Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2015

Publication Title

The Journal of Nietzsche Studies

Volume

46

Issue

2

Pages

229-238

Abstract

Nearly every common theory of truth has been attributed to Nietzsche, while some commentators have argued that he simply has no theory of truth. This essay argues that Nietzsche’s remarks on truth are better situated within either the coherence or pragmatist theories of truth than the correspondence theory. Nietzsche’s thoughts conflict with the correspondence framework because he believes that the truth conditions of propositions are constitutively dependent on our actions.

Comments

Copyright © 2015 The Pennsylvania State University Press.

This article is used by permission of The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Original Publication Citation

Remhof, J. (2015). Nietzsche's conception of truth: Correspondence, coherence, or pragmatist? The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 46(2), 229-238.

ORCID

0000-0002-7620-3184 (Remhof)

Download

Share

COinS