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General Douglas Macarthur and the Philippine Army

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GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR AND THE PHILIPPINE ARMY

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PREFACE

Few military leaders in American history achieved and none has surpassed, the fame of General Douglas MacArthur, and his brillant record as a soldier and a statesman commends itself to careful study. Like most great figures, MacArthur was either loved or detested by his contemporaries. To most Americans, however, he stood as the indomitable symbol of American resolution and courage in the darkest days of World War II. His detractors, far fewer in number, were equally convinced that they accurately precieved a less noble, less capable figure. There was no middle ground, and until recently every work published on the General or his career reflected the one bias or the other.

From 1935 to 1941 General MacArthur served as the military adviser to the Philippine Government, and during that period he created the Philippine Army. This thesis is a study of MacArthur and the Philippine Army and its performance in the Philippine Campaign of 1941-1942. Directed solely to the question of the Philippine Army and its performance and its problems, this study does not provide a detailed analysis of the campaign itself and, indeed, it concludes with MacArthur's departure from Corregidor in March 1942.

The evidence leads me to conclude that the Philippine

Army was poorly trained and for that reason proved incapable of achieving MacArthur's strategic plan to repulse an enemy invasion on the beaches. MacArthur's strategy was predicated on, and it failed because of his undue confidence in the Philippine Army. This in turn led to the failure of his primary mission, the defense of the Philippine Islands. Although this conclusion tarnishes the lustre of MacArthur's reputation as a strategist in his first campaign of the war -- a reputation quickly and deservedly recovered -- it does not diminish his stature or reputation. For although local responsibility rested with MacArthur, he was also victimized by a lethargic Congress and by a grand strategic plan that concentrated the Allied effort in Europe and doomed the Philippines. Moreover, whether intentionally or through official oversight, his superiors kept him ignorant of the Allies' grand strategy. Under the circumstances the heroic defense of the Philippines could be no more than a gesture of bitter defiance, and MacArthur transformed a bitter military defeat into a psychological victory of critical importance.

For its generous support of this study the writer expresses his sincere appreciation to the Douglas MacArthur Memorial Foundation and its Executive Director, Major General Norman J. Anderson (USMC, Ret.). The opportunity to study so influential and significant a figure as General MacArthur has indeed been a privilege. I also wish to thank the staff of the MacArthur Memorial Archives and

particulary its archivist, Captain Robert A. Alexander (USN, Ret.), and his able assistant, Lieutenant Commander James E. Boone, Jr. (USN, Ret.), whose cooperation was critical to the completion of this project. I am indebted, too, to the staff of the Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania and in particular to Dr. Richard Sommers. The courteous assistance of the Eisenhower Library at Abilene, Kansas and the Federal Records Center at Suitland, Maryland is also greatly appreciated.

I would like to give a special note of thanks to Dr. Patrick J. Rollins of Old Dominion University, who acted as an adviser and friend. And above all I wish to thank my wife, Carolyn, who worked with me through fair weather and foul and provided the encouragement and support to complete this project.

CHAPTER I

THE FORMATION OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY

The strategy for the defense of the Philippines in World War II was formulated by General Douglas MacArthur after he became military adviser to the Philippines in 1935. The troops who composed the majority of the defense force on Bataan and Corregidor were members of the Philippine Army, an army created by General MacArthur. Therefore, MacArthur's role in the formation of the Philippine Army in the years before the war is essential in order to understand the Philippine Campaign. MacArthur had a long and distinguished career before he became Military Adviser to the President of the Philippines. While a student at the United States Military Academy at West Point he compiled one of the highest scholastic averages ever achieved at that institution. MacArthur was one of the most decorated American soldiers in World War I, and in 1930 he was appointed Chief of Staff of the United States Army, the youngest man ever to attain that position.

In 1934 The Congress of the United States passed the Tydings-McDuffie Act. The Act provided for independence of the Philippines after a ten year transitional period. At the end of that time, all United States military installations would be abandoned and the Philippines would cease to be a

colony of the United States. Manuel Quezon, the newly elected President of the Philippines in 1935, believed it was imperative that the Philippines be prepared to defend itself by 1946. One of Quezon's first acts as president of the new nation was to ask MacArthur to become military adviser to the Philippines and help establish a self-defense force.[1]

General MacArthur, about to retire as Chief of Staff, gladly accepted the offer and on 26 October 1935 arrived in the Philippines to assume his new position. He was accompanied by four aides; Major James B. Ord, Major Dwight D. Eisenhower, Captain Thomas J. Davis and Major Howard Hunter. The MacArthur party was met on the pier in Manila by the members of the new government amid an atmosphere of pomp, pageantry and high expectations.[2] The press corps covered the arrival with banner headlines and countless stories that recounted the career of the General and his plans for the Philippines. In the meantime Quezon spoke in the highest terms of General MacArthur, his four aides, and stressed the importance of a strong national defense.[3]

Quezon wasted little time in passing the necessary

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[1]D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol. I, 1880-1941 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970).
For anyone interested in General MacArthur prior to 1941 the writer suggests the above mentioned volume.

[2]The Philippine Herald, October 26, 1935, p. 1.

[3]Ibid.

legislation for forming the Philippine Army. On 25 November 1935 a conscription bill provided for the training of all students between the ages of ten and eighteen, and all the able men over the age of twenty-one. Quezon declared that the defense program would "serve notice upon the world that these Islands are not to be subjugated."[4] On 31 December 1935 MacArthur was officially designated Military Adviser to the President of the Philippines under the authority of Act 3431. In addition to his salary from the United States Army, MacArthur received, an annual salary of 36,000 Pesos($18,000), annual representation expenses of 30,000 Pesos ($15,000), and furnished quarters.[5]

MacArthur announced The Philippine Defense Plan shortly after the inauguration of the new government. Five principles served as the basis of the plan. First, every citizen was obligated to serve in the national defense effort. The concept of universal military training was adopted not only to provide the necessary manpower for the army but also to help the Philippines build a large body of patriotic citizens. The second principle declared that if the plan was carried to completion, no nation no matter how strong could afford to invade the Philippines. MacArthur declared that if any nation did invade the Philippines the "destruction would

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[4]The Sunday Tribune (Manila), October 27, 1935, p. 1.

[5]Unpublished Letter from Manuel Quezon to Douglas MacArthur, December 31, 1935. Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives (DMMA), Record Group 1, (RG 1), Box 1.

involve such a staggering cost to the aggressor, both in blood and gold that even the boldest and strongest will unerringly mark the folly of such an undertaking."[6]

MacArthur was aware of the limitations of the Philippine budget, thus his third principle emphasized the need for frugality in the implementation of the defense plan. Although the Philippine Government provided $8,000,000 for each year of the ten year plan, MacArthur decided not to undertake the construction of a battle fleet. That decision, he believed, would not only stretch the defense budget but would also emphasize the defensive aims of the Philippine Government. The fourth principle stressed the need for a highly trained cadre of leaders for the army. Therefore, a military academy was established on the order of West Point. Finally, MacArthur recommended that the Philippine Legislature confer very considerable powers on the President of the Philippines regarding the army.[7]

The army was to be strictly defensive in character and was modeled after the Swiss Army. However, the small professional force would be augmented by thousands of trained reservists to bolster the country's defenses in the time of need and thus afford "a maximum of protection at a minimum of

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[6]General MacArthur's First Report to the Philippine Government, April 27, 1936, DMMA, RG 1, Box 1, pp. 16-19.

[7]Ibid.

expense."[8] The plan, General MacArthur declared, was no more militaristic in nature than to make each island of the archipelago "a citadel of defensive strength."[9]

The manpower for the reserve forces would be drawn from all able bodied males between the ages of twenty-one and fifty. The actual training would begin in the public schools, and for those not in school military instruction would be given on Sundays and holidays. Refresher courses would be conducted for all reserve personnel on weekends. Since training could be stretched over several years, the initial training period would only be five and one-half months.[10]

The professional force of the Philippine Army was limited to 930 officers and 6,500 enlisted men. The regular army was charged with the responsibility of training the civilian reservists, providing the administrative and technical expertise, keeping ready for emergencies and carrying on the work of the national police force.[11] The plan obligated men to serve thirty years. The first ten years of service sould include the conscripts' five and one-half month initial training period and then assignment to the

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[8]Ibid., p. 22.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid., p. 23.

[11]Ibid., pp. 23-24.

First Reserve for a ten year period. The last twenty years of the reservists time would be spent in the Second and Third Reserves.[12] It was hoped that by calling up 40,000 men each year, the First and Second Reserves could be fully organized by the end of the ten year period.[13]

The new army was to be organized so as to produce the greatest amount of mobility and firepower. MacArthur attached great importance to mobility and firepower and applied a law of physics to illustrate his concept. Following Napoleon he asserted that the "striking force increases directly with the mass applied, it increases to the square of the speed of the application."[14] To achieve that end, MacArthur hoped to develop reliable units that could move in all types of terrain and meet the enemy on any ground. Such an organization would be able to foil the purpose of any attacker and engage the enemy in a war of "relentless attrition."[15]

The General informed the Philippine government of the lack of internal communications, industry, and money. He urged the government to push ahead with all possible speed the development of internal communications. Although any attack against the Philippines would be waterborne, MacArthur placed little emphasis on the development of a fleet. Instead

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[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid., pp. 24-25.

[14] Ibid., p. 25.

[15] Ibid., p. 26.

he advocated the use of torpedo boats and medium range bombers.[16] In order to overcome the handicaps of the lack of an industrial base the General recommended that the Philippine Government purchase arms and munitions directly from the United States government. Where practicable and economical a few items were to be manufactured locally.[17] Other deficiencies could be off-set by moderate programs of procurement in artillery, transportation and machine shops.[18]

The most serious problem that the new army faced was the shortage of trained personnel, especially officers. MacArthur established a command staff system to help correct this problem. However, due to the shortage of trained officers, supply and personnel were placed under one assistant chief of staff, war plans under another who, in addition to the provost marshal's regular duties, was also responsible for the internal police force.[19]

Many of the officers in the new Philippine Army were drawn from the Philippine Constabulary, while others were taken from the Philippine Scouts and commissioned reserve officers who had served in the U. S. Army. It was hoped that future officers would come from the Reserve Officers Training

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[16] Ibid., pp. 27-28.

[17] Ibid., p. 39.

[18] Ibid., p. 40.

[19] Ibid., pp. 41-42.

Courses at the various universities in the Philippines.[20] A military academy was also established, but it was too small even to produce officers for the small standing army, thus the civilian universities had to provide the majority of the officer corps.

Even though the Constabulary provided the majority of the trained officers, they were not trained for army duties since they were only proficient in handling small units. To correct this problem MacArthur received permission from the U. S. Army to send six Filipino officers to the Command and Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. Upon completion of their course of instruction they were to return to the Philippines and organize similar schools.[21]

The enlisted men would be trained in small detachments near their homes. It was hoped that an officer and eight to twelve enlisted men could handle 120 trainees at the various local training centers.[22] The plan called for one hundred thirty eight regional training centers built at a cost of 16,000 Pesos ($8,000) each. The entire professional garrison of the Philippine Army was to be located on the main island of Luzon except those men detailed to the scattered training centers. The training centers were to be completed and ready to receive the first group of 16,560 recruits on 1 January

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[20]Ibid., pp. 44-48.

[21]Ibid., pp. 47-48.

[22]Ibid., p. 50.

1937. Another group of equal size would follow 1 July 1937. Thus, by the end of 1937 the Philippines presumably would have its first group of trained reservists.[23]

The outlook MacArthur presented to the Filipino people in 1936 was a rosy one. He proclaimed that the geographic position of the Philippines made air raids the only real danger the islands faced. Even if an enemy managed to mount a successful amphibious operation and landed unopposed, he would have great difficulty in subjugating the Philippines.[24] MacArthur used the Gallipoli Campaign of World War I as an example of the futility of attacking a fortified position.

The essence of the Philippine Plan was to insure an active and carefully planned defense of every foot of beach in the Archipelago. At the end of the ten year period each island was supposed to have a garrison of sufficient strength to insure an effective concentration of troops against a hostile landing. Even a partial penetration would encounter a bitter and continuous resistance from the moment the troops left the transports, MacArthur declared.[25] He believed that even if the enemy managed to take the other islands, the excellent system of interior communications on Luzon would permit the rapid concentration of forces to repel a landing attempt. If the enemy attempted to blockade the Philippines

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[23]Ibid.,pp. 51-54.

[24]Ibid., p. 56.

[25]Ibid., p. 58.

the defense plan called for the stockpiling of supplies, but the real keystone of the defense was the existence of "a well trained citizens army which will compel every attack to assume the character of a major overseas operation."[26]

The importance of the Philippine Plan was that it not only determined the quality of the army that would face the Japanese in 1941, but the basic strategic concept of defense of the beaches remained unchanged until 23 December 1941. General MacArthur pointed out some of the deficiencies of his plan but he omitted some of the more important ones or chose to ignore them. He attached great importance to the concept of mobility and firepower, yet at the same time he decided to keep costs down by pursuing moderate programs of motor transports and artillery, the very essence of mobility and firepower. Despite the fact that the Philippines are an island nation he underplayed the importance of torpedo boats and aircraft. Furthermore, the only way that many of the islands could be reinforced in time of war was by ship transport, yet there were no contingencies for them.

The widely spread regional centers minimized the ability of the General Staff to keep a close eye on the progress of the various units. Furthermore, it all but prohibited the officers from gaining experience in handling large units. It also used more personnel than would be required to train

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[26]Ibid., p. 60.

more men at larger centers. Training was also hampered by the low education level of many of the enlisted men. Many different dialects were often spoken in one unit, thus complicating the problem of training.

To be sure, General MacArthur's plan had some good points. It would help forge national unity and provide vocational training centers. But the plan ignored the problem of amphibious assult, the lack of education among the natives, and the shortage of training personnel.

Since 1909 the United States Army and Navy had developed a series of war plans for the defense of the Philippines. These plans were known as the Rainbow Plans because of the different colors used to denote the enemy. War Plan Orange Three, (WPO-d) the Philippine defense plan was based on the assumption that a hostile force would attack the Philippines. The problem was the defense of the Philippines and the maintenance of a United States outpost in the Far East. The plan took into account the limited size of the United States garrison in the Philippines and the limitations of the United States Fleet which operated in the adjacent waters.

The plan which was well known to every officer who served in the Philippines over six months was purely defensive. The joint missions of the Army and Navy, according to WPO-3, were to hold Manila Bay in order to provide a base for the United States Fleet and maintain United States sovereignty in the Far East. The Army was specifically charged

to hold Manila Bay and if possible the Manila Bay "area."[27]

The Navy, due to the limited forces available in the Far East, had a defensive sea area which stretched from the Capones to the Lubang Islands. Coastal action was confined to the defense of Manila and Subic Bays while the remainder of the Asiatic Fleet, such as it was, was free to operate against hostile operations directed against the Philippines.[28]

Army planners believed that the major thrust of an enemy attack would occur against the island of Luzon at Lingayen Gulf, although they also expected minor attacks against the smaller islands accompanied by feints or small landings on Luzon. They surmised that the initial enemy strike force would consist of four to ten divisions composed of 100,000 to 150,000 men. The most likely time for the enemy to mount his operations was December or January, but planners believed that the Philippines would receive a thirty-six hour warning. Finally, they believed that the enemy would know the exact location of all United States forces.[29] The U. S. Army prospects proved correct in every respect except for the thirty-six hour warning.

Official reaction to General MacArthur's defense proposal from Washington, D.C., was quick and sharp. The

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[27]The Army War College, Map Study No. 3 Philippine Department, Situation and Requirements, War Plans Course No. 6-C, 1935-1936, p. 3.

[28]Ibid., p. 7.

[29]Ibid., p. 15.

dissent was led by General Malin Craig, the newly appointed Chief of Staff of the United States Army. Craig's criticism focused on five areas. First, it failed to consider the possibility of armed revolt in the Philippines because of the widely dispersed training centers. Secondly, unlike Switzerland, the Philippines were widely dispersed and lent themselves to successful interdiction by enemy forces. This dispersion required massive stockpiling of equipment, but the cost of such a venture was out of the question for the Philippine government. Third, the establishment of the Philippine Army had little or no value, except as an end in itself. Craig insisted in his fourth point that the Philippines needed a military force for the purpose of keeping internal order. Finally, Craig believed that the United States government should announce at the earliest possible moment that it did not intend to bear the responsibility for the defense of the Philippines.[30]

The mystery that confronted General MacArthur and the U. S. Army was Japan. Since 1931 the Japanese had been engaged in war with China and economic expansion throughout Asia. Opinions as to the true motives and goals of the Japanese were split. For example, in the Philippine Herald on 20 April 1935 a prominent Filipino columnist wrote:

> Of course Japan has no designs on the Philippines. In the first place she will be too exhausted after China is through with her to set out on another

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[30]James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol. I, pp. 502-503.

> expedition before twenty-five years are over. Secondly, she has nothing but friendly intentions toward the Archipelago....What authority is there that Japan would invade the Philippines....as some people with fantastic imaginations are not ashamed to say in public? None beyond their own goblin ridden imaginations.[31]

Thus, some circles in the Philippines felt that the fear of Japan and the National Defense Plans were unnecessary. The State Department, on the other hand, cast a suspicious eye on Japanese aggression in the Far East. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew in Japan openly expressed his fears of Japanese encroachment to the Secretary of State. Grew believed that the United States should either withdraw from the Far East or continue to insist "not aggressively yet not less firmly" on the maintenance of our legitimate rights in that area of the world.[32]

Grew was not the only member of the Diplomatic Corps who voiced concern over Japanese expansion. The State Department Chief of Far Eastern Affairs, Stanley Hornbeck, believed that the United States eventually had to oppose Japanese policy in China and that opposition would result in an "inevitable conflict."[35] Thus as early as 1935 members of the State Department were concerned about the

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[31]Antonio Estrada, "Along the Road," The Philippines Herald, April 20, 1935, p. 4.

[32]Note from Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State, January 27, 1935, U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1935 the Far East, Vol. III (Washington, D C: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 823.

[33]Ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 855.

possibility of armed conflict with Japan. Unfortunately, the State Department never urged a military buildup in the Far East to thwart Japanese expansion. The strategic position of the Philippines formed a natural barrier to Japanese expansion, but the use of the Philippines as an advance base for the Asiatic Fleet was never seriously considered.

The United States Congress seemed totally unconcerned with the situation in the Far East. In fact some congressmen urged that the trade deficit between the United States and the Philippines be lowered by reducing military expenditures in the Philippines.[34] Even when bills were introduced for defense, they provided for "selective construction of frontier defense in Alaska, Panama and coastal cities in the United States."[35]

The only legislation designed specifically for the Philippines was an amendment to an Act passed in 1926, that authorized the President of the United States to detail officers and enlisted men to assist the governments of Latin American Republics in the development of their armed forces. When the amendment was introduced in Congress on 1 April 1935 it met strong opposition because the "Philippines were

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[34]U. S., Congress, Senate, A Letter from Senator Carl Hayden to Senator Millard E. Tydings on the Trade Defecit Between the United States and Philippines, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., August 6, 1935, Congressional Record, LXXIX, 12912.

[35]U. S. Congress, House, Representative Wilcox speaking for a Bill to authorize the selective construction and installation of Frontier Defenses, H. R. 4130, 74th Cong., 1st. Sess., January 30, 1935, Congressional Record, LXXIX, 1332.

too far away." The amendment was finally passed after a second reading on 6 May 1935. The second reading was necessary when one alert Congressman asked why the United States was giving military aid to San Diego, California.[36]

The support of Congress was absolutely essential to MacArthur since the Philippines had to rely on the United States for material and for training officers. To be sure, a good deal of the congressional inactivity was a result of the overwhelming wave of isolationism and the depression. However, as Hanson Baldwin pointed out in the New York Times, "Congressmen are not too happy about giving the Philippines independence."[37] In essence Congress questioned why, if the Philippines wanted independence and were going to leave the protection of the United States, U. S. taxpayers should foot the bill for their defense.

Despite the failure of the Congress to provide the necessary financial support and the United States, General MacArthur went full speed ahead with his defense program. In a glowing report published in The Tribune, a leading newspaper in the Philippines, MacArthur declared that the response of the Filipino people was "splendid beyond words."[38]

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[36]U. S., Congress, House, An Act to Amend the Act of May 19, 1926, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1935, H. R. 3482, p. 1332.

[37]Hanson Baldwin, "Forts in Pacific Next Big Navy Issue," The New York Times, May 3, 1936, p. 6.

[38]"No Ethiopian Fate for Philippines, says MacArthur," The Tribune, (Manila) June 20, 1936, p. 1.

Obviously, reports of this type were intended to generate enthusiasm in the United States and the Philippines for the defense plan. However, such reports seemed a little premature in 1936 when the Philippine Army did not yet exist; the first group of trainees would not report to the induction centers until January 1937. General MacArthur was apparently concerned over the lack of support in Congress because he told Frank Murphy, Governor-General and High Commissioner of the Philippines, that the Philippine Army had to depend on the United States for cooperation and support.[39]

The year 1937 was an important one for the General and the Philippine Army. Opposition was still growing in Congress to his defense plan, and many highly critical letters were published in The Congressional Record. The most vocal opponent was General William C. Rivers. Rivers was a former head of the Philippine Constabulary and a self-styled expert on Far Eastern affairs. He believed that a Philippine Army, no matter how large, could successfully defend the islands and scoffed at the idea that Japan would ever want to seize the Philippines.[40] On 1 January 1937 the first group of conscripts began their training and at the same time a new High Commissioner, Paul McNutt was selected by President Roosevelt to replace Murphy.

In a letter to President Quezon, McNutt intimated that

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[39]James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol. I, p. 504.

[40]U. S. Congress, Senate, Letter from General William C. Rivers to Senator Frazier, concerning the Defense of the Philippines, Congressional Record, LXXX, p. 4164.

Roosevelt wanted to talk to the Philippine President. Perhaps sensing that Roosevelt was willing to put his weight behind the MacArthur mission, the General and President Quezon along with military and personal attendants departed from Manila on an around-the-world tour on 25 January 1937. President Quezon created embarrassing problems for the United States when he accepted ceremonial honors normally reserved for the head of a sovereign state in the various countries he visited prior to his arrival in the United States. When the delegation arrived in New York it received a low key welcome, and even worse Quezon never received an invitation from Roosevelt to visit him in the White House.

MacArthur was upset over the failure of Roosevelt to see Quezon and made a personal journey to Washington to see the president. After a heated discussion, Roosevelt agreed to see Quezon briefly. After the lackluster visit between the two Presidents, Quezon continued on his world junket while General MacArthur stayed in Washington for the reinternment of his mother's body in Arlington Cemetery and to cajole support for his defense plan. The General was never far from criticism, even in the United States. Oswald Garrison, editor of the Nation, blasted the Philippine Defense Plan as too nationalistic.[41] The only bright spot of MacArthur's visit was his marriage to Jean Faircloth in a civil ceremony

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[41]"Defense Program Upheld by Quezon," The New York Times, April 4, 1937, p. 7.

in New York.[42]

In the Philippines the military training program was underway, and new difficulties confronted the Philippine General Staff. Large groups of Japanese business men had begun to establish factories and plantations in the province of Davao, Mindanao. A lengthy memorandum prepared by the Philippine Army War Plans Division stated that not only was economic exploitation a problem but that the Japanese business men were laying the ground work for an invasion by the Imperial Japanese Army. The report indicated that many of the Japanese plantations' buildings were located on strategic sites and could be readily converted into pill boxes and gun emplacements.[43] The concern over Japanese infiltration was not confined to the Philippines, however. The Congressional Record of 1937 was replete with articles and statistics that expressed concern about Japanese infiltration, but economic ramifications rather than the military ones were stressed in the United States.

The Philippine Army faced a lack of equipment and supplies. The training program had been in effect only six months and there were already critical shortages of even the most essential material. For example, 15,500 canteens were needed for the first group of trainees, but there were only

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[42]James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol. I, pp. 511-513.

[43]Unpublished Memorandum from Vicente Lim, Brig. General P. A. to Chief of Staff P. A. April 29, 1937, DMMA, RG 1, pp. 1-4.

2,400 available for distribution to the troops.[44] In an effort to correct some of the serious supply problems General MacArthur sent Major Ord to Washington in the summer of 1937 to procure equipment. Ord's first attempts met with failure. The Philippine Army needed ammunition for training and for stockpiling at the mobilization centers, but the War Department refused to approve the sale of ammunition for stockpiling, although it did promise that in the event of an emergency ammunition would be furnished.[45]

Major Ord suffered another setback when he tried to buy artillery for the Philippine Army. The United States Ordinance Department had not yet adopted a standard model for use in the U. S. Army, thus it could not sell artillery to the Philippine Army since it was impossible to determine which models would be obsolete. The best that Ord could obtain were some World War I British 2.95 mountain guns. The torpedo boats needed for the off-shore patrol squadrons could not be purchased either since the U. S. Navy was just beginning to build experimental models in the Norfolk Navy Shipyard.[46]

After banging on every door in Washington, Major Ord finally achieved some limited success. General Craig, Chief

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[44]Unpublished Memorandum for General Embick, June 28, 1937, DMMA, RG 1, Box 1, p. 1.

[45]Unpublished Letter from Major James B. Ord to General MacArthur, July 2, 1937, DMMA, RG 1, Box 1.

[46]Unpublished Letter from Major James B. Ord to Major Dwight Eisenhower, July 27, 1937, DMMA, RG 1, Box 1, pp. 1-2.

of Staff of the United States Army, agreed to continue to loan and sell enough equipment to the Philippine Army to meet the training requirements for 1937 and 1938. Meanwhile, the military adviser to the Philippines was to present complete data on the final requirements of the Philippine Army. The War Department would investigate the methods of storage and inspection and determine exactly what the Philippine Army had on hand. When those measures were completed, the U. S. Army Chief of Staff would lay down a policy for future loans and equipment, taking into account the possibility of change of relationship between the United States and the Philippines.[47]

In other words, the U. S. Army had adopted a wait-and-see attitude in regard to the Philippine defense. Although this was detrimental to General MacArthur's mission, the attitude was warranted. The many divergent groups that make up the people of the Philippine nation led to instability in politics. Large groups of bandits roamed the hills and the presence of lightly guarded stockpiles of ammunition ready for the taking were a real threat to United States and Philippine security. Furthermore, the U. S. Army was not certain as to the status of Philippine independence since Quezon often made inflammatory statements demanding immediate independence. Thus, there were few alternatives available to the War Department when it came time distribute supplies from

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[47]Ibid.

the sparse U. S. Army stockpiles.

Major Ord's limited success was overshadowed by reports of Eisenhower on the status of training of the Philippine Army. The 1,000,000 Pesos ($500,000) that the Philippine government provided for buying equipment for the first graduating class of 16,560 men would only purchase equipment for half that number of personnel. The recruiting drives in some of the more remote provinces were running into difficulties, although Filipino officers reported that they were achieving 100 percent participation. Major Eisenhower reported his "grave doubts as to the accuracy of that information."[48]

In July 1937 Eisenhower complained to Ord of the "disappointing" results of his inspections of the Philippine Army training centers. He found the conditions in Southern Luzon "very unsatisfactory." While Eisenhower recognized that many of the problems were brought on by heavy rains, he observed that "many of the defects are directly tracable to the neglect on the part of cadre officers and in some instances on the part of our army headquarters."[49]

The difficulties Eisenhower initially encountered in the budget and the quality of training vexed the Philippine Army through the years preceding World War II. Although some

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[48]Unpublished Letter from Major Dwight Eisenhower to Major James B. Ord, July 8, 1937, DMMA, RG 1, Box 1, pp. 1-2.

[49]Unpublished Letter from Major Dwight Eisenhower to Major James B. Ord, August 13, 1937, DMMA, RG 1, pp. 1-2.

difficulties could be attributed to the newness of the program, many were directly related to the defense plan itself. The widely scattered training centers staffed by too few and often half-trained officers simply could not train the new conscripts. Even more important, many of the men who received their training under those inefficient conditions would be leaders of the Philippine Army when World War II began.

The defense budget originally prepared by General MacArthur and his staff proved to be grossly understated. It became a continuous obstacle and worry for the Philippine Army. For example, the off-shore patrol had to be set aside since the cost of the two patrol boats would have consumed the entire defense budget for 1937.[50] Thus, many important features of the defense plan were slated to be curtailed without a much larger appropriation. The alternatives were few and the decisions were hard. Major Eisenhower was ordered to prepare a budget which would maintain expenditures within the $8,000,000 annual limit but before it was finished, MacArthur instructed him to base all planning on a $16,000,000 annual appropriation.[51]

President Quezon received the new bill for the national defense in September, 1937. According to Eisenhower, the

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[50]Unpublished Letter from Major Dwight Eisenhower to Major James B. Ord, August 13, 1937, DMMA, RG 1, Box 1, pp. 1-3.

[51]Unpublished Memorandum from Major Eisenhower to General MacArthur, October 6, 1937, DMMA, RG 1, Box 1, pp. 1-7.

size of the budget "dismayed and astonished him." He felt that he had been deceived "in view of the definite promises made two years ago, and I gather that only the intervention of more immediate officers had kept us from hearing about it in a big way."[52] General MacArthur, however, wrote the President in defense of his request for more money. He stated that war could be avoided and peace maintained only if the Philippine government followed a policy of neutrality and maintained an "adequate national defense establishment."[53] An expanded military budget was necessary, MacArthur continued, because of the possibility of early independence and the danger that the Philippines might be drawn into a war. If war broke out between the United States and Japan, MacArthur's command must have "sufficient flexibility to readily meet and absorb such new changes as new conditions may demand."[54]

Thus, General MacArthur hoped to gain his request for more money by playing on the hopes and fears of Quezon. If President Quezon wanted early independence then he had to pay the increased price for armaments. If he wanted the Philippines to remain free after gaining independence then he had to watch closely the increased diplomatic tension between the United

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[52]Unpublished Letter from Major Dwight Eisenhower to Major James B. Ord, September 1, 1937, DMMA, RG 1, Box 1, pp. 1-3.

[53]Unpublished Letter from General MacArthur to President Manuel Quezon, October 14, 1937, DMMA, RG 1, Box 1, pp. 1-4.

[54]Unpublished Letter from General MacArthur to President Manuel Quezon, October 14, 1937, DMMA, RG 1, Box 1, pp. 1-4.

States and Japan and be prepared to defend the Philippines. This line of reasoning was presented to the Philippine Legislature with the added promise that if the money was forthcoming, the Philippines never need worry about a war with Japan.

General MacArthur faced more than budgetary and training problems in 1937. Late in that year rumors were rife in Manila that the General was to be recalled from mission in the Philippines. Since MacArthur had already reached the pinnacle of his army career as Chief of Staff, he was faced with two alternatives if recalled to Washington - either to accept a lesser post in the U. S. Army or retire. MacArthur chose the latter course and on 16 September 1937 submitted his papers for retirement from the U. S. Army to be effective 31 December 1937. Although MacArthur had not stated his plans other than to suggest that he might return to Milwaukee, Wisconsin and devote full time to writing, Quezon, without the consent of the Philippine Legislature, issued an executive proclamation making General MacArthur the Philippine Military Adviser.[55] The way President Quezon railroaded the MacArthur appointment through the Legislature angered many Filipinos who were growing tired of the spiraling cost of the Philippine Army and the large salary paid to MacArthur.[56] In an effort

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[55]James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol. 1, p. 524.

[56]Ibid.

to silence the criticism President Quezon made a public statement in support of MacArthur. The Philippine President stated that there would be unfortunate consequences if MacArthur left; MacArthur in turn declared that the request to stay was a "call to duty he could not fail."[57]

Despite the support from Quezon, General MacArthur's retirement from the U. S. Army created more problems for the Philippine Army, since a retired officer acting as a military adviser did not have direct access to the War Department. After 31 December 1937 General MacArthur was forced to rely on the whims and the good will of the Philippine Department for supplies and equipment.

The rhetorical support of Quezon, the silent critics, and the fact that General MacArthur was now the Field Marshal of the Philippine Army did not solve the many difficulties that faced the fledgling army. In an effort to display the progress of the Philippine Army to the public, MacArthur decided that there should be nationwide maneuvers that would culminate in a massive downtown parade in Manila. Eisenhower, after studying the plan, informed the General that such an endeavor would consume almost the entire budget. Nevertheless, MacArthur informed Major Eisenhower to continue with the project.

In the course of preparations for the maneuvers Eisenhower

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[57]"MacArthur Remains at Quezon's Behest," The New York Times, January 1, 1938, p. 10.

told the Philippine President of the plan. Quezon immediately contacted MacArthur and ordered the General to cancel the project. MacArthur denied that he had ever issued the orders and blamed the entire project on Eisenhower. According to Eisenhower, the friendly relationship that had existed in the military adviser's office was never again the same.[58] To make matters worse for the General, Major Ord was killed in an airplane crash while on an inspection tour of the training centers.[59]

The training difficulties were somewhat alleviated when the United States Congress passed a bill which authorized Philippine Army personnel to attend U. S. Army schools on a space available basis from 1 July 1938 until 1945.[60] Unfortunately, only a small percentage of the Philippine Army were able to attend the U. S. Army training centers. For the rest of the men training was provided in the regional training centers based on the programs formulated by the Philippine General Staff and General MacArthur.

The majority of the Filipino recruits' training time was concerned with inspections, ceremonies and close order drill. Subjects such as chemical defense, aircraft defense

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[58] James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol. I, pp. 525-526.

[59] Ibid., p. 532.

[60] U. S. Congress, Senate, A Bill to Authorize the Attendance of Philippine Army Personnel to Schools of the U. S. Army, S 3629, 75th Congress, 3rd Sess., 1938, p. 4377.

and firing practice ranked only slightly above the amount of hours devoted to sex hygiene.[61] To be sure, in most armies of the world, including the U. S. Army, a great deal of time was devoted to close order drill. However, in the Philippine Army the amount seemed to be extremely high. Thus, an army that could do little more than march was being produced.

Graft was first noticed in the Philippine Army in 1937, when the Chief of Staff published a memorandum to all troops concerning the "excessive loss of equipment."[62] In another bulletin published in August 1938, the Chief of Staff noted that in inspections of the various training centers discrepancies were noted in property accountability, lack of receipts and ration allowances. Furthermore, post exchanges were giving unlimited credit to civilians.[63]

Despite the serious problems with money, training, lack of equipment and graft, General MacArthur issued a a glowing report to the Philippine Legislature and the press corps. He termed the year 1938 as one of progress along the lines already established in the defense plan. In fact the General stated that "in every specialized line of activity

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[61] Philippine Army Training Memoranda, Training Directives (Manila: Army Headquarters, 1937-1941), Directive Number 33.

[62] Philippine Army Bulletins (Manila: Mimeograph, Army Headquarters, January, 1936 - November, 1941), Bulletin Number 187.

[63] Ibid., Bulletin Number 130.

considerable advances were being made."[64] The only change made in the initial plan was the separation of the constabulary from the regular army.[65] The Washington Star quoted observers who stated that the Philippines were ready to defend themselves and fully equipped for freedom.[66] The Manila Bulletin went a step further and proclaimed that the Philippine Army was ready for action and could put 100,000 men on the beach in twenty-four hours to defend their homeland.[67]

Obviously the purpose of the reports was in part to whip up enthusiasm for the defense plan. However, optimistic reports did not train men, supply equipment, or compensate for a lack of money. In 1939 General MacArthur was forced to face the hard fact that he simply did not have enough money. MacArthur sent Philippine Army Chief of Staff, General Valdes, a memorandum in which he informed Valdes that unexpected problems affecting the government's income made it necessary to limit military expenditures. The General instructed Valdes to make savings in barracks maintenance, clothing expenses, target practice, gasoline purchases, library expenses,

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[64] A Memorandum on National Defense, 1939, DMMA, RG 1, Box 2, pp. 1-5.

[65] Ibid.

[66] P. W. Reeves, "Observers Say Filipinos Are Fully Equipped for Freedom," The Sunday Star, December 3, 1939, p. 20.

[67] Carlos Niveria, "The Philippine Army is Ready for Action," The Manila Bulletin, February 20, 1939, p. 1.

and other smaller items of expense.[68]

The wisdom of cutting those items from the military budget must be questioned. General MacArthur stressed the importance of mobility and firepower in his initial proposal for the establishment of a Philippine Army. Yet the items reduced in the defense budget were needed to achieve that goal. Mobile troops required highly trained officers, yet the library expenses were cut; mobile troops had to be proficient with their weapons in order to supply the necessary firepower, but target practice was reduced. Above all a mobile force needed vehicles to practice rapid manuevers, yet gasoline purchases were reduced.

Perhaps the only advantage gained from the lack of funds was the decision to consolidate the training centers. Beyond that, however, General MacArthur continued to proclaim that the first objective of the Philippine Defense Plan was to defeat the enemy on the beaches - a goal that could only be accomplished by universal military service.[69]

Optimism may have been the order of the day in MacArthur's headquarters, but that was certainly not the case in the office of General Fidel V. Segundo, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, of the Philippine Army. General Segundo prepared a memorandum in which he suggested

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[68]Unpublished Memorandum from General MacArthur to General Valdes, May 20, 1939, DMMA, RG 1, Box 2.

[69]Unpublished Memorandum from General MacArthur to President Manuel Quezon, December 8, 1939, DMMA, RG 1, Box 1, pp. 1-19.

that the General Staff prepare its own budget. In order to prove his point Segundo pointed out in rapid fire fashion the problems that vexed the Philippine Army. First he noted that the First Division of the Philippine Army, which had been intended as the professional core of the army, was composed almost entirely of trainees. Second, the air corps and the off-shore patrol, even when completely developed would be too small to accomplish their assigned missions. Third, Segundo criticized the tables of organization that listed units as having equipment which they did not have. Finally, he objected to the lack of reserve ammunition and the bare training budget that left the army no opportunity to experiment with new methods of warfare or to try out their defense plans.[70]

The Segundo memorandum was a direct attack on the Philippine Defense Plan and the way it was administered. MacArthur responded by informing Segundo that President Quezon believed it was unnecessary to stockpile vast quantities of ammunition and supplies because they would deteriorate or become outmoded. Furthermore, he was told when the U. S. Army withdrew from the Philippines in 1946, large amounts of material would be left behind. Thus, the quantities of supplies needed could not be determined until that time. MacArthur pointed out that modern equipment could not be obtained for the army at the present time.

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[70]Memorandum for the Chief of Staff from Fidel Segundo, July 2, 1940, DMMA, RG 1, Box 2, pp. 1-4.

due to the conflict in Europe. The air corps was limited not by the budget or the military adviser, but because of the lack of qualified pilots. MacArthur stated that the off-shore patrol would be enlarged when the problems related to the procurement of boats were solved. The professional soldiers in the Philippine Army would be up to full strength when the Filipino Scouts were integrated into the Philippine Army in 1946. The memorandum closed tersely: "It is not believed that General Segundo understands the scope of the air corps and the off-shore patrol or the General Headquarters Combat Group."[71]

Constructive criticism was obviously not liked in the Philippine Army, but in this case it was warranted; Segundo's memorandum was long overdue. The Philippine Defense Plan had been in effect for five years. Aside from several thousand men undergoing military training, little had been accomplished. Even the training was questionable since the troops had never engaged in large scale exercises to determine their strengths and weaknesses. Military equipment was at a premium and except for the 2.95 mountain guns, the rest of the artillery existed on paper. Furthermore, little equipment was available in the United States to build up the supplies in the Philippines. When the

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[71]Memorandum from General MacArthur to General Segundo, July 2, 1940, DMMA, RG 1, Box 2, pp. 1-4.

commanding officer of the Philippine Army Ordinance Department requested supplies, the War Department informed him that there were no three-inch mortars and no machine gun tripods or 75 mm gun carriages in the United States. The best the War Department could do in response to the Philippine Army's requests for equipment was to inform them that the Commanding General of the Philippine Department had twenty 75 mm guns, but he would decide whether or not the Philippine Army received them.[72]

General MacArthur had undertaken an enormous task to which he brought extensive military and administrative experience, admiration and fondness for the Philippine people, and a deep devotion to the Philippine cause. His general plan for the defense of the Philippines implied a veritable national revolution -- to prepare and instruct a poor backward, divided and diverse, insular nation in the requirements and responsibilities of its own defense. In retrospect it appears that MacArthur's plan to develop a first-class Philippine Army in ten years was overly optimistic. Although he committed himself to the task with characteristic enthusiasm and energy, he faced overwhelming obstacles. Vital material and equipment and supplies were not available and, unfortunately, the

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[72]Unpublished letter from the Office of the Chief of Ordinance to the Commanding Officer of the Philippine Army Ordinance Department, July 3, 1940, DMMA, RG 1, Box 2.

Filipinos themselves fell short of his expectations of them. He persisted, nevertheless, and despite growing evidence to the contrary, he could not or would not acknowledge that his confidence in the Filipinos and his Philippine Defense Plan was excessive.

CHAPTER II

A FIRM STANCE IN THE PACIFIC

On May 29, 1941 General MacArthur informed General Marshall that the Philippine Army should be absorbed by the U. S. Army and that he was closing his adviser's mission. MacArthur's letter to Marshall suggesting that the Philippine Army be absorbed into the U. S. Army was not unrealistic.[1] Japan was growing bolder in China and the war in Europe was going badly for the Allies. As early as 1939 the United States had attempted to inhibit the military advances of Japan by sending the aircraft carrier Langley to bolster the Asiatic Fleet. Feelings in the United States were running high about the fear of war and even to concern about a possible invasion of the United States. One Congressman sent a letter to the Army Defense Command demanding gas masks, rifles, and field equipment for his state's militia.[2]

The War Department believed it was only a matter of time before the United States became involved in the war. In December 1940 the Joint Planning Board convened in

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[1]Unpublished Letter from General Marshall to General MacArthur, June 20, 1941, DMMA, RG 1, Box 2.

[2]"U. S. Defense Pacific Forces Strengthened, Army Divisions Streamlined," Newsweek, October 9, 1939, p. 30.

Washington, D.C., under the joint leadership of General Marshall and Admiral Stark to draw up a grand strategy in the event of war. They decided that the major portion of all United States forces and material would be committed to a Europe-first policy.[3] Marshall also believed that the Philippines should be sacrificed in the event of war unless large sums of money were spent to bolster the defense of the islands. In fact Marshall suggested that the Philippines be neutralized and that the United States should withdraw from the Far East and accept Alaska, Panama and Oahu as the western-most bastions of American strength in the Far East.[4]

An American-British Staff Conference convened in February, 1941 and solidified the report of the Joint Planning Committee on the Europe-first strategy. The conference reemphasized the importance of defeating Nazi Germany and more importantly it stated that despite the heightened aggressiveness of the Japanese, "our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory."[5]

The War Department made a dramatic change in that policy in the summer of 1941. The invasion of the Soviet

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[3]Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Ordeal and Hope, Vol. II (New York: Viking Press, 1965), p. 127.

[4]Ibid. p. 175.

[5]Ernest S. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King, A Naval Record (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1952), p. 361.

Union by Nazi Germany on 22 June 1941 negated the hope that the Soviet Union could act as a checking force against Japanese expansion. Thus, on 17 July, the War Plans Division was instructed to prepare a report on the feasibility of reinforcing the Far Eastern forces of the United States. In response to that order five courses of action were recommended:

1. The President of the United States should by executive order call into the service of the United States for the period of the existing emergency all the organized forces of the Philippine Commonwealth.
2. That General MacArthur be called to active duty in the grade of Major General and assigned as Commander in Chief of the Army in the Far East.
3. That $10,000,000 of the President's emergency fund be alloted to cover the cost of training of the Philippine Army for a period of three months.
4. That the training of the Philippine Army for a period of six to nine months be financed by the sugar excise funds or other funds appropriated by Congress for that purpose.
5. That 425 Army Reserve Officers be sent to the Philippines to assist in the mobilization and training of the Philippine Army.[6]

The entire proposal was presented by Secretary of War Henry Stimson to President Roosevelt. Stimson later said he readily gave his approval to such a plan because of the "contagious optimism" of MacArthur and the dramatic success of the B-17 bomber in Europe. Furthermore, he was concerned over the political and military ramifications if the

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[6]D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol. I (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), p. 588.

Philippines fell to the Japanese.[7]

Roosevelt wasted little time in approving the plan. On 26 July 1941, the War Department established the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). The command was to include the Philippine Department and forces of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.[8] In addition to the forces of the Philippine Commonwealth which numbered approximately 75,000 men, General MacArthur now had the forces of the Philippine Department which included 2,036 American troops of the Regular U. S. Army and 7,921 Filipino Scouts.[9]

Prior to the formation of USAFFE MacArthur had little contact with the Philippine Department except to request sorely needed supplies. The relationship of the Philippine Department to General MacArthur's plans for the defense of the Philippines is difficult to ascertain. For example, when Admiral Thomas Hart arrived in the Philippines in the summer of 1939 to take command of the Asiatic Fleet, he was extremely surprised at the lack of contact between MacArthur and the U. S. Army in the Philippines. The General never attended social functions given by the officers of the

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[7]Henry L. Stimson & McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, Vol. I (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 395.

[8]Unpublished General Order Number 1, July 27, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

[9]Louis Morton, The United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, D.C., 1953), p. 22.

Philippine Department.[10] General Grunert, Commanding General of the Philippine Department, kept a most meticulous list of official and unofficial calls, and in the period before USAFFE was formed, he never made or received a call from MacArthur.[11] The absence of a working relationship between the two commands at high levels was shared by subordinate officers in the Philippine Department. Some of the officers in the department had a distinct dislike for the new government in the Philippines. For example, Colonel William Braly wrote to his wife that:

> Quezon spoke in generalities so he could always say that he was misquoted and that he (Quezon) was made because Mr. Sayre (High Commissioner to the Philippines) would not let him get his greedy mitts on any of the defense money so he could pass it out to his friends.[12]

To be sure, it would be wrong to say that every officer in the Philippine Department harbored dislike and mistrust toward the Philippine government. However, there did exist a certain amount of disdain for the Philippine government and the Philippine Army.

General MacArthur faced formidable problems in organizing USAFFE. Although the Philippine Army had rudimentary training

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[10] The Reminiscences of Thomas C. Hart, (Columbia University: Oral Research History Office, 1962), p. 94.

[11] U. S. Army Military History Research Collection, The George Grunert Papers Box 1, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pa.

[12] U. S. Army Military History Research Collection, The William C. Braly Papers, A letter to wife dated 15 June 1941, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pa.

it had to be brought up to a fully trained status by American officers. The Army Air Force, which was to be reinforced by heavy bombers and pursuit aircraft, was still small. Finally, there were the problems of supplies for the entire force and the organization of a high command.

The first order of business for the new Commanding General was the selection of a General Staff. On 28 July 1941 Colonel Carl H. Seals, Lt. Colonel C. L. Irwin, Lt. Colonel L. C. Beebe and Major L. A. Diller reported to USAFFE headquarters for staff duty. The staff's first assignment was to form a war college committee to study the billeting requirements for the Philippine Army and decide what specific units of the Philippine Army would be called up.[13] On 28 July the General appointed Lt. Colonel Richard K. Sutherland, who had replaced Eisenhower as MacArthur's assistant in 1937, as Chief of Staff of USAFFE. In addition, he appointed Seals as Adjutant General and Diller as his Aide de Camp.[14] The General Staff assignments were finalized on 28 September when General Order #8 was published:

1. Chief of Staff -- Brigadier General Richard K. Sutherland
2. Deputy Chief of Staff -- Lt. Colonel R. J. Marshall
3. Assistant Chief of Staff for G-1 -- Lt. Colonel William F. Marquat

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[13]General MacArthur's Journal, July 28, 1941, DMMA, RG2, Box 2, pp. 1-2.

[14]General Order No. 2, July 28, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

4. Assitant Chief of Staff G-3 -- Lt. Colonel Constant Irwin
5. Assitant Chief of Staff G-4 -- Lt. Colonel Lewis C. Beebe
6. Acting Quartermaster -- Colonel Charles C. Drake.[15]

The paucity of supplies was a serious problem to the new command in the Far East. The early decisions of the Joint Planning Committee and the American-British Staff Conference had, until the President's decision in July, made the Philippines a garrison of secondary importance. Prior to the formation of USAFFE, there was only enough equipment for the U. S. Army troops and even they were lacking the critical material. Resupply of the Philippines demanded a long sea voyage from the United States on freighters that were in short supply due to European shipping demands.

However, once the decision to reinforce the Philippines was made, all efforts were made in the War Department to expedite the buildup of supplies and men. General MacArthur received word from the War Department in July that plans were nearly complete to send nine B-17 bombers to the Philippines as soon as staging fields on Wake and New Britain were completed. He also learned that twenty-five 75 mm guns mounted on half-tracks were placed on transports leaving the United States on 18 September and another twenty-five 75 mm guns were being sent on the October transport.

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[15]General Order No. 8, September 28, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

In addition to the equipment a company of light tanks, a regiment of National Guard troops trained in anti-aircraft defense, 24,000 rounds of anti-tank ammunition, and 425 reserve army officers were to be sent forward.[16]

Requests for material burned the wires between the Philippines and Washington D C. On 9 August USAFFE requested two Brigadier Generals, ten Colonels, of whom seven would command Philippine Army divisions, thirty Lt. Colonels slated to be regimental commanders and instructors, and 104 Lt. Colonels or Majors as infantry field officers. In addition, he requested two Adjutant Generals, twenty officers from the Quartermaster Corps, ten engineering officers, four ordinance officers, and four signal officers for administrative and staff work.[17] This request was followed by another for equipment for ten divisions of the Philippine Army, 19,500 Garand rifles, machine guns, more 75 mm guns, and additional equipment such as field glasses and aiming circles.[18]

These early requests indicated that the Philippines were woefully short of equipment of all types, and second, that the Philippine Army in its five year existence had never solved its difficulties in the areas of supply and

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[16]Unpublished Memorandum from the War Department to General MacArthur, August 1, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

[17]Radiogram from Colonel Carl H. Seals to Washington, August 9, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

[18]Raidogram from Colonel Carl H. Seals to Washington, August 22, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

training. The need for material was a pressing problem that had not been solved by the time the war began. The USAFFE command also had an acute shortage of trained personnel. On 2 September USAFFE sent another request for 300 officers in the fields of anti-tank warfare, machine guns, and communications, as well as 127 infantry officers.[19] Still another request was dispatched to the War Department for two regiments of 155 mm howitzers, three regiments of 105 mm howitzers, another regiment of anti-aircraft personnel, and a signal company.[20]

In October USAFFE requested a 250-bed hospital and 180 sets of regimental infirmary equipment to be delivered by 15 December 1941.[21] The most important communique that MacArthur received in relation to the supply problem arrived on 24 October. General Marshall informed the USAFFE Commanding General that commencing 1 November 1941 shipments to the Philippines would arrive, subject to the availability of freighters and equipment, in the following order:

1. Between 20 November and 1 February, shipments totaling 15,000 measurement tons consisting of troops and impediments would arrive to complete 82,000 tons of divisional equipment for the Philippine Army, along with 220,000 tons of corps and Army equipment necessary for the

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[19]Radiogram from Colonel Carl H. Seals to Washington, September 2, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

[20]Unpublished Letter from General MacArthur to General Marshall, November 17, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1, pp. 1-2.

[21]Unpublished Message to the Surgeon General from Carl Robinson, Adjutant General, October 23, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1.

Philippine Army would be sent.

2. Beginning 1 December the above supplies would arrive, subject to the availabilty of shipping and supplies in the following order: first half of December five freighters followed by nine freighters on the second half of December. In the first half of January fifteen freighters would be sent with another ten to follow in the second half of that month. Ten freighters were scheduled to arrive in the first half of February followed by another five in the second half of the month. In March five freighters would arrive.[22]

The Regular Army in the Philippines as well as the Philippine Army desperately lacked equipment and men. The War Department, on the other hand, was faced with a shortage of supplies and cargo vessels due to the effort then underway to reinforce the beleagured British. Since the war in the Far East was not expected to begin until the spring of 1942, the entire garrison in the Philippines, consisting of regular U. S. Army troops and the Philippine Army, would be fully supplied to meet that eventuality.

The question of supplies played an important role in the Philippines and has been called "the" reason for the defeat suffered in the Philippine Campaign. Many have accused the War Department of ignoring the problem in the Far East. That was not the case, however, judging from Marshall's response to the supply problem. In fact, General MacArthur expressed high esteem for the support he received in a letter to John O'Laughlin, editor of the Army-Navy

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[22]Radiogram from War Deaprtment to Quartermaster USAFFE, Oct. 24, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1.

Journal. MacArthur wrote that the action of President Roosevelt in forming the Far Eastern Command was "electrical," and universal support and morale rose to the point of exuberance. He stated that "I am confident that we can successfully resist any effort that may be made against us.... No field commander could have received better support from a Chief of Staff than I have from Marshall."[23]

The mobilization and training of the Philippine Army represented a very difficult task that was complicated by distance, poor communications, and a shortage of trained personnel. The first orders for the mobilization of the Philippine Army were issued on 26 July 1941, when General MacArthur informed President Quezon that the 11th, 22nd, 31st, 42nd, 52nd, 61st, 71st, 81st, 91st, and 101st Regiments of the Philippine Army along with the training cadres in each of the ten military districts in the Philippines were to report to training centers by 31 August 1941.[24] MacArthur on 30 August wrote General Marshall that the directive to organize the Philippine forces was being executed in a most orderly fashion; before the end of the year the new training camps would be constructed, and the remaining troops would be called to complete the divisions already in training. The

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[23]Unpublished Letter from General MacArthur to John Callan O'Laughlin, October 6, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1, pp. 1-2.

[24]Unpublished Letter from General MacArthur to President Manuel Quezon, August 1, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

only problem that MacArthur mentioned was that Philippine Army units had poor training above the battalion level, but the "whole program is progressing by leaps and bounds."[25]

The tasks of training the troops of the Philippine Army fell on the regular officers of the Philippine Department. General George Gurnert, Commanding General of the Phillipine Department, informed his officers that the mission of their command was two-fold. Their first job was to keep U. S. Army troops in a state of readiness for a combat mission and nothing should interfere with that objective. Their secondary mission was to initiate a training program for the Philippine Army.[26] However, the regulars not only had the task of training the Filipino troops, they also had to train their own reinforcements that were arriving from the United States. Many of the American officers looked on their new duties with a lackluster attitude mixed with contempt. Colonel William Braly wrote his wife that a new National Guard outfit arrived and had been stationed at Fort Stotsenburg. He said that his unit would be responsible for the training of the new outfit and "they will need plenty of it." They did not make a very good impression on their arrival.[27] The training

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[25]Unpublished Letter from General MacArthur to General Marshall, August 30, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, pp. 1-2.

[26]The George Grunert Papers, A Memorandum from Grunert, August 22, 1941, Box 1.

[27]The William Braly Papers, A Letter of October, 1941 Box 1.

duties also wore on the nerves of the officers and enlisted men. Colonel Clinton A. Pierce wrote that the morale of the soldiers was not good. "They had been hearing wolf too long and doing the same things regulars have been doing for years with the added restrictions on recreation time that makes many training camps into a type of concentration camp."[28] Some men were perturbed by the increased duties:

> Since Doug has taken over the troops are in a bit of a dither. Doug has dragged his existing staff from department and division setups....The R A (Regular Army) has to train the Philippine Army even though Doug has received a penthouse and $50,000 per annum to see that they were.[29]

That was but one sample of the strong feelings against the Philippine Army.

The training of the Philippine Army before the war was very important since it constituted the bulk of the defense forces. MacArthur was completely optimistic about the readiness of the Philippine Army in his reports to General Marshall. MacArthur reported that the status of the training of the Philippine Army "has progressed beyond expectations." Furthermore, a construction program had been initiated and he reported that it was making excellent progress. In fact MacArthur considered the progress so good that he informed the U. S. Army Adjutant General that War Plan Orange Three,

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[28]U. S. Army Military Research Collection, The Clinton A. Pierce Papers, A Letter of October, 1941, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pa.

[29]Ibid., A letter of September 16, 1941.

the U. S. Army plan for the defense of the Philippines, was no longer in effect. MacArthur believed that the entire island of Luzon could now be defended since the development of the Philippine Army proved a "sufficient force to accomplish such a mission."[30]

General MacArthur's optimism was not shared by those in the lower echelons of command who were charged with the responsibility of training the Philippine Army. For example, Major Clifford Bluemel wrote that when the 31st division of the Philippine Army was organized on 18 November, rations had to be purchased by the individual companies. The only uniforms the men had were blue fatigues and canvas shoes with a minimal amount of equipment per company.[31] In one battalion of the 31st Infantry Division, Philippine Army, each man had fired a total of only thirty-five rounds of ammunition. Before any more practice rounds could be fired, the rifle range had been closed. Rifle companies in the 32nd Division, Philippine Army, had also fired a total number of thirty-five rounds per man in practice firing. None of them had ever fired a 50 caliber machine gun or a trench mortar. Bluemel's conclusion was most damning:

All the enlisted men were supposed to receive

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[30]A Letter from General MacArthur to General Marshall, October 28, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1, p. 3.

[31]U. S. Army Military Research Collection, The Clifford Bluemel Papers, A Letter of November 18, 1941, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pa.

> five and one-half months training. They appear to have been proficient in two things; one, when an officer appeared, to yell attention in a loud voice, jump up and salute, the other, to demand three meals per day.[32]

The conclusion appears obvious -- that after five years of training, the Philippine Army was hardly an effective fighting force. Furthermore, the responsibility for its deficiencies belonged to its commander, General MacArthur.

General MacArthur was confronted with the massive difficulties of finding qualified administrative personnel. He had requested administrative personnel from the War Department, but until their arrival such personnel had to be provided by the Philippine Army itself.[33] The Philippine Department provided some administrative services, but this often resulted in splitting commands. For example, when the General Staff of USAFFE was formed, the message center of the headquarters of the Philippine Department was assigned to direct control of USAFFE, but matters pertaining to the routine supply and maintenance were left in the hands of the Philippine Department.[34] That sort of arrangement also was used in the formation of other commands. On 28 September 1941 the Philippine Coast Defense Command was organized and

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[32] Bluemel Papers, A letter from Bluemel, November 18, 1941.

[33] Unpublished Memorandum from General Sutherland to the Commanding General of the Philippine Dept., October 7, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1.

[34] General Order No. 9, August 30, 1941, DMMA, RG 2. Box 2.

placed under direct control of USAFFE except for routine administrative matters which were to be handled by members of the Philippine Department.[35]

The officers in the Philippine Department were apparently upset and confused over the barrage of orders that changed commands and sent personnel from one command to another. Colonel Pierce, in a letter to his wife wrote, "things over here are a bit on the frantic side. The situation is evidently one to make the boys higher up rush into grandiose preparations without the tools."[36] Many other officers were even more vocal about the problems engendered by the administrative procedures of USAFFE. One officer, obviously in a state of consternation over these problems, wrote:

> The only reason it has succeeded at all is that every one pitched in with the greatest good will in the world, and has been doing his damdest.... We have had three bosses USAFFE Headquarters, Philippine Department, and the Philippine Army. Manila has not yet made up it mind what it's going to do far less how its going to do it."[37]

Difficulties in administration were not confined solely to the USAFFE command, however. The construction of airfields and fortifications in the Philippines had to be completed with

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[35]General Order No. 7, August 26, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

[36]Pierce Papers, Letter of October 11, 1941.

[37]U. S. Army War College Military History Collection, The William Braddock Papers, A Letter of November 16, 1941, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pa.

the greatest possible speed. In order to accomplish that goal, a large amount of heavy construction equipment was needed and since the army had little equipment, it hoped that much of it could be borrowed from the Philippine Department of Public Works. Things apparently worked well until November 1941 when the Public Works Department demanded that their equipment be returned for use in national flood control projects.[38]

General MacArthur was obviously confronted with serious problems in the administration of his command. Many of those problems were not his fault since he was forced to deal quickly with the larger problem of creating a viable fighting force. Therefore, much of the criticism of the officers in the field was unwarranted. However, the separation of command - to assume direct control over a unit and then subordinate its supply and maintenance to another command - created severe problems when the war came. It meant, for example, that a unit could be sent to support a position in the line without the necessary supplies to carry out its mission. Even more important, howver, was the confusion created by placing subordinate commanders directly under the control of USAFFE. Under combat conditions they had to depend on USAFFE, rather than a local commander, for their orders. The over-centralization of the command structure also created

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[38]Unpublished letter from V. Frangante, Director of Public Works to Colonel H. H. Stickney, October 21, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1.

a severe communications problem, because only a small staff was available to receive and handle a very large flow of information. Under those conditions important or vital information did not receive prompt attention or was misplaced or lost. Field commanders, therefore, had to act on their own responsibility or not at all. But most important, USAFFE Headquarters could react not with events but only in their wake.

The geographic position of the Philippines made cooperation with the Asiatic Fleet imperative to the completion of measures for the defense of the Philippines. Admiral Thomas Hart, who had commanded the fleet since 1939, was directly responsible for the Navy's contribution to the mission. War Plan Orange Three made the Asiatic Fleet responsible for the protection of a limited sea frontier and the coastal areas around Subic Bay and Manila Harbor. However, with the formation of USAFFE and MacArthur's more aggressive plans for defense of the Philippines the Navy's mission should have been modified. That required close cooperation between USAFFE and the U. S. Navy.

Unfortunately, the necessary cooperation never materialized and the failure to secure it had a disastrous effect on the campaign. The subject of cooperation first came to the fore in September during a conversation between General MacArthur and Admiral Hart. Hart raised the subject by suggesting that a joint operational command be established.

MacArthur assumed Hart meant that the Navy's air force in the Philippines and the Army Air Corps would be placed under one command. However, Hart quickly corrected any such notion. He sent a letter to MacArthur stating that he was only referring to the "facilities" for such a command.[39]

Before MacArthur could reply, the two men clashed over a minor incident. This occurred when Navy Shore Patrol personnel arrested Army personnel on leave in Shanghai China. Since MacArthur held authority over all Army personnel in the Far East the matter came to his attention. He sent a letter to Hart complaining of the interference of the Navy in Army affairs.[40] After a short time Hart dropped his claim to Naval authority over Army personnel in Changhai. Nevertheless the exchange seems to have been the beginning of a less than cordial relationship between the two commands.

Following the shore patrol incident Hart sent another letter to MacArthur concerning the plausibility of organizing joint operational control of aircraft over water areas. The Admiral suggested that the Navy control all scouting, patrol and reconnaissance over water. In addition the Navy

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[39]Unpublished letter from Admiral Hart to General MacArthur, August 14, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

[40]Unpublished letter from General MacArthur to Admiral Hart, October 19, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2, pp. 1-2.

would assist in the attack on all foreign military expeditions that threatened the island of Luzon. If the attack took place in areas where U. S. Navy ships were operating, the Navy should assume direct control of the attacking aircraft and pursuit units attacking the enemy ships.[41]

MacArthur's reply to Hart's letter was final and bordered on rudeness. He stated that after consideration of Hart's letter of 23 October, he found the plan for Navy control of Army Air Corps over water "entirely objectionable." To support his objections the General cited the policies of the Joint Board. The mission of the Army, MacArthur declared, was to defend the coast of the Philippine frontier in cooperation with the Navy, to conduct air raids against the enemy, to support the Navy in rading hostile sea communications, and to cooperate with associated powers. The Navy's mission, MacArthur went on, was to support the Army in the defense of the Philippines and to protect the shipping of the United States. However, the most important part of the letter was MacArthur's contention that "the mission of the Asiatic Fleet so far as its strategic employment is not known to me nor have I been informed as to what you may have in contemplation."[42] MacArthur continued that

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[41]Unpublished Letter from Admiral Hart to General MacArthur, October 23, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1, pp. 1-3.

[42]Unpublished Letter from General MacArthur to Admiral Hart, November 7, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1, pp. 1-4.

the role of the Army Air Corps in the Philippines was to strike an enemy force committed to attack the Philippines or a force in the position to execute such an attack. Only under the "most extraordinary circumstances" could units of the Army Air Corps operate with units of the Navy.

The real barb in the letter was MacArthur's statement that the term "Fleet" could hardly be applied to the two cruisers and one division of destroyers that comprised the surface elements of the naval command. "This is especially striking when judged against the potential enemy naval forces in the Western Pacific or the air force of this command." Thus it was "manifestly illogical" to assign control or tactical command of such a powerful air strike force to an element of "such combat inferiority as your command."[43]

The letter to Hart ended any attempt to secure cooperation with the Navy. Hart's only reply was to disagree, but he offered no new alternatives.[44] Consequently, as late as November 1941, there was never an attempt to plan a scouting force utilizing the Naval resources at hand, meager as they were, in the defense of the Philippines. Furthermore, not only was the Army unaware of the Navy's plans for the defense of the Philippines, but the Navy too was in the dark

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[43]Ibid.

[44]Unpublished Letter from Admiral Hart to General MacArthur, November 12, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1, pp. 1-3.

as to what the Army under MacArthur wanted to do in the Philippines. Thus, lack of cooperation existed not only in the Philippines but also in Washington where the buildup had been initiated.

Prior to the formation of USAFFE, air power in the Philippines was almost non-existent. The Army Air Corps consisted of 158 obsolete aircraft. The fledgling Philippine air force had only sixty-three aircraft.[45] That situation, however, changed rapidly when MacArthur received word on 26 July that plans were underway to send nine B-17 bombers to the Philippines.

Priority was then given to the construction of new air fields in the Philippines and the merging of the Philippine Army Air Force into the U. S. Army Air Corps. On 4 August 1941 the air force of the Philippine Department was informed that it would "operate directly under the control of the Commanding General of USAFFE except for routine administration and supply which will be handled by members of the Philippine Department."[46] The following day the Philippine Air Corps was called into the service of the U. S. Army, effective on 15 August 1941.[47] MacArthur's

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[45]Unpublished Memorandum from Colonel H. H. George to General MacArthur, August 14, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1.

[46]General Order No. 4, August 4, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

[47]General Order No. 5, August 5, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

placing the U. S. Army Air Corps directly under his command is a very important point, since that order gave MacArthur direct responsibility for all American air power in the Far East.

He wrote that all he needed to complete the advance preparations for more aircraft was more money and construction equipment.[48] The portent of the message was that MacArthur, like the War Department, believed that war would come in the Spring of 1942 and not before. Unfortunately, the one commodity that the forces in the Philippines needed was time and Washington could not supply that.

The mission of the bombardment squadrons also formed an interesting question. On 11 September 1941 Brigadier General H. B. Clagget prepared an official report on the United States Army Air Corps in the Far East for General MacArthur. The first subject treated in the report was the tactical employment of the expanding air force. Clagget believed that offensive-defensive missions from the Philippines could find some 61 major land targets within a non-stop range from the Philippines and some 900 additional targets in the Japanese Navy. Those targets could be destroyed with a force of 262 aircraft over a period of twenty days, as long as replacements of aircraft and crews were available. To accommodate such a force required fifty-six air fields,

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[48]Unpublished Radiogram from General MacArthur to the Adjutant General, August 19, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2, pp. 1-2.

13,559,900 gallons of gasoline, 67,995 gallons of oil and 7,192 tons of bombs.[49]

The targets for this force numbered fourteen in Formosa, thirty-two in Indo-China, seven major target areas in the small Japanese-held islands which included the Pescadores, Pelew, Waichow, Amoy, Itu Ada, Patas and Hainan.[50] Thus the decision to reinforce the Army Air Corps in the Far East was not only a major decision but also involved thousands of tons of supplies and thousands of support personnel, not to mention the construction of fifty-six air fields. However, most important were the target lists. According to a report received by General MacArthur in September 1941, Formosa was definitely listed as a target area.

On 10 October the question was raised as to the Feasibility of bombing Tokyo. However, close examination of the operational ranges and bomb loads carried on the B-17's disclosed that Tokyo could be bombed only if Vladivostok could be used as a base of operations. Since the use of Soviet territory was out of the question, at least for the near future, the bombing of Tokyo was tabled. The industrial areas in Southern Japan were considered to be in the realm of the possible and marked for further study.[51] In addition

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[49]Unpublished Memorandum from General Clagget to General MacArthur, September 11, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1, pp. 1-14.

[50]Ibid.

[51]Unpublished Memorandum, October 10, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1, pp. 1-3.

to the study of targets, it was decided to establish bases on Rabaul, New Britain, Port Moresby, Port Darwin, Rockhampton and Australia. These fields would permit the United States to control the sea routes between Japan, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies.[52] The force of B-17 bombers began arriving in the Phillipines 5 September 1941. An officer wrote that "it was a real thrill and gave us all a feeling that our boys are good and Charlie (the Japanese) better watch out."[53] Since there was no general air officer in the Philippines qualified to assume command of such a large unit, the War Department offered General MacArthur the choice of one of three general officers for the post of Commanding General of the Far East Air Force: Major General Lewis H. Brereton, Major General Jacob Eufickel, or Brigadier General Walter H. Frank.[54] As if to underscore the need for such an officer, MacArthur was notified the same day that twenty-six B-17's and another ten aircraft of the 19th Bombardment Squadron had left the United States for the Philippines.[55] General MacArthur requested the services of Major General Lewis H. Brereton as Commanding General of the Far Eastern Air Force.

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[52]Ibid.

[53]Pierce Papers, U. S. Army Research Collection, Carlisle Barracks, Letter of September 16, 1941.

[54]Unpublished Message from General Marshall to General MacArthur, September 30, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1.

[55]Unpublished Memorandum from Major H. G. Quinn to General MacArthur, September 30, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1.

General Brereton was informed on 5 October that he had been selected for the position, and according to his diaries, he faced the prospect of the new command with something less than joy. He informed General Arnold that he considered it "extremely hazardous" to place heavy bombers in an area that lacked sufficient fighter protection and long range warning equipment.[56] Brereton was justifiably correct in voicing his concern over conditions in the Philippines since he was assuming a heavy responsibility in his new command. Brereton had a formidable job on his hands. There were air detectors in the Philippines for long range warning but no personnel to assemble them.[57] As late as 9 October requests were just being initiated for airstrips at Del Carmen, O'Donnel and Lipa fields. Furthermore, Nichols and Clark Fields needed underground storage tanks.[58]

Brereton arrived in the Philippines to take charge of his new assignment on 4 November 1941, just one month and three days before the war began. He delivered to MacArthur a personal letter from General Marshall. When MacArthur read it he exclaimed to Sutherland, his Chief of Staff,

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[56]Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, The War in the Air in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941 to 8 May 1945 (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1946), p. 6.

[57]Unpublished Radiogram from General MacArthur to War Department, October 6, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1.

[58]Unpublished Memorandum from Captain J. R. Manerow to Dept. Engineer, Philippine Dept., October 9, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1.

"Dick, they're going to give us everything we need."[59] Later in the day Brereton asked Sutherland about the possibility of war, and the latter replied that it would not happen before 1942.[60]

If Brereton's memory was correct concerning the meeting on 4 November, then the contention by some MacArthur supporters that Washington did not send supplies to the Philippines for personal reasons was not true. The supplies never arrived because no one expected war before April 1942.

Brereton's inspection of existing facilities offered him little comfort. The most acute shortage existed in qualified personnel. There were no medical, communications, or weather officers. Brereton instituted a new training plan in which forty percent of all training was done at night. In addition he placed one squadron of bombers and one squadron of fighters on constant readiness.[61] On 6 November Brereton published his staff assignments: Chief of Staff, Colonel Francis M. Brady; Major Charles H. Caldwell, Assistant Chief of Staff, and acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Colonel Harold H. George, former commander of the Army Air Force in the Philippines was appointed G-4.[62] The staff assignments

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[59]Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, pp. 19-20.

[60]Ibid. [61]Ibid., p. 22.

[62]General Orders No. 6, November 6, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1.

themselves bore testimony to the shortage of personnel in the Far Eastern Air Force, since some officers held two positions. Furthermore, it indicated that when the War Department reinforced the Philippines, it proceeded in a most haphazard fashion since there were no weather or air officers in the Philippines - posts absolutely essential to carry out long-range bombing missions. It also indicated that General MacArthur was unaware of the needs of a large air force, since he had not requested officers to fill those billets.

Brereton continued his heavy work load and even went to Australia to find new fields for bombers. According to his diaries he submitted plans for construction of two airfields on Mindanao and asked permission to make two high level reconniassance flights over Formosa. He was refused permission to make the reconnaissance flights but did secure permission to locate two squadrons of B-17's on Del Monte Field, Mindanao.[63]

Nevertheless, optimism was the order of the day in the Philippines. After the inception of the USAFFE, MacArthur continually sent letters to Marshall about the rapid and successful progress of the Philippine Army, and he announced that War Plan Orange Three which provided for a hold-out on Bataan was suspended in favor of a defense of the entire island of Luzon. MacArthur hoped to accomplish

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[63]Brereton, Brereton Diaries, pp. 33-35.

the defense of the entire archipelago with the organization of the seven Philippine Army Divisions and the regular troops of the U. S. Army into three forces: a Northern Luzon Force (NLF), a Southern Luzon Force (SLF), and a general reserve of three divisions of which two were to be located in the Visayans and one in Mindanao.[64]

The Northern Luzon Force (NLF) was constituted on 1 November under the Command of Brigadier General E. P. King with its headquarters at Fort Stotsenburg in Pampaganga province. Its troop strength consisted of U. S. Army troops at Fort Stotsenburg, elements of the Philippine Division and the 86th Field Artillery (155mm guns). In addition the NLF had the Philippine Army units stationed at Campidel Pilar which included the 11th, 21st, 31st, and 91st Divisions.[65]

The Southern Luzon Force was established under the command of Brigadier General George M. Parker. The SLF's headquarters were located at Fort William McKinley in Rizal Province. The command consisted of one regiment of Philippine Constabulary, engineer cadres of Canalubang and Camp Murphy, and all elements of the 41st, 51st, and 71st Divisions of the Philippine Army.[66]

The Visayan-Mindanao Force was placed under the command

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[64]General Orders No. 20, November 1, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1, pp. 1-2.

[65]Ibid.

[66]Ibid.

of Colonel William Sharp with headquarters at Fort San Pedro, Cebu; it included all elements of the Philippine Army stationed in the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th military districts of the Philippines.[67]

In addition General MacArthur made some changes in the General Staff. Colonel Charles A. Willoughby was made Chief of Staff of the SLF, and Colonel William Marquat was assigned as the Chief of the Philippine Coast Artillery.[68] Also the 21st, 41st, 61st, 71st, 81st and 91st Field Artillery units of the Philippine Army were mobilized.[69]

November was the last full month of peace and life that many would see in the Philippines. As early as 27 January 1941 the diplomatic world had been hearing rumors of an impending Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.[70] In November the Philippine Constabulary picked up information from an informant that Japanese officers in the Tokydo, a night spot, had talked of war between the United States and Japan in the next four months.[71]

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[67]General Order Number 20, November 1, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1, pp. 1-2.

[68]Ibid.

[69]Unpublished Memorandum form Colonel J. T. Menzie to Commanding General NLF, November 4, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1, pp. 1-2.

[70]Message from the Navy Department to the Secretary of State, November 29, 1941, U. S., Foreign Relations of the United States 1941, The Far East, Vol. IV (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 17.

[71]Ibid., p. 699.

Both MacArthur and the civilian press remained optimistic about the abilities of the USAFFE command. MacArthur wrote Marshall that "I have every confidence we can hold our own."[72] The press bolstered public opinion in the United States and the Philippines by articles with titles such as "If War Comes We Will Not be Caught Dozing."[73] Newspapers in the United States ran similar stories resplendent with photographs of men and equipment under headlines such as "The Man Japan Fears Most."[74]

Although the Japanese respected General MacArthur they had little cause for concern in December 1941. Despite the rhetoric of the press and the optimistic letters of General MacArthur, the Philippines were not prepared for war. Perhaps the event that typified the entire process of reinforcements of the Philippines occurred on 7 December 1941, the last full day of peace in the islands. Eight wooden wheeled 75 mm guns were delivered to the troops of the Philippine Army without fire control equipment, while unit strength was raised to its full level by inducting men with little or no training.[75]

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[72]Unpublished Letter from General MacArthur to General Marshall, December 1, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 1, pp. 1-2.

[73]"How We Will Do It," Philippine Commonwealth Magazine, November 9, 1941, p. 7.

[74]Henry C. Wolfe, "Meet the Man Japan Fears Most," The Atlanta Constitution, This Week Magazine, November 30, 1941, pp. 4-7.

[75]The Clifford Bluemel Papers, U. S. Army Historical Research Military History Collection, U. S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pa.

The six-month period from July to December was an important one. The period witnessed a dramatic turn-around in the policy of the United States in the Far East. It also began to show the chinks in the armor of the Philippine Army, and the inability of anyone to transform a citizen army overnight into an effective fighting force. It was during this period, moreover, that MacArthur decided to utilize his forces to defend the entire island of Luzon.

CHAPTER III

THE WAR BEGINS

On 15 November 1941 General Marshall summoned seven newsmen to his headquarters in Washington, D.C., for a secret briefing. He told them that the United States and Japan were on the brink of war and it was hoped that if the Philippines were reinforced war might be forestalled in the Far East.[1] Unfortunately the American buildup had little effect; on 15 November the Assistant Naval Attache in Shanghai reported an unusual number of ships at the Woosung Military Supply Depot. A few days later ten of these transports, most of them troop laden, sailed.[2] In an effort to avoid an act that might be construed as "overt aggression" against Japan, General Marshall was ordered to stop any flights near Japanese installations. However, added to that message was a paragraph stating, "this policy should not, repeat, should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize the successful defense of the Philippines. Prior to Japanese action you are directed to

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[1]Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Ordeal and Hope, Vol. II (New York: Viking Press, 1965), p. 202.

[2]Message from the Assistant Naval Attache in Shanghai to Secretary of State, November 15, 1941, U. S., Foreign Relations of the United States 1941, The Far East, Vol. IV Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 633.

take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary."[3]

The United States and Japan were aware that the days of peace in the Pacific were rapidly drawing to a close. Japan sent a sharp diplomatic rejoinder to Washington concerning overflights of Formosa. The United States responded with a similar note complaining of overflights of Guam.[4]

Since the early thirties Japan made no secret of her desires for expansion in the Far East. The dreams of a greater sphere of influence in the Far East took on more hostile terms after the Japanese military took control of the government in 1936. Between 1936 and 1941 the size of the Imperial Army doubled from twenty to fifty divisions, air squadrons rose from fifty to 150 and the Navy's combat fleet reached one million tons.[5] Japanese preparations reached a zenith in October 1940 when the Total War Research Institute was established. In December 1940, three Army divisions were withdrawn from China in order to engage in tropical training, and Japanese pilots began to make daily

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[3]Pogue, George C. Marshall, p. 233.

[4]U. S., Foreign Relations of the United States 1941, p. 726.

[5]Kent Robert Green Field, Ed., Command Decisions, "Japans Decision for War" (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959), p. 66.

reconnaissance flights over the Philippines.[6]

The Japanese plan for the invasion of the Philippines was formulated by the General Staff of the Japanese Army in the fall of 1941. The final plan was completed in a series of meetings on the 13, 14 and 15 November 1941. The Japanese plan called for simultaneous air attacks on the first day of the war by the Fifth Air Group and the Eleventh Air Fleet. While the air attacks were in progress, Japanese Army and Navy units were to land on Batan Island north of Luzon, at Aparri, Vigan, Legaspi and at Davao in Mindanao in order to secure air bases to launch subsequent raids against U. S. air bases in the Philippines.[7] Following the destruction of U. S. air strength the main invasion force, the 14th Army, would land at Lingayen Gulf. At the same time another force would land at Lamon on the east coast of Luzon. These two forces were then to advance from the north and the south to converge on Manila. It was believed the U. S. forces would stand and fight at Manila and that they would be defeated there in a decisive engagement. The Japanese General Staff allotted fifty days for the entire operation.[8]

The war in the Far East began on 8 December 1941. During

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[6]Ibid., p. 67.

[7]Batan Island not to be confused with Bataan Peninsula in southern Luzon. Batan Island lies in the Luzon Strait midway between Formosa and Luzon.

[8]Louis Morton, U. S. Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 56-59.

the early hours the Japanese forces struck at Kota Bharu in Malaya, Singnora in Thailand, Singapore, Guam, Hong Kong, Wake and the Philippines. When Guam fell on 10 December and Wake on 23 December, the United States was left with no base west of Midway. This factor coupled with the heavy losses of the U. S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor meant that the Philippines were isolated except for a tenuous sea route to Australia.[9]

Admiral Hart notified MacArthur of the attack on Pearl Harbor at 3:55 a.m., 8 December 1941. The General assembled his staff and informed them that a state of hostilities existed between Japan and the United States. Immediately all troops were put on the alert and sent to their assembly points. The Philippine Constabulary was brought under military control, anti-sabotage measures were taken, and authorities began to round up all Japanese and those suspected of Axis leanings.[10] Thus MacArthur, unlike the senior officers at Pearl Harbor, received several hours warning of an impending Japanese attack on the Philippines. Authentication of the message from Pearl Harbor left no question that a state of hostilities existed.

Because General MacArthur had advanced warning, a controversy developed over the total destruction of the

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[9]Ibid., p. 77.

[10]"General MacArthur's Journal," December 8, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

Far Eastern Air Force on the ground several hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Based in the Philippines were thirty-three B-17 bombers. Sixteen of these aircraft were at Del Monte Field, out of range of air attacks. The remainder were at Clark Field. Pursuit aircraft were based at various locations in the Philippines: the 3rd Pursuit Squadron at Iba and the 17th Pursuit Squadron at Nichols; each of these squadrons contained eighteen P-40 E's. The 20th Pursuit Squadron, stationed at Clark, consisted of eighteen P-40 B's. The 21st and the 34th Pursuit Squadrons at Nichols and Del Carmen each had eighteen P-40's and P-35's; the P-40's had just arrived on 7 December and had never been properly tuned or tested for combat flying. In addition an assortment of non-combatant aircraft and twelve P-26's which belonged to the Philippine Air Force were scattered around various fields in the Philippines.[11]

The air force in the Philippines could hardly have been expected to forestall the war, since thirty-three bombers were obviously not capable of crippling the Japanese war effort. However, the bombers did present a potential threat to an invasion force, and they could have been used to interdict and harrass Japanese shipping in the Southern Pacific. However, Brereton and his staff had only planned bombing missions against Formosa.

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[11]Walter D. Edmonds, "What Happened at Clark Field," The Atlantic Monthly, October, 1951, p. 22.

The Far Eastern Air Force operated one radar station in the Philippines. At 3:00 a.m. on the morning of 8 December, fifty-five minutes before MacArthur received word of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the radar station at Iba on Luzon's west coast picked up a flight of approaching aircraft. Realizing that there were no American aircraft operating in the vicinity the radar operators notified the 3rd Pursuit Squadron at Iba. The pilots scrambled to their aircraft and in a matter of minutes were airborne with orders to intercept if the aircraft approached within twenty miles of the Philippines. The Japanese turned away before they reached the twenty mile limit.

By the time the 3rd Pursuit Squadron returned to base, word arrived that the Japanese had bombed Pearl Harbor. The 21st and the 17th Squadrons at Nichols received news of the Pearl Harbor attack at 4:30 a.m. The 17th was sent to patrol near Tarlac while the 20th patrolled near Rosales. The 34th Pursuit Squadron was finally notified at 8:00 a.m. that the war had begun.[12] Thus, the entire pursuit command was alerted long before the first bombs fell on the Philippines.

Clark Field, the only base on Luzon from which the heavy bombers could operate on long range missions had been

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[12]Ibid., pp. 22-23.

notified of Japanese hostilities at 4:00 a.m. At 5:30 a.m. all bomber pilots and their crews were assembled for a briefing, and three bombers were ordered out on patrol. However, due to mechanical difficulties only one bomber actually took off. Bombs were placed near the remaining aircraft, but they were not loaded until General Brereton returned from General MacArthur's Headquarters at 8:00 a.m. Brereton informed his staff that they could not attack until "fired upon."[13] At 8:50 a.m. USAFFE Chief of Staff General Sutherland telephoned Brereton to hold off bombing Formosa "for the present." At 9:05 a.m. USAFFE headquarters received a message that the Japanese had bombed Baguio, the summer capital of the Philippines, and also the city of Tugegarao in northern Luzon.[14] If there had been any room for doubt, by 9:30 a.m. it was clear that a state of war existed between the United States and Japan in the Philippines.

At 10:30 a.m. the B-17 bombers accompanied by P-40 escorts landed at Clark Field. At 11:30 a.m. the Iba radar station reported a large formation of aircraft headed toward the Philippines from the South China Sea. Immediately the Army Air Corps Headquarters ordered the 3rd Pursuit Squadron to intercept the incoming raid and the 34th Pursuit Squadron to cover Clark Field. Unfortunately, through a mixup in

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[13]Ibid., p. 24.

[14]Chief of Staff's Diary, "December 8, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2, p. 1.

communications the 3rd Squadron was sent to Iba and the 34th Squadron at Nichols heard that enemy forces were over Clark, but headquarters ordered them to take up a patrol position between Corregidor and Cavite. The new planes of the third flight of the 21st experienced mechanical troubles and did not leave for five minutes.[15]

In the meantime, at the direction of General MacArthur, his Chief of Staff telephoned Brereton for a report on air operations. The substance of the Brereton report was that since the start of hostilities there had been "no actual contact.... Our air force will send a mission this afternoon."[16]

While Brereton was reporting to MacArthur's headquarters, the Japanese destroyed the only operational radar station in the Philippines at Iba. Six more of the new P-40's in the 21st Squadron at Nichols experienced mechanical trouble and were forced to return to their base, while the remaining four attempted to join up with the 3rd Squadron over the China Sea. Clark Field was without fighter cover. The 34th Squadron was available but it had not received orders and was still on the ground.

With the destruction of the radar station at Iba, the only way to detect incoming aircraft was the uncertain native warning system that relied on public telephone to call the

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[15]Edmonds, "What Happened at Clark," p. 27.

[16]Ibid.

Far Eastern Air Force Headquarters at Nielson Field. Nielson was supposed to be connected to the other bases by teletype, telephone and radio. However, due to bombing attacks the wires were down, and radio communications were extremely poor. Thus it was almost impossible to warn the bases of impending raids.

At approximately 12:30 p.m. (the time given by different observers varies as much as thirteen minutes), nine hours after Pearl Harbor had been bombed and four hours after receiving reports that the Philippines had been bombed, the klaxon sounded the alert at Clark Field. High overhead a wave of Japanese aircraft dropped bombs in a diagonal pattern across the field. A second wave followed and soon the entire field was afire. A squadron of Japanese pursuit aircraft dropped low over the field and strafed every plane that was not destroyed by the bomb attacks. In forty-five minutes the operational strength of American air power in the Pacific was destroyed.[17]

The destruction of the Far Eastern Air Force was a disaster. Without air power, reconnaissance was hampered, ground support of troops was ended, and the Japanese could move with impunity. Historians have had great difficulty in assessing responsibility for that disaster. Intensive interviews have been conducted with Generals Sutherland and Brereton.[18]

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[17]Ibid., pp. 28-30.

[18]Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, p. 82.

Neither of their stories agree. General MacArthur, in an interview with the New York Times, told reporters in 1946 that he was unaware of any planned attack on Formosa and would have never given his permission for such an attack.[19]

Several facts can be determined from the existing evidence, however. First an attack was considered on Formosa, since the report to General MacArthur in September 1941 confirms that serious thought was given to it.[20] Secondly, Brereton finally did receive permission to bomb Formosa at 11:00 a.m. from USAFFE Headquarters. In response to those orders the heavy bombers were being readied on Clark Field.[21]

The question of responsibility was more difficult to determine. General MacArthur was the Commanding General, and Field Manual 101.5 makes the commander of any unit ultimately responsible for the safety of that unit.[22] Furthermore, MacArthur had assumed direct responsibility for the Far Eastern Air Force when he integrated that unit into the USAFFE high command structure. Thus MacArthur was ultimately responsible.

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[19]The New York Times, September 28, 1946, p. 6.

[20]On September 11, 1941 General Clagget prepared a study on targets for the Far Eastern Air Force for General MacArthur (see supra, Chapter II, pp. 57-58).

[21]Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, pp. 83-84.

[22]"Staff Officers' Field Manual, FM 101-5," Army War College, Carlisle, Pa., p. 1.

In the case of Brereton, however, different conclusions must be drawn. Brereton was a Major General in the U. S. Army and by virtue of his rank should have exercised some authority. Regardless of whether Formosa was to be bombed at the opening of hostilities, Brereton had immediate responsibility for the safety of the bombers. He knew that Del Monte Field was out of range of Japanese air attack. He at least should have secured permission to move his units to safety pending approval of a raid on Formosa. Furthermore, Brereton should have developed an alternative plan for the use of his aircraft, especially when a study had already determined that 220 aircraft would be needed to neutralize targets in the Formosa area.[23] Since the duty of the air officer is to advise the commanding general on the use of aircraft, it appears that Brereton failed decisively in his responsibility. Although Brereton had only arrived in the Philippines in November, that did not absolve the Commander of the Far Eastern Air Force from exercising his basic responsibilities and prerogatives for the safety of the Far East Air Force.

While Japanese air elements were busily engaged in their mission of destroying American air power, Japanese naval forces landed on Batan Island and began to build an

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[23]On September 11, 1941 General Clagget prepared a study on targets for the Far Eastern Air Force for General MacArthur (see supra, Chapter II, pp. 57-58).

air strip. However, when the success of the initial attacks on Clark Field became known, work on the airstrip was suspended.[24]

On 12 December batteries of field artillery were organized at Fort Stotsenburg with personnel from the Philippine Army and Philippine Scouts, and Philippine Constabulary personnel were activated into the Army.[25] Aside from the bombing raids, USAFFE troops had had no contact with the enemy. The Japanese were not idle, however. On the morning of the tenth the Third Gunboat Division landed at Camigun Island and established a seaplane base. The landing was not only unopposed but also unnoticed; General MacArthur reported that the enemy had not yet landed.[26]

The first major landings by Japanese forces took place on 10 December at Vigan and Aparri in northern Luzon. The 2nd Formosa Infantry regiment and 48th Division, consisting of 2,000 men under the command of Colonel Toru Tanaka, landed at Aparri. Another 2,000 troops of the 2nd battalion 2nd Formosa regiment landed at Vigan. Defending the area was the Northern Luzon Force under the command of General Jonathan H. Wainwright. Wainwright had three Filipino divisions, a Philippine Scout regiment, one battery of field artillery

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[24]Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, p. 100.

[25]"General Order No. 40," December 9, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

[26]Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, p. 106.

and a quartermaster troop to defend an area 625 miles long and a 125 miles wide.[27]

Wainwright believed that the Japanese purpose was two-fold: first, to establish airfields and second, to act as point for the major landings which he believed would occur at Lingayen Gulf. Thus, he sent only a few scout cars from the 26th Cavalry Regiment to engage the Japanese force. The only other opposition was a flight of B-17's, P-40's and P-35's which attacked the landing force at Vigan. The air strike sunk the transports Ogiwa Maru and Takao Maru and damaged a destroyer and the light cruiser Naka. It was in that action that Captain Colin P. Kelly won a posthumous Distinguished Service Cross. Despite the success of the air strike, it was the last coordinated effort by the Far Eastern Air Force in the Philippine Campaign. The Japanese, undaunted by the air strike and bad weather, seized their objective by 10:30 that morning. The only other action by the defending forces occurred on the night of 10 December when it was believed that landings had begun at Lingayen. Nervous and fearful troops opened up on a Japanese patrol boat with a major artillery barrage.[28]

Wainwright's wisdom in not opposing the Aparri landings was questionable. To be sure his troops were untrained, but

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[27]Ibid., p. 102.

[28]Ibid., p. 105.

to keep them in defensive positions, thinly spaced along a wide front, seemed to play into the hands of the Japanese who landed a sizeable force.

On 12 December 2,500 Japanese troops of Major General Nauki Kimura's 16th Division supported by a battery of 22nd Field Artillery and engineer detachments from the 1st Special Naval Landing Force landed at Legaspi in southern Luzon. Defending a zone sixty miles long and ninety miles wide was the Southern Luzon Force with two Philippine Army divisions, the 41st and 51st, under the command of General Parker. The only opposition at Legaspi occurred when two pursuit aircraft strafed the Japanese landing force. The Japanese secured their objectives by 9:00 a.m.[29]

General MacArthur, distraught that two major landings had occurred and gone relatively unopposed, became concerned over the fate of his defense force. On 13 December, he wrote General Marshall that Admiral Hart believed the Islands were doomed. MacArthur continued by stating: "I do not know the grand strategy, but I do know acutely what will follow here unless an immediate effort conceived on a grand scale is made to break the Japanese blockade. If Japan ever seizes these islands the difficulty of recapture is impossible of conception.... The Philippine Theatre of Operations is the locus of victory or defeat and I urge a strategic review of the entire

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[29]Ibid., pp. 109-112.

situation lest a fatal mistake be made."[30]

General Brereton, in a letter to MacArthur, also urged a major relief effort for the air wings. He stated that two hundred pursuit aircraft and fifty dive bombers could be sent to the Philippines on aircraft carriers. After talking to a naval acquaintance, it was Brereton's belief that the mission could be accomplished by two aircraft carriers.[31]

The portent of these two communiques is critical in the light of the controversies that swirled around the defeat of the forces in the Philippine Islands. First, it indicated that MacArthur, after five days of war realized the forces he had under his command were in peril if they did not receive reinforcements. However, even more noteworthy was that the General was apparently unaware of the Europe-first policy that had been adopted by the Joint Board in 1940. Furthermore, he had not been informed of the disastrous defeat suffered by the Navy at Pearl Harbor, since the severe losses dealt to the U. S. Fleet left little hope for relief of the Philippine Islands. The suggestion by Brereton that sufficent air reinforcements could be supplied by two carriers was another indication that USAFFE did not know how seriously U. S. Naval forces had been damaged: the U. S. Navy had only two operational

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[30]Unpublished Radiogram From General MacArthur to General Marshall, December 13, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2, pp. 1-2.

[31]Unpublished Memorandum from General Brereton to General MacArthur, December 14, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2, pp. 1-2.

aircraft carriers in the Pacific. Obviously the relief of the Philippines could not have been undertaken since the probability of success was minimal. Washington had not informed MacArthur of the nearly isolated position of the Philippine Islands.

When General MacArthur formed various commands prior to the outbreak of the war, he had assumed personal command over them. Almost every decision had to go through USAFFE headquarters. Incoming information was channeled directly to the Chief of Staff who after receiving an estimate of the situation and the field commander's decision would then approve a plan of operation. USAFFE even took control of battalion size units.[32] The Chief of Staff's log reveals the variety of decisions that were made by the General Staff. Log entries for 15 December were in part as follows:

> 3:20 PM General Parker phoned and discussed the engineer materials to go to the Southern forces.
> 4:45 PM Chief of Staff phoned Colonel Brady re decorations.
> 7:23 PM Staff Conference
> 7:40 PM Phone call that two aviators that bailed out safe and on their way to Manila.
> 7:40 PM Staff Conference continued.[33]

Decorations and the fate of two aviators were trivial matters for a commander and his staff conducting a critical campaign. The fact that so many things had to pass through

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[32]Unpublished Radio Message from Adjutant General to Commanding Officer Provisional Tank Battalion, December 12, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

[33]Chief of Staff's Log, December 15, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2, p. 8. The Chief of Staff's log is full of entries similar to n. 33.

the Chief of Staff indicated either a lack of faith in the field commanders or poor organization. Many decisions that could and should have been handled by subordinates were personally handled by the Chief of Staff or the Commanding General.

The inadequate training of many subordinate officers noted prior to the outbreak of the war was immediately apparent to the staff. USAFFE reprimanded transportation units on their poor handling of transport columns. On 11 December, after only three days of war and little opposition to Japanese landings, Wainwright reported that his troops were almost out of ammunition.[34] At a Staff Conference on the 15th, the G-2 section, intelligence, reported that they were receiving very little information from front line units while G-4, logistics, reported that many of their orders were being taken too lightly.[35] In an attempt to correct some of the problems USAFFE issued a training memorandum on 15 December that instructed troops in the proper use of camouflage, dispersion, air sentries and the importance of seeking protection and maintaining road discipline during air raids.[36] It was also noted that many

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[34]Unpublished Memorandum from E. T. Halstead to All Forces, December 18, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

[35]Chief of Staff's Log, December 15, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2, p. 8.

[36]Training Memorandum Number 3, December 15, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2, pp. 1-3.

of the remaining air fields were either unguarded or had insufficient numbers of guards.[37]

The shortage of trained officers was another sore point. In an attempt to correct it General MacArthur requested authority from Washington to appoint Filipino Scouts as officers in the Philippine Army.[38] Unfortunately, officers could not do everything. The shortage of technical personnel was dramatically revealed by numerous violations of cryptographic security.[39] By and large however, the main problem was the untrained and undisciplined enlisted men and officers of the Philippine Army. The problem with the officers was best stated by General Jones, who succeeded General Parker as Commanding Officer of the Southern Luzon Force. In a memorandum to MacArthur, Jones stated that the problem was one of leadership and command. The results were "directly proportional to the number of American leaders...." In cases where American officers have been assigned as advisers they have been forced to take command: "the Philippine Army Officers just haven't got what it takes."[40]

These deficiences were noted in the first thirteen

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[37]Memorandum from Engineering Officer to Chief of Staff, December 15, 1941, DMMA, Box 179.

[38]Unpublished Message from General MacArthur to War Department, December 15, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

[39]Unpublished Memorandum from Signal Officer to G-3, December 18, 1941, DMMA, Box 179.

[40]Unpublished Memorandum from Lt. Colonel Jesse T. Traywick to General Sutherland, DMMA, Box 179.

days of the campaign. The main Japanese landing had not yet begun and already the Philippine Army, upon which the hope of the entire defense rested, was disintegrating even before it met heavy opposition. Over four thousand Japanese troops had landed relatively unopposed against a defense force that was supposed to crush a major enemy invasion on the beaches. Admiral Hart already considered the Philippines doomed, and General MacArthur admitted the same when he indicated that he needed heavy reinforcements. The letters that he sent to the Chief of Staff before the war, when the training was going ahead by "leaps and bounds," must have seemed ironic in comparison to the letters of December 1941.

The general military situation in the Philippines was not good. By 21 December, the Far Eastern Air Force was reduced to two P-40's in Mindarao with another eleven P-40's, eight P-35's, three P-49's and two A-27's spread throughout the islands. The rest of the Air Force which included fourteen B-17's, two B-18's and one C-39 were in Australia.[41]

The naval forces at the outbreak of hostilities included four destroyers, twenty-seven submarines, three sub tenders and repair ships, six gunboats, five minesweepers, two tankers, three salvage vessels and one floating drydock based at Manila

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[41]Unpublished Aircraft Status Report from Captain J. R. Manerow to General MacArthur, December 21, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

and Olongapo along with thirty-four patrol planes. Hart ordered the entire force out of Philippine waters on the evening of 8 December when he learned of the total destruction of the Far Eastern Air Force. He left the Philippines without naval forces except for twenty-nine submarines, some P T Boats and Q Boats. These ships were handicapped, however, when Japanese bombing raids destroyed the torpedo depot. Although there were other naval units within sailing distance of the Philippines, they were never ordered in. Without firing a shot the majority of the Asiatic fleet, the only sea defense for the Philippine Islands, was withdrawn before the main Japanese landings.[42] After 8 December the only forces defending the Philippines were the ground troops awaiting the inevitable Japanese attack.

The main Japanese landing occurred on the morning of 21 December at Lingayen Gulf, just as War Plan Orange Three and General MacArthur had forecast. Seventy-six transports entered the gulf loaded to the gunwales with 43,110 men of the 14th Army under the command of Lt. General Yuichi Tsuchibashi. The force landed at three points on Lingayen Gulf - Bavang, Aringay, and Agoo. The positions chosen were excellent since they were all connected to roads leading

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[42]Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in W. W. II, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942, Vol II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948), pp. 158-166.

to Route 3, the main road to Manila.[43] Despite heavy seas and a bombing attack by four B-17's the landing was very successful.[44]

Opposing the Japanese troops were two Philippine Army divisions (the 11th and 71st) and one battery of 155 mm howitzers with the 26th Cavalry Regiment in reserve. At Bavang where initial contact was made, the Headquarters Battalion of the 12th Infantry Regiment with one fifty-caliber machine gun and several thirty-caliber machine guns met the invasion. The 26th Cavalry Regiment offered the most heroic resistance, but despite its heroism the regiment was driven back with heavy casulties, and the Japanese attained their objectives.[45]

The Japanese wasted little time in their drive from the beaches. On 23 December they pushed inland toward Agno. In an effort to thwart that move General Wainwright ordered the 71st Division of the Philippine Army to take a position astride Route 3, some nine miles inland from the initial Japanese landings. The 71st Engineers were placed in the front of the line while the 71st Field Artillery took up a support position. The 26th Cavalry, Philippine Scouts, which had suffered heavily in the preceeding day's action was ordered to fall back through the 71st's lines and regroup.

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[43] See infra, Appendix 1, map 1.

[44] Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, pp. 128-133.

[45] Ibid.

In the meantime the 91st Division, USAFFE Reserve, had been attached to the Northern Luzon Force. The 91st Combat Team was assigned to reinforce the 71st Division and to be in position by noon.

The Japanese attack began late in the morning when two battalions of the 47th Infantry Division hit the 71st Division near Sison. The Philippine Army held however, and the Japanese advance was stopped until noon by the 71st Division's Field Artillery. Undaunted the Japanese rushed in reinforcements and shortly after noon on the 23rd smashed into the 71st Division. The 71st Division of the Philippine Army broke and ran leaving their artillery unprotected. If the 91st Combat Team had reached its position in time the line might have held, but they were held up by air attacks. The Japanese secured their objectives by 7:00 p.m. that night.[46]

General MacArthur failed in his attempt to apply his basic law of warfare - the greatest force with the greatest possible speed at the enemy landing area. In fact the defenders failed to offer even token resistance at the beaches. The whole strategic plan upon which MacArthur relied so heavily had failed even before the heavy fighting took place. He informed Washington that 80 to 100,000 men had landed - twice the actual amount. He then stated that on the island of Luzon the defense forces numbered only

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[46]Ibid., pp. 137-138.

40,000 men in partially equipped units and that this "enormous tactical discrepancy" would force him to withdraw to Bataan and Corregidor were he would hold out until the end.[47]

The communique was most ironic. Since the General's arrival in the Philippines he had predicated his strategy on the premise, proven he believed by the failure of the Gallipoli Campaign in World War I, that it would be impossible to land on a defended beach without taking enormous casualties. MacArthur had scoffed at War Plan Orange Three. Yet he was forced to adopt it and so he ordered the withdrawl into Bataan.

After thirteen days the Philippine Army and the Far Eastern Air Force were in a shambles. Then the main invasion began. Despite the bravado about defeating the enemy on the beaches and the build up of supplies on Luzon, only a token force opposed the major Japanese landing. When that landing occurred at Lingayen as expected, the defending forces were spread so thinly around the gulf that the Japanese were able to destroy each unit piecemeal. The failure to obtain cooperation with the Navy, whose twenty-nine submarines might have created havoc with the Japanese transports, was astounding. The first thirteen days of the war in the Philippines was a nightmare which left everyone in a state of shock. Despite several hours warning, senior officers permitted the entire strategic air force to be destroyed on the gound. Landings

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[47]Unpublished Message from General MacArthur to the War Department, December 22, 1941, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

by the Japanese went unopposed or undetected. The major landing came where it was anticipated, but it was met only by an undermanned headquarters company. The entire invasion force came into effective submarine range after high level planners had had thirteen days to convince the Navy to patrol the expected invasion area. After 21 December 1941, the fate of the Philippines was only a matter of time.

CHAPTER IV

WAR PLAN ORANGE THREE IS IN EFFECT

The rout of the Philippine Army around Sison and the capture of that town opened the road to the Japanese objective -- Manila. More important, however, the fall of Sison ended the strategy of attempting to defeat the enemy on the beaches. On the evening of 23 December 1941, USAFFE Headquarters informed all field commanders: "War Plan Orange Three is in effect."[1] All forces then began a withdrawal down the island of Luzon to the Bataan Peninsula.

Implementation of War Plan Orange Three so late in the campaign was a futile effort to gain time. The subsequent withdrawal and the defense on Bataan did two things. First, it revealed the failure of MacArthur's original plan to defend the Philippines on the beaches and second it showed the inadequacies of the Philippine Army.

War Plan Orange Three depended upon a successful withdrawal to the Bataan Peninsula and a store of supplies for the defenders. Although General Marshall had been as helpful as possible in the shipments of supplies to the Philippines, the entire relief effort was not to be completed

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[1]Jonathan M. Wainwright and Robert Considine, ed., General Wainwrights Story (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1946), p. 36.

until March 1942.[2] Thus, there were never ample stores in the Philippines to support the large forces that MacArthur had assembled for the defense of the archipelago. Furthermore the supplies that had arrived were scattered throughout the Islands. No stockpile was accumulated for a siege on the Bataan Peninsula.

MacArthur must have had some inkling of the forthcoming withdrawal to Bataan as early as 10 December. On that date at 12:00 noon he ordered the Philippine Army to destroy all its stores.[3] That message was followed by another on 15 December to Visayan-Mandanao Force:

> Ensure that preparations are complete for the destruction of oil stock particularly at Cebu, Iloilo, Surigao and Tagaloan. La Union and Baguio mining areas to be completely destroyed including tanks prior to any definite threatened enemy occupation. All useful military supplies including transportation and oil supplies must be denied the enemy by evacuation or destruction.[4]

Thus, even before the main Japanese landing MacArthur was laying the groundwork for the withdrawal to Bataan, but the decision was too late to forestall the destruction of supplies that would be needed for a long siege on the peninsula. Thus, MacArthur had implemented a plan that was foredoomed.

On 24 December MacArthur moved his headquarters from

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[2]For a list of tenative arrival dates of supplies see supra, Chapter II, pp. 43-44.

[3]G-3 Journal, December 10, 1941, DMMA, Box 179.

[4]Report of the Visayan-Mindanao Force, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2, p. 26.

Manila to the island of Corregidor in Manila Bay. He also ordered General Wainwright to place his Northern Luzon Force along a line north of the town of San Fernando in Pampanga Province and then to withdraw to lines D-1 through D-5.[5] Those lines had been prepared prior to the outbreak of the war and were separated by a night's march. The lines took advantage of natural obstacles and the terrain. The Northern Luzon Force was to hold this zone as long as possible and allow the Southern Luzon Force to withdraw and permit Bataan to be readied for a protracted siege.[6]

A delaying action of this type under heavy enemy pressure is probably one of the most difficult in warfare. It calls for extreme sacrifice by troops who require training, determination, and ability to execute maneuvers with precise timing. Unfortunately Wainwright's troops had none of these attributes. The majority of his infantry had three to four weeks of training and his combat engineers had none. His field artillery had never fired a practice round before the war, and in the early days of the campaign they could only point their guns in the general direction of the enemy and pull the lanyard. To further complicate an already impossible situation, communications relied mainly on the local telephone

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[5]See infra, Appendix I, map 2.

[6]Louis Morton, The U. S. Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 168.

system.[7]

By 31 December 1941 the Northern Luzon Force was precariously holding line D-5. Despite the enormous difficulties, the left and center of General Wainwright's forces had withdrawn with moderate success, but his right flank was in imminent danger of collapse. The 21st Infantry Regiment of the 21st Division, reinforced by the 1st Battalion held Bamban, a small town located forty miles north east of the main battle line on Bataan. Facing these units were the 3rd Battalion of the 9th Infantry and the Kanno Detachment supported by the 8th Field Artillery Regiment. On the right of Wainwright's lines, where his weakest elements were concentrated, was the Japanese 48th Division supported by two regiments of tanks.[8]

Simultaneous with Wainwright's withdrawal from the north General MacArthur ordered the Southern Luzon Force to withdraw past Manila and then link up with the Northern Luzon Force for the withdrawal into Bataan.[9] The Japanese, in an attempt to strike Manila from the south and link up with their forces moving down from Northern Luzon, landed on 24 December at Lanon Bay, some eighty miles southeast of Manila. Thus, Japanese forces consisting of the 2nd Battalion and the 20th Infantry Division wereadvancing in two columns toward

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[7]Wainwright, Wainwright's Story, p. 81.

[8]Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, p. 188-189.

[9]See infra, Appendix I, map 3.

Manila. General Jones skillfully evaded the Japanese however, and successfully joined Wainwright. On 2 January 1942 the Northern and Southern Luzon Forces were on the Bataan Peninsula.[10]

The majority of the troops making the withdrawal were Philippine Army units, and their performance even before that major operation was less than admirable.[11] The Chief of Staff of USAFFE received complaints about the quality of guards at the few remaining airfields. During an air raid on 15 December, the alert was never given and the machine gun that was supposed to provide anti-aircraft protection was unable to fire due to faulty positioning. Furthermore, the troops detailed to guard the fields left within fifteen minutes of their assignment.[12] The commanding general of the Southern Luzon Force was reprimanded by the USAFFE staff because his self-propelled 75 mm gun mounts were not placed properly.[13] In the Visayan-Mindanao Force, composed entirely of Filipinos, an American officer made the following comment:

> Discipline was a problem. Many of our officers and non-commissioned officers conceived the idea of commandeering things on their own. They would stop cars and search and take out equipment they

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[10]Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, pp. 193-195.

[11]For a list of units composing the various forces see infra, Appendix II.

[12]Telephone message from Colonel Mielenz to Chief of Staff, December 15, 1941, DMMA, Box 179.

[13]Memorandum from Artillery Section to Chief of Staff, December 17, 1941, DMMA, Box 179.

felt they needed.[14]

The poor communications in the Visayan-Mindanao Force created problems that were not covered in military textbooks. Runners were sent out with messages but they never returned. Finally officers were dispatched but many of them also never returned.[15]

General MacArthur organized the Bataan Defense Force on 6 January 1942 in Field Order Number 1. He formed the I and II Corps and placed them under the command of Generals Wainwright and Parker. These corps were to defend the Bataan Peninsula exclusive of the service area and prevent any Japanese attack along a line from Mabatang to Mount Matib. In addition, a reserve battle line was established from Pandan Point to Bagao. I Corps under Wainwright was responsible for the western sector of the Peninsula while Parker's II Corps was to defend the eastern sector of the peninsula. A reserve force was to be formed from the Philippine Division, and each defense was to be handled by 155 mm guns properly located by the chief of artillery.[16] MacArthur had little choice in the placement of his defensive forces on the Bataan Peninsula. His troops had retreated into dense jungle and mountainous terrain with natural obstacles that both aided and hindered the defenders. There was no room for retreat

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[14]U. S. Army Historical Research Collection, The Bradford G. Chynoweth Papers, Army War College, Carlisle, Pa., p. 3.

[15]Ibid., p. 10.

[16]Field Order Number 1, January 6, 1942, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

except down the peninsula and eventually into the sea. The untrained troops of the Bataan Defense Force would ultimately hold out for four bitter months.

To bolster morale among his army, General MacArthur sent the following message to his troops:

> Help is on the way from the United States. Thousands of troops and hundreds of planes are being dispatched. The exact time of their arrival is unknown as they will have to fight their way through Japanese attempts against them. It is imperative that our troops hold out until reinforcements arrive.
>
> No further retreat is possible. We have more troops then they have thrown against us; our supplies are ample and a determined defense will defeat the enemy's attack.
>
> It is a question now of courage and determination. Men who run will merely be destroyed but men who fight will save themselves and their country.
>
> I call upon every soldier in Bataan to fight in his assigned position, resisting every attack. This is the only road to salvation. If we fight, we will win; if we retreat we will be destroyed.[17]

The Commanding General directed every commander to read that message to his men. The need for such a message to boost morale had been apparent since the beginning of the campaign, but the letter did not have the desired effect on the troops. USAFFE Headquarters dispatched another message the following day on the subjects of fatigue and loose talk. MacArthur reprimanded unit commanders for sending in reports that their troops were tired. He declared

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[17]Unpublished Message from General MacArthur to all Corps and Divisional Commanders, Janaury 17, 1942, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

that after long years of experience it was his belief that what was called fatigue was in fact a lack of "determination and resoluteness on the part of commanders." Furthermore, all unit commanders were to punish any personnel who spread talk concerning the excellent potentialities of the enemy.[18]

On 17 January another message noted that fifty percent more rations were being distributed than the amount of troops on Bataan. Since rations were issued on the basis of strength reports, some units were obviously padding their reports. Furthermore it was noted that existing stocks of food were not being properly distributed, and in some cases they were being forcibly diverted from the units that they were intended for. In addition, some unit commanders were not turning over vehicles to the motor pool. To correct these problems MacArthur ordered the inspector-general to investigate the complaints and to press charges against individuals where charges could be sustained.[19]

Fighting a protracted defense with untrained troops was difficult. A stout spirit of resoluteness was needed among the troops and in many cases that was lacking. The

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[18]Unpublished Message from General MacArthur to all Corps and Divisional Commanders, January 18, 1942, DMMA RG2, Box 2.

[19]Unpublished Message from General MacArthur to all Unit Commanders, January 17, 1942, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2, pp. 1-2.

The situation was further complicated when many unit commanders lost control over their men. To correct that problem the General ordered that any officer who did not meet fully the standards of field campaign would be relieved from his assignment and sent to USAFFE headquarters for disposition.[20]

Some units of the Philippine Army performed admirably in the campaign, but their performance was directly related to the amount of training they had received before the war. For example, the 1st and 4th Regiments, formed with Philippine Constabulary personnel, performed very well. Likewise the field artillery composed of the cadets from the Philippine Military Academy, acquitted themselves in a very professional manner.[21] However, the performance of the Philippine Army as a whole was not very good. In the Visayan-Mindanao Force the 61st Field Artillery voluntarily gave up their beach positions, which had not been attacked, and exposed the right flank of the 103rd Infantry Regiment.[22]

The time of the General Staff, as in the early days of the campaign, was taken up by matters that could have been handled by others. The duties of the General Staff were many. On 17 January 1942 the Chief of Staff's journal read

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[20]Ibid.

[21]Unpublished Memorandum from Headquarters, 2nd Regiment January 7, 1942, DMMA, Box 179.

[22]The Visayan-Mindanao Report, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2, p. 56.

in part as follows:

> 9:20 a.m. Directed air officer to land plane on old Pilar Field and go out again in twenty minutes; purpose to deceive enemy into bombing unused field. Ordered certain air reconnaissance and protection during relief of the 91st Division by the 31st Division.
> 10:40 a.m. Reported on various phases of the situation to General MacArthur, mentioned that a check was being made into delay of the Philippine Division to execute the movement ordered.
> 3:05 p.m. Directed G-2 to make request of the Navy for detailed reconnaissance of the Ternater-Nais Area.
> 3:10 p.m. Phone call from Brigadier General Parker.[23]

The massive amount of communications that had to be handled by a small number of people created confusion and delay in the field. For example, during the withdrawal the Southern Luzon Force had to submit requests to USAFFE for the movement of artillery. It requested permission to move two 155 mm guns of the 86th Field Artillery to cover the approach to Atimonan. At first the General Staff denied the request and later changed its mind. However, by the time the field commander received the change of orders from USAFFE the situation in the field had changed and the permission to move the artillery came too late.[24]

The staff not only acted on matters of a tactical nature however. Matters large and small were filtered to higher authorities for their perusal and decision. USAFFE had to

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[23]Chief of Staff's Journal, January 17, 1942, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2, p. 40.

[24]Report of the Southern Luzon Force, 98-USFI-0.0 RG 407, The National Archives, p. 9.

bear the burden of issuing training memorandums to troops in the field. On 22 January for example, a memorandum chastised field artillery units for failure to comply with the field manual regulations that governed the care and maintenance of their artillery pieces.[25] Training problems were still evident in late January when large amounts of duds were reportedly found in the ammunition. Investigation by a member of the General Staff revealed that virtually untrained Filipino troops, ignorant of the difference, were throwing dummy practice hand grenades at the Japanese.[26]

To deal with the numerous problems plaguing the front line units, MacArthur issued a memorandum which reprimanded all senior officers for using so many qualified officers on staff duty. By curtailing the number of staff officers, the more experienced officers would be free to take command of the front line units. It was hoped that this would help mitigate some of the problems that were caused by untrained officers.[27]

Some units of USAFFE were so decimated that they bore little resemblance to their original composition or strength. The General Staff constantly faced the problem of reorganizing

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[25]Unpublished Memorandum from Colonel Carl H. Seals to All Field Artillery Units, January 22, 1942, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

[26]G-3 Journal, January 31, 1942, DMMA, Box 179.

[27]Memorandum from Colonel Carl H. Seals to Corps, Sub-Sector and Divisional Commanders, February 3, 1942, DMMA, Box 179.

units. On 26 January USAFFE formed the 27th Bombardment Group from the 48th Material Squadron, 17th Squadron, 91st Squadron and the 2nd Observation Squadron.[28] That same day it also formed the 1st Provisional Military Police Company.[29] But despite the attempts to stay abreast of the fluctuating strengths of units, many were formed without the permission or knowledge of the General Staff. In some cases men were detached from their units by an officer or non-commissioned officer and sent to other units on the basis of verbal orders.[30] Such maneuvers by subordinates presented great difficulties to the General Staff since tactical directives were formulated on the basis of unit strength and designations.

Again and again inadequate training proved to be the bete noire of the campaign. On 1 February 1942 General Segundo, the former G-3 officer who was the harshest critic of the defense plan in 1939, made the following report to USAFFE:[31]

> General Segundo attempted himself and with the aid of chaplins to get his men to see why they had to stand and fight. All attempts in this direction had no apparent results. Following this, personal pleas to officers and the men

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[28]General Order No. 13, January 26, 1942, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

[29]General Order No. 15, January 27, 1942, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

[30]G-3 Journal, February 3, 1942, DMMA, Box 179.

[31]See supra, Chapter I, pp. 30-31.

> had the same results. As a last resort kicking and slapping were employed but still the troops sought cover upon subsequent firing.[32]

Segundo's memorandum was written in the third month of the war and reveals that many men could not be persuaded to fight despite their desperate position. Furthermore, this report by a Filipino officer illustrates that no amount of pleading or force could take the place of training that had not been accomplished before the war.

In a letter to General Marshall in January, MacArthur revealed the seriousness of the situation:

> Heavy fighting has been raging all day. The enemy has been repulsed everywhere. He seems finally to have adopted a policy of attrition. My losses during the campaign have been very heavy and are mounting. They own approximate thirty-five percent of my entire force and some divisions have registered as high as sixty percent. ... I intend to fight to the complete destruction of my command.... I wish to take this opportunity while the army still exists and I am still in command to pay tribute to the magnificent service it has rendered. No troops have done so much with so little. I bequeath to you the charge that their fame and glory be duly recorded by their countrymen. In the case of my death I recommend that my Chief of Staff, Sutherland, be designated as my successor.[33]

MacArthur cannot be accused of exaggerating the difficulties that he and his men faced. As February waned, heavy casualties forced the 11th and the 12th Divisions to be disbanded and the remaining personnel to be sent to other

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[32]G-3 Journal, February 3, 1942, DMMA, Box 179.

[33]Unpublished letter from General MacArthur to General Marshall, January 1942, DMMA, RG 2, Box 2.

units. Units bore little resemblance to their initial strength and composition, as officers and non-commissioned officers were killed many of the regular U. S. Army troops were transferred to the Philippine Army divisions. Thus, unit designations ceased to have any meaning.

The Abucay Line for example was held by the 75th Infantry consisting of two Regiments of Philippine Scouts and one regiment of U. S. Regulars. In support of the 75th were two batteries of 75 mm guns and one battery of 2.95 mountain guns. The unit was responsible for the defense of a front and an exposed flank. However, many of their officers and non-commissioned officers were sent to Philippine Army units and their ranks were bolstered by adding Philippine Army personnel.[34]

The defenders of Bataan fought under miserable conditions. Colonel Irwin, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, G-3, described the hospital conditions as "deplorable." Thirty patients shared one bedpan and sanitation was almost or completely neglected. Inadequate food retarded recovery. Soldiers discharged from the hospital for return to active duty had to pay a civilian five pesos in order to retrieve their weapons.[35] Conditions in the field were even worse. At the opening of the campaign the quartermaster had to

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[34]H. K. Johnson, "Defense Along the Abucay Line," Military Review, February 1946, 51-52.

[35]G-3 Journal, February 25, 1942, DMMA, Box 179.

feed 106,000 people, including 26,000 civilians with rations designed to feed that number for a thirty day period. In February the ration was cut to thirty ounces per man per day, and by March the rations were cut to fourteen and one-half ounces per man per day. Subsistence was maintained by eating monkeys, dogs, carabao and iguanas. The food problem was complicated by bands of mauraders who held up the food columns going to front line units. The food deficiences led to muscle waste, night blindness, diarrhea, dysentery and beriberi. Malaria, which was normally kept under control in the army, became a scourge since there was little or no quinine available. In March malaria reached a thousand cases per day.[36]

The end of the Philippine Campaign was only a matter of time, and the War Department grew concerned that one of America's foremost generals might fall into enemy hands. Therefore, President Roosevelt ordered General MacArthur, despite the latter's objections, to leave the Philippines. The order was carried out on 11 March 1942. The Japanese began their final assault on Bataan on 3 April and General King surrendered his forces on 9 April. Corregidor fell on 6 May 1942 and with its surrender U. S. Army resistance in the Philippines officially ended.[37]

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[36]Louis Morton, "The Battling Bastards of Bataan," Military Affairs, Summer 1951, 108-109.

[37]Ibid., p. 113.

The futility of the campaign was best captured in a poem entitled the "Battling Bastards of Bataan.:

> We're the battling bastards of Bataan;
> No mama, no papa, no Uncle Sam;
> No aunts, no uncles, no cousins, no nieces;
> No pills, no planes, no artillery pieces.
> .... And nobody gives a damn.[38]

Few troops in American History have had to endure the hardships that the Filipino-American forces did during the Philippine Campaign. They withdrew down the island of Luzon and held out for three months against starvation, disease, and the Japanese. Their sacrifice thwarted the Japanese plan for a speedy conquest of the Philippines and their courage inspired the American people in the dark days of World War II.

Despite the bravery and the sacrifice, there were too many cases of incompetence to ignore. The Philippine Army on the whole performed poorly - not because they were Filipinos but because they were poorly trained. The reader only need recall the brilliant and bold action of the 26th Cavalry, a Philippine Scout Regiment, to quash any blanket condemnation of the Filipinos as soldiers. Colonel Cynoweth pointed out in the Visayans, "the spirit was good and the desire was there but they just didn't know how to be good soldiers.[39] Another officer stationed in the

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[38] Ibid.

[39] The Chynoweth Papers, p. 10.

Visayans reported that the men "did not have enough training to instill in them a sufficient sense of discipline and duty." Furthermore, the problem of communications resulting from many dialects among the Filipinos and the incompetence of the officers and non-commissioned officers did little to remedy the situation.[40]

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[40]The Visayan-Mindanao Report, pp. 17-18.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The outcome of a campaign is seldom determined on the battlefield. The conclusion of a campaign is determined by a range of circumstances: logistics, timing, training, weather, and luck. The orchestration of these elements rests with the commanding general of the forces involved. Thus, the defeat of the Filipino and American forces in the Philippine Campaign rests with General Douglas MacArthur. To be sure, a lethargic Congress obsessed with placating a cantankerous public ignored the plight of the U. S. Army, and that in turn led to an under-equipped Philippine Army, Likewise, indecision on the part of the U. S. Army and faith in the ability of bombers to forestall an inevitable war in the Far East, led to a belated decision to reinforce the Philippines. Nevertheless, the burden of defeat rested in the hands of MacArthur.

General MacArthur's role in the debacle that occurred in the Philippine Campaign began with his arrival in that nation in October 1935. He had been given an opportunity that few men in history have been offered - the chance to create something from nothing. President Quezon had given him carte blanche privileges to form the Philippine Army. The General, fresh from his disappointments as Chief of

Staff of the U. S. Army, encouraged the Philippine Legislature to give the President of the Philippines substantial power in the affairs of the Philippine Army. Since MacArthur was handpicked by Quezon, the large power invested in the president meant that MacArthur's personal stamp of authority carried tremendous weight. Moreover, the reputation that the General brought to the Philippines was of immense proportions. His meteoric rise in the U. S. Army, his combat record in World War I, and his father's record as a soldier at home and in the Philippines placed MacArthur in the limelight.

As the Philippine Army developed according to MacArthur, his personal stamp became indelibly etched upon it; thus the success or failure of the Philippine Army was directly related to the success or failure of MacArthur. Although serious problems developed in the Philippine Army they were often ignored. The goal of defeating an enemy on the beaches became the major objective of his plan, yet the budget reductions slashed into the very ingredients that made that goal a possibility.

When MacArthur was placed in command of U. S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), he believed that the additional U. S. Army forces under his command when combined with the Philippine Army would enable him to defend the Philippines on the beaches. Thus, he discarded War Plan Orange Three. MacArthur's evaluation of the situation in

the Philippines is questionable. The Philippine Army was not ready to assume a major combat role, a fact that MacArthur should have been aware of. The Far Eastern Air Force, although a unit of some tactical importance, could have hardly been expected to deter a war or carry out a protracted conflict against enemy forces. Finally, the petty conflicts that occurred between MacArthur and Hart destroyed any possibility of Army-Navy cooperation.

When the war struck the Philippines on 8 December 1941, the Far Eastern Air Force was destroyed on the ground -- a victim of an incompetent commander. Although General MacArthur was ultimately responsible by virtue of his rank, he can not be accused of incompetence in the destruction of the bombers. However, the tactical decisions made by MacArthur after 8 December appear to have been influenced more by the General's desire for the fulfillment of the Philippine Defense Plan than by the reality of the situation. The destruction of the Far Eastern Air Force negated any possibility of offensive action by MacArthur. Moreover it gave the Japanese air superiority, which in turn jeopardised the long interior lines of communications on Luzon that MacArthur needed to defend the islands on the beach. Finally, the lack of air support and superiority caused Hart to withdraw the Asiatic Fleet from the Philippines, and destroyed any chance of a token resistance or a force in being to force the Japanese to act with caution.

The major landing took place on 21 December 1941. Although the Japanese landed at Lingayen Gulf, the Northern Luzon Force was stretched so thinly around the gulf's perimeter that the only resistence they encountered was an underequipped headquarters company. Although MacArthur's forces had the advantage of defending well known terrain and the ability to scout likely landing areas, the Japanese landing found them unprepared. In essence the defenders failed to exploit their advantages.

The only recourse was to fall back to Bataan, in other words, War Plan Orange Three. However, by the time that MacArthur put the old plan into effect, the ingredients for success were no longer available. Therfore, after 21 December 1941 the fall of the Philippines was inevitable.

MacArthur's record in the Philippine Campaign was not in keeping with some of his earlier and later accomplishments. The Philippine Army that he envisioned was too great a responsibility for the Philippine nation to assume in so short a time with such limited resources. A more workable solution might have been to create a small professional army in the first ten years and then to develop a large reserve as equipment became available. As it was, MacArthur only succeeded in half-training several thousand men. His confidence in the Filipino people and his own ability clouded his judgment of the situation. In the end he failed to

defend the Philippines because he based his ambitious plan of defense on an untrained and ill-equipped army.

APPENDIX 1: MAPS

Map [1]grom Vincent J. Esposito, ed., The West Point Atlas of American Wars, 1900-1953, Vol. II. (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1959), p. 119.

Map [2]Ibid., p. 120.

Map [3]Ibid., p. 121.

Map 1


HOMMA
PACIFIC OCEAN
L U Z O N
VIGAN
10 Dec.
12 Dec.
22 Dec.
22 Dec.
USAFFE Reserve
NORTH LUZON FORCE
SOUTH LUZON FORCE
From Ryukyu Is.
16 (-)
(7,000)
24 Dec.
18 Dec.
NAGA
BICOL PEN.
MANILA
CORREGIDOR
CATANDUANES
12 Dec.
Kimura
(2,500)
From Palau Is.
SOUTH LUZON FORCE
VISAYAN-MINDANAO FORCE
(3 Divisions)
MINDORO
BAGABAG
BAYAMBONG
BALER BAY
LAMON BAY
TAYABAS BAY
Phil.
(2,000)
(43,000)

Map 2



22 Dec
23 Dec
24 Dec
25 Dec
27 Dec.
28 Dec
29 Dec
29 Dec
D-1
D-2
D-3
D-4
D-5
(Planned)
NORTH LUZON FORCE
WAINWRIGHT
SOUTH
CHINA
SEA
DASOL BAY
ZAMBALES MTS
LUZON
SAN CARLOS
CAMILING
VICTORIA
SAN JOSE
RIZAL
GAPAN
PAPAYA
CAPAS
CONCEPCION
CAMP O'DONNELL
IBA
BOTOLAN
TIAONG
DOLORES
CLARK FIELD
FT STOTSENBURG
MT PINATUBO
ANGELES
MAGALANG
MT ARAYAT
ARAYAT
SAN FERNANDO
MEXICO
SAN FELIPE
SAN JOSE
SIBUL SPRINGS
BALIUAG
BALETE PASS
CARRANGLAN
PANTABANG
BURGOS
LUPAO
SAN QUINTIN
SAN NICOLAS
SANTA FE
SALACSAC
IMUGAN
CARABALLO MOUNTAINS
RCT (91)
71(-)
11(-)
26
21
91
48(-)
9
1


NORTH LUZON FORCE
WAINWRIGHT
FOURTEENTH
HOMMA
USAFFE
MacARTHUR
SOUTH LUZON FORCE
PARKER (JONES)
MAIN BATTLE POSITION
WAINWRIGHT
PARKER
MANILA BAY
LAGUNA BAY
LAMON BAY
Actual, 31 Dec
2 Jan
1-4 Jan
6 Jan.
7 Jan
31 Dec
26-28 Dec.
24 Dec
29 Dec
28 Dec
27 Dec
26 Dec
Began moving into position 15 Jan.
En route to Bataan, 24 Dec.
MANILA
PASAY
SAN FERNANDO
MEXICO
ARAYAT
SAN JOSE
SIBUL SPRINGS
UMIRAY
TAMALA
INFANTA
MONTALBAN
SAN MATEO
MARIKINA
ANTIPOLO
PINUGAY
TAYTAY
PASIG
SAMPALOC
TANAY
SAN DIEGO
SINILOAN
PAGSANJAN
OLUPAS
MAUBAN
LUCBAN
SAN PABLO
TAYABAS
LUCENA
ATIMONAN
TAGAYTAY RIDGE
TAGAYTAY
NASUGBU
CANLUBANG
MUNTINLUPA
NIELSON FIELD
OLONGAPO
SUBIC
DINALUPIHAN
SAN MARCELINO
MT PINATUBO
FT. STOTSENBURG
MORON
MAUBAN
MT SAMAT
IPO
MT ORO
ST MARIA
CORREGIDOR
CABALLO I.
EL FRAILE
CARABAO I.
LAKE TAAL
BALAYAN
NAGA

Map 3

APPENDIX 11

Sector	Troop Assignment	
	U. S. Army	Philippine Army
North Luzon Force	Force Hq and Hq Co (U.S) 26th Cavalry (PS) One bn, 45th Inf (PS) Btry A. 23d FA (PK) (PS) Btrys B and C, 86th FA (PS) 66 QM Troop (Pk) PS)	11th Division 21st Division 31st Division 71st Division (used as directed by USAFFE)
South Luzon Force	Force Hq and Hq Co (U.S.) Hq and Hq Btry, Btry A, 86th FA (PS)	41st Division 51st Division
Visayan-Mindanao Force	Force Hq and Hq Co (PS)	61st Division 81st Division 101st Division
Reserve Force	Hq, Philippine Dept Philippine Division (less one Bn) 86th FA (PS) less dets Far East Air Force	91st Division Hq, Philippine Army
Harbor Defenses	Headquarters 59th CA (U.S.) 60th CA (AA) (U.S.) 91st CA (PS) 92d CA (PS) 200th CA (U.S.), assigned to PCAC	

Louis Morton, The U. S. Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, D C: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 70.

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Research concerning the Philippine Campaign is handicapped due to the paucity of documents. The official records, and those of General MacArthur, were originally located in Manila. Following the withdrawal to Bataan and Corregidor the material was shipped under arduous conditions to Corregidor, and when possible by submarine to Australia, and finally to the Adjutant General's Office in Washington, D.C. Many boxes were destroyed in the Philippines and many more boxes disappeared. To further complicate matters material which definitely does exist has been misplaced by U. S. government archivists. It is unlikely that the official records will ever be fully catalogued since the interest in that period of American military history is not very strong.

Books about General MacArthur and the Philippine Campaign and his period as an adviser are, with the exception of D. Clayton James's The Years of MacArthur, Vol. I of little use for the historian. Most are biased to the extreme or ignore the Philippine Campaign. Material concerning the Philippine Campaign written by the participants usually concerned their ordeal as prisoners of war. Two exceptions are Wainwright's Story, which deals in part with the prewar period and is almost identical with Wainwright's

official report after the war. The Brereton Diaries cover the Period from October to December. The Diaries were written from Brereton's official diary which many historians believe has been tampered with. The three best volumes relating to the campaign are The Fall of the Philippines by Morton, Morison's History of the U. S. Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. III, and Craven and Cate's The U. S. Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. I.

Articles in periodicals are primarily concerned with the operation of various units. Newspapers before the war are valuable for public opinion, but when the war began they ceased to be a valuable tool for research.

The best source for material related to the Philippine Army, and on the Philippine Campaign may be found in two places, the MacArthur Archives and the Army War College. Record Groups 1 and 2 of the MacArthur Archives provide orders and letters related to the Philippine Campaign. Included also are many excellent clippings and articles from Philippine and American newspapers. The Army War College Archive and 400,000 volume library is an excellent source of material. Not only do they have personal papers but also the only collection of material in the U. S. related to the Philippine Army.

The best maps concerning the Philippine Campaign may be found in the West Point Atlas of American Wars, Vol. II.

Official Records

General Correspondence of the Secretary of War, Record Group 107, National Archives, Washington, D C.

Record Group 107 is primarily concerned with the reinforcement of the Philippines. Most of the material may be found in the MacArthur Archives.

Records of the U. S. High Commissioner of the Philippines, Record Group 126, Selected Documents related to General Douglas MacArthur, National Archives, Washington, D C.

Most of the material was of little value in the preparation of this thesis.

Records of the War Department, Record Group 165, National Archives, Washington, D C.

The War Department records are a varied mixture of material related to the Philippine Campaign ranging from requests for material to MacArthur's report of Brereton's handling of the Far Eastern Air Force before the war.

World War II Operations Reports, Record Group 407, The Adjutant General's Record Group 94. The Federal Record Center, Suitland Maryland.

Record Group 407 is a collection of the operation reports taken after the war from the officers who served in the Philippine Campaign. The most comprehensive report is the Visayan-Mindanao Report, however, all the material is of value. The Wainwright report of operations is almost identical to the book published by Wainwright in 1946. Unfortunately, the majority of the material deals with the American forces in the Philippines and neglects the Philippine Army units with the exception of the Visayan-Mindanao Report.

Personal Papers

H. H. Arnold Papers., Record Group 19, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives.

The Arnold papers were of little value in the preparation of this thesis. Most of the material related to this time period concerns the flights of the B-17 bombers to the Philippines.

The William and James Belote Collection. U. S. Army Historical Research Collection, Army War College, Carlisle, Pa.

The Belote Collection is a group of letters from such individuals as Admiral Chester Nimitz to obscure privates who served on Corregidor. The letters were used in the prepartion of the book, Corregidor: The Saga of a Fortress. The letters were a far more valuable research tool than the book.

The Clifford Bluemel Papers. U. S. Army Historical Research Collection, Army War College, Carlisle, Pa.

An excellent report of the operations of the 31st Division, Philippine Army from 18 November 1941 to 9 April 1942.

The William Hallock Braddock Papers. U. S. Army Historical Research Collection, Army War College, Carlisle, Pa.

The Braddock Papers include official and personal papers relating to Braddock's service as an army surgeon in the Visayan-Mindanao Force. Most of the material deals with the medical problems faced by the army in the campaign.

The William C. Braly Papers. U. S. Army Historical Research Collection, Carlisle, Pa.

Official and unofficial material related to Braly's service as operations officer of the 92nd Coast Artillery Regiment on Corregidor. Of particular interest is the official log Braly kept concerning the seige of Corregidor.

The Bradford Grethen Chynoweth Papers. U. S. Army Historical Research Collection, Army War College, Carlisle, Pa.

These papers include personal and official correspondence related to Chynoweth's carrer. An extremly important collection for this thesis since he was adviser to the 61st Division, Philippine Army. Chynoweth was also one of the more outspoken of the officers who served in the Philippines.

The George S. Grunert Papers. U. S. Army Historical Reseach Collection, Army War College, Carlisle, Pa.

The Grunert papers include official and private correspondence related to his service as Commanding General of the Philippine Department from 1940 to 1941.

Admiral Thomas C. Hart. Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, 1962.

The Hart reminscences cover the entire career of Hart from his days as a midshipman to retirement. He tends to ignore the more unpleasent circumstances related to the U. S. Naval action in the Philippines and his relationship with MacArthur.

The MacArthur Archives. MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, Va.

The MacArthur Archives is a huge collection of the personal papters of MacArthur and material related to his career separated in twenty-two record groups. Most helpful were groups one and two concerning the General's career as adviser to the Philippines and the Philippine Campaign.

The Clinton A. Pierce Papers. U. S. Army Historical Research Collection, Army War College, Carlisle, Pa.

Pierce was the commander of the 26th Cavalry Regiment. He was critical of MacArthur and his letters to his wife were very enlightening.

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Craven, Wesley F., and James L. Cate eds. Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942. Vol. I: The Army Air Forces in World War II. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948.

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