Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Recent research suggests that, regardless of the truth of libertarianism about free will, there appears to be a widespread belief among nonphilosopher laypersons that the choices of free agents are not causally necessitated by prior states of affairs. In this paper, I propose a new class of debunking explanation for this belief which I call ‘reasons-based accounts’ (RBAs). I start the paper by briefly recounting the failures of extant approaches to debunking explanations, and then use this as a jumping off point to articulate several alternatives, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each.
Original Publication Citation
Kissel, A. (2021). Thinking reasonably about indeterministic choice beliefs. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 51(8), 588-601. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.18
Kissel, Andrew, "Thinking Reasonably About Indeterministic Choice Beliefs" (2021). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 94.