Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2022
DOI
10.1016/j.comcom.2022.03.019
Publication Title
Computer Communications
Volume
189
Pages
205-220
Abstract
The recent devastating mission Cyber–Physical System (CPS) attacks, failures, and the desperate need to scale and to dynamically adapt to changes, revolutionized traditional CPS to what we name as Software Defined CPS (SD-CPS). SD-CPS embraces the concept of Software Defined (SD) everything where CPS infrastructure is more elastic, dynamically adaptable and online-programmable. However, in SD-CPS, the threat became more immanent, as the long-been physically-protected assets are now programmatically accessible to cyber attackers. In SD-CPSs, a network failure hinders the entire functionality of the system. In this paper, we present MystifY, a spatiotemporal runtime diversification for Moving-Target Defense (MTD) to secure the SD-CPS infrastructure. In this paper, we relied on Smart Grid networks as crucial SD-CPS application to evaluate our presented solution. MystifY’s MTD relies on a set of pillars to ensure the SDN controller resiliency against failures and attacks. The 1st pillar is a grid-aware algorithm that optimally allocates the most suitable controller–deployment location in large-scale grids. The 2nd pillar is a special diversifier that dynamically relocates the controller between heterogeneously configured hosts to avoid host-based attacks. The 3rd pillar is a temporal diversifier that dynamically detours controller–workload between multiple controllers to enhance their reliability and to detect and avoid controller intrusions. Our experimental results showed the efficiency and effectiveness of the presented approach.
Original Publication Citation
Azab, M., Samir, M., & Samir, E. (2022). “MystifY”: A proactive moving-target defense for a resilient SDN controller in software defined CPS. Computer Communications, 189, 205-220. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comcom.2022.03.019
Repository Citation
Azab, Mohamed; Samir, Mohamed; and Samir, Effat, ""MystifY": A Proactive Moving-Target Defense for a Resilient SDN Controller in Software Defined CPS" (2022). Electrical & Computer Engineering Faculty Publications. 326.
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/ece_fac_pubs/326
Included in
Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons, Information Security Commons, Theory and Algorithms Commons
Comments
This is an open access article under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).