The radical skeptic argues that I have no knowledge of things I ordinarily claim to know because I have no evidence for or against the possibility of being systematically fed illusions. Recent years have seen a surge of interest in pragmatic responses to skepticism inspired by C.S. Peirce. This essay challenges one such influential response and presents a better Peircean way to refute the skeptic. The account I develop holds that although I do not know whether the skeptical hypothesis is true, I still know things I ordinarily claim to know. It will emerge that although this reply appears similar to a classic contextualist response to radical skepticism, it avoids two central problems facing that response.
Original Publication Citation
Remhof, J. (2018). A new Peircean response to radical skepticism. Contemporary Pragmatism, 15(1), 15-22. https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01501002
Remhof, Justin, "A New Peircean Response to Radical Skepticism" (2018). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 68.