Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2016
DOI
10.1093/philmat/nkv041
Publication Title
Philosophia Mathematica
Volume
24
Issue
1
Pages
117-128
Abstract
Tim Räz has presented what he takes to be a new objection to Stewart Shapiro's ante rem structuralism (ARS). Räz claims that ARS conflicts with mathematical practice. I will explain why this is similar to an old problem, posed originally by John Burgess in 1999 and Jukka Keränen in 2001, and show that Shapiro can use the solution to the original problem in Räz's case. Additionally, I will suggest that Räz's proposed treatment of the situation does not provide an argument for the in re over the ante rem approach.
Original Publication Citation
Kouri, T. (2016). Ante rem structuralism and the no-naming constraint. Philosophia Mathematica, 24(1), 117-128. doi:10.1093/philmat/nkv041
ORCID
0000-0001-6519-1723 (Kouri Kissel)
Repository Citation
Kouri, Teresa, "Ante Rem Structuralism and the No-Naming Constraint" (2016). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 56.
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/philosophy_fac_pubs/56
Comments
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Philosophia Mathematica following peer review. The version of record:
Kouri, T. (2016). Ante rem structuralism and the no-naming constraint. Philosophia Mathematica, 24(1), 117-128. doi:10.1093/philmat/nkv041