Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2016

Publication Title

The Journal of Nietzsche Studies

Volume

47

Issue

2

Pages

238-246

Abstract

In this article, I begin to develop Nietzsche’s scientific fictionalism in order to make headway toward resolving a central interpretive issue in his epistemology. For Nietzsche knowledge claims are falsifications. Presumably, this is a result of his puzzling view that truths are somehow false. I argue that Nietzsche thinks knowledge claims are falsifications because he embraces a scientific fictionalist view according to which inexact representations, which are false, can also be accurate, or true, and that this position is not inconsistent.

Comments

Copyright © 2016 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.

This article is used by permission of The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Original Publication Citation

Remhof, J. (2016). Scientific fictionalism and the problem of inconsistency in Nietzsche. The Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 47(2), 238-246.

ORCID

0000-0002-7620-3184 (Remhof)

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