Date of Award

Spring 5-2022

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts (MA)

Program/Concentration

International Studies

Committee Director

Richard Maass

Committee Member

Regina Karp

Committee Member

Jesse Richman

Abstract

The United States has a history of imposing its will on other countries via aggressive sanction regimes. In many of those regimes, U.S. policymakers note that support from European partner states is paramount to the regime's success. Over the past 20 years, the U.S. and its European partner state's interests have had relatively aligned, fostering cooperation and implementation of like-minded policies against target states. The end of paralleled interests left policymakers with a conundrum, which stemmed the research question of this study. What circumstances determine whether secondary sanctions or positive inducements are more effective in gaining European support for a U.S.-led sanctions regime? Utilizing Mill’s method of agreement (Mill 1869) and implementing the structured focused comparison case study approach (George and Bennett 2005) this study evaluates two cases in which European actors are being sought out to support a U.S.-led sanction regime. Both cases evaluated differ in various ways, however, contain two critical similarities, the U.S. need for partners state support and the unwillingness of the partner state to comply with the sanction’s regime. Through the comparative framework outlined this study argues that specific conditions can facilitate higher efficacy secondary sanctions over positive inducements, and vice versa, even when the partner state does not desire to comply with the overall sanction’s regime.

DOI

10.25777/52w0-q075

ISBN

9798834003441

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