Preventing Future Harm: Understanding Epistemic Injustice Against Children

Date

April 2022

Location

Schewel 208

Description

Epistemic injustice occurs whenever someone is regarded as lacking in fully fledged capacities as a knower, or someone possessing knowledge, because of some prejudice against the social group to which that person belongs. Epistemic injustice has been extensively discussed by feminist epistemologists, philosophers of race, and bioethicists. I argue that a distinct kind of epistemic injustice can be committed against children. Many arguments that question the occurrence of epistemic injustice against children are based on outdated assumptions about developmental psychology. While it is unreasonable to expect a child to have extensive factual knowledge, current research shows that can be believed when testifying to their own personal experiences under certain conditions. Further, I argue that it is distinctive from the other forms of harm against adults and that children must be treated with special consideration. Caregivers have a moral obligation to treat children as if they were competent epistemic agents so that children can develop their epistemic capacities. This has concrete practical implications in preventing childhood abuse and neglect.

Presentation Type

Presentation

This document is currently not available here.

Share

COinS
 

Preventing Future Harm: Understanding Epistemic Injustice Against Children

Schewel 208

Epistemic injustice occurs whenever someone is regarded as lacking in fully fledged capacities as a knower, or someone possessing knowledge, because of some prejudice against the social group to which that person belongs. Epistemic injustice has been extensively discussed by feminist epistemologists, philosophers of race, and bioethicists. I argue that a distinct kind of epistemic injustice can be committed against children. Many arguments that question the occurrence of epistemic injustice against children are based on outdated assumptions about developmental psychology. While it is unreasonable to expect a child to have extensive factual knowledge, current research shows that can be believed when testifying to their own personal experiences under certain conditions. Further, I argue that it is distinctive from the other forms of harm against adults and that children must be treated with special consideration. Caregivers have a moral obligation to treat children as if they were competent epistemic agents so that children can develop their epistemic capacities. This has concrete practical implications in preventing childhood abuse and neglect.