Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2018

DOI

10.1163/18758185-01501002

Publication Title

Contemporary Pragmatism

Volume

15

Issue

1

Pages

15-22

Abstract

The radical skeptic argues that I have no knowledge of things I ordinarily claim to know because I have no evidence for or against the possibility of being systematically fed illusions. Recent years have seen a surge of interest in pragmatic responses to skepticism inspired by C.S. Peirce. This essay challenges one such influential response and presents a better Peircean way to refute the skeptic. The account I develop holds that although I do not know whether the skeptical hypothesis is true, I still know things I ordinarily claim to know. It will emerge that although this reply appears similar to a classic contextualist response to radical skepticism, it avoids two central problems facing that response.

Comments

© 2018 Brill.

This is the author's pre-peer review copy of an article published in Contemporary Pragmatism. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01501002.

Brill allows authors to share their work in non-commercial online repositories and archives under certain conditions.

Original Publication Citation

Remhof, J. (2018). A new Peircean response to radical skepticism. Contemporary Pragmatism, 15(1), 15-22. https://doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01501002

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