Date of Award
Summer 1997
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
History
Committee Director
Lorraine M. Lees
Committee Member
James R. Sweeney
Committee Member
Harold Wilson
Call Number for Print
Special Collections LD4331.H47 C625
Abstract
The Suez Canal Crisis of 1956 illustrated a potentially harmful dichotomy in Dwight D. Eisenhower's foreign policy goals. Eisenhower relied on the support of America's major allies, the British and the French to resist Communist influence throughout the world. In addition, Eisenhower felt it necessary to "win over" the developing nations of the world by supporting their anti-colonialist struggles and trying to bring the rising tide of nationalism into line with American policy. These two goals came into conflict during the Suez Crisis. By using various governmental sources as well as the memoirs of key figures in the governments of both the United States and its major allies, this study documents this rift between the United States, Great Britain and France, while noting the inability of the United States to win compensating gains in its relations with the developing nations of the Middle East.
Rights
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DOI
10.25777/3ve8-cd33
Recommended Citation
Colburn, Gregory D..
"The Eisenhower Administration and Allied Relations During the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956"
(1997). Master of Arts (MA), Thesis, History, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/3ve8-cd33
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/history_etds/89
Included in
Diplomatic History Commons, European History Commons, Islamic World and Near East History Commons, United States History Commons