Defense Acquisition Research Journal
This article investigates the concept of developing a game theoretic framework that is based on the application of buyer and seller utility functions to support the bidding process in government acquisition. The results of a literature survey of utility function approaches, with potential to provide a suitable foundation to a game theory framework for acquisition, are presented. The utility function methods found most promising were further adapted and tested: the Best-Worst method, the Multi-Swing Method, and Functional Dependency for Network Analysis. To test the scalability of the approach, the Best-Worst method is applied to a larger problem to show the extensibility on a government-relevant scale. The future application of these utility models is in support of a game theory framework that is envisioned to move bidding contractors closer to the government’s preferred negotiation point and expedite the decision-making process in government acquisition during competitive source selection.
Original Publication Citation
Rosen, S., Horinek, K., Odeh, A., Servi, L., & Tolk, A. (2019). Foundations for a game theoretic framework for agile acquisition. Defense Acquisition Research Journal, 26(3), 250-289. https://doi.org/10.22594/dau.18-812.26.03
Rosen, Scott; Horinek, Kelly; Odeh, Alexander; Servi, Les; and Tolk, Andreas, "Foundations for a Game Theoretic Framework for Agile Acquisition" (2019). VMASC Publications. 88.