Nietzsche on Monism About Objects

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2018

DOI

10.1111/sjp.12310

Publication Title

The Southern Journal of Philosophy

Volume

56

Issue

4

Pages

469-487

Abstract

This article concerns whether Nietzsche is sympathetic to monism about concrete objects, the heterodox metaphysical view that there is exactly one concrete object. I first dispel prominent reasons for thinking that Nietzsche rejects monism. I then develop the most compelling arguments for monism in Nietzsche’s writings and check for soundness. The arguments seem to be supported by the texts, but they have not been developed in the literature. Despite such arguments, I suggest that Nietzsche is actually not sympathetic to monism about objects—but his reasons for siding against monism are not at all obvious. The result should be a new understanding of some of Nietzsche’s fundamental ontological commitments.

Comments

© 2018 The University of Memphis

Original Publication Citation

Remhof, J. (2018). Nietzsche on monism about objects. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 56(4), 469-487. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12310

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