Date of Award

Spring 1983

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts (MA)

Department

History

Committee Director

Patrick Rollins

Committee Member

Darwin Bostick

Committee Member

D. Alan Harris

Call Number for Print

Special Collections LD4331.H47V36

Abstract

General Aleksei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin's leadership of the Russian Army in Manchuria in 1904-5 is examined. Fran the rear guard battles at the Yalu and Te-li-ssu through the engagement at Tieh-ling Kuropatkin's direction of the war reflected his belief that the Russian armies were of inferior strength. Whenever a serious threat appeared he retreated to the north to gain tine so that more reinforcement would be available to swell the size of his army. He believed that eventually this strategy would provide the preponderant force and eventual victory. But that proclivity to retreat, to be oriented to the defense rather than the offense, determined the outcome of the land war.

Rights

In Copyright. URI: http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s).

DOI

10.25777/r0p6-2t91

Download

Share

COinS