Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2016

DOI

10.1007/s10670-015-9792-4

Publication Title

Erkenntnis

Volume

81

Issue

6

Pages

1243-1252

Abstract

Restall (Erkenntnis 79(2):279–291, 2014) proposes a new, proof-theoretic, logical pluralism. This is in contrast to the model-theoretic pluralism he and Beall proposed in Beall and Restall (Aust J Philos 78(4):475–493, 2000) and in Beall and Restall (Logical pluralism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006). What I will show is that Restall has not described the conditions on being admissible to the proof-theoretic logical pluralism in such a way that relevance logic is one of the admissible logics. Though relevance logic is not hard to add formally, one critical component of Restall’s pluralism is that the relevance logic that gets added must have connectives which mean the same thing as the connectives in the already admitted logic. This is what I will show is not possible.

Comments

This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Erkenntnis. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-015-9792-4

Original Publication Citation

Kouri, T. (2016). Restall’s proof-theoretic pluralism and relevance logic. Erkenntnis, 81(6), 1243-1252. doi:10.1007/s10670-015-9792-4

ORCID

0000-0001-6519-1723 (Kouri Kissel)

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