of my Soviet motherland and one of the honorable members of my dear Communist Party."

⁴⁴Michael Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990): 33-43.

resulted in millions of destroyed livestock. Kazakhs correctly perceived the policy as a direct and aggressive attack upon their traditional way of life. As might be expected they strongly opposed the nationalization of their herds, which in their culture were used to define wealth, prestige, and standing in the aul. Frequently Kazakhs slaughtered their animals to prevent their seizure by the Soviets. In 1929 there were 7.4 million head of cattle in Kazakhstan, by 1933 there were only 1.6 million. The number of sheep also dropped dramatically in the same period from almost 22 million to 1.7 million.⁴⁵ Starvation, because of the lack of fodder, was also responsible for the large decrease. The traditional Kazakh food supply and economy was devastated.

The resulting famine was the primary cause of death of the human population during the era of collectivization. Robert Conquest estimated that over one million Kazakhs starved to death in the 1930s.⁴⁶ The 1926 census showed almost four million Kazakhs in the Soviet Union. However, the 1939 census showed only 3.1 million Kazakhs.⁴⁷ By mid-1933, 95 percent of the Kazakh population had been collectivized. The number of native households dropped from

⁴⁵Olcott, The Kazakhs, 248-49. Olcott also provides tables of livestock numbers in the appendix. The amount of cattle did not recover their pre-1930 size until the mid-1970s. Sheep recovered by 1960.

⁴⁶Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow, 190.

⁴⁷Ibid.

1,350,000 in 1927 to 626,950 in 1933.⁴⁸

The disaster was due to economic and political miscalculations. The famine was man-made, by both Kazakhs and Soviets, and according to Conquest was the result of "ideologically motivated policies recklessly applied."⁴⁹ Moscow did not comprehend the nature of Kazakh culture and society. Much of the information Soviet authorities relied on was inaccurate data compiled by Tsarist officials.⁵⁰ The era of NEP, when Moscow achieved a small amount of cooperation from natives, was over. The drastic economic changes in the steppe alienated the Kazakhs and increased the destructive forces of resistance.

World War II provided only a temporary respite from collectivization and its consequences. Nevertheless, over 450,000 Kazakhs were mobilized for service. Moscow also required Kazakhstan to maintain its agricultural productivity, without providing material or technical assistance. In order to accomplish this more women were forced to work the fields. By the end of the war 80 percent of all agricultural workers were women. One means of increasing productivity was to allow limited private ownership of land and livestock. Martha Olcott writes that by 1945, 20 percent of all grain sold to the state was

⁴⁸Olcott, The Kazakhs, 266.

⁴⁹Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow, 196.

⁵⁰Olcott, The Kazakhs, 157.

privately produced.⁵¹ Because of the shortages caused by the war Moscow also took a closer look at Kazakhstan's extensive untapped natural resources, once considered too expensive to exploit. Coal was particularly important. By 1945 annual coal production had risen 300 percent to 45,722,000 tons.⁵²

After World War II Moscow reestablished direct control over Kazakhstan's economy. Between 1946 and 1950 over 600,000 hectares of land were renationalized.⁵³ The amount of non-fallow land used increased nearly 40 percent, although output of cereal crops increased less than 20 percent. In 1954 Nikita Khrushchev introduced the Virgin and Idle Land project, which he believed would solve the Soviet Union's chronic agriculture problems by farming the vast regions of Northern Kazakhstan and Southern Siberia. Olcott argues that the lands were not idle and that it was a purely "centrist perspective" since the Kazakhs had utilized the affected area for centuries as pasturelands.⁵⁴

The policy was not a new idea, in fact it had been discussed before the war. Reaction to the plan was not all favorable, especially in Kazakhstan. In February 1954

⁵¹Ibid., 190-91.

⁵²Ibid., 189.

⁵³One hectare is equal to about two and one half acres.

⁵⁴Olcott, The Kazakhs, 224.

Zhumabai Shaiakhmetov (1902-1966),⁵⁵ KCP First Secretary, was removed from his post for arguing that any gains from increased cultivation would negatively affect livestock breeding. From 1955 to 1960 the harvests met their quotas only twice, in 1956 and 1958. Drought, soil infertility and inefficient machinery, material, and farming methods were to blame. The annual expected grain yield of over 32 million tons never materialized.⁵⁶ Several new party leaders lost their positions based on the harvest results. In 1959 another Kazakh and Brezhnev protégé, Dinmukhamed Kunayev, was appointed KCP First Secretary, a job he held, with one brief interruption in the mid-1960s, until 1986. Indeed, in 1971 he became the first and only Kazakh elected to full membership on the Politburo.

Kunayev's legacy was the promotion of more Kazakhs into the Party and to positions of authority in the KCP. He was allowed a certain degree of freedom in governing Kazakhstan. Moscow continued to provide economic and cultural direction, but Kunayev was allowed to nurture native cadres and reward his loyal followers, both Kazakh and Russian, with powerful positions. In the early 1980s eleven oblast first

⁵⁵Kyskasha Entsiklopediya, 549. Shaiakhmetov was the first Kazakh to serve as KCP First Secretary, 1946-1954.

⁵⁶Douglas Jackson, "The Virgin and Idle Lands Program Reappraised," Annals 52 (1962): 69-79.

secretaries were Kazakhs.⁵⁷ The size of the Party also grew, although its numbers were never very significant in terms of popular participation. In 1981 only 5 percent of the republic's population were party members, with Kazakh membership only about 35 percent.

After Brezhnev's death in 1982, Yuri Andropov attempted to oust Kunayev from office. Andrei Chernenko's tenure provided a brief respite, although Gorbachev renewed the effort. Moscow's chief concerns were corruption and nepotism, which one Russian resident of Alma-Ata described as the "curse of life" and, added pessimistically, that Moscow lacked ability to change Kazakhstan because "all the little Kazakh groups . . . protect each other and really run things here."⁵⁸

Kunayev's power waned under the constant pressure and several of his followers were replaced, including his half-brother, the director of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences. In December 1986, after only an eighteen minute meeting, the Central Committee of the KCP accepted Kunayev's "request" for retirement and then unanimously chose Gennadi Kolbin as his successor.⁵⁹ Kolbin, a Russian with no previous

⁵⁷Olcott, The Kazakhs, 240-46.

⁵⁸Paul B. Henze, "Impressions and Conversations in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, September 1988," A Rand Note (Santa Monica, CA, 1990): 42.

⁵⁹Martha B. Olcott, "Perestroyka in Kazakhstan," Problems of Communism 39 (July-August 1990): 65.

connections to Kazakhstan, had been very prominent in the government's anti-alcohol and anti-corruption campaigns.⁶⁰ He apparently was Gorbachev's choice to lead the reforms in the republic.

On 16 December TASS reported Kunayev had been replaced. The next day a crowd, consisting primarily of students and other young people, tried to march to the Communist Party headquarters, only to be turned away by the city militia. The second and last full day of the demonstration was far more violent and destructive but civil authorities were able to restore order. The official inquiry revealed only two dead, 200 hospitalized with various injuries, and several thousand arrested. The official reason was a standard Soviet characterization--youths inspired by greed and intoxicated by alcohol and drugs attacked the militia that attempted to control the crowds through peaceful means.⁶¹

Eye-witness accounts provide a different and perhaps unreliable scenario of events. The size of the crowd often varied from witness to witness, but two points remained constant: the protest was a peaceful one and the crowd consisted of Kazakhs and Russians.⁶² One Russian bystander claimed the riots started when a Kazakh killed a Russian and

⁶⁰Kuzio, "Nationalist Riots in Kazakhstan," 80-81.

⁶¹Ibid., 92-95.; Olcott, "Perestroyka in Kazakhstan," 66-67.; Gennadi Kolbin, "On Restructuring and the Party's Personnel Policy," Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (March 15, 1987): 1-3.

⁶²Ibid., 66.

then "several of them were killed."⁶³ This account conflicts with the official version of the number killed. His story gives credence to unofficial accounts in the Western press that many hundred died during the two days of rioting. The witness claimed to have watched events unfold. He believed that the demonstrators were Kazakhs, and Kunayev beneficiaries, who would lose their positions, prestige, and benefits as Kolbin attempted to reform the republic. A Kazakh engineer provided a different, but not contradictory, view of events. He claimed that many Kazakhs were disillusioned with Kunayev and was certain that "Kunayev and his people organized" the demonstration.⁶⁴

The government responded to the demonstration by directing a commission to investigate the status of inter-ethnic relations in the republic. The commission proposed a range of measures to promote and improve the teaching of the Kazakh language, a specific Kazakh grievance. This proposition initiated widespread, and generally passionate, debate, which culminated in the creation of the Kazakh Law on Language.

⁶³Henze, "Impressions and Conversations," 42.

⁶⁴Ibid., 43-44. Kazakh activists were eventually able to succor the release of many individuals convicted of crimes. In December 1991 President Nursultan Nazarbayev, in a symbolic gesture, issued a decree releasing prisoners serving time for killings linked with the demonstration.

CHAPTER III

Language and Nationalism

According to the 1989 census, almost 99 percent of the Kazakhs claimed Kazakh as their mother tongue, while hardly any of Kazakhstan's Russians were bilingual. Only 56,000, or less than 1 percent of the republic's Russians, claimed Kazakh as a second language. On the other hand, almost 63 percent of the native Kazakh population claimed a "good knowledge" of the Russian language. Kazakh bilingualism was second only to the Latvians and greater than the Ukrainians and Belorussians.¹ However, language affiliation in the 1989 and earlier Soviet censuses was the individual's personal choice and may not have accurately reflected true language proficiency. Therefore, an individual may indicate a specific language as his "mother tongue" but lack the tools necessary to communicate in that language. In addition, an individual's personal perception of his second language ability may be overstated.²

Language in Soviet nationality policy was always one of

¹Ann Sheehy, "Russian Share of Soviet Population Down to 50.8 Percent," Report on the USSR 1 (20 October 1989): 1-5.

²Rasma Karklins, "A Note on 'Nationality' and 'Native Tongue' as Census Categories in 1979," Soviet Studies 32 (July 1980): 415-23.

the principal barometers for gauging individual and group loyalty to the Soviet state. Official policy has always stressed the development of bilingual skills; however, the implication was that non-Russians should develop Russian language abilities. The goal of Soviet authorities was to create a society free of the cultural differences inherent in a multinational state. Bilingualism in the Soviet Union meant the use of Russian as the second language. Soviet linguists often agreed that monolingualism was the characteristic of the dominant ethnic group. But, they argued, this inequality did not exist in the USSR because the Russian language was the "free and voluntary choice" of the indigenous population. According to the Soviet scholar, M. I. Isayev, Russian was

the language of the Union's most developed nation, which guided the country through its revolutionary transformations and won itself the love and respect of all the other peoples, the Russian language is naturally being transformed into the language of communication and cooperation of all the peoples of [our] socialist state.³

Soviet scholars also suggested that non-Russian use of the Russian language was accepted because of "love and respect" for the Russian people. They implied there was a debt to repay for Russian generosity. In a "reply to the falsifiers of history" regarding Russian population growth in Kazakhstan, Khamid Inoyatov wrote:

³M. I. Isayev, National Languages of the Soviet Union (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), 299-300.

By joint effort the Soviet peoples freed the people of Kazakhstan from backwardness, ignorance, poverty, hunger and political oppression, which had been their lot before the October Revolution.⁴

In time, according to M. N. Guboglo, Russian language fluency became "an 'objective necessity and need' under conditions of developed socialism." For that reason,

it is extremely important that perceived needs for knowledge of the language of internationality communication [Russian], together with the ideas and principles of internationalism, be transformed into firm convictions, a habitual norm of behavior, and an active life stance for all peoples of the Soviet Union.⁵

Throughout the Gorbachev era, the desired goal of both supporters and opponents of republican language legislation was the return to so-called Leninist norms, which, so each argument went, was distorted during the "cult of personality" and the "period of stagnation." Lenin, who was sensitive to the national language issue, wrote:

The strictest rules must be introduced on the use of the national language in the non-Russian republics . . . and those rules must be checked with special care . . . a detailed code will be required, and only nationals living in the republic in question can draw it up successfully.⁶

Furthermore, Lenin argued that the state should not

⁴Khamid Inoyatov, Central Asia and Kazakhstan Before and After the October Revolution (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966), 88.

⁵M. N. Guboglo, "The General and the Specific in the Ethnic Function of a Native Language," Soviet Anthropology and Archeology 27 (Winter 1988-89): 86-87.

⁶V.I. Lenin, Collected Works (Moscow and London: Progress Publishers, 1967), 36: 606-11.

recognize any "compulsory official language" and that a constitution must contain a "fundamental law that prohibits any privilege . . . to any one nation."⁷

Throughout Central Asia in the 1920s, early republican constitutions contained specific language rights. For example, Article 13 of Uzbekistan's 1929 constitution guaranteed national minorities the right to education in their native languages, while the Turkmen SSR constitution declared Turkmen and Russian the official state languages.⁸

To facilitate the educational process, the literacy rate among the indigenous population in Central Asia needed to be raised. Before the 1917 revolution, Tadzhikistan had a 2.3 percent literacy rate, Kirgizia 3.1 percent, Uzbekistan 3.6 percent, and Turkestan and Kazakhstan under 10 percent.⁹ Education received high priority in Moscow, but the program of mass education was extremely difficult to carry out since the government lacked teachers, educational material, local facilities, and written languages. To

⁷Ibid., 21: 408.

⁸Bodhan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationality Problem in the USSR (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 63.

⁹J. J. Tomiak, ed., Western Perspectives on Soviet Education in the 1980s (London: Macmillan Distribution, 1986), 88-9; Thomas Winner, "Problems of Alphabetic Reform Among the Turkic Peoples of Soviet Central Asia, 1920-41," Slavonic Review 21 (December 1952): 133-47. Winner cites Soviet sources obtained from the last Tsarist census of 1897, which shows Kazakhs 2 percent, Uzbeks 1 percent and Kirghiz 0.5 percent. The criterion of literacy was the ability to sign one's name.

combat this, in 1923 Joseph Stalin, the Commissar for Nationality Affairs, outlined a program to raise the cultural and literacy level among the indigenous population in Central Asia and elsewhere. He proposed the creation of clubs, societies for the spread of literacy, educational facilities, increased publications, and theaters in the native languages.

Unfortunately, many of the Central Asia languages did not have alphabets, or, if they did, they used the complex Arabic script. Most scholars agree that this was ill-suited to the Turkic languages and therefore harmful to Soviet plans.¹⁰ However, as a result of reforms throughout the 1920s, most major languages in the region acquired the Latin alphabet as their written form. It may seem an odd choice, particularly since the Cyrillic alphabet was being used by over 70 percent of Soviet society at the time, but Soviet authorities, sensitive to national resentment over the Tsarist policy of russification, did not want to give the impression of advocating a similar policy. The government also wanted to eliminate the use of the Arabic script because of the religious association with the Koran.

The Cyrillic alphabet crept slowly into the republics, but by 1940 all Central Asian republics were using it. Soviet authorities argued that a common alphabet would facilitate international understanding and ease interaction

¹⁰Winner, "Alphabetic Reform," 133-47.; Tomiak, Western Perspectives on Soviet Education in the 1980s, 75-96.

among Soviet nationalities. Two years earlier, Stalin had decreed that Russian would be mandatory in all state schools. Over the next fifteen years, Russian was given greater prominence in education, government, and social interaction; and, without it, advancement in the workplace or social ladder was greatly inhibited.

After the death of Stalin in 1953, there was a fundamental change in Soviet language policy. Under Stalin, all languages, in theory, were equal. However by the late 1950s, Russian took precedence over all other languages and efforts were devoted to expanding its role throughout society. In late 1956, amendments to the constitutions of Uzbekistan and Kirghizia proclaimed the indigenous languages as the official languages. In the summer of 1957, Kazakh intellectuals first publicly complained about the deplorable state of the Kazakh language.¹¹ In a collective letter published in Kommunist Kazakhstan, they stated their opposition to russification because of its "negation of the national individuality of the Kazakh people".¹²

¹¹See Olcott, The Kazakhs, 199-223.; Winner, Oral Art and Literature, 193-254.; Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, "History of the Kazakh Press," 151-63. These works detail the story of the Kazakh press prior to the 1917 revolutions and their role during the brief period of Kazakh independence. It should be noted that before Kazakhstan's incorporation into the Soviet State in 1920 several Kazakh writers, particularly Ahmed Baitursunov, lamented the decreased use of Kazakh in many of the newspapers in the region.

¹²Nahaylo and Swoboda, Soviet Disunion, 122-23.

In December 1958, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed a comprehensive law on educational reform. Included was Khrushchev's heralded language law, "Thesis 19," which changed the role of the Russian language and Soviet attitudes toward language planning. Its goal was to enhance the role of the Russian language at the expense of native languages. According to "Thesis 19," the Russian language was to be "studied seriously" as a "powerful means of international communication, of strengthening friendship among the peoples of the USSR."¹³ Furthermore, in order to restrict excessive language instruction in non-Russian schools, parents were given the right to decide the language their child should have as a compulsory subject but only if there were a "sufficient number of children to form classes for instruction in a given language."¹⁴ Oddly, there was little opposition to "Thesis 19" in Central Asia. Perhaps that was because, as Yaroslav Bilinsky argued, the Muslim peoples of Soviet Central Asia lived their lives apart from the rest of the state, distinct from other ethnic groups in Soviet society by culture, history, language, and religion.¹⁵

"Thesis 19" also made the study of native languages optional in Russian schools. Russians living in non-Russian

¹³Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Education Laws of 1958-9 and Nationality Policy," Soviet Studies 14 (April 1963): 138-57.

¹⁴Ibid., 139.

¹⁵Ibid., 152.

republics no longer had to learn the language of the people around them, but native children were required to begin learning Russian in their second year of school. Parents were also encouraged to promote the use of Russian during recreational periods, at social functions, and at home. Native languages slowly began to disappear from the curricula of the non-Russian schools. Bilinsky points out that the study of non-Russian languages had already become endangered before "Thesis 19". For example, in Uzbek and the Turkmen SSRs, the indigenous languages were dropped after being re-classified as elective subjects in the Russian schools. Moscow felt these skills were essential for political socialization and the maintenance of a multinational state.¹⁶

Pressure by Moscow to learn Russian continued to mount on Central Asians after 1964. The glorification of Russian that started under Khrushchev continued unabated, even exceeding the earlier years. Russian was often heralded as the language of October and of Lenin.¹⁷ Language conferences, started under Khrushchev, became almost annual

¹⁶Alexander J. Motyl, Will the Non-Russians Rebel? State, Ethnicity, and Stability in the USSR (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1987), 89.; Martha Brill Olcott, "The Politics of Language Reform in Kazakhstan," in Sociolinguistic Perspectives on Soviet National Languages: Their Past, Present and Future, ed. Isabelle Kreindler (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1985), 183-204.

¹⁷Isabelle Kreindler, "Soviet Language Planning since 1953," Language Planning in the Soviet Union, ed. Michael Kirkwood (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 46-63.

events. In 1975, the Central Committee of the CPSU convened a major conference in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, to discuss ways to improve Russian language teaching in the non-Russian republics. In 1978 and 1979, Moscow decreed compulsory Russian language courses in every non-Russian kindergarten and nursery throughout the USSR. This issue was potentially so explosive that the government decided not to publish the new provisions in the Soviet press, and details about it became known to the West only through samizdat material. Again, no provision was made to induce Russians living in Central Asian republics to learn the indigenous languages. In fact, a language conference in Tashkent in 1979 was entitled "The Russian Language--The Language of Friendship and Cooperation of the Peoples in the USSR." Throughout the Brezhnev period, bilingualism was the mainstay of Soviet language policy, with Russian being the lingua franca of the state.

During the 1980s Moscow continued to sponsor major conferences to discuss the issue of expanded Russian language education. In June 1982, a conference was held in Riga to promote language, particularly Russian, as a means of patriotism and education of the state's youth for future military service. In 1983, the Central Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted joint resolutions to improve the teaching of Russian in the non-Russian republics.

The core of Moscow's concerns regarding the Russian language was the unbridled birthrate in the Muslim

republics. Between 1959 and 1979, the Slavic population grew about 19 percent, while the non-Slavic Central Asian population increased almost 100 percent. The 1989 census figures were equally distressing to Moscow. According to some estimates, by the year 2000 every second child born in the Soviet Union would be a Muslim.¹⁸

During his first year in power, Gorbachev made no major statement on the nationalities issue. In 1986, the CPSU again declared the nationality question had been solved. But slowly Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and glasnost began to have an impact in the Central Asian republics.

In Kazakhstan perestroika was significantly influenced by the removal and subsequent degradation of Dinmukhamed Kunaev and the selection of Gennady Kolbin as first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (KCP). Much has been written about the causes and effects of this rearrangement.¹⁹ In the years just before Kunaev's ouster in December 1986, the Kazakhs had become more conscious about their language and their natural and human resources. According to Bilinsky, they acted as if they were the true masters of their republic.²⁰ The Kazakh press carried

¹⁸Ann Sheehy, "Preliminary Results of the All-Union Census Published," Report on the USSR 1 (19 May 1989): 3-5.

¹⁹Martha B. Olcott, "Perestroyka in Kazakhstan," Problems of Communism 39 (July-August 1990): 65-77.; Kuzio, "Nationalist Riots in Kazakhstan," 79-100.

²⁰Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Nationality Issues," in The Gorbachev Generation: Issues in Soviet Domestic Policy, ed. Jane S. Zacek (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 86.

articles that talked of the necessity and importance of native tongue retention and development. This issue became particularly important after the December 1986 riots in Alma-Ata. Shortly thereafter Pravda accused the Kazakh press of fostering the atmosphere that precipitated the riots and of showing excessive concern for the Kazakh language.⁴ Similar to the early Khrushchchev years, articles and letters published in the local press requested the rehabilitation of political and cultural figures.

In reaction to the demonstrations, Kolbin appointed a commission to study the issues of inter-ethnic relations in Kazakhstan and to determine how to improve them. One of the commission's first suggestions was to expand and improve the use of Kazakh in government, education, and public life. In early March 1987, the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers issued a decree "On Improving the Study of the Kazakh Language in the Republic." The resolution was firmly supported by Kolbin, who even declared he would learn the Kazakh language and encouraged others to do so.²¹ With ethnic tensions high and efforts needed to quell nationalist sentiment, it is no surprise that Kolbin's commission emphasized the dismal state of Kazakh language education and use and recommended measures for improvement. In an interview with Krasnaya Zvezda in early 1989, Kolbin said that

while acknowledging the equal right of both Kazakh and Russian to statehood, we believe that special concern

²¹Nahaylo and Swoboda, Soviet Disunion, 269.

should be shown primarily for the language of the people who gave the republic its name. The Kazakh language needs it more today.²²

He added that "real steps" were necessary to assert the "Kazakh language in official business, in public and labor activity, in science and culture," and in other spheres of republic life.

In general, most who favored Kazakh as the sole official language also regarded bilingualism as necessary in Kazakhstan. Writing in Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, Gerald Belger stressed that "salvation lies in bilingualism" and explained that

bilingualism offers tremendous possibilities for overcoming language problems in our society. Here, I will resort to a phrase from Chingiz Aytmatov [Kirghiz poet], who expressed the essence of this idea very precisely: 'We seek a way, not to push ethnic language onto history's roadside, but to join two languages as equals within the bounds of an ethnic region, to cultivate equal respect toward them.'²³

He also argued that there must be conditions "for the flourishing of culture," and that Kazakhs "must patiently and purposefully educate and cultivate ethnic self-awareness."²⁴

The desire to reduce the unequal role of Russian became

²²"Kazakh's Kolbin Interviewed on Interethnic Relations," Krasnaya Zvezda, first edition, 31 March 1989, 1-2, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-SOV-89-064, 5 April 1989, 65-69.

²³"How to Overcome Language Problems. Towards the CPSU Central Committee Plenum: Improving Interethnic Relations," Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 22 January 1989, 3, translated in Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS-UPA-89-023, 13 April 1989, 50-2.

²⁴Ibid., 51.

a principal focus of many Kazakhs. Kazakh was not compulsory in Russian language schools or preschools, although Russian was required in Kazakh schools. Uzbekali Dzhanibekov, a Kazakh party secretary, wrote:

The departure from Leninist principles in national language policy led to a curtailment of the Kazakh language's functions and a drop in the number of Kazakh schools in the republic.²⁵

Its dominating position in vocational and technical schools was "quite incomprehensible" to the Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Public Education, G. Yagodin. In an article in Pravda just before the passage of the Kazakh language law, he stated that

in present-day conditions, the best option for our country is national-Russian or Russian-national bilingualism implemented on a voluntary basis. . . . Representatives of any nationality must have a real opportunity to retain their identity irrespective of which republic they live in and regardless of what percentage of the republic's national composition they constitute. They must have the opportunity to teach their children in any language, whether a national language or Russian.²⁶

Though unstated, this passage appeared to have been directed at Kazakhstan's Russian population.

As Kazakhstan moved closer to state language legislation, opponents lined up to criticize and protest its passage. Some favored an all-union act on language with

²⁵"A Matter For One and All," Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 12 March 1990, 3, translated in JPRS-UPA-90-035, 25 June 1990, 42-46.

²⁶"Meeting Each Other Halfway," Pravda, second edition, 15 August 1989, 3, translated in FBIS-SOV-89-167, 30 August 1989, 72-74.

Russian as the state language,²⁷ while others believed any introduction of state language laws had dangerous, negative implications. According to one Soviet scholar, the creation of a state language "signifies privilege for the race whose language is declared the state language."²⁸ In general, Kazakhstan's ethnic Russians argued against the "disguised coercion" of state languages. One, V. Neverov, favored Russian "solely by the rights of citizens of the USSR." He advocated its use because

I am a Russian; I was born and raised in the Moldavian SSR. I have lived in Kamchatka, graduated from school in an institute in Kirghizia, served in the army in Kazakhstan and worked in the Baltic Republics. And it is not beyond the realm of possibility that I will move again in the future. How many languages am I 'obligated' to study?²⁹

Another, from Alma-Ata, wanted to know in "what language would one send a telegram from Kazakhstan to Latvia?" He also warned against "nationalistic extremists" and their deception and wrote:

Strange for 70 years everything went along normally, everything was fine. Yet now we suddenly have this

²⁷In May 1990 the USSR Supreme Soviet passed an all-union law that for the first time declared Russian the official language. The law also granted equal status to the other languages of the USSR.

²⁸"The Truth About the Laws," Sovetskaya Molodezh, 12 November 1988, 3, translated in JPRS-UPA-89-019, 24 March 1989, 45-47.

²⁹"Polemics: Which language to Speak?" Literaturnaya Gazeta, 13 September 1989, 3, translated in JPRS-UPA-89-060, 15 November 1989, 58-63.

'language malady'? 'Language' is an excuse for well-disguised but militant nationalism.³⁰

Members of other ethnic groups also opposed preferential treatment for the Kazakh language. Natalya Gellert, a CPSU Central Committee member from Kazakhstan, favored Russian as the official state language. Gellert, an ethnic German who married a Kazakh, had learned three languages, but she argued that it was essential to have Russian as the language of instruction because "children cannot go out into the wild world without the Russian language." Gellert also argued that "today when, in many regions, the language problem has become a basis for establishing divisions along ethnic lines, such an approach would reduce tensions."³¹

Some Kazakhs also opposed the legislation. One, a Kazakh engineer living in Alma-Ata, did not see the need for the Kazakh language. He recalled his difficulties learning Russian as an adult to gain education and employment. He and his wife, a Kazakh born and raised in Alma-Ata who learned Russian as a child, decided to have their children educated in a Russian language school. Like Gellert, he believed that education and Russian usage would eliminate ethnic tensions. He wrote:

Nothing is lost by our not speaking Kazakh . . . if all of us together were to go over to the chief device for

³⁰Ibid., 59.

³¹"We Are Building a Family of Peoples," Sovetskaya Rossiya, 23 September 1989, 1, translated in JPRS-UPA-89-062, 1 December 1989, 8-11.

internationality relations--to the language of internationalism--the Russian language, there would be no controversy, and there would be no ethnic tensions.³²

In addition to these arguments, much of the language debate evolved around the inequality that existed between Russians and Kazakhs and of the necessity for a "language of interethnic communication." Nursultan Nazarbayev, who replaced Kolbin in June 1989 as the republic Party First Secretary, recalled his own experience with Russian language inequalities in his first interview as First Secretary:

All state affairs, all political questions, and all our measures are carried out exclusively in Russian. I was at a rayon party conference--with 298 delegates, all Kazakh, and one rayon military commissar, who was Russian--and yet it was conducted in Russian.³³

Despite the inequalities, Russian was the language of a large segment of the population and could not be cast aside. Whether "voluntary" or "coerced", certain aspects of life in Kazakhstan could not be denied. Citing 1979 census figures, R. B. Absattarov, a Kazakh party official, argued:

Some 33 percent of all respondents stated that they spoke Kazakh at home (37.6 percent of the respondents were Kazakhs) . . . 23.3 percent of respondents said they read literature in Kazakh, 92.8 percent in Russian . . . I think that the specific conditions present in our republic call for making both Kazakh and Russian equally-empowered official languages.³⁴

³²"Do We Need the Kazakh Language?" Zerde 2 (February 1989): 6, translated in JPRS-UPA-89-037, 1 June 1989, 90-91.

³³"Kazakh's Nazarbayev Discusses Nationality Issues," Izvestia, morning edition, 26 August 1989, 3, translated in FBIS-SOV-89-171, 6 September 1989, 59-64.

³⁴"High Expectations of Internationalism," Leninshil Zhas, 21 March 1989, 2, translated in JPRS-UPA-89-037, 1 June 1989, 86-90.

The goal, for those who favored Kazakh language legislation, was to create conditions for Kazakh to be used and taught in conjunction with the Russian language. The Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers 1987 resolution recognized the need to upgrade the educational environment in the republic. Measures were taken to create elective courses in Kazakh in the Russian schools. Dictionaries, phrase-books, textbooks, audio cassettes, and other such material were also needed. Calls were even made for the return to the Arabic script.³⁵ Interestingly, in the fall of 1988, a children's publication, Pioner, was made available with Kazakh language instruction in the Arabic script.³⁶

In January 1989, the Kazakh Supreme Soviet Presidium concluded that "study of the Kazakh, Russian, and other languages is in poor shape", a sentiment expressed by Kazakhs and Russians in the republic's press. Kazakhstan-skaya Pravda also reported that "the shortage of textbooks, educational supplies, and manuals for teaching the Kazakh and Russian languages remains acute as before". Publishing in the Kazakh language lagged far behind their growing population. In 1987, generally, less than one-third of the republic's books, brochures, newspapers, and

³⁵Azade-Ayse Rorlich, "The Return of the Arabic Alphabet," Report on the USSR, 1 (5 May 1989): 20-22.

³⁶Erica Dailey, "Update on Alphabet Legislation," Report on the USSR 1 (11 August 1989): 29-31.

magazines were published in Kazakh.³⁷ Perhaps the material that was reportedly being produced failed to reach those responsible for using it. In addition, according to the Kazakhstanskaya Pravda article, the rectorates and the party organizations of most pedagogical institutes failed to train bilingual teachers to meet the needs of the republic.³⁸ Many concluded that language legislation was necessary to produce the desired goal of Kazakh language parity. The resolution issued in 1987 was not achieving the desired effect.

In July 1989, representatives of professional and scientific circles issued an appeal that expressed concern for the future of the Kazakh language and added "that only official status for the Kazakh language can revive it."³⁹ Gerald Belger's dictum that "a language's prestige is not achieved by law, but by its speakers"⁴⁰ would have little chance to succeed unless, according to the intellectuals, drastic measures were taken to upgrade Kazakh language education for Kazakh youth. Writing in Sotsialistik Qazaqstan, A. Garkavets, chief of the Russian Language and

³⁷Olcott, The Kazakhs, 275.

³⁸"Lofty Mission of the VUZ," Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 24 January 1989, 1.

³⁹"Kazakh Figures Issue Appeal to Revive Language," TASS (Alma-Ata) 12 July 1989, translated in FBIS-SOV-89-139, 21 July 1989, 101-2.

⁴⁰"How to Overcome Language Problems," JPRS-UPA-89-023, 50-2.

Sociological Linguistics Division of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences Linguistics Institute, stated that in republican schools there are "2,021,598 children receiving instruction in Russian and only 923,990 in Kazakh."⁴¹ A review of the 1989 census figures reveals that the indigenous population has grown 54.3 percent over the last twenty years, whereas the Russian population has increased only 12.8 percent during the same period.⁴² The obvious imbalance between language of instruction and ethnic Kazakh juvenile population growth only intensified the movement to legislate the protection, expansion, and use of the Kazakh language.

The "Draft Law of the Kazakh SSR on Languages" was published on 22 August 1989 in Kazakhstanskaya Pravda.⁴³ In September, a new version appeared in the same newspaper. The original draft had placed Russian on "equal footing" with Kazakh, but the final version "guaranteed the free functioning of the Russian language on the same level as the state language." It continued to maintain the Kazakh

⁴¹"Putting the Law to Work," Sotsialistik Qazaqstan, 4 February 1990, 3, translated in JPRS-UPA-90-024, 8 May 1990, 52-53.

⁴²Bess Brown, "Kazakhs Now Largest National Group in Kazakhstan," Report on the USSR 2 (19 May 1990): 18-19.

⁴³"Draft Law of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic on Language," Kazakhstan Pravda, 22 August 1989, 1, translated in JPRS-UPA-89-063, 5 December 1989, 10-13.; see also "Law of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic on Languages in the Kazakh SSR," Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 28 September 1989, 1, translated in JPRS-UPA-90-009, 23 February 1990, 15-16.

language as the state language and expressed "concern for active use of the language in government organs and public organizations, institutions of national education, culture and science, in the spheres of service, mass information and other areas." Kazakh was made mandatory in "general education schools, vocational technical schools, mid-level special, and higher educational institutions" curricula.

Article 22 allowed "equal functioning" of the Kazakh and Russian languages in the "sphere of culture and mass information." It also created "conditions for the active use in these spheres of the languages of the peoples and national groups in the places of their densest habitation." No figures were provided to define "densest habitation", but a decree of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, issued three days after the law's passage, provided some indication:

It is also necessary to create conditions for conducting business in the Kazakh language in rayons and cities, where the portion of the population comprised by the Kazakh nationality reaches 70 percent or more in 1989-1990; 50-69 percent in 1991-1992; less than 50 percent in 1993-1994.⁴⁴

Based on the 1989 census figures, Kazakh would fail to be used in business the majority of urban locations at least until 1993.

Article 26, one of the more interesting provisions in the new legislation, aimed to promote the "traditional

⁴⁴"In the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers," Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 25 August 1989, 1, translated in JPRS-UPA-89-061, 30 November 1989, 49-52.

Kazakh written language, based on Arab script, towards scientific goals." This was similar to Article 24 of the Uzbek language law which "encourage[d] all citizens" to learn the ancient Uzbek script, which is based on the Arabic script.⁴⁵ The Kirghiz language law also sought to create conditions for those wishing to study the "Arabic and Latin scripts."⁴⁶

Despite the new legislation, the issue continued to be questioned and debated. One month after the law's passage, Sotsialistik Qazaqstan published a "symposium" of letters, interviews and short articles on the law and the public's reaction to it, entitled "Fate of a Language, Fate of a People." There was "tremendous reader interest" in the issue, which centered on three major points: 1) the law was necessary and "long overdue," 2) Russian should continue to be the language of "interethnic communication," and 3) the educational system must make a "tremendous" effort to teach Kazakh to all.⁴⁷ Shortly thereafter, the same newspaper published an interview with Sultan Sartayev, department chair of the Kazakh State University Legal Faculty and former chairman of the Commission on the Official Language

⁴⁵"Draft Law on Language in Uzbekistan," Central Asia and Caucasus Chronicle 8 (November 1989): 3-7.

⁴⁶"Draft Law on the Kirghiz State Language," Central Asia and Caucasus Chronicle 9 (January 1990): 14-15.

⁴⁷"Fate of a Language, Fate of a People," Sotsialistik Qazaqstan, 20 September 1989, 3, translated in JPRS-UPA-90-001, 9 January 1990, 46.

Question of the Ideological Division of the Central Committee of the Kazakhstan Communist Party. He defended the new legislation because

preference to Kazakh as the official language of the republic was not any prejudice against Russian, or Russian culture, but the recognition that equal status in theory for Russian and Kazakh in the past has simply not worked.⁴⁸

Sartayev lamented the fact that many Kazakhs, "particularly the young," do not know their mother tongue well and are therefore losing their identity and culture.⁴⁹

During the period between the law's passage and 1 July 1990, when it became law, reaction and compliance varied. In an article in Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, Uzbekali Dzhanibekov reported that 83 schools and 290 kindergartens were opened and 700 Kazakh classes in mixed schools started. He warned, however, against "tossing our caps in the air" at apparent gains. The language law that provided for bilingualism had not "yet been considered" by state ministries. In addition, they were "strangely indifferent" to providing the necessary means to ensure successful implementation of the law. Only the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences had created a simultaneous translation system.⁵⁰

⁴⁸"The law Has Been Approved, What Must We Do Now?" Sotsialistik Qazaqstan, 12 October 1989, 3-4, translated in JPRS-UPA-90-001, 9 January 1990, 47.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰"A Matter for One and All," Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 12 March 1990, 3, translated in JPRS-UPA-90-035, 25 June 1990, 42-46.

Kazakhstanskaya Pravda subsequently admonished public officials to learn "the languages which are not their native," and asked the republic citizenry to "be more patient" with this complex issue. The editorial writer continued:

We have killed so many good undertakings already with our impatience, desire to accelerate various social processes, haste and, in the case of administrators, desire to promptly report on efforts undertaken. Let us not rush. Social processes must develop naturally.⁵¹

Six months after the law's passage the Kazakh SSR Supreme Court Plenum examined the practice of applying the law to legal proceedings. It concluded that violations still occurred and that in certain regions of the republic the "sphere of use of the state language is unjustifiably restricted." The Plenum's report blamed this on the "judicial examiners' insufficient level of knowledge of the language of the populace, or by their preference for a language that is more convenient for them."⁵²

Despite the language law, ethnic tensions continued to disturb the republican leadership. Clearly one of the most controversial and ethnically divisive issues was Alexander Solzhenitsyn's program for a new Russia, which claimed

⁵¹"The Soul of the Nationality: Legal Basis for the Use of Languages," Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 4 October 1989, 1, translated in JPRS-UPA-89-066, 12 December 1989, 30-31.

⁵²"Kazakh SSR Supreme Court Plenum," Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 29 December 1989, 2.

certain regions of Kazakhstan as historically Russian.⁵³ Sensing an opportunity to express their grievances, Russian national groups in Alma-Ata and elsewhere rallied behind the program. Boris Yeltsin exacerbated the issue when, shortly after the failed coup in August 1991, he stated the need for an examination of Russian-Kazakh borders. However, an agreement reached between the two republics guaranteed the present borders.

Valentin Petrov commented in Sovetskaya Molodezh on the rise of ethnic tensions and the effect on the republic's youth:

Right now schools are being established in the republic with instruction in the medium of the Kazakh language. Where space is not available, in Alma-Ata, for example, existing school buildings are being partitioned into Russian and Kazakh sections, and a chain-link fence runs down the middle of the playground. It will be tragic if the children of these different nationalities, reared behind fences and bars, cannot surmount the wall of distrust.⁵⁴

Kazakhstan witnessed an increased interest in the republic's cultural heterogeneity in the Gorbachev era. Under the historical development of the Soviet system, linguistic inequalities developed in every part of Kazakh society. Kazakhstan became the first republic to develop a

⁵³See Charles Carlson, "Kazakhs Refute Russian Territorial Claims," Report on the USSR 2 (10 August 1990): 18-20; Bess Brown, "Kazakhs Protest Against Solzhenitsyn's Proposal for 'A New Russia,'" Report on the USSR 2 (5 October 1990): 19-20.

⁵⁴"Kazakhstan: The Storm Approaches," Sovetskaya Molodezh, 19 December 1990, 5, translated in JPRS-UPA-91-009, 12 February 1991, 46-47.

language program ostensibly to further the interests of the Kazakh people and to quell the tension sparked by the removal of Kunayev.

After the riots in Alma-Ata in December 1986 language became the key to alerting the public to the inequalities between the eponymous populations and ethnic Russians. In the Gorbachev era, nationalism, through the promotion of national languages and other religious and cultural distinctions, sought to define a peoples' national uniqueness. Kazakhstan, once the pride of Soviet nationality policy, was the first to undergo the riots and ethnic tensions of the Gorbachev era. Seeking answers and solutions, a commission created by Gennady Kolbin stressed the need to "improve" the role of the Kazakh language. The ensuing debate centered on the role of the Russian language. Some argued that continued use of Russian would ease ethnic tensions. Others agreed that while Russian had to occupy a prominent place, Kazakh deserved a greater role because of the ethnic composition of the republic. The August 1989 language law guaranteed the use of Kazakh language in all aspects of republican life, but it also acknowledged Russian as an equal.

CHAPTER IV

Transitional Politics: Informal Groups and Alternative Parties in Soviet Kazakhstan, 1988-91

During the Gorbachev era, one of the most dramatic by-products of the General Secretary's policies was the creation of numerous alternative political parties and informal groups throughout Kazakhstan, and elsewhere in the USSR. It was in the latter half of 1988 that the informal groups started to appear throughout the republic. Indeed, according to an article in the Kazakh-language newspaper Sotsialistik Kazakhstan, by late November 1988 as many as 60 to 70 groups, usually referred to as "unofficial," existed in Alma-Ata.¹ Those with a cultural or environmental focus were readily accepted by the public and the government. But groups with a declared political agenda were often shunned or criticized by the communist party leadership. President Nursultan Nazarbayev who, according to some polls, enjoyed considerable popularity among the republic's Russians and Kazakhs,² was originally reluctant to encourage political groups and had on several occasions been highly critical of

¹"Focus on Kazakhstan." Central Asia and Caucasus Chronicle 8 (May 1989): 10.

²James Critchlow, "Kazakhstan: The Outlook for Ethnic Relations." RFE/RL Research Report 1 (31 January 1992): 34-39.

many groups, even referring to the Alash party as fascist.³ Initially perhaps he saw them as ethnically divisive, particularly since most formed along national lines. But Nazarbayev later recognized the importance of popular participation for the republic's evolution, both politically and economically, and after resigning from the Communist Party in September 1991, he remained politically uncommitted.⁴

On 14 April 1989, in an effort to put the "formation and activities" of informal groups on a more "orderly basis," the presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet decreed procedures for forming "Unsponsored Associations."⁵ All associations, which included those formed by individuals, cultural or sports organizations, schools, homes and palaces of youth, libraries, trade and professional unions, etc., must have at least ten members of "legal age" to register. Groups that formed before the decree was issued also had to register within one month. An association could be terminated if its activity contradicted the Soviet or Kazakh Constitutions or other legislative acts

³Ibid., 34.

⁴After the KCP was dissolved in September 1991, Nazarbaev refused to join the new socialist party, saying that he must be president of "all the people." See James Critchlow, "Kazakhstan and Nazarbaev: Political Prospects." RFE/RL Research Report 1 (17 January 1992): 33.

⁵Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 16 April 1989, 1, translated in JPRS-UPA-89-039, 12 June 1989, 1-2.

of the USSR or Kazakh SSR. Also, most interestingly, termination was possible if the group contradicted its own statute, or "if the entity where the association [was] based is liquidated."⁶ The decree does not state who makes the decision as to whether or not a group has contradicted its own statute.

In 1990 the Congress of People's Deputies abolished Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, which had guaranteed the party's monopoly on power. The goal of republic sovereignty gave many of the alternative political parties a consolidating opposition, namely the CPSU which was committed to preservation of the union.

As of January 1992 there were well over one hundred such groups recognized throughout Kazakhstan,⁷ although they seem not to have proliferated like similar organizations in the Russian Republic.⁸ The associations discussed in this survey were only a fraction of the numerous groups that existed in Kazakhstan at the end of 1991 and, except for the Socialist party, were very small with memberships usually numbering less than two-hundred.⁹ Many of these groups

⁶Ibid., 2.

⁷Critchlow, "Kazakhstan and Nazarbaev," 33.

⁸Vera Tolz, "Proliferation of Political Parties in the RSFSR," Report on the USSR 3 (4 January 1991): 10-12.

⁹Those I have selected for discussion provide a fair representation of Kazakhstan's diverse political environment at the end of 1991. Selection was indeed difficult as some of the groups may have ceased to exist or may have changed their original program. In addition, the Kazakh press often

started out as single issue movements. Some, such as "The Kazakh Language Society" [*Qazaq tili qoghamy*],¹⁰ remained that way, whereas others, such as the "December National-Democracy Party" [*Zheltoqsan ultyq-demokratiiyalyq partiiasy*], moved beyond their original goals and encompassed a variegated political agenda. One of the associations, the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk Antinuclear Testing Mass Movement" [*Nevada-Semipalatinsk Yadrolyq Synaqqa Qarsy Khalyqtyq Qozghalysy*], received international attention. The vast majority such as "Unity" [*Birlik*], a union of students organized to fight teenagers who "behave as ruffians,"¹¹ or "Foal" [*Kulym*], which was created to defend children's nutrition in Kazakhstan,¹² were unknown outside the republic. Still others incorporated international agendas, such as the "Alma-Ata Helsinki Committee" [*Alma-Atinskii Khel'sinskii Komitet*] and "Doctors of the World

reported the joining of many associations without providing the reader with the names of the member organizations or other pertinent information. Moreover, many groups were "here today, gone tomorrow," or simply changed their names. Those groups I have selected appear to have had a relatively permanent foundation or had achieved an influential position in the republic.

¹⁰The Kazakh translation is given when available.

¹¹M.K. Kozybaev, "The Political Landscape of Present-Day Kazakhstan." Newsletter of the Association for Central Asian Studies 6 (Spring 1991): 2.

¹²Ibid.

Against Nuclear Wars" [*Vrachi Mira Protiv Yadernoi Voyny*].¹³

Kazakhstan's unofficial associations had traits similar to those found in other republics. People's fronts received the greatest amount of press coverage, both in the West and the former Soviet Union. For example, *Sajudis*, the Lithuanian movement, was perhaps the best known. The declared goal of these groups was often to achieve recognition of their republic's sovereignty and the establishment of independent states. Several groups in Kazakhstan had these aims, including the "Alma-Ata People's Front," the "December" group, and the "Alash" party.¹⁴

Several different groups were distinguished by their national-cultural characteristics. These groups were often formed by individuals with an interest in the national uniqueness. They hoped to revitalize and develop their national culture and pursue the growth of their people's ethnic self-awareness. Examples include the aforementioned "Kazakh Language Society," the "Kazakhstan Society of Local Historians" [*Qazaqstan olketanshylyar qoghamy*], the "Fertile Land Historical-Ethnographic Union" [*Zheruyyq Tarikhi-*

¹³V. Ponomarev, Samodeyatel'nye Obshchestvennye Organizatsii Kazakhstana i Kirgizii 1987-1991, (Moscow, 1991): 65.

¹⁴"Alash" was the name of the legendary founder of the Kazakh people, whose three sons each established one of the three Kazakh hordes. The first Kazakh political party and autonomous Kazakh government (1917) were named Alash Orda, the Horde of Alash.

ethnografiyalyq birlestigi], and the "Truth History-Education Society" [*Aqiqat tarikhi-aghartu qoghamy*]. A group's agenda was often identified by its name, for example, the "Union of Kazakhstan Muslim Women" [*Qazaqstan musulman ayyeldri odaghy*]. The program of this group, organized on 7 April 1990 called for the alleviation of

dangers posed to the lives of mothers and children by negative ecological, economic and socio-political conditions from which [the] republic is suffering, and becoming an intermediary for life.¹⁵

Another aspect of the cultural revival in Kazakhstan was the role of Islam. Islam was growing in influence in Kazakhstan, although not to the degree experienced by Kazakhstan's neighboring states.¹⁶ On 12 January 1990 the Council for Religious Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers created the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan. Ratbek Hajji Nysanbay-Uly was elected its first mufti. In an interview with Kazakhstan's Russian-language youth magazine he reported that from 1985 to 1990 mosques in Kazakhstan had increased from twenty-five to sixty. In addition, he said that the republic had about 600 mullahs. He also proposed the creation of a medresseh in Alma-Ata to

¹⁵Zhusipbek Qorghasbekov, "The Supporter, Glasnost, the Helper, Democracy." *Qazaq Adebiyeti*, 28 December 1990, 13, translated in JPRS-UPA-91-028, 23 May 1991, 32.

¹⁶Historically the Kazakh people have been the least Islamicized of the USSR's muslim population, although they have traditionally practiced certain rituals, such as circumcision, death and marriage rites.

train the republic's Islamic students.¹⁷ Although the mufti was an elected member to the republic Supreme Soviet, there did not appear to be any formal Islamic party in Kazakhstan similar to those that appeared in Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. In the city of Chimkent two small religious groups had registered with the government, "Warriors of Islam" [*Voiny Islama*] and the "Union of Islamic Youths" [*Soyuz Islamskoi Molodezhi*].¹⁸ In February 1991 TASS reported that young men had begun studies at an Islamic institute in Alma-Ata. It also noted that the number of mosques in Kazakhstan had grown to nearly 150, with another twenty under construction.¹⁹

Charitable and social assistance groups also appeared. Two of the informal organizations were the "New Home Social and Residential Housing Group" [*Shangyraq alewmettik-turghyn uy kesheni*] and the "Golden Cradle National Ethnographic Center" [*Altyn beik ulttyq-ethnografiyalyq ortal-yghi*]. "New Home" was founded in June 1990 with declared aim to aid Kazakh young people who were without housing or employment. "Golden Cradle" was founded in November 1990. The group proposed to assist homeless young workers and "representatives of the intelligentsia." In addition it

¹⁷Paul Goble, "The New Mufti of Alma-Ata." Report on the USSR 2 (22 June 1990): 20-21.

¹⁸ Ponomarev, Organizatsii Kazakhstana, 76-77.

¹⁹Report on the USSR 3 (8 February 1991): 45.

obtained a "piece of land" outside of Alma-Ata where it hoped to build a mosque, schools, and playgrounds for national sports competitions, and a children's house. It claimed to have more than two-hundred members.²⁰

Environmental issues acquired significance in Kazakhstan. The degradation of the Aral Sea and its surrounding lands was perhaps unparalleled in the world. Environmental groups, or "Greens" as they became known, were the most influential in the republic. Some, such as "Green Rescue" [*Zelehoe Spasenie*] and "Green Front" [*Zelenyi Front*], were small and failed to attract a strong following.²¹ Two of the more popular and well-known were "The Kazakhstan Social Committee for Ecology and the Aral and Balkhash Problems" [*Qazaqstan ekologiyasy zhane Aral, Balqash problemalary zhonindegi Qoghamdyq komitet*] and "Nevada-Semipalatinsk."

The "Kazakhstan Social Committee for Ecology" was formed in November 1987 by USSR people's deputy Mukhtar Shakhanov. The principal goals of the group were to improve "ecological conditions within republic territories, save the Aral and Lake Balkhash from disaster, and show humanitarian concern for the local people of those regions." It also proposed convening a multiple thematic international conference entitled "20th Century, Poetry, the World and

²⁰Qorghasbekov, "The Supporter," Qazaq Adebiiyeti, 32.

²¹Ponomarev, Organizatsii Kazakhstana, 37.

Ecology."²²

Without question, the most influential organization in Kazakhstan was the anti-nuclear movement "Nevada-Semipalatinsk." It was registered in late February 1989 in Alma-Ata in the wake of reports of radiation leaks at the site. The Semipalatinsk test site was the Soviet Union's primary testing range. From 1949 to 1991 over five-hundred tests were conducted there. The movement may have gained additional support due to the awareness and concern over the Chernobyl nuclear accident two years earlier.²³ The group attracted worldwide attention and successfully created a diverse coalition, including schools, trade and professional unions, and united both Kazakhs and Russians against the testing of weapons in the republic. One example of their influence and diversity came in April 1990 when the Kazakh Miners' Union, as an act of unity, decided to call a nationwide two-hour strike after the next test and a day-long strike after the following one.²⁴ There was no doubt that the site was dangerous to public health. One Soviet doctor told an antinuclear congress of Swedish doctors that between 1949 and 1963 the atmospheric tests were responsible for afflicting one million people with cancer, leukemia, and

²²Qorghasbekov, "The Supporter," Qazaq Adebieti, 31.

²³Bess Brown, "The Strength of Kazakhstan's Antinuclear Lobby." Report on the USSR 3 (25 January 1991): 23-24.

²⁴Report on the USSR 2 (27 April 1990): 36.

other related diseases.²⁵

"Nevada-Semipalatinsk" was also very successful in organizing large, vocal demonstrations. On 27 May 1990 TASS reported that thousands of people took part in a demonstration sponsored by "Nevada" near the test site, at which time a foundation stone was laid for a monument to the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Branches opened in several regions of the republic, and it sponsored at least two publications, *Amanat* and *Izbiratel*. The leader of the movement was Olzhas Suleymanov, noted poet, first secretary of the Kazakhstan Writers' Union and former USSR people's deputy. Its greatest success occurred on 29 August 1991 when Nazarbayev signed a decree permanently closing the Semipalatinsk test site. This was the culmination of two years of extensive organizational work. "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" had already begun to diversify its interests and deal with other environmental issues so as not to be identified with only the nuclear question. The organization continued to campaign for compensation to residents in the affected oblasts of Semipalatinsk, Pavlodar, and Karaganda.²⁶

As accepted as environmental and cultural associations had become, it was Kazakhstan's, indeed the entire union's, slide towards political pluralism that generated enthusiasm

²⁵Report on the USSR 2 (9 November 1990): 38.

²⁶Bess Brown, "Semipalatinsk Test Site Finally Closed." Report on the USSR 3 (13 September 1991): 15-16.

and concern among Kazakhstan's population. Gorbachev's troika of policies-- perestroika, glasnost, and democratization--fed the rise of the multi-party system. Several different parties had been born, some with pro-Kazakh, anti-Russian programs, and others that accepted the republic's multi-ethnic character as a reality that was not likely to change in the near future. Kazakh intellectuals attempted to balance between national self-assertion and ingenuous nationalism, a charge many wished to avoid. Many groups came under sharp criticism from the government for their blatant national programs and statements. In January 1989 Gennadi Kolbin, while still Kazakhstan Party First Secretary, said,

People's pride in their talent and their nation is a quality which ought to belong to every people, great or small . . . but we must not tolerate it turning into nationalism or elevated demands for one's own nation in particular.²⁷

Many groups adopted platforms that embraced nationalist goals. Among them were the "Alma-Ata People's Front," the "Democratic Union," the "All-Union Socio-Political Club," "The Liberation Civil Movement" [Azat Azamattyq Qozghalysy], the "December National-Democracy Party" [Zheltoqsan ultyq-demokratyalyq partiyasy], and "Alash." One group, "Kazakh Wrath," [Kazak Kaxapy] issued a pamphlet that urged Kazakhs to unite against Russians, who it argued had "captured

²⁷"Focus on Kazakhstan." Central Asia and Caucasus Chronicle 8 (May 1989): 10.

Kazakhstan and converted it into a colony."²⁸ The objective of many of these groups was the development of the Kazakh nation through language and culture. They also sought political independence, an idea that ran counter to the KCP plans.²⁹

The "December" group, founded in May 1989, became very active in efforts to have the government reevaluate the December 1986 riots in Alma-Ata and exonerate those who were punished. In May 1990 it declared itself a political party, with membership estimated at three-hundred and branches in Chimkent, Tselinograd, and Pavlodar.³⁰

The "Liberation" movement was founded on 1 July 1990. Its leaders declared themselves to be opposed to divisions based on national, racial, and social considerations.³¹ In a statement to Kazakhstanskaya Pravda in December 1990, co-chairman Sabetqazy Aqatyev stated that the organization advocated an independent, national-democratic state in Kazakhstan. He also claimed 120,000 members with divisions in nine oblasts, the Russian republic, and Mongolia.

²⁸Ponomarev, Organizatsii Kazakhstana, 38.

²⁹It was only after the failed August 1991 coup attempt that President Nursultan Nazarbaev moved away from the idea of an All-Union treaty. Prior to August, Nazarbaev had been one of the staunchest supporters of the treaty.

³⁰Qorghasbekov, "The Supporter," Qazaq Adebiiyeti, 31.

³¹Bess Brown, "New Political Parties in Kazakhstan." Report on the USSR 2 (31 August 1990): 10.

Agatyev argued that the term nationalist was unfair and that it was "impossible not to think nationalistically under conditions of ethnic tensions."³²

Many in Kazakhstan were deeply concerned with the rise in ethnic tensions and the possible negative influence of the informal groups. In an interview with Kazakhstanskaya Pravda in July 1990, Myrzatai Dzholdasbekov, a member of the Presidential Council and head of the KCP Central Committee's ideological department, praised the goals of cultural and environmental groups but expressed serious concerns about groups with political aspirations. He singled out "Alash" and "December" as having negative influences. He liked "Liberation" but had reservations about their program which called for the creation of local military formations and the relocation of residents of the Aral sea region. He charged "December" with being too pro-Kazakh and anti-Russian. Because of its obvious nationalist connotations, the title "Alash," was, according to Dzholdasbekov, inappropriate for a contemporary party.³³

The most powerful political group in Kazakhstan was still the former Communist Party, although it may not have been the most influential. In the rarefied air of change, it was not unaffected by the move towards political

³²Qorghasbekov, "The Supporter," Qazaq Adebieti, 31.

³³Brown, "New Political Parties in Kazakhstan," 10.

pluralism. For example, on 11 October 1990 thirty Kazakh SSR people's deputies organized the "Democratic Kazakhstan Deputy Group." They expressed "serious concern with the economic and sociopolitical situation that has developed in the country and the republic."³⁴ One of the group's goals was the "withering away of the Kazakh CP via the de-politicization (de-partyization) of . . . executive and judicial power."³⁵ The deputies expressed their fear that the Communist Party would use the republic's declaration of sovereignty to preserve and strengthen its power, although they do not say how.

After the failed coup attempt, Kazakhstan's Communist Party was summarily dissolved. In early September 1991 the 760,000 member party held its last congress in Alma-Ata. It resolved to leave the CPSU and form its own independent political organization. It was renamed the "Socialist Party of Kazakhstan" and was considered the successor to the KCP.

Not all informal groups in Kazakhstan were ethnically Kazakh. In September 1990 a report from Alma-Ata said that a group of the republic's Russians had formed an organization called "Intermovement" to represent their interests. Their primary goal was to counteract the

³⁴"Political Guarantees to Democracy! The Declaration of the 'Democratic Kazakhstan' Deputy Group," Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 11 October 1990, 4, translated in JPRS-UPA-90-071, 30 December 1990, 44-45.

³⁵Ibid.

numerous Kazakh groups favoring Kazakh sovereignty. Another non-Kazakh group was *Yedinstvo* [Unity], a Soviet political group headed by Nina Andreeva, a Leningrad teacher and author of the 1988 anti-perestroika manifesto. It was registered in Alma-Ata. The co-chairman, Yu. Bunakov, an engineer at the Alma-Ata Giprottrans Institute, claimed to have forty other enterprises "under Union-type administration" join this movement. He said that "they were impelled to band together because they did not wish to become victims of violence or force; they also wanted to struggle for peace within [Kazakhstan]." ³⁶ He also said they did not have any particular reasons for taking action, and therefore the cause had not proceeded any further than "expressing objections in written protests." ³⁷ In addition, a "Cossacks' Movement" was created in Kazakhstan. It took the form of a struggle for class privileges and advocated the separation of the western and northern regions of the republic into independent territories. ³⁸ Some, such as the

³⁶Almira Kozhakmetova and Yuri Kirinitsiyanov, "Nazarbaev Convincing," Rabochaya Tribuna (27 April 1991): 1-3, translated in JPRS-UPA-91-026, 16 May 1991, 61.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Kozybaev, "Political Landscape of Present-Day Kazakhstan," 2. One of the more ethnically divisive issues in Kazakhstan has been the integrity of the borders between Kazakhstan and Russia. In September 1990 Alexander Solzhenitsyn published an article in two of the Soviet Union's more popular papers called "How shall We Reconstitute Russia?" In it he argued that the northern regions of Kazakhstan were historically Russian and should be retroceded. This infuriated Kazakhs, who characterized the claims as historically inaccurate. See Charles Carlson,

"Social Democratic Party of Kazakhstan," claimed to have a membership composed of various nationalities. Sergei Duvanov, chairman of the "Social Democrats," was quite proud of the fact that his party had some 200 active members from many different ethnic groups.³⁹

Other ethnic groups also formed informal associations. In July 1989 the Alma-Ata City Soviet Executive Committee granted official status to Uighur, Korean, German, Jewish, Greek and Tatar organizations. Each group set up national centers with its own "council, program, charter, and bank account."⁴⁰ The aim of each center, which were reportedly created on a voluntary basis, was to promote the preservation and development of national cultures. This was to be accomplished by creating reading rooms, exhibits on their people's histories and cultures, publishing in the native languages, and opening ethnic food establishments and folk craft stores. In addition, newspapers, television, and radio programs were created in languages other than Kazakh or Russian.

In October 1991 in Alma-Ata an event significant for Kazakhstan's political pluralism occurred: The "People's [or

"Kazakhs Refute Russian Territorial Claims." Report on the USSR 2 (10 August 1990): 18-20.

³⁹Critchlow, "Kazakhstan and Nazarbaev," 33.

⁴⁰E. Matskevich. "National Centers Set Up." Izvestia (24 July 1989): 3, translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 41 (no. 30, 1989): 33.

Popular] Congress of Kazakhstan" held its first constituent assembly. The environmental leaders Suleymanov and Shakhanov were elected co-chairmen. Also present was Nazarbayev, who had been noticeably absent from the Socialist party congress, and members of many of the republic's informals groups and political parties, including representatives from *Yedinstvo*. The goals of this new organization were to find a mechanism to consolidate the republic's multi-ethnic population and to prevent the "Socialists" from emerging as the ruling party. Existing parties were allowed to join the "People's Congress" and retain their name and program. Those factions could run their own candidates while remaining in the coalition. The new party hoped to participate in the 1993 legislative elections. Of concern for many at the assembly was the disparity in the number of Kazakhs to Russians.

After 1988 informal groups and alternative political parties took their place alongside the once all-powerful Communist Party and moved Kazakhstan to a new level of political maturity. Few groups other than the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" movement have achieved recognition outside of Kazakhstan's borders. Compared to other republics of the former Soviet Union, Kazakhstan's political atmosphere was relatively calm, although ethnic tensions appeared to be festering just below the surface, ready to erupt as the various parties vied for power. Kazakhstan's leaders faced a difficult period on the road to economic and political

independence. Parties such as *Alash*, "December," and "Liberation" embraced cultural and linguistic divisions and appealed to Kazakh heritage and thereby forced a re-examination of the relationship between Russians and Kazakhs. Until the formation in October 1991 of the "People's Congress," attempts to form multiethnic parties had very little success. The only true unifying force for the republic's multiethnic population were environmental issues.

CHAPTER V

Conclusion

The nationalism that was expressed by Kazakhs in the Gorbachev era was a resumption of the nationalism that was suspended or suppressed during seventy years of Soviet rule. Hans Kohn's factors of nationalism--common descent, language, territory, political entity, customs and traditions, and religion--were all manifested, albeit to varying degrees. Issues, such as language equality, land, and democratic self-determination, once championed by Kazakh nationalists Ahmed Baitursunov and Ali Khan Bukeikhanov, again found a voice.

The first 21 months of Gorbachev's General Secretaryship provided few tangible, or effective, changes to Kazakhstan. The December 1986 demonstration in Alma-Ata irreparably altered ethnic relations in the republic and had repercussions that directly influenced the implementation of perestroika, glasnost, and democratization, not only in Kazakhstan but throughout the whole Soviet Union. The riots clearly demonstrated that the nationality question had not been solved. It also exposed the enormous fear and trepidation that most Soviet officials would exhibit towards reform. Despite glasnost, the central and republican

leadership responded to the demonstration with predictable rhetoric.

The effects of December 1986 continued to be felt long after the event. In October 1991 a large crowd in Alma-Ata demonstrated in front of the Kazakh parliament against popular President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Copies of a book written by him, Neither Left Nor Right, were symbolically destroyed by the protesters. In the book he claimed that in 1986 he had "headed one of the columns of demonstrators."¹ The protesters claimed he had actively participated in the "crushing of youth demonstrations."

Language, which was a matter of concern before the 1917 revolutions, was identified shortly after the 1986 demonstration as a contentious subject between Kazakhs and Russians. Thereafter, the issue received significant, although retarded, attention in the Kazakh parliament and press. The solution was to legislate the function and protection of the Kazakh language within the republic.

In 1990 the Congress of People's Deputies abolished Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, which had guaranteed the party's monopoly on power. One year earlier Kazakhstan began requiring all organizations to register with the government, including environmental, social, political, and charitable groups. The goal of republic sovereignty gave

¹"Anti-Nazarbayev Demonstration Held in Alma-Ata," translated from Moscow Russian Television Network in FBIS-SOV-91-209, 29 October 1991, 73.

organizations with a political agenda a consolidating opposition, namely the CPSU which was committed to preservation of the union.

Clearly the most influential groups were "Nevada-Semipalitinsk" and other environmental organizations. The Communist Party, while remaining the most powerful, lost much of its strength after the failed coup attempt. In September 1991 it changed its name and reconstituted itself as the "Socialist Party of Kazakhstan" and was considered the successor to the KCP.

In less than seven years the USSR dissolved and unlike the conflict in Yugoslavia, or the war between the former Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Kazakh nationalism did not produce an untenable condition. Nazarbayev managed to assure most non-Kazakhs that their rights as citizens of Kazakhstan would not be violated.

Relations between Russians and Kazakhs have for centuries been tense and sometimes violent. Kazakhs had to endure the humiliation and repressive effects of colonization in both the Tsarist and Soviet periods. Ironically, the decision to create a federal system based on ethno-territorial units encouraged the formative process of nationalism in which the republics became repositories of national traditions, languages, cultures, and religions. The Gorbachev reforms clearly generated unexpected responses, which were often a result of official timorousness. In addition, the Soviet leadership,

doubtlessly bolstered by past Soviet rhetoric, underestimated the scope and potential explosiveness of their actions. As the Soviet Union eroded, the 15 new separate states remained coupled together by archaic transportation, communication, economic, and military systems. Kazakhstan, with its over 100 national groups living within its borders, managed to remain the most stable of the USSR's former republics.

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APPENDIX A

Kazakh SSR Draft Law on Language

[Text] Language is a nation's greatest property and inalienable symbol. Inescapably bound to the development of a language and the broadening of its social functions are the flowering of a national culture and the future of the nation itself as a historically formed stable community of people.

Guided by the Leninist principles of political self-determination, the equality of nations and the free development of languages and culture, with the goals of improving inter-nationality relations and strengthening friendship and cooperation between the peoples, nationalities and national groups that live in the Kazakh SSR, this Law establishes the legal bases for the functioning and development of languages in the republic.

The Kazakh SSR assures legal guarantees and a respectful attitude towards all the languages that are used in the republic, and protects the inalienable right of citizens of any nationality to the development of their language and culture.

Section I. General Statutes

Article 1. The state language of the Kazakh SSR is the Kazakh language.

The Kazakh SSR provides government protection for the Kazakh language and expresses its concern for active use of the language in government organs and public organizations, institutions of national education, culture and science, in the spheres of service, mass information and other areas.

Article 2. The Russian language will be the language of inter-ethnic communication in the Kazakh SSR. The Kazakh SSR will guarantee the free functioning of the Russian language on the same level as the state language.

A knowledge of the Russian language will correspond to the vital interests of members of all nationalities in the republic.

Article 3. The status of the Kazakh language as the state language and the status of the Russian language as the language of inter-nationality communication do not impede the use and development of the languages of national groups living on the territory of the Kazakh SSR.

Article 4. In areas densely populated by the other national groups of the Kazakh SSR, their languages may be given, through the established procedure and by decision of the appropriate Soviet of People's Deputies, the status of local official language.

The local official language is utilized on an equal footing with the state language and the language of interethnic communication.

Article 5. The Kazakh SSR expresses the government's concern for the comprehensive development of national-Russian and Russian-national bilingualism and multilingualism.

Article 6. The present Law does not regulate the use of languages in interpersonal relations, in military [indistinct], in institutions of military type, or in religious communities.

Article 7. The Kazakh SSR, in determining the status and procedure for the application of languages in the republic, guarantees all citizens equal freedom in the choice of a language for public activity and equal protection for the national dignity of every person, regardless of his choice of language for vital activities.

Citizens' enjoyment of rights and freedoms in the area of language must not harm the interests of society and the government or the rights of other citizens.

Section II. The Functioning of Languages in Organs of Government Authority and Administration, in Public Organizations and at Enterprises

Article 8. The work language of the organs of government authority and administration, the law enforcement organs, public organizations and enterprises of Kazakh SSR is the Kazakh language, the Russian language, and the languages of national groups.

Article 9. Acts of republican organs of government authority and administration are made in the Kazakh and Russian languages.

Acts of local organs of authority and administration can be made in the Kazakh, Russian and local official languages

depending on the language customarily used in legal proceedings in the region.

Article 10. The language of the domestic business correspondence of enterprises, institutions and organizations is the Kazakh, Russian and local official language.

Article 11. Accounting and statistical, financial and technical documentation in the Kazakh SSR is conducted in the Kazakh and Russian languages.

Article 12. Responses of enterprises, institutions and organizations to proposals, inquiries, applications and complaints from citizens and other documents are made in the Kazakh, Russian or official local language.

Article 13. The legal proceedings of the Kazakh SSR are conducted in the Kazakh or Russian languages or in the language of the majority of the population of the given location.

Persons participating in the suit who do not know the language in which the legal proceedings are being conducted are guaranteed the right to become completely familiar with the case, to participation in court actions through a translator, and the right to speak in court in their native languages as well.

Investigation and court documents are entrusted to the persons participating in the case according to established procedure, in translation to a language that they understand.

Article 14. Proceedings for cases of administrative violations of rights are conducted in the Kazakh or Russian languages or in the language of the majority of the population in the given location.

Persons who do not understand the language of the proceedings will be provided with an interpreter.

Article 15. In communications between the organs of government authority and administration, institutions, enterprises and organizations of the Kazakh SSR and the organs of government authority and administration, institutions, enterprises and organizations of the USSR and other union republics the language of interethnic communication is utilized.

Article 16. Employees of organs of governmental power and administration, law enforcement agencies, social security agencies, institutions of public education, culture, and health, enterprises in trade, consumer services,

communications, transportation, municipal services, and the communication and news media will greet citizens and speak with them in the language in which they are addressed, and as the appropriate conditions are established, will master the Kazakh and Russian languages, and in locations densely populated by other nationalities and national groups--their languages as well, to the extent that is necessary for the performance of official functions.

With a view to the prospects for a higher level of professional training and education in the Kazakh, Russian, and other languages, provisions should be made for a maximally objective, sequential, and strictly differentiated personnel hiring and certification procedure with a mandatory emphasis on the professional, moral, and political qualities of employees.

Article 17. The organs of government authority and administration, enterprises, establishments, and social organizations will encourage and secure, with the aid of budget allocations and the personal funds of enterprises, the study of the Kazakh and Russian languages, and in areas densely populated by representatives of other nationalities and national groups--of their languages as well.

Section III. Language in the Sphere of Education, Science and Culture

Article 18. The Kazakh SSR guarantees the right of every citizen to the free choice of a language of instruction and study.

This right is provided for by the creation of a broad network of preschool institutions, schools with instruction and study in Kazakh and in Russian or another language as well, with consideration of the interests of the nationalities living in the given area, and with the implementation of policy aimed at spreading the practice of continuous and uninterrupted instruction and study in the native language as a means of cultivating solid skills in the area of national traditions and culture.

Article 19. In general educational schools, vocational and technical schools, mid-level special and higher educational institutions, Kazakh and Russian languages will be required subjects in the educational curriculum, and is included in the disciplines listed on the documentation of graduation from an educational institution (for the completion of the full course of study).

In vocational-technical, mid-level special and higher educational institutions in the Kazakh SSR, instruction and study are conducted in the Kazakh and Russian languages,

regardless of the educational institution's departmental affiliation. Here the principle of continuity in the language of instruction and study is strictly heeded.

Training of specialists in other languages is conducted according to the requirements of the republic.

Article 20. The Kazakh SSR guarantees that entrance examinations for mid-level special and higher educational institutions are taken in the languages of study in the republic's schools.

Examinations in languages will be determined by the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Public Education.

Article 21. The Kazakh SSR promotes the equal functioning of the Kazakh and Russian languages in the sphere of culture and mass information and creates conditions for the active use in these spheres of the languages of other national groups.

Article 22. In the Kazakh SSR equal rights are guaranteed for the functioning of the Kazakh, Russian and other languages in the sphere of science, and the free choice of a language for scientific works are enacted, as well the writing and public defense of dissertations in the Kazakh, Russian, or other language with consideration of the possibilities of a specialized council.

Documentation on the defense of dissertations, with the exception of the manuscript itself, are sent to the USSR Council of Ministers Higher Attestation Commission in Russian, while the dissertation itself is presented in the language of the original.

Article 23. The Kazakh SSR guarantees the publication of scientific works, artistic literature, periodical publications and other printed products, and the propaganda of the achievements of science, technology and culture through the mass information media in the state language, the language of interethnic communication, and in the languages of nationality groups that have concentrated populations in the republic as well.

Article 24. Scientific conferences, symposia and other events of republican and local significance are conducted in the Kazakh and Russian languages, while those concerning the problems of other nationality groups living in the republic are conducted in their native language as well.

Participants in the events are guaranteed translation.

Article 25. The Kazakh SSR promotes the study of the traditional Kazakh written language, based on Arab script,

towards scientific goals, for which it is implementing training of the appropriate scientific and pedagogical personnel and the establishment of the necessary material and technical base.

Article 26. The Kazakh SSR promotes the creation of national cultural centers, societies and other public organizations, and grants them the right to introduce proposals for opening preschool institutions, schools, groups and sections in vocational-technical, mid-level special and higher education institutions, and institutions of culture, and for the creation of creative collectives.

With the goals of developing languages and cultures, national cultural centers, societies and organizations are granted the right to conduct socio-political and mass cultural events, to perform rituals, to carry out the preparation of scientific, popular science, artistic and other literature, periodicals, and radio and television programs, and to conduct other public activities in native languages.

Section IV. The Naming of Populated Areas, Proper Names. Signs and Information.

Article 27. In the Kazakh SSR, every populated area, street, square and other territorial object has one traditional name--for the most part in the Kazakh language, that is reproduced on other languages according to the operating rules.

The names of institutions, enterprises, organizations and their structural subdivisions are given in the Kazakh language and subtitled in Russian, and where necessary--in other languages as well.

Article 28. In writing personal names, patronymics, last names and ethnic names, the orthography of national literary languages is observed. They are relayed through other languages in accordance with the literary norms of those languages.

Article 29. The texts of the official press, stamps, forms for enterprises, institutions and organizations are composed in the Kazakh and the Russian languages.

The text of forms, signs, announcements, official advertisements, menus, price lists and other visual information is written in the Kazakh and the Russian languages, and in areas densely populated by other national groups--in their native language as well.

Labels on goods, markings and instructions for goods produced in the republic must contain the necessary information in the Kazakh and Russian languages.

All tests of visual information are arranged in the following manner: on the left or at the top--the text in the Kazakh language, and on the right or at the bottom--the text in Russian, printed in letters of the same size.

Oral information, announcements and advertising are given first in the state language, and then in the language of interethnic communication.

Article 30. Postal and telegraph dispatches are made in the Kazakh and Russian languages within the boundaries of the Kazakh SSR, while those addressed to locations outside of the republic (excluding international)--are in the Russian language.

Section V. Legal Protection for Languages Used on the Territory of the Kazakh SSR

Article 31. In the areas of the state language's functioning to which the action of the present Law applies, the norms of the modern Kazakh literary language are observed.

Article 32. An official's refusal to accept an inquiry, application or complain, or their incomplete examination due to lack of knowledge of the language will be answerable as specified by law.

Article 33. Limitation of citizens' rights to the choice of language and discrimination based on language will be answerable as specified by law.

Section VI. Support, Enactment, and Enforcement of Law

Article 34. The Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers will be responsible for providing the personnel, material and technical supplies, financial resources, and instructional-procedural materials required for the enactment of the provisions of this law.

Article 35. Control over the present Law's implementation is carried out by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers.

Source: Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (28 September 1989): 1, translated in JPRS-UPA-90-009, 23 February 1990, 15-16.

APPENDIX B

Kazakh and Russian Population in the Kazakh SSR, 1959-89

	Kazakhs	%	Russians	%
1959	2,787,309	30	3,972,042	43
1970	4,234,166	33	5,521,917	42
1979	5,289,349	36	5,991,205	41
1989	6,534,616	40	6,227,549	38

Source: Olcott, The Kazakhs, 259.; Brown, "Kazakhs Now Largest Group," 19.