Can the US and Europe Contain Russian Power in the European Energy Market? A Game Theoretic Approach
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-2019
DOI
10.1016/j.esr.2019.100393
Publication Title
Energy Strategy Reviews
Volume
26
Pages
100393 (1-9 pp.)
Abstract
The Russian history of politicization of natural gas supplies led Europe to seek alternatives. US LNG is considered to be a viable alternative for Europe, which positioned the US as a strong competitor against Russia. In a game theoretic approach, we model this strategic decision-making process in simultaneous-move and sequential games. Our findings indicate a mixed strategy equilibrium: Europe cannot commit to diversify in the face of Russian advantages, and Russia cannot fully resist the temptation to politicize its supplies to Europe. The US might attempt to intervene in the European commitment problem through implementing sanctions on Russian gas sales. We find that in any case episodic Russian politicization remains likely in equilibrium.
ORCID
0000-0002-5420-0521 (Richman), 0000-0001-5660-5891 (Ayyilmaz)
Original Publication Citation
Richman, J., & Ayyilmaz, N. (2019). Can the US and Europe contain Russian power in the European energy market? A game theoretic approach. Energy Strategy Reviews, 26, 100393. doi:10.1016/j.esr.2019.100393
Repository Citation
Richman, Jesse and Ayyilmaz, Nurullah, "Can the US and Europe Contain Russian Power in the European Energy Market? A Game Theoretic Approach" (2019). Political Science & Geography Faculty Publications. 24.
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/politicalscience_geography_pubs/24
Comments
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).