Shaping American Foreign Policy A Game Theoretic Analysis of the United States'--North Korean Relationship

Date of Award

Spring 5-2015

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts (MA)

Department

Political Science & Geography

Program/Concentration

Graduate Program in International studies

Committee Director

Jesse Richman

Committee Member

Kurt Taylor Gaubatz

Committee Member

C. Ariel Pinto

Committee Member

Brandon Yoder

Call Number for Print

Special Collections LD4331.I45 G36 2015

Abstract

Over the past two decades, international relations researchers have developed increasingly nuanced game theoretic models to analyze interstate interactions. This study is a modem, case-specific Bayesian analysis that aims to make contributions to the scholarly analysis of conflict while offering practical advice to policymakers interested in relations between the United States and North Korea.

This study develops a new model of United States - North Korea relations in order to develop insights useful for understanding and hopefully refining, management of this relationship. This study utilizes the extensive form of a signaling game to model the interactions between both states. This method reveals insightful equilibria that expose nuances in the relationship. Finally, I empirically estimate the game using a set of comparative statics and player type estimates. Ultimately, the analysis suggests that North Korea aims to maintain an air of mid-range credibility while the United States aims to appear as hawkish as possible.

Rights

In Copyright. URI: http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s).

DOI

10.25777/2t7v-s424

ORCID

0000-0002-3819-5697

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