Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2022
DOI
10.1016/j.hcc.2022.100067
Publication Title
High-Confidence Computing
Volume
2
Issue
3
Pages
100067 (1-6)
Abstract
Physical layer security has attracted lots of attention with the expansion of wireless devices to the edge networks in recent years. Due to limited authentication mechanisms, MAC spoofing attack, also known as the identity attack, threatens wireless systems. In this paper, we study a new type of MAC spoofing attack, the virtual MAC spoofing attack, in a tight environment with strong spatial similarities, which can create multiple counterfeits entities powered by the virtualization technologies to interrupt regular services. We develop a system to effectively detect such virtual MAC spoofing attacks via the deep learning method as a countermeasure. A deep convolutional neural network is constructed to analyze signal level information extracted from Channel State Information (CSI) between the communication peers to provide additional authentication protection at the physical layer. A significant merit of the proposed detection system is that this system can distinguish two different devices even at the same location, which was not well addressed by the existing approaches. Our extensive experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the system with an average detection accuracy of 95%, even when devices are co-located.
Original Publication Citation
Jiang, P., Wu, H., & Xin, C. (2022). A channel state information based virtual MAC spoofing detector. High-Confidence Computing, 2(3), 1-6, Article 100067. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hcc.2022.100067
Repository Citation
Jiang, Peng; Wu, Hongyi; and Xin, Chunsheng, "A Channel State Information Based Virtual MAC Spoofing Detector" (2022). Electrical & Computer Engineering Faculty Publications. 327.
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/ece_fac_pubs/327
ORCID
0000-0002-2178-6888 (Jiang)
Included in
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Commons, Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons, Information Security Commons
Comments
© 2022 The Authors.
This is an open access article under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) license.