The Journal of Nietzsche Studies
In this article, I begin to develop Nietzsche’s scientific fictionalism in order to make headway toward resolving a central interpretive issue in his epistemology. For Nietzsche knowledge claims are falsifications. Presumably, this is a result of his puzzling view that truths are somehow false. I argue that Nietzsche thinks knowledge claims are falsifications because he embraces a scientific fictionalist view according to which inexact representations, which are false, can also be accurate, or true, and that this position is not inconsistent.
Original Publication Citation
Remhof, J. (2016). Scientific fictionalism and the problem of inconsistency in Nietzsche. The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 47(2), 238-246.
Remhof, Justin, "Scientific Fictionalism and the Problem of Inconsistency in Nietzsche" (2016). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 49.
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