Date of Award
Fall 1997
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
History
Committee Director
Lorraine M. Lees
Committee Member
Willard C. Frank
Committee Member
Austin Jersild
Call Number for Print
Special Collections LD4331.H47 K37
Abstract
Although it seemed at the time that the destruction of a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over Soviet territory, slightly over two weeks prior to the Four-Power May 1960 Paris Conference had ended the summit, more deeply rooted historical differences ensured the meeting's failure. While President Dwight Eisenhower sought to ensure a national policy of defense sufficiency via his New Look strategy, he faced many internal and external critics who over-stepped or underutilized their positions. These included Allen Dulles, Christian Herter, Richard Bissell and Charles De Gaulle. Nikita Khrushchev faced internal division over his desires to achieve a new peaceful coexistence as well, and his own external challenges from Mao Tse-Tung. In the end, both leaders inability to manage the pressures they faced and ensure their domestic advisors adherence to their national strategy ended their attempts to cool the Cold War.
Rights
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DOI
10.25777/eser-3m35
Recommended Citation
Kapral, Vincent M..
"Eisenhower and Khrushchev at the Paris Summit: Anatomy of a Failure"
(1997). Master of Arts (MA), Thesis, History, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/eser-3m35
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/history_etds/163
Included in
Diplomatic History Commons, European History Commons, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Commons, United States History Commons